







Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2009 with funding from  
Ontario Council of University Libraries





A

r



A silver tetradrachm in the  
 Münzkabinett of the Kaiser-Friedrich-  
 Museum, Berlin. The obverse  
 shows Athena's head.

# ANTIGONOS GONATAS

BY

WILLIAM WOODTHORPE TARN

138223  
—  
5.10

OXFORD  
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1913

HUMPHREY MILFORD

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK, TORONTO

MELBOURNE AND BOMBAY

TO  
HENRY JACKSON

O.M., LITT.D.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY  
OF CAMBRIDGE



## PREFACE

No special history of the Antigonids, or of any of them, exists, though Dr. Beloch years ago pointed out both the omission and the opportunity. The present work attempts to fill one part of the gap ; it purports to give, from 294 to 240 B.C., the history of Macedonia and Greece, treated in relation to one central figure. Such a scheme necessarily means that some things of importance are passed over lightly, while others, it may be of no greater importance, are elaborated at length : but I hope that the book has thereby secured a certain unity of purpose and treatment. No doubt it is against modern tendency to cast history round a kernel of biography, rather than to use history as the kernel of an essay on economics or sociology ; but the latter method of handling a subject appears to demand, among other things, that one shall first be sure of one's history, and during a large part of the third century this is notoriously not the case.

The only possible way of dealing with this period with any satisfaction to oneself would be by a series of disconnected essays. The attempt to string the fragmentary material together as a narrative is almost bound to fail ; for one is often compelled to write, not what one would, but what one can. But it may perhaps be some justification of the narrative form that so much here has still to be done merely in the way of arranging dry bones, and that the work may perhaps be of

some use to the writer who shall one day definitely clothe those bones with flesh and blood.

It is possible that the reader may think that too much has been made of the figure of Antigonos. I believe that nothing has been put down which cannot be justified from the sources ; but of course I claim to interpret the sources in the light of what is said in Appendix I, and to treat Aratos, for instance, as a hostile witness. Moreover (if I may refer to one matter specifically) we have, in Plutarch and elsewhere, the jetsam of what may once have been a considerable literature dealing with Antigonos' personality ; and as I cannot find that this jetsam, and its relation to contemporary philosophic literature, has ever been specially or fully studied, it may well be that in attempting to use it I have sometimes overshot the mark. I do not myself think that my picture of the king differs much from that in most German writers, save in greater detail ; but what does seem very possible is that I have made a somewhat nebulous figure too elaborate and distinct. But I feel this about much else in the book ; probabilities may sometimes be stated too dogmatically, from sheer weariness of the potential mood ; had I taken care to express, on every page, the exact amount of hesitation I have felt, the proper shade of reservation which each statement appeared to demand, the text would have been absolutely unreadable. I would rather enter here the general caution (unnecessary to scholars), that, in the later chapters especially, there is much which is mere working hypothesis, liable at any moment to be modified or abandoned in the light of some new inscription or more thoroughgoing analysis.

For this period as a whole, the labours of many scholars



have gradually evolved some sort of order out of chaos, and my debt to them is, naturally, correspondingly great. The mass of relevant books and articles is now very considerable, and one can only hope that too much of importance has not been overlooked. I have done my best to acknowledge my obligations as fully as is possible without writing a history of the literature of each section of the subject. It is, however, inevitable that one should occasionally put down as one's own thought what is really a mislaid memory of some one else's; and to any one thus piratically treated I tender full apology. But as one sometimes quotes one's predecessors only on the points where one disagrees, I desire here to acknowledge more explicitly the help derived from two works in particular. One, I need hardly say, is the third volume of Dr. Julius Beloch's *Griechische Geschichte*, one's indispensable base, my admiration for which increases every time I use it; the other, an earlier book, but surely one of the most stimulating of its kind ever written, is Professor Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's *Antigonos von Karystos*.

As some parts of this book cover the same ground as portions of Professor W. S. Ferguson's *Hellenistic Athens*, I ought perhaps to mention that this book was substantially completed before the appearance of the latter work, though it has had a thoroughgoing revision since, in the light both of Mr. Ferguson's book and of much else. But most of Mr. Ferguson's views had been accessible for some time in his numerous special studies. The recently published *I. G.* xi (ii) reached me while this book was in the press, in time to enable me to add some references, but not to recast the first page of Appendix XI, part of which the Introduction to that volume

has rendered superfluous. An important document, which appeared just as this book was going to press, is Herr A. Mayer's restoration of column V of the Herculanæan papyrus no. 399, Philodemos *περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν* (*Philol.* 71, 1912, pp. 211, 226), which bears on Antigonos' doings in 280-277; all I have been able to do is to indicate in addenda some of the questions it raises.

The genealogical tables are appended for the reader's convenience only. They are not, and are not meant to be, complete.

One word as to the spelling of Greek proper names. The wisdom of our fathers has so ordered the English language that any satisfactory system is, I think, impossible. I have adopted what I take to be the method put forward in vol. xv of the *Annual of the British School at Athens*, viz.: Greek words in Greek form (except *y* for *v* before a consonant), unless there be an English form. The question of course is, what is an English form; and here I have retained the traditional spelling of a few words that are hardly English, such as Aetolia, Cyclades, merely because of their excessive familiarity. Englishmen are said to love a compromise; but it may be doubted if any two will, in this respect, love quite the same one. In one case I have taken advantage of the existence of two forms, keeping Ptolemy for the royal house of Egypt and using Ptolemaios for others. For non-Greek names, such as Gallic, the Latin form is generally employed.

There remains only the pleasant task of acknowledging personal help. I owe a great debt of gratitude to the kindness of Professor Felix Dürnbach, of the University of Toulouse, who not only managed to find time to give me

much assistance and information with regard to the inscriptions from Delos, but also lent me copies of the material parts of the principal unpublished inventories, and enabled me to quote them by the numbering they will bear in *I. G.* xi. Some of them, but not the very important ones of Boulon, Menethales, and Akridion, have now appeared in *I. G.* xi (ii). I also desire to thank Professor R. Herzog, of the University of Basel, and Messrs. A. J. B. Wace and M. S. Thompson, for copies of unpublished inscriptions; Herr Dressel, Director of the Münzkabinett of the Kaiser-Friedrich Museum, Berlin, for a cast of the coin figured as frontispiece; Mr. A. M. Woodward for various suggestions and references; Mr. G. F. Hill for some very welcome help; Mr. D. G. Hogarth for some very valuable criticism; and Mr. Leonard Butler, of New College, Oxford, now sixth form master at Cheltenham College, for kindly undertaking the thankless task of reading the proofs and verifying a large number of references.

W. W. TARN.

MOUNTGERALD, DINGWALL,  
*December, 1912.*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . .	xii
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	I
CHAPTER I	
THE TEACHERS OF ANTIGONOS . . . . .	15
CHAPTER II	
THE EMPIRE OF DEMETRIOS ON LAND . . . . .	37
CHAPTER III	
THE EMPIRE OF DEMETRIOS OVER THE SEA . . . . .	72
CHAPTER IV	
THE FALL OF DEMETRIOS . . . . .	89
CHAPTER V	
ANTIGONOS AS PRETENDER . . . . .	110
CHAPTER VI	
THE COMING OF THE CELTS . . . . .	139
CHAPTER VII	
ANTIGONOS AND MACEDONIA . . . . .	167
CHAPTER VIII	
ANTIGONOS AND HIS CIRCLE . . . . .	223
CHAPTER IX	
THE RECKONING WITH PYRRHOS . . . . .	257
CHAPTER X	
THE FIRST WAR WITH EGYPT . . . . .	275
CHAPTER XI	
THE LOST YEARS . . . . .	311
CHAPTER XII	
THE SECOND STRUGGLE WITH EGYPT . . . . .	340

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

xi

## CHAPTER XIII

THE RECKONING WITH EGYPT . . . . .	367
------------------------------------	-----

## CHAPTER XIV

THE YOUNGER GENERATION . . . . .	392
----------------------------------	-----

## APPENDIX I

ONE VIEW OF THE SOURCES. . . . .	410
----------------------------------	-----

## APPENDIX II

ON SOME ATHENIAN ARCHONS . . . . .	415
------------------------------------	-----

## APPENDIX III

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE MONARCHIES ON LAND .	424
---	-----

## APPENDIX IV

THE SUPPOSED NEUTRALITY OF DELOS . . . . .	429
--	-----

## APPENDIX V

WHO FOUNDED THE LEAGUE OF THE ISLANDERS? . . .	432
--	-----

## APPENDIX VI

PAUSANIAS' ACCOUNT OF THE GALLIC INVASION . . .	439
---	-----

## APPENDIX VII

THE WORLD-POSITION IN 273 . . . . .	442
-------------------------------------	-----

## APPENDIX VIII

PLUTARCH, <i>PIRRHOS</i> , CHS. 27 TO 34 . . . . .	447
--	-----

## APPENDIX IX

THE DEATH OF DEMETRIOS THE FAIR . . . . .	449
---	-----

## APPENDIX X

THE SEA-STRENGTHS OF EGYPT AND MACEDONIA . . .	454
--	-----

## APPENDIX XI

DATING BY DELIAN FESTIVALS . . . . .	458
--------------------------------------	-----

## APPENDIX XII

THE DATES OF KOS AND ANDROS . . . . .	461
---------------------------------------	-----

## APPENDIX XIII

THE MACEDONIAN PROTECTORATE OF THE CYCLADES . .	466
---	-----

GENEALOGICAL TABLES . . . . .	473
-------------------------------	-----

ADDENDA . . . . .	477
-------------------	-----

INDEX . . . . .	479
-----------------	-----

## ABBREVIATIONS

(Most of the usual ones can be found in the list printed each year at the end of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, and are not repeated here.)

Arnim = *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, vol. i (1905), ed. H. von Arnim.

Beloch = Julius Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* (vol. iii, 1904).

*B. Ph. W.* = *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift*.

Bouché-Leclercq = A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides* (1903-7).

Ferguson, *Athens* = W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, 1911.

Ferguson, *Priests* = W. S. Ferguson, *The Priests of Asklepios* (1906, reprinted 1907).

Head<sup>1</sup>, Head<sup>2</sup> = B. V. Head, *Historia Numorum*, first and second editions (1887 and 1911; it is sometimes still necessary to quote the first edition for matter omitted in the second merely to gain space).

*I. J. G.* = *Recueil des Inscriptions juridiques grecques*, ed. R. Dareste B. Haussoullier, Th. Reinach.

*Journ. Intern.* = *Journal international d'archéologie numismatique*.

Kaerst = Julius Kaerst, *Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters* (vol. i, 1901; vol. ii, pt. I, 1909).

Klotzsch = C. Klotzsch, *Epirotische Geschichte bis zum Jahre 280 v. Chr.* (1911).

Kolbe, *Archonten* = W. Kolbe, *Die attischen Archonten von 293/2-31/30 v. Chr.* (1908).

*O. G. I.* = W. Dittenberger, *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*.

*P. W.* = Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*.

*R. É. G.* = *Revue des Études grecques*.

*R. Ph.* = *Revue de Philologie*.

Susemihl = F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit* (1892).

*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> = W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (2nd ed.).

Wilamowitz, *Antigonos* = U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Antigonos von Karystos* (*Philologische Untersuchungen*, iv, 1881).

*W. Kl. Ph.* = *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie*.

---

Polybios is cited according to Th. Büttner-Wobst's numeration in the Teubner edition. Classical texts as a rule from the Teubner edition. Diogenes Laertius from Huebner. Wilamowitz's *Griechische Literatur* from the first edition (the second was a reprint, and the third, enlarged, was not available to me in time).

## ✧ INTRODUCTION

No part of Greek history should come home to us like the third century B. C. It is the only period that we can in the least compare with our own ; indeed, in some ways it is quite startlingly modern. We meet with half the things that we ourselves do, half the problems that we ourselves know. The days of Salamis or of Sophokles are as remote from the men of that time as the days of Shakespeare or the Spanish Armada from ourselves. All the horizons have widened and opened out ; civilization pulsates with new life, and an eager desire to try all things. Almost all the barriers are already down. Men may think as they please, speak as they please, believe as they please. An astronomer who proclaims that the earth goes round the sun risks nothing worse from the orthodox than a few hard words. No man's religion is any one else's matter, save for a lingering feeling, occasionally translated into action by some Government, against any one who proclaims himself altogether an atheist, acknowledging no god at all. Amid the clash of creeds old and new, solicited alike by the philosophies of the West and the more intimate worships of the East, each man is free to choose his own guide, whether for this life or another.

But he is, as a rule, thinking rather of this life than of any other. For there is so much to be done ; nothing less than the conquest, material, social, intellectual, of a whole new world. In his desire to master that world, he shrinks from no effort, and he achieves. The dark places of the earth contract before him ; one language now takes him from the Rhone to the Indus, from the Caspian to the Cataracts. He measures the planet on which he lives ; he is taking the first tentative steps to reduce it to its true insignificance in the heavens. He despises its distances. A modern general might hesitate to raid Babylon from a base in Syria, as did



Demetrios ; a modern contractor might think twice about bringing five hundred fighting elephants overland from the Punjab to the Mediterranean, as did Seleukos. And while Pyrgoteles of Cyprus is building that triakonteres which no modern shipyard would care to try and reconstruct, a philosopher is asking how it would affect man, could he fly.

Socially, the man of the third century creates with both hands. His world, like ours, is a complex of states, big and little, almost all bound together by the tie of one dominant civilization. Asiatic peoples too are adopting that civilization ; Asiatic men are thronging to his universities. Every form of constitution shall be experimented with ; and the little orthodox republics see Kingship stand forth as a vital formative principle and Federalism take to itself new scope and activity ; see too, as we see to-day, an experiment in the combination of both. Here and there, timidly emerging from Federalism, and doomed to be stifled almost as soon as born, can be traced what looks like the germ of representative government itself. The balance of power has become a reality and a preoccupation ; and because the sea unites, every State turns its thoughts to the sea. The great land powers are taking eagerly to the water ; and the Governments are contending with each other in the provision of larger and ever larger warships. But while war at sea, with its triple risk of steel, fire, and water, is no less terrible than it has always been,—danger, ran the proverb, is the forward bench of the fighting galley,—war on land, though still half of the business of mankind, is gradually losing something of its pristine horror. The old rules indeed survive, but a strict application of them to the vanquished now raises fierce protest. Arbitration has taken on a new spirit, and is rapidly gaining upon war ; and though there is no Geneva Convention, there is a great and growing movement at work to exempt temple after temple and town after town from liability to attack, to create a series of centres of immunity. National and social antipathies are still plentiful enough and fierce enough ; but in their despite a few have already begun to preach the brotherhood of man. With the brotherhood of man comes the emancipation of woman ; queens apart, it



moves slowly as yet, but it moves; and no one will ever more openly defy more conventions than the well-to-do and respectable Hipparchia.

Intellectually, the movement is all toward reality, to get closer to actual life as lived by men, not in this or that compartment of their existence, but in every way possible. Imperfect as yet, and cumbered with much rubbish, naturally; but men's faces are set in the right direction. The best brains are at work on two very great things: one is the philosophy of conduct, of which something will have to be said later; the other is physical science. Science has indeed thrown wide her gates; her disciples are numerous and devoted; insatiable is men's thirst for the fact. There is everything to know, and some of it becomes known; it is but a few years since a third-century text-book was still used in English schools. And with science comes much else. There is a new outburst of poetry, pouring itself into many strange moulds and unaccustomed forms, but always with that one aim, to get closer to some aspect of life. The old formal oratory, the grand style, is passing away, as to-day; men have too much to do for set speeches. There are various schools of history, and much debate as to how it should be written; and if but few of its exponents are prepared to sacrifice everything to the truth, that too has a flavour, if not of to-day, at any rate of yesterday. Universities,—properly incorporated and endowed societies for the worship of the Muses,—are in full working order. Scholarship is already held in honour; here is Dryasdust,—Chalkenteros they will presently call him,—there the first Corpus of Inscriptions; the Homeric question shyly dawns on the sacrilegious Separatists. Expert wars with expert, and rejoices. In one sphere, philosophy, the popularizer is already at work, giving attractive lectures for those who have not the time, or the inclination, for real study, and preaching in all its glory the modern gospel of the short cut. It takes, at times, something of an effort to realize that this world is, after all, alien and far distant; a world in which our industrialism was replaced by slavery, in which no sea and few coasts were ever safe from the slave-raider, and half mankind lived a travesty of a life; a world in which, in place

of great machines, there were giants, men grown so great that their fellow men could only express it by worshipping them as gods ; strangest perhaps of all, a world of which the rulers, rough soldiers whose thrones had been won by their own or their fathers' swords, generally held wealth or long descent in less honour than intellectual distinction.

\* The record of this world is a wreck, the worst wreck in all Greek history. For eighty years we have no attempt at a continuous narrative, unless such wretched stuff as Justin's compilation can be dignified by that name ; for large sections of these eighty years we have no attempt at a narrative at all. Even the epigraphical material is sometimes wasted through utter uncertainty where to place it. But it was not always so. If some part of that eighty years seems never to have been covered by any really good narrative, so far at least as concerns Macedonia, for another part of it the material was once abundant and of good quality, indeed almost uniquely so.<sup>1</sup> It still remains for some one to investigate the causes which have led to this very complete destruction of the history of the third century, and to ascertain whether it may not be the case that some part of the loss is not entirely due to accident.

— Of the third-century kings, Antigonos Gonatas is undoubtedly the most interesting. For he was a good deal more than the second founder of the Macedonian monarchy, the head of the dynasty that for over a century shielded Greek civilization from the flood of northern barbarism, till Rome was able and willing to take up the work. He was the one monarch before Marcus Aurelius whom philosophy could definitely claim as her own, and to whom she could and did look to translate into fact what she envisaged as theory. And the curious thing about Antigonos' reign is, that the scraps and fragments of our tradition, mutilated as it is, do nevertheless combine, not into larger scraps and fragments, but into a sort of definite whole ; and it is as a whole that the attempt is made here to represent it. This is the sufficient reason for treating it by itself ; in any general history of the period its unity must, and does, become obscured. It is, too, only of very recent years

<sup>1</sup> See App. I.

that new material from Delos has enabled us to form any idea, however imperfect, of this reign in its relations to the sea.

The natural starting-point is the year 294, when Demetrios became king of Macedonia, rather than the year 288, when he was expelled from that country. But Antigonos' own activity dates from before 294; and as regards the relations of the Antigonid dynasty to the sea, the events of the years 315 to 245 form one connected whole. It may be advisable, therefore, while treating 294 as the starting-point, to give here a very brief outline of the fortunes of Antigonos' house from the death of Alexander; as regards the sea, certain points in this outline will have to be filled in later.

Alexander died at Babylon in the summer of 323. He left no heir to his huge empire, but his queen Roxane was expecting the birth of a child: a regency was formed under Perdikkas, to whom he had, when already past speech, given his ring. Owing to the action of the army, the kingship became vested jointly in two persons, Philip Arrhidaios, an illegitimate half-witted son of Philip II, and the son, Alexander, to whom Roxane soon afterwards gave birth. Antipatros, the contemporary and trusted minister of Philip II, continued to govern Macedonia and so much of Greece as was Macedonian, as he had done during Alexander's lifetime; while Krateros, the best loved of Alexander's generals, received the special office of 'protector of the kingdom of Philip', a post of which the meaning is obscure. But irreconcilable differences lost no time in showing themselves among the generals. Perdikkas made himself unpopular; and matters came to a head in the autumn of 322, when Antigonos the One-eyed, satrap of Phrygia, had to fly for his life from the regent.

Antigonos, like Antipatros, belonged to an older generation than that of Alexander. The tradition says that he was not even a member of the Macedonian aristocracy, but was a yeoman farmer;<sup>2</sup> and the tradition may be true, for, in

<sup>2</sup> Ael. *V.H.* 12, 43, αἰτουργός; cf. Diod. 21, 1, ἐξ ιδιώτου γενόμενος δυνάστης, which shows that he was *not* of illustrious birth, as Droysen (*Hellenismus*<sup>2</sup> 1, 87) supposed.

spite of his enormous ability, Alexander had not taken him with him to the conquest of Asia, but had left him behind as governor of the not particularly important province of Phrygia. Antigonos now fled to Antipatros; and when, in the spring of 321, Krateros fell in battle, Antigonos sought and obtained for his son Demetrios the hand of Antipatros' daughter Phila, Krateros' widow. Of this marriage, which must have taken place in the winter of 321/0, were born two children; a son Antigonos, called Gonatas, and a daughter Stratonike.

On the murder of Perdikkas in the spring of 321 Antipatros became regent of the empire. He meant honestly by the kings, and had them brought to Europe; to every one else, unless it was to the Greek Eumenes, who now led the remains of Perdikkas' party, they were only pawns in the game. In the summer of 321 Antipatros made a new distribution of provinces, and, among other things, restored Antigonos to his Phrygian satrapy, considerably enlarged, with the commission to carry on the war against Eumenes; this gave Antigonos control of a large army. Antipatros himself died in 319, a blow to Alexander's house that nothing could make good. He nominated as his successor in the regency Polyperchon, a good soldier but an incapable statesman; Antipatros has been blamed for his selection, but in fact he had little choice, for the ambitions of the more capable men were too manifest. The struggle between Antigonos and Eumenes, who was supported by Polyperchon in Macedonia, was waged with varying success, and lasted till the winter of 316, when Antigonos captured Eumenes and had him executed; this success left Antigonos at the head of a devoted army of veterans and in the strongest single position of any one of the Successors. He practically controlled Asia from the Hellespont to India.

Great changes had meanwhile taken place in the position of the royal family in Europe. Antipatros' son Kassandros had successfully established himself in Macedonia, and Philip Arrhidaios, or rather his ambitious wife Eurydike acting in his name, had in 317 purported to depose Polyperchon from the regency and to nominate Kassandros in his place. There-



upon Polyperchon called to his aid Alexander's terrible mother, the Epeiros Olympias, who had been kept in the background while Antipatros lived. She saw in Philip's existence an insult to herself and a threat to her grandson, whom she was ready to champion. Her name was still a power in Macedonia; supported by Aiakides of Epeiros, she entered the country in Kassandros' absence; the Macedonians refused to fight against her, and she seized and murdered Philip and Eurydike and many of Kassandros' friends. But Kassandros was too strong for the coalition; he captured Olympias, together with Roxane and her son; and sentence passed by the army ended the old queen's life. It is said that the proud woman refused to plead her cause, and that Kassandros could find none to execute the sentence but the actual relatives of the men she had murdered.

Two tendencies had been clearly manifested among the Successors from the beginning. There were those who, like Ptolemy, the satrap of Egypt, saw clearly that the huge shapeless empire, nominally the heritage of an infant and an idiot, must break into fractions, and resolved to obtain a definite fraction as a kingdom for themselves. There were those, on the other hand, who desired, whether genuinely (as Antipatros and doubtless Eumenes), or as a colourable pretence (as Perdikkas), to attempt to hold the empire together for the kings. A third tendency was now to show itself, in the person of Antigonos; a desire to grasp the whole inheritance of Alexander for himself, without any reference to the royal family at all. In fact, as soon as Eumenes was disposed of, Antigonos' inordinate ambition at once became visible, and led to a coalition against him in 315 of Ptolemy, Kassandros, and Lysimachos, satrap of Thrace. Four years of hard but indeterminate fighting followed; the most important event was the restoration by Ptolemy of Seleukos to his satrapy of Babylon, from which he had been driven by Antigonos. In 311 the war ended in a general but short-lived peace.

The results of ten years' constant warfare on a great scale were by now taking shape. Polyperchon, though still controlling an army, had lost all authority and could do no more

than maintain himself in the Peloponnese. The great satraps had become kings in all but name; the smaller men were nearly all eliminated, and five definite realms were taking shape. The far-seeing Ptolemy was firmly established in Egypt, with his capital at Alexandria. Babylon, and the east beyond the Euphrates, appeared definitely to be Seleukos; he was building himself a new capital, Seleukeia on the Tigris. Lysimachos of Thrace had formed a strong realm in the north, with its centre in the Thracian Chersonese, where he was soon to build himself a new capital, Lysimacheia. Kassandros held Macedonia, and had brought part of Greece, including Athens, under his sway; he had built himself a new capital, Kassandreia, on the spot where Potidaia had once stood. In the centre of these four states lay the huge realm of Antigonos. He held Syria and the Asiatic provinces from the Hellespont to Egypt, from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean; at sea he had the strongest fleet; and he could strike where he would at the circle about him. But it was a circle; he was ringed in.

The year after the peace saw the end of the nominal kingship of Alexander's son; he and his mother, Roxane, were murdered by Kassandros. None living was likely to strike an honest blow for the house of Alexander. In spirit it was dead already; Kassandros only translated thought into action. The odium fell on him alone; all alike reaped the benefit. Antigonos' position, in particular, became absolutely clear. Whether he was deliberately aiming at the sole dominion of the whole empire or not, the other rulers certainly believed that he was, and believed that his ambition threatened their very existence. All drew together in face of the coming storm.

In 307 the storm burst. Antigonos' son Demetrios, now a man of twenty-nine or thirty, sailed for Greece with a great force, swept Kassandros out of Athens and the Megarid, and received the warmest of welcomes from the Athenian democracy. In 306, while Antigonos was building his new capital in Syria, Antigoneia on the Orontes, Demetrios turned his attention to Ptolemy; with a fleet 118 strong he sailed for Cyprus, and audaciously blockaded the Egyptian fleet of

60 ships in the harbour of Salamis with only 10 galleys, while with the remainder he put to sea to meet the relieving fleet of 140 ships, which was being brought up by Ptolemy in person. In the ensuing battle Demetrios succeeded in putting into practice at sea a version of the tactics introduced by Epameinondas on land; massing his strength on his left wing, he crushed Ptolemy's right, and then turned successfully against the centre; the Egyptian fleet was all but annihilated, and the squadron in Salamis surrendered. Demetrios never had again to fight at sea. His father and he each took the title of king; for the moment it must have seemed that they held the destinies of the world in their hands. An invasion of Egypt by land and sea followed, but Fortune turned her face, and the undertaking failed; while the next year, 305, was wasted over the siege of Rhodes, an heroic struggle that brought no less renown to Demetrios the Besieger than to the stubborn and successful islanders, but of which the results, from Antigonos' point of view, were quite incommensurate with the expenditure of men, material, and time. Peace was not made with Rhodes till 304; and the delay enabled Kassandros to advance and lay siege to Athens, while Polyperchon was conquering the Peloponnese. Demetrios, whose energy at this period of his life was not inferior to that of Alexander himself, flew back to Greece; he drove off Kassandros, and by 303 had conquered Boeotia, mid-Greece, and a large part of the Peloponnese. Thereupon he carried out two measures of great political importance; he married the Epeirot princess Deidameia, sister of Pyrrhos, who as a child had been selected to be the future bride of Alexander's son and empress of the world; and he revived the League of Corinth, the league which Philip II had founded, and at whose head Alexander had conquered Asia. The Greek states, assembled at the Isthmus, elected Demetrios general by sea and land in the war against Kassandros; armed with this mandate, he invaded Thessaly in the next year; the conquest of Macedonia looked but a question of time. Time, however, was the one thing no longer at Demetrios' disposal. While he had tarried over the siege of Rhodes, the fate of his house had been settled

on the banks of the Indus. Seleukos of Babylon, unable to make head against Chandragupta, the new monarch of a united Northern India, had come to terms ; he had ceded his provinces along the Indus, which doubtless he could not have held in any case, in return for 500 trained war elephants. The beasts were successfully marched across Asia, and with their arrival the crisis came. Antigonos was ringed by a world in arms ; Seleukos was moving against him from the east, Lysimachos from the north ; Ptolemy from the south was invading Hollow Syria. He was forced to recall Demetrios from Europe ; and Demetrios, hastily arranging a truce with Kassandros, returned to Asia. Kassandros succeeded in throwing across some of his troops to the aid of Lysimachos ; and the king of Thrace, his army thus stiffened, by a series of brilliant marches outmanœuvred Antigonos, who sought to crush him while unaided, and effected his junction with Seleukos. Demetrios, too, had joined his father ; and in the late summer of 301, at Ipsos in Phrygia, the two armies met in one of the great struggles of history, to decide the fate of half the world. Antigonos is said to have had over 70,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 75 elephants ; Seleukos and Lysimachos had 64,000 foot, 10,500 horse, 120 chariots, and 480 elephants. Demetrios, charging at the head of the cavalry massed on the left wing, as usual scattered his immediate opponents ; doubtless he designed to repeat the victorious tactics of Salamis. But he found, as so many cavalry leaders in antiquity found, that a great mass of horsemen, riding without stirrups, and once fairly launched, could not, like galleys, be turned at a signal ; the impetus of his men swept him on too far ; and he returned to find the battle over. Seleukos' elephants had trampled out the hopes of the house of Antigonos ; the old king himself lay dead on the lost field.

No longer king of kings, Demetrios fled with a small force to Ephesos, and sailed for Europe, giving up Asia as lost, save for a few fortresses ; while Seleukos and Lysimachos divided the Asiatic empire of Antigonos, on terms that Lysimachos took the provinces to the north of Tauros and Seleukos those to the south, except Kilikia, which was given



to Kassandros' brother, Pleistarchos. Demetrios turned first to Athens, the city where six years before he had been welcomed as a deliverer and worshipped as a god; there he had left his treasure, his ships, and his wife Deidameia; in the goodwill of Athens was sure refuge. The Athenians sent Deidameia to Megara, handed over the ships and the treasure, and closed their gates upon the fugitive: it is recorded that the Besieger felt this as a worse blow than the field of Ipsos. With Athens went Euboea and central Greece; but Demetrios' garrisons saved for him Corinth and a good deal of the Peloponnese, while his command of the sea was still absolute. Leaving his brother-in-law, Pyrrhos, the future king of Epeiros, to command for him in Greece, he sailed at the head of his fleet to the Thracian Chersonese, and there succeeded in inflicting some damage on Lysimachos, who was his irreconcilable personal enemy, and whom he bitterly hated. Lysimachos, a very good soldier with a reputation for meanness, had come off very well in the division of Antigonos' kingdom; he was on good terms with Kassandros, and Ptolemy, whose daughter, Arsinoe, he was presently to marry, was already making advances to him. For Ptolemy had sent no troops to Ipsos, but had occupied Hollow Syria while the other kings were fighting; and as he had no intention of returning it to Seleukos, to whom by right it belonged, he was looking for friends against a possible day of reckoning. Seleukos suddenly found himself isolated in the face of an informal league of Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Kassandros; and as he could not take direct measures against Ptolemy, to whom he had lately owed both life and kingdom, he looked about for a makeweight, and found it in Demetrios.

The alliance of the two was celebrated at Rhossos in Syria with great ceremony. Demetrios summoned Phila to join him, and gave their daughter, Stratonike, in marriage to Seleukos; Seleukos feasted him in his camp, and he Seleukos on his flagship, the largest vessel of war yet known. In spite of his possessions in Greece and the islands—he still held Cyprus and the islands of the Aegean, and soon after reconquered Kilikia—Demetrios' true kingdom now was his

overwhelming fleet, based on a few great fortresses—Corinth, Ephesos, Tyre, Sidon. But kingship at this time was a matter that was personal and not territorial; it resided in the individual dynast; the particular country which that individual ruled was quite an accidental matter. The essential thing here was the man Demetrios, who had ruled a great realm before, and might do so again. Seleukos and Demetrios sent a joint embassy to Ephesos, and no doubt to the other cities that still held to Demetrios, announcing the alliance; and Seleukos showed his appreciation of Demetrios' real position as a sea-king by dedicating to Apollo of Delos two silver models of war-vessels, in honour of the share he had gained in the kingdom of the sea.<sup>3</sup> He also brought about peace between Demetrios and Ptolemy; but whether the other kings recognized Demetrios as again king of a fifth realm beside their own may be doubted.

However, this arrangement did not last long. In 297 the balance of power was rudely upset by the death of Kassandros; his eldest son, Philip, who succeeded him, was consumptive, and died soon after. About the same time, too, Demetrios and Seleukos fell out, apparently over a refusal of Demetrios to sell to Seleukos Tyre and Sidon, which he held with strong garrisons. The result was a recrudescence of the great war of 302/1. Ptolemy, Seleukos, and Lysimachos formed a new combination, with the object of annexing and dividing up everything that Demetrios still held in Asia: Ptolemy acquired Cyprus, Seleukos Kilikia, Lysimachos Ephesos and other towns, leaving to Demetrios only a few scattered fortified places—Tyre, Sidon, Miletos, Kaunos. On the other hand, Demetrios crossed to Europe, apparently with the object of renewing the undertaking that he had been compelled to break off in 302, before Ipsos. Which came first in time, the coalition against him or his attack on Athens, cannot be said; but in 295 he appeared with a great fleet before Athens, ruled at the moment by Kassandros' friend Lachares as tyrant, and formed the siege of the city. No doubt he was invited by his friends within the walls. An attempt by Ptolemy to relieve the city failed,

<sup>3</sup> See ch. 3, n. 36.

and after a heroic resistance Athens, in the first half of 294, was starved into surrender. Demetrios showed every kindness to the citizens, and poured in corn as fast as possible : but he made sure of the future by garrisoning the Mouseion and Mounychia. Perhaps now, perhaps a little later, he also recovered Euboea.

Demetrios already held a good deal of the Peloponnese ; and in 295, before forming the blockade of Athens, he had attacked and been beaten off from Messene. He now attacked Sparta, but was recalled by an opening in the north. Kassandros' two younger sons, Antipatros and Alexander, had divided Macedonia, and were fighting. Antipatros, the elder, who had married a daughter of Lysimachos, and perhaps was supported by him, murdered his mother Thessalonike, the last surviving daughter of the great Philip, for favouring his brother ; whereon Alexander sought help from Pyrrhos, now king of Epeiros, and Demetrios. Pyrrhos arrived first, drove off Antipatros, and installed Alexander as king, receiving or taking a large cession of territory in return for his assistance. Demetrios came up too late to influence the arrangement ; Alexander received him with courtesy, but explained that he no longer required his help ; and Demetrios, accompanied by Alexander, retraced his steps to Larisa in Thessaly. What happened there is quite uncertain. The version of events that afterwards found favour at the court of Pella was, that Alexander laid a plot to assassinate Demetrios, and that the latter discovered and anticipated the treacherous act. Another version, which perhaps originated at Lysimacheia, says that there was no plot, but that Antipatros' father-in-law, Lysimachos, had effected a reconciliation between the brothers, which would have checkmated Demetrios' designs. It is hardly worth remarking that a statement about Demetrios originating from Lysimachos' court is absolutely valueless. All that is certain is the crude fact, that Alexander at a banquet was cut down by Demetrios' guards, and that his army, probably tampered with beforehand, thereon hailed Demetrios as 'king of the Macedonians', and escorted him over the border into Macedonia. There was no resistance ; Antipatros escaped to

Lysimachos;<sup>4</sup> and Demetrios was once again king of a great kingdom.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 21, 7 and Plut. *Mor.* 530C say that Antipatros was assassinated by Demetrios; Justin 16, 1, 19 (cf. 16, 2, 4) and Euseb. p. 231 (Schoene) say that he escaped to Lysimachos, and was put to death by him later; Paus. 9, 7, 3 is ambiguous. Probably we have here again the conflicting versions of Lysimacheia and Pella. *A priori*, Diodoros is most likely to represent Hieronymos and the facts; but he has not much more than an allusion, and Droysen and Beloch follow without a question the more circumstantial story in Justin. If the Antipatros of Laches' decree for Demochares be this Antipatros, as generally supposed (ch. 4, p. 102), this would show that Justin is right.

## CHAPTER I

### THE TEACHERS OF ANTIGONOS

ANTIGONOS, called Gonatas,<sup>1</sup> son of Demetrios the Besieger and of Phila, was in all probability born at the end of 320 or early in 319,<sup>2</sup> when Demetrios was a mere boy of seventeen. The moralists of a later time were accustomed to quote him as an example of how a man might, by his own conduct, avoid being visited with the sins of his forefathers.<sup>3</sup> And indeed his forefathers had passed on to him a mixed inheritance.

Few families possessed such a consistent record of crime and misfortune as that of his grandfather Antipatros. Of those of the numerous sons and daughters of the regent whose careers are known to us, not one enjoyed good fortune.<sup>4</sup> Kassandros, for all his high political ability, was

<sup>1</sup> Meaning unknown, except that Porphyry's explanation, 'man of Gonnoi,' is wrong (Euseb. 1, 237, Schoene):—Demetrios had no connexion with Gonnoi in 320, and the ethnic, which is common enough, is Γοννεύς; see, beside the coins, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 453 = *G. D. I.* 3205; *G. D. I.* 3286; *B. C. H.* 1900, p. 85. Porphyry may have confused Γόννοι and γόννα (Steph. Byz. *s. v.* Γόννοι, γόννα γὰρ οἱ Αἰολεῖς τὰ γόννατα), and hence his blunder; but it is strange that Schoene's text gives Γόννοις, a form which L. Dindorf in Steph. *l. c.* deduced ought to exist somewhere. Anyhow, if the word is Greek, the two possible connexions appear to be γονή, γενέσθαι (? 'first-born'), and γόνν, 'knock-kneed' or something of the sort. This latter was suggested by L. Dindorf, *s. v.* Γονατᾶς, and is preferable to Niebuhr's view (*Kl. Schriften*, p. 228), that γονατᾶς was a piece of armour covering the knee; for there is an old tradition in favour of Dindorf's view, though apparently he did not know this; the Latin translation appended to Theon of Alexandria's life of Aratos (given by E. Maass, *Commentariorum in Aratum reliquiae*, 1898, p. 146 seq.; Theon's life = No. 3 in Westermann, *Βιογράφοι*) translates Gonatas by Geniculus. This may be correct, and if so it may be a soldier's nickname, like Caligula. But it may not be a Greek word at all. Curiously enough, O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen*, p. 193, follows Porphyry without comment.

<sup>2</sup> His death in 240/39 is certain. [Lucian], *Macrob.* 11, makes him eighty at the time; Porphyry (Euseb. 1, 237, Schoene), eighty-three. The former is probably correct, for Phila's marriage must be connected with the restoration of the elder Antigonos by Antipatros; but the authority given for it, Medios, is not known. He was not, of course, Medeios of Larisa.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 562 F.

<sup>4</sup> See the genealogical tables.



execrated throughout Greece as a 'tyrant', and more than execrated in Macedonia as the butcher of the old royal house; and history chose to remember him, not as the founder of Salonika, but as the murderer of the mother, the wife, and the son of the great Alexander. Of Kassandros' sons, one murdered his mother, the last of Philip's daughters; another was murdered; both alike lost their kingdom. To Antipatros' three daughters, Phila, Eurydike, Nikaia, the fates gave even less. Of Phila's tragic life we shall speak presently. Eurydike was married to Ptolemy I, the able king of an established kingdom; she lived to be supplanted by her own maid of honour, to see herself repudiated and her son disinherited of his crown; one of her daughters, Lysandra, was married to Kassandros' ill-fated son Alexander, and after his death to the no less ill-fated Agathokles, while her exiled son, Ptolemy Keraunos, is known chiefly as the murderer of his benefactor Seleukos and of the sons of his half-sister Arsinoe, and as the prince whose folly let the flood of Celtic invasion sweep through Macedonia. Nikaia, having been married to and perhaps repudiated by the ill-fated Perdikkas, was next married to Lysimachos of Thrace; her son Agathokles was murdered by his father, and of her daughters, Eurydike was married to Kassandros' son, the matricide Antipatros, and Arsinoe to Ptolemy II of Egypt, to be repudiated, much as her aunt Eurydike before her, in favour of her quondam step-mother Arsinoe Philadelphos. It is a dreary chronicle; the superstitious might be forgiven for supposing that a member of Antipatros' house started life at a considerable disadvantage.

There was, however, another side to the shield; and Antigonos, if on the mother's side he inherited a fair share of misfortune, inherited also a great deal of character and political wisdom. Antipatros may not have been an attractive figure,—it was of course inevitable that Greek tradition should be something less than just to the conqueror in the Lamian war and the cause of the suicide of Demosthenes,—but he is a remarkably solid one. The pupil and friend of Aristotle, a past master in the art of statesmanship, he stood out as the wisest of the group of Alexander's generals. While

Alexander was conquering Asia, there fell to Antipatros the difficult and thankless task of securing his rear and holding down Greece; and in the war after Alexander's death, when Greece so nearly threw off the Macedonian yoke, on Antipatros fell the odium of the political arrangements made in the conquered states.<sup>5</sup> In politics Antipatros had neither illusions nor sentiment. What raises him above the level of his contemporaries, many of whom were far more successful, is this; that he alone of the Successors refused to worship Alexander as a god,<sup>6</sup> and that he nevertheless, almost alone of them, kept faith with Alexander's house.

Antipatros' political ability and political theories descended to Antigonos through his mother Phila. She appears to us in brief outline as one of the noblest women of a time when the women were generally distinguished, either for good or evil. She could by her tact quell a tumult in camp, for she knew the right thing to say to each discontented mercenary; she used to provide marriage portions for the sisters and daughters of the men who had nothing; she often defended and obtained the acquittal of others unjustly accused.<sup>7</sup> Married to Krateros, the best beloved of all Alexander's generals, his death in battle against Eumenes in 321 left her early a widow with one son; and in the next year, as part of a political arrangement between the old Antigonos and Antipatros, she was married to Demetrios. Demetrios was at the time a mere boy,—he cannot have been much over sixteen,—and it is implied that Phila was not only older but considerably older than himself; and his dislike to the marriage called forth the frank cynicism of his father, who whispered him that people must marry against their inclinations if they got enough by it.<sup>8</sup> Phila was incalculably superior to her husband. She bore with his innumerable infidelities, of which of course the time thought nothing; she

<sup>5</sup> Polyperchon's rescript in the name of Philip Arrhidaïos, Diod. 18, 56; the reference to the hardships suffered by Greek states at the hands of the king's generals aims at Antipatros.

<sup>6</sup> Suidas, *Ἀντίπατρος, ἀσεβὴς τοῦτο κρίνας*. On his policy generally, Kaerst II. (1), p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> Phila's portrait, Diod. 19, 59, 3-6; (ultimately from Hieronymos).

<sup>8</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 14.

bore even with his taking a second and a third legitimate wife, which even that easy-going epoch considered scandalous; if she left him when he was prosperous and polygamous, she returned to him when he was in misfortune, as after Ipsos; she went as his envoy to her brother Kassandros, doing her best to keep peace between the two; and, at the last, such acceptance as Demetrios had from the Macedonians as their king was largely due to her as Antipatros' daughter. If the comparison of Demetrios with Mark Antony be a stock one, Phila may very justly take her place beside the gracious figure of Octavia.

That Antigonos was the son of his mother rather than of his father comes out on every page of his history. He had inherited, it is true, from the old Antigonos strength of purpose, but none of the overbearing ambition that had accompanied it. He possessed also to the full the most honourable characteristic of his father's house; he had the same devoted loyalty to Demetrios as Demetrios had had to the elder Antigonos.<sup>9</sup> But he inherited neither his father's genius nor the instability which made that father impossible. Demetrios was incomparably the most brilliant figure of that age of giants. Brave as a hero and beautiful as a god;<sup>10</sup> of such majesty that strangers followed him merely to gaze, of such attraction that whole communities spontaneously worshipped him; a great mechanician, a great admiral, a great leader, of inexhaustible energy and world-embracing ideas; to the superficial eye he had everything and more than everything, (save hereditary claim), that had belonged to Alexander. But that which in Alexander lay hidden beneath the glittering surface was lacking in Demetrios. Demetrios could win hearts but not keep them; conquer kingdoms only to lose them; gain victories which led no whither; and through his life runs a gradual thread

<sup>9</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 51.

<sup>10</sup> Demochares ap. Athen. 6, 253 c; Diod. 20, 92, 3. There is a wonderful head in the Vatican, with ram's horns, published by J. Six (*Röm. Mitt.* 1903, p. 212, figs. 2 and 3), which Six called Alexander, but which A. J. B. Wace (*J. H. S.* 1905, p. 87) thinks is a head of Demetrios as Alexander Ammon. If it be indeed Demetrios, he must have been about the handsomest man of whom any record remains, even allowing for idealization.



of disillusionment, whereby he who at the beginning had expected too much of his fellow men ended by conceding them too little, and the king and hero gradually passed into the adventurer, till at the last the man who had been worshipped as a present deity on earth was hunted down and caged like a wild beast, a danger too great even to that society.

Antigonos was between eighteen and nineteen years old at the time of the battle of Ipsos; but he was in all probability not present at the battle. For in 303 Demetrios had married the Epeirot princess Deidameia,<sup>11</sup> and Phila's position at his court must have become impossible. This marriage, like the revival in the same year of the League of Corinth, was a part of the political combination which he was forming against Phila's brother; it was useful to acquire the possibility of interference in Epeiros, and still more useful, since Kassandros had married Philip's daughter, to be married to Alexander's cousin. Deidameia was too important a person for the marriage to be looked on in the light of some of Demetrios' other unions; and Phila left him, though she returned to him after the disaster of Ipsos.<sup>12</sup> As Demetrios left Deidameia in Athens when he sailed for Asia,<sup>13</sup> Phila cannot have remained there also; we must conclude that in 303 she, and in all probability her son with her, went to Kassandros, perhaps (as Octavia in like case) to play the part of peacemaker.<sup>14</sup>

For the time being, Antigonos was quite eclipsed by the youthful brilliancy of Deidameia's brother Pyrrhos.<sup>15</sup> The young prince of Epeiros, who was nearly a year younger than Antigonos, had been brought up an exile at the court of the Illyrian prince Glaucias; and though Glaucias had restored him at the age of twelve to his share of Epeirot kingship, Pyrrhos had again lost his kingdom in a revolution when about seventeen, and betaken himself with his only remaining possession, his sword, to his brother-in-law Demetrios. It was the year before Ipsos, and Demetrios welcomed him

<sup>11</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.

<sup>12</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 32.

<sup>13</sup> *Ib.* 30.

<sup>14</sup> On Demetrios' polygamy see ch. 2, n. 21.

<sup>15</sup> Pyrrhos was born about winter 319/8; Klotzsch, p. 95, n. 1, cf. Beloch 3, 2, 103.

gladly. In the life-long rivalry of Pyrrhos and Antigonos, the more precocious Pyrrhos thus gained, and for a long time kept, the start; for while Antigonos was probably not at Ipsos at all, Pyrrhos had already shown his mettle in this his first battle, defeating the forces immediately opposed to him.<sup>16</sup> He adhered to Demetrios after the defeat, and was left by him as his governor in Greece<sup>17</sup> when he crossed the Aegean. Events, however, moved quickly in those troubled years. In the year after Ipsos Phila rejoined her husband in Asia, bringing with her their daughter Stratonike for the celebration of her marriage with Seleukos; and in the year 299 Seleukos brought about peace between Demetrios and Ptolemy.<sup>18</sup> This ended the association of Pyrrhos and Demetrios. Demetrios sent him to Egypt as his hostage, where the young man fell completely under the glamour of the brilliant court of Alexandria; and when in 298 Deidameia died, the last link that bound him to his former patron snapped. He attached himself at Alexandria to the party of Berenike, and Ptolemy, liking his address, gave him the hand of Antigone, Berenike's daughter by her first marriage, and with money and troops restored him to his kingdom on Kassandros' death in 297. Henceforward Pyrrhos was the consistent enemy of the house of Demetrios.

Phila's return, Pyrrhos' departure, Deidameia's death, opened the way for the beginning of Antigonos' political career; and in 296 he is found acting as his father's governor in some part of Greece.<sup>19</sup> He was probably present at the siege of Athens in 295/4; he certainly accompanied his father on the expedition which in 294 gave Demetrios the crown of Macedonia.<sup>20</sup> Henceforward, while Demetrios reigned in Macedonia, Antigonos governed for him in Greece.

He had grown up as heir to the greatest throne in the world; and before reaching manhood had seen his house, in

<sup>16</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.

<sup>17</sup> *Ib.* 5; *Dem.* 31.

<sup>18</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 32.

<sup>19</sup> In the Delian inventory of Phillis I, *I. G.* xi, 154, A, ll. 43, 44, there is an entry, apparently relating to the Dionysia, *ξύλον εἰς τὸν φα[λ]λὸν παρὰ Ἀντιγόνου ΔΔΔ*. The date being 296, Gonatas is meant; and such a gift, so stated, implies, though it does not actually prove, that he had at the time an independent governorship.

<sup>20</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 37.

one day's battle, reduced almost to the condition of fugitives. He had watched his father attempting to rule Greek states by sentiment, and had seen the cities, which yesterday were fawning on and worshipping him, to-day shut their gates in his face. Meantime he had been learning from his mother, possibly too from Kassandros, something of the policy of the old Antipatros, a policy stern perhaps and harsh, but based on an idea of duty of a kind and absolutely discarding every form of sentiment. And he had mastered the fact, to be spoken of presently, that the rule of the sea, once secured, had endured to Demetrios unshaken by every vicissitude on land. Now fortune had again turned her wheel, and at the age of twenty-five he stood heir once more to another great kingdom. If Antigonos was not by this time absolutely contemptuous of whatever fortune might bring him, it was not the fault of that goddess.

What fortune brought him at the moment was teachers. Plato, in a well-known paradox, had laid it down that for the world to be well governed philosophers must become kings or kings philosophers; and the world was ripe for experiment. Never yet had philosophy attained to such a position as she held at the beginning of the third century; and if she could hardly herself aspire to rule, save as Demetrios of Phaleron had ruled Athens,—and philosophy as such had no concern with an unconstitutional ruler supported by foreign spears,—she could and did aspire to train a king; and Antigonos inevitably offered himself for the attempt.<sup>21</sup> He had probably met both Menedemos and Zeno before 301; but a boy of sixteen is perhaps hardly likely to have frequented with much profit the philosophic schools, and from 301 to 294 both Athens and Eretria were closed to him. Now, however, that Athens and Euboea both formed part of his father's kingdom, and were under his personal governorship, the opportunity came; and in Menedemos of Eretria he found the man.

Eretria was a good type of the provincial town that does not forget that it has once been greater than provincial. The Eretrians remembered that they had once ruled the sea and sent out many colonies, and had stood shoulder to shoulder

<sup>21</sup> See ch. 8, p. 254 seq.

with Athens against the Persian. They remembered their early school of art; and while their old rival, Chalkis, for all its splendid public buildings and its famous market-place, had become a garrison town of the Antigonids, a great fortress and arsenal, at Eretria gathered all elements of culture in the island that had not yielded to the enormous centralizing pull of Athens. When at a later date the Romans took the town, they found it full of pictures and statues by the old masters of a number and quality out of all proportion to its size and wealth;<sup>22</sup> and a school of philosophy went by its name.

The centre of cultivated society in Eretria at the time was the philosopher Menedemos.<sup>23</sup> An Eretrian by birth, the son either of a master builder or of a scene painter,—his father at any rate worked for his living, and Menedemos learnt his trade,—he had studied under Stilpon at Megara, in the school of Phaidon in Elis, and for a while in Athens, where, like Kleanthes after him, he had worked in a mill by night that he might by day have food and leisure to attend lectures.<sup>24</sup> Little esteemed at first in his native town, he soon won the highest position there, both politically and socially; he went on important embassies,<sup>25</sup> and was elected one of the Probouloi, the board of magistrates who in Eretria saw to the finances and the foreign relations of the town;<sup>26</sup> he became

<sup>22</sup> Livy 32, 16, 17.

<sup>23</sup> Life of Menedemos in Diog. L. ii, from which all details in the text not otherwise noted are taken. A good deal of it comes from Antigonos of Karystos; he was not quite a contemporary, (on the dates, Beloch 3, 1, 499, n. 1), but could perhaps, as a boy, have seen Menedemos. Of modern writers, see especially Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, pp. 86–102 and 133–43, and Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (Eng. Trans. 1905), vol. ii, p. 205 seq. I cannot refrain from quoting Gomperz's beautiful image: 'Menedemos of Eretria, the philosopher at the head of a little commonwealth, . . . is a figure on which the eye of the historian gladly rests, as on a sun-illuminated peaceful island in the midst of a troubled sea.'

<sup>24</sup> Athen. 4, 168 a. The statement of Diogenes that Menedemos was also Plato's pupil must be due to a confusion with Menedemos Πυρραῖος.

<sup>25</sup> To Ptolemy, to Lysimachos, and to Demetrios at least twice, once on behalf of his wife's city Oropos, and once in a successful attempt to get the taxes imposed on Eretria reduced; Diog. L. 2, 140. The two former embassies are connected by Beloch, 3, 2, 301, with the period immediately following the battle of Ipsos; the two latter must belong to the period of Demetrios' rule in Macedonia.

<sup>26</sup> πρόβουλος, Herakleides Lembos ap. Diog. L. 2, 143. Possibly Antigonos of Karystos gave the same thing, τὰ ὅμοια τούτῳ. Another account (Diog. L. 2, 137) merely says προύστη τῆς πολιτείας. On the power and consequence of



the informal head of the little commonwealth. The reason of his success is not far to seek ; for though he was no great thinker, and though his chief claim to the title of 'philosopher' must rest on mental attitude rather than actual teaching, he had the one great gift of character.<sup>27</sup> A well built, rather stout man, sun-burnt as an athlete, of straightforward speech and biting tongue, he appears before us, not as a searcher after wisdom, but as a dignified and cultured man of the world ; a student of men, rather than of books ; one who not only took the lead in the public life of his native town, but who in private gathered round him a notable circle. Indolent, and contemptuous of the routine of the schools, with which he had little enough in common, he taught, not a host of pupils on the ranged benches of a class-room, but a few who walked or sat with him informally, as it might chance. His spiritual affinities went back behind the schools to Socrates ; like him, he wrote nothing and left nothing behind him, attempting to stimulate those who came to him by conversation and question, to call out rather than to impart ;<sup>28</sup> to mould each for his own life, rather than all to a pattern. The portrait which remains to us is an attractive picture of a very human man, one who could inspire love no less than fear,—one whose friendship for his friend became proverbial, and with whom the mocking speech was often enough redeemed by the kindly action.<sup>29</sup> Illdoers feared that mocking speech, invincible in retort, and apt to go to its point with a coarseness of satire as brutal as effective ; while behind it lay a nobility of character that could deter a man from doing a dubious act 'lest Menedemos should hear'. His chief faults—no great weight in the balance—were perhaps a

the *πρόβουλοι* at Eretria, see Holleaux in *R. É. G.* 10, 1897, pp. 157, 166 (on *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 277).

<sup>27</sup> Gomperz *l.c.* remarks on the disproportion between Menedemos' reputation and our knowledge of what that reputation was founded on. The solution must be character, personality, a thing hardly to be conveyed upon paper.

<sup>28</sup> See Plato *Rep.* 7, 518 B: the true function of education is to bring out what is in the pupil. Straton the Peripatetic, filling pupils with facts, would have it that while *his* scholars worked those of Menedemos only played (Plut. *Mor.* 472 E).

<sup>29</sup> The story of Alexinos' wife, Diog. L. 2, 136.

certain measure of pomposity, and too high an opinion of the deference due to a philosopher.<sup>30</sup>

It is perhaps at his famous suppers rather than in the lecture-room that we see him most clearly.<sup>31</sup> His friends came on to them after dining elsewhere, each bringing his own cushion, if he wanted one, to sit on a straw mat in summer or a sheepskin in winter and join in a dessert consisting of a very little fruit and wine and a great deal of intellectual conversation. There they would sit on through the night, solving the universe, or listening to 'the word that chastens those who care to hear',<sup>32</sup> as a poet of the circle put it; cock-crow would not always part them.<sup>33</sup> By this last phrase we are reminded,—we are no doubt meant to be reminded,—of that more famous banquet at which Socrates, after the wondrous discourse in praise of love, drank the whole company under the table and himself departed soberly at cock-crow to his daily work.

The circle of friends whom Menedemos gathered round him was a notable one for a provincial town, as notability went. Hither came the poets Aratos of Soloi, (undistinguished as yet, save perhaps for his leaning to Stoicism), and Antagoras of Rhodes, the friend of the grave heads of the Academy: we shall meet both again at Antigonos' court.<sup>34</sup> Hither came Dionysios of Herakleia, who was afterwards to

<sup>30</sup> The Nikokreon episode, *ib.* 2, 129. — As to pomposity. Parody always made Menedemos a very *heavy* character; and parody cannot invent, it can only exaggerate a real trait; it must have something to go upon. When Krates the Cynic, no friend of his, called him the bull of Eretria (*Diog. L. 2, 126* = *Diels, fr. 2*), it might refer to a fierce look (see *Diels*); but Timon cannot be explained away. In the Fishing of the Philosophers (see *chap. 8, p. 241*), Arkesilaos tries to swim by the aid of 'that lump of lead, Menedemos', *ἔχων Μενέδημον ὑπὸ στέρνοισι μόλις βδον* — (*Wachsmuth* emended this, but it is obviously a *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* for some word meaning bladder) — (*fr. 31 Diels* = *16 Wachsmuth*); and again (*fr. 29 D.* = *28 W.*) Timon speaks of his bulk, and calls him supercilious, and *ἀφροσιβόμβαξ*, of which the exact rendering would be Serjeant Buzfuz. No doubt Menedemos had soon taken Timon's measure, and showed it.

<sup>31</sup> *Diog. L. 2, 139*; repeated with more details, *Athen. 10, 419 e*; taken by Antigonos of Karystos from Lykophron's *Menedemos*.

<sup>32</sup> Lykophron *ap. Diog. L. 2, 140*, *ὁ σωφρονιστὴς τοῖς φιληκόοις λόγος*. The line as given in Athenaios has a less pointed variant.

<sup>33</sup> Lykophron *ap. Athen. l. c.*; *ὁ ὄρνις κατελάμβανε τὴν ἔω καλῶν τοῖσι δ' οὐδέπω κόρος*.

<sup>34</sup> See *ch. 8, pp. 226, 229*.

become Zeno's pupil and to earn renown of a kind by deserting the Stoics for the Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure ; a man of some parts nevertheless, for he admired Aratos, and left among his writings two, of which the unusual titles rouse our curiosity, 'On the Kings of ancient days' and 'On the morals of barbarous peoples'.<sup>35</sup> Hither, too, came jolly souls like the 'philosopher' Ktesibios, who brought officers from Antigonos' garrison at Chalkis to play tennis with him, and said that philosophy was a splendid thing, for it got him so many invitations to dinner.<sup>36</sup>

But the brightest member of the circle was the youthful Lykophron of Chalkis.<sup>37</sup> He was probably already known as the author of the *Alexandra*, the most obscure piece of verse then in existence ; afterwards he was to arrange the comic poets in the library at Alexandria. But at present he was writing tragedies ; and Menedemos, it is said, found them to his taste. Lykophron himself had a frank admiration for the master, and wrote in his honour the satyr-play *Menedemos*,<sup>38</sup> from which has survived the already quoted account of Menedemos' suppers. Good-natured banter there was in it in plenty ; and if the reference to cock-crow recalls the Banquet of Plato, it may be a harmless conceit to see in the choice of Seilenos as a vehicle for the praise of Menedemos a reference to Plato's famous comparison of Socrates to the carved figures of the old Satyr, whose grotesque shell hid the inner divinity.

Into this society, in the intervals of campaigning, came the crown prince Antigonos.<sup>39</sup> His earliest teacher had been the Megarian philosopher, Euphantos of Olynthos, who wrote a treatise for him on the art of governing a kingdom.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Diog. L. 7, 166, 167 = Arnim I, 422.

<sup>36</sup> Athen. 4, 162 e ; Epit. Athen. I, 15 c. Timon called him 'dinner-mad'.

<sup>37</sup> Diog. L. 2, 140 ; Susemihl I, 272.

<sup>38</sup> See note 31.

<sup>39</sup> Diog. L., *Life of Menedemos*, *passim*.

<sup>40</sup> Diog. L. 2, 110. The passages where Euphantos is mentioned in papyri are collected by W. Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos*, p. 26. It may now be taken for certain that Euphantos was Euboulides' pupil and that it was Antigonos Gonatas whom he taught. (See generally Susemihl I, 621 ; E. Schwartz, *Hermes*, 35, 1900, p. 128 ; Natorp, *Euphantos* in *P. W.*, 1907.) His supposed description of Kallikrates as a flatterer of Ptolemy III is a mere mistake, whether we ought to read *πρώτου* for *τρίτου* in Athen. 6, 251 d, or not ; and if Kallikrates the admiral be meant, the epigraphic evidence is

Euphantos, however, was a pupil of Euboulides, and probably taught the regular Megarian doctrine, that there was only one good, unchangeable and unalterable, though known by different names, and only one virtue, the knowledge thereof. Antigonos may well have wondered what the knowledge of an unchangeable good could do toward the solution of the problems of the struggling universe as they presented themselves to him. Menedemos also taught that virtue was one; but we may suppose that he did not thrust the doctrine of the unchangeable good upon Antigonos. What he did was to deal faithfully with his faults, as with those of a common man; on one occasion he had to remind him, sharply enough, that he was a king's son.<sup>41</sup> Antigonos had met a character of a type different to those at Demetrios' court; and he recognized the fact. It is written that he loved Menedemos, and called him his teacher;<sup>42</sup> and the two remained close friends down to Menedemos' death.

Menedemos was able to give the prince an example of that rare thing, a philosopher at home in the work-a-day world. He not only loved his country—many did that—but he also served her; it is probable that to the Eretrians his political activity may have seemed more important than his lectures. It has been well said that he represents an interval of truce in the bitter feud between philosophy and practical life.<sup>43</sup> It might, perhaps, be equally true to put it that he was the forerunner of the Stoics in the influence which they were so soon to exert upon those in high places; it was not for nothing, nor was it chance, that Menedemos was to be the first to influence Antigonos. Whether his influence was exerted on the lines which the Stoics afterwards laid down for the true practice of kingship we do not know.<sup>44</sup> Apart from this, it can be seen that Menedemos' society would be stimulating, and would make for independence of character and judgement. But there was something deeper and wider to come, if it

complete that his activity falls from some date between 280 and 270, to some date between 270 and 265, and not later; see *J. H. S.* 1911, pp. 251, 254.

<sup>41</sup> Diog. L. 2, 128.

<sup>42</sup> Ib. 2, 141; ἡγάπα δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ Ἀντίγονος καὶ μαθητὴν ἀνεκέρυττεν αὐτόν.

<sup>43</sup> Gomperz, *l. c.*, p. 208.

<sup>44</sup> See chap. 8, p. 254 seq.



could be found; for this, Antigonos had to go to Athens, and seek knowledge at the fountain head.

Athens was no longer head of a great confederacy, or mistress of the sea; but the fact merely served to emphasize her intellectual pre-eminence. She was still, and for some time yet was to remain, the spiritual centre of the Greek world; to Athens, sooner or later, came most of those who had any message for that world, and most of those who desired to be hearers. Antigonos in any case spent much of his time in Athens; and of teachers he found plenty of choice.

There was Plato's school, the Academy, under the headship of the universally respected Polemon. Its repute in Athens stood high, not merely through the glamour of its founder's name, but from its well understood if unostentatious patriotism. Its leaders were Athenian of the Athenians; in fair weather and foul they had stood quietly by their native city, and even if they had taken no active part against Philip their attitude was never in doubt; the time was to come when Athens would owe her safety to their intervention. But intellectually the school was moribund. Polemon and his friend Krates might be looked upon as relics of the Age of Gold; but they were relics. Polemon led the life of a recluse, and his school had nothing new to say to the world, nothing to meet men's present needs. It had become merely orthodox; it was on its way to become orthodoxy in decay, and, like other decaying matter, to breed strange forms of life alien to its own substance. Within the lifetime of those then living, Plato's school was to fall to preaching pure scepticism and suspension of judgement.<sup>45</sup>

Over against the Academy stood the Peripatetics of the Colonnade, the successors of Aristotle, under the headship of Theophrastos, a man whose many-sided learning can be

<sup>45</sup> Respect for Polemon and Krates; Diog. L. 4, 19, 22; *Acad. Ind. Herc.* (ed. Mekler), col. xiv, l. 25. It was Arkesilaos who called them *λείψαντα τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους*.—Patriotism of the School; Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, Excurs I, 'Die Philosophen-Schulen und die Politik.' Xenokrates' embassy to Antipatros after the Lamian war, Diog. L. 4, 9, Plut. *Phok.* 27, *Acad. Ind. Herc.* col. vii, ll. 22-41. Philip said he was the only man he had never been able to bribe, *ib.*—Krates saves Athens; ch. 4, p. 98.

illustrated from the fact that he was at once a great botanist, a great jurist, and the first historian of philosophy. The mission of Aristotle's school in the world was to foster the scientific spirit. It thirsted for facts. Collect facts enough about anything, and you were in the way of knowledge. So they diligently collected facts, from the constitutions of states to the characters of individuals, from the heights of mountains to the habits of molluscs, from the cedar which is in Lebanon to the hyssop which is upon the wall; all was grist for the Peripatetic mill.

In sharpest contrast to the Academy was the open and avowed sympathy of this school with Macedonia,<sup>46</sup> inevitable in the followers of one who had been born in Macedonia, who had been the teacher and friend of Alexander and Antipatros, and whose principal successors were all aliens. Their fortunes had fluctuated with the fluctuations of Athenian politics. Aristotle had had to leave Athens and seek refuge with Antipatros, at whose court he had died; Athens had not been his birth-place, and she had not his grave. With Kassandros' domination came the palmy days of the school. Faithful to his father's friend, he had entrusted the governorship of Athens to a Peripatetic, Demetrios of Phaleron; for ten years the school was all powerful, and Theophrastos inspired the laws made by the philosophic governor.<sup>47</sup> Then came Demetrios the Besieger; Demetrios of Phaleron fled to Kassandros and thence to Egypt; Theophrastos was banished by the triumphant democracy. It is true that he was soon recalled, and taught in Athens till his death; but the school never really recovered its position there, though Theophrastos' successor, Straton, was a great physicist. The Macedonia of its sympathies had been the Macedonia of Antipatros and Kassandros. It had no part or lot in the Macedonia of Demetrios, and its heart went to Alexandria with his namesake: Straton was the tutor of Ptolemy II, and corresponded with Arsinoe.<sup>48</sup> In Alexandria it still had a great work to do, in founding the Museum after

<sup>46</sup> Wilamowitz, *l. c.*

<sup>47</sup> Ferguson, *Klio*, 1911, p. 265.

<sup>48</sup> Diog. L. 5, 58, 60.

its own model, and helping to turn it into the paths of natural science ; but in Athens the best of its work was over.

The age, however, was one that called for a new message. Alexander had enlarged alike the bounds of the world and of human endeavour, and new thoughts and forms of activity were crowding in upon men. The clever Greek, his career hitherto bounded by the offices at the disposal of one small city, might now become chancellor of an empire ; all the great monarchies required every able man they could get for finance and administration ; no one need limit his ambition. Alexander had put into circulation huge masses of hoarded gold, which could not fail, at least for a time, to raise the general standard of the world's well-being ; every country was full of veterans returning to spend at home the spoils of Asia. Great new cities were springing up, affording endless employment to architects, to sculptors, to overseers of slaves, to men in a hundred departments of human activity ; trade was seeking out new routes for itself, grasping with a myriad hands at the wealth of the East. Men's lives were becoming very full, and with this there must have come to each man the feeling, as it has come with every great expansion in civilization, of the increased importance of his own individual life. A man no longer felt himself a part of his own city state, with his life bound up in the corporate life within those city walls ; he felt himself a separate individual ; his home might be what and where he chose to make it. There were, of course, thousands who had no such feelings, thousands who clung, actually or in idea, to the city state, regretting the past ; many, perhaps, to whom the present was actually repulsive, and who despaired of their world. But that the new philosophies arose out of despair is not easily to be believed. They arose to meet a want ; and the want was a rule of conduct for the individual, who had in a great new world become conscious of the increased importance of his own individual life.

The want was met. Plato and Aristotle had desired above all things to *know* ; and when they turned to politics and ethics, they had dealt—they could not otherwise—with the city state, and with man as a member thereof and in relation

thereto. But man had now become a citizen of the world ; philosophy had to deal with him as such ; and the question he asked of his teachers was, how was he to act in relation to himself. Inevitably the philosophy of *knowledge* was to be replaced by the philosophy of *conduct*. The Cynics, indeed, were already teaching a rule of conduct, of which the essence was, to have done with illusions and to get back to nature ; but they appealed largely to the poor, and most men were probably revolted by their roughness and their neglect of the ordinary decorums and courtesies of life, rather than attracted by the nobility and manliness inherent in their teaching.

From this position arose the new schools. Already by the beginning of the century the Athenian Epicurus had gathered about him in his garden a number of friends ; soon his teaching drew half Athens. Men flocked out of all the other schools to the Garden, and they never returned.<sup>49</sup> The amiable and attractive character of the teacher, conjoined with the charm of what he taught, exactly met the needs of the numerous class to whom the new world was oppressive and peace desirable. How to escape from the delusions which made of that world a nightmare, from the fear of the gods and of death, from the spur of ambition and desire ; how to find happiness in oneself, in the calm of a virtuous and well-ordered mind that had cast off the worry and trouble of external things ; these ideas were greedily absorbed. And if some laid too much stress on one side only of their founder's teaching, and chose to treat physical pleasure as a means to the much-desired happiness, it is possible that the attraction of the school for the average man was not thereby materially diminished.

But Antigonos' choice was not any of these. He turned as little to the Macedonian Colonnade as to the Athenian Academy or Garden. The first two had nothing to teach him ; he was not in search of abstract knowledge, or of large collections of facts, or of a rule of conduct befitting the members of a small city state. The Garden had less than nothing to teach him. What could there be in common

<sup>49</sup> Diog. L. 4, 43.



between the gentle frugal Athenian, who preached freedom from worry, and the rough-spoken hard-drinking Northerner, to whom half the practical problems of a noisy and troublesome universe were already crying for solution? What it was that led Antigonos elsewhere we do not know; perhaps the advice of Menedemos;<sup>50</sup> perhaps it was some touch of greatness in himself that turned him to the greatest man in Athens, or the world.

For the greatest man in Athens at this time was not Polemon or Theophrastos, or even Epicurus. He was a gaunt middle-aged Phoenician, weak of body, swarthy of skin, his face lined and shrunken, who carried his head on one side and loved to sit in the sunshine and eat green figs; Zeno of Kition,<sup>51</sup> the founder of the philosophy called Stoic. Of how and why Zeno came to Athens the accounts vary; it is certain that he was for a while a pupil of Krates the Cynic, and always retained traces of the Cynic teaching, and that he was some time in the city before he opened his own school, toward the end of the archonship of Klearchos, 301/0.<sup>52</sup> His Semitic nature<sup>53</sup> made him very strange in Athens. He was almost an ascetic in food and dress,<sup>54</sup> as the standard of the time went. In the city of talkers he could keep silence and enjoin it upon others.<sup>55</sup> In the city whose idiom set the standard for the world he was careless how he spoke; current coin, he would say, purchased nothing more for having a pretty picture on it; to the end his

<sup>50</sup> Dionysios the Turncoat went from Menedemos to Zeno, Arnim 422 = Diog. L. 7, 166; and Zeno had other pupils from Eretria, Arnim 19=Ael. V. H. 9, 33.

<sup>51</sup> Life of Zeno in Diogenes: as to how much of it is Antigonos, see Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*. Complete collection of biographical data in Arnim. A recent and full account of his life will be found in E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, 1911, pp. 64-77. There is some good criticism still in the notes to Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, p. 36 seq. (Eng. tr.).

<sup>52</sup> The material passage of Apollodoros' chronicle, with Crönert's readings, is given in Beloch 3, 2, 39; Ferguson, *Priests*, 153; Arnim 36 a. On the interpretation see now Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 182, n. 1.

<sup>53</sup> Contemporaries (e.g. Timon, Krates) regularly called him a Phoenician. His father, Mnaseas, must have belonged to the Phoenician colony in Kition, for the name is Manasses (see Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen* (1910), p. 167). His mother might have been Greek.

<sup>54</sup> Diog. L. 7, 16, 26, 27.

<sup>55</sup> Arnim 284. Cf. Diog. L. 7, 23.

Greek was full of solecisms.<sup>56</sup> In that great centre of intellectual activity he was too shy to lecture to a class; he walked in the Pictured Porch with two or three friends only, and if a crowd gathered to hear him he dispersed them by threatening to make a collection.<sup>57</sup> In the home of fashion he gave offence by not repelling the poor and the dirty.<sup>58</sup> His teaching must at first have seemed one gigantic paradox. To a world that wanted, and was prepared to welcome, some practical rule for making its life better and happier, he preached the strangest and most impossible idealism. He bade men live according to nature, while he bruised and lacerated poor human nature with every fresh precept. He flung in men's faces a rule of virtue so unworkable that he had to modify it himself in his own lifetime. He set up as the ideal an imaginary Wise Man so aloof that neither he nor his followers ever pretended to have any chance of attaining to it,<sup>59</sup> and so seemingly ridiculous that every succeeding century riddled it with criticism, each new wit draped it with facile laughter. Small wonder that his followers were at first but few.

Yet he was of those who have moved the world. The very severity of his teaching seems to have acted as a kind of tonic on noble natures; and ideals are perhaps none the worse for being unattainable. To say that nothing mattered but virtue and vice was to the world foolishness; but it was a noble folly that urged men to despise pain and misfortune, and to treat wealth and power, good report and evil report, as matters altogether indifferent. To call all sins equally sinful was a paradox;<sup>60</sup> but it at least emphasized the sinfulness of sin. To preach the suppression of all emotions—if indeed he ever did preach it<sup>61</sup>—was absurd; but at least it

<sup>56</sup> Diog. L. 7, 18; cf. 7, 20.

<sup>57</sup> Diog. L. 7, 14 (Wilamowitz' text in *Antigonos*, p. 117).

<sup>58</sup> Diog. L. 7, 16.

<sup>59</sup> The Wise Man described, Arnim 216–18. The simple and natural meaning of the phrase μέγαν [δ'οὖν] αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ μὴ σοφὸν ὁμο[λογού]σιν γεγενῆναι (in col. 12, l. 19 of the new fragment of Philodemos *περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν*, Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos*, p. 58), is surely this, that the later Stoics admitted that Zeno, though a great man, had never attained to being σοφός, the Wise Man.

<sup>60</sup> *ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα.* Arnim 224; Zeller, *l. c.*, 267.

<sup>61</sup> The view has recently been strongly urged that the Stoics, from the

involved the restraint of the unworthy ones. From the strife and turbulence of the world the Stoic could withdraw into his own soul, and there, even if a slave or a beggar, he could be free, he could be rich, he could be a king; nevertheless, as a citizen of the world, he was rather to go out into the world and there play his part; and as he was directed to find his happiness in virtue, and virtue in his own strength of mind and will, he would probably play his part well. Moreover, when things indifferent—that is to say, everything intermediate between absolute virtue and absolute vice—were at last admitted to belong to two classes, the Stoic became bounden to choose the preferable class; and therewith came into the world the first beginnings, as a philosophic concept, of the idea of duty.<sup>62</sup> The ideal Wise Man was a monster of self-sufficiency, passionless, pitiless, perfect; but in the attempt to reach perfection the Stoic was led to examine the progress which he was making, and therewith came into the world the idea of conscious moral growth.<sup>63</sup> A philosophy which started from the moral consciousness of the individual was led to take up and develop, though it did not actually originate, the notion of conscience.<sup>64</sup> The idea of conscience is still perhaps incomplete; the idea of duty is still far from the categorical imperative; but it was much to get a start made. And if the Stoic, happily, never realized his Wise Man, in the struggle toward him he realized much else; and the men whom he formed were men.<sup>65</sup> Of all the systems of the Greek world, Stoicism is the only one that in any sense comes home to ourselves, or has any affinity to

beginning, *never* taught the suppression of all emotions, but only of the irrational or vicious ones; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, 1910, pp. 18, 102 seq.

<sup>62</sup> See the remarks of Sir A. Grant, in the essay on the Stoics appended to his *Ethics of Aristotle*, pp. 324-5; probably still the most illuminating account of Stoic ethics ever written.

<sup>63</sup> An idea very prominent in Seneca.

<sup>64</sup> συνέδησις. See Lightfoot, *St. Paul and Seneca*, (in his *Epistle to the Philippians*), p. 301. The idea itself, which is not found in the Old Testament, appears in Greek literature, as σύνεσις, first in Euripides (*Or.* 396), from whom, probably, Menander took it (*Stob. Flor.* 24, 3, p. 192, conscience makes cowards of the boldest); but the Stoics first brought it into philosophy.

<sup>65</sup> The Stoics were never tired of insisting on the virility of Zeno's teaching; see Zenodotos' epigram ap. Diog. L. 7, 30, ἀρσενα γὰρ λόγον εἶπες; Seneca *ad H. l.* 12, 4 = Arnim 15, rigida ac virilis sapientia.

the feelings of modern men and women. And it is not merely through its influence upon St. Paul that Stoicism affects the world to-day. The later Stoics travelled far from Zeno; they learnt much that he did not know; nevertheless, without his impulse they would not have been.<sup>66</sup> We may pass over Aristotle, and treat Plato as poetry; but we cannot imagine a time when men, for their own sakes, will cease to read the slave Epictetus and his imperial pupil.

Zeno in his own life attempted in many ways to practise what he preached, and rather more.<sup>67</sup> He taught self-control, and his own passed into a proverb.<sup>68</sup> He taught freedom from false pride, and gave an object lesson of it by attending the lectures of a rival.<sup>69</sup> In his theory all men were foolish and sinful; in fact, he taught that one must try to find the good in people and not the bad.<sup>70</sup> He certainly never said that one should love one's enemy; ~~but he did something very like it.~~<sup>71</sup> He uttered some extravagant paradoxes; but ~~his life was held to be the pattern of temperance.~~<sup>72</sup> This was the Zeno to whom Antigonos turned;<sup>73</sup> and we would gladly know more of their relationship. The friendship between the full-blooded prince and the shy philosopher must have been a quaint one. It is known what Zeno thought of friendship; a friend was a second self.<sup>74</sup> Antigonos sought him out whenever he came to Athens, and loaded him with presents, with which the philosopher, true to his own teaching, refused to be either pleased or displeased, treating them as things altogether indifferent.<sup>75</sup> He would drag Zeno off

<sup>66</sup> See, inter alia, the valuable testimony of Apollodoros for *his* epoch, fr. 78 Jacoby.

<sup>67</sup> Perfectly expressed in the Athenian decree for him, Diog. L. 7, 10; see ch. 10, p. 310.

<sup>68</sup> Poseidippos ap. Diog. L. 7, 28, Ζήνωνος ἐγκρατέστερον.

<sup>69</sup> Polemon; Diog. L. 7, 25. On τίφος, against which he preached (Diog. L. 7, 22 = Arnim 317), see ch. 8, n. 70.

<sup>70</sup> Diog. L. 7, 19.

<sup>71</sup> Arnim 297.

<sup>72</sup> If not σοφός he was σώφρων. See the Athenian decree for him, ap. Diog. L. 7, 11, ἐπαινέσαι μὲν Ζήνωνα . . . ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ σωφροσύνης; and the epigram of Antipatros of Sidon (Diog. L. 7, 29),

τὰν δὲ ποτ' ἄστρο  
ἀτραπιτὸν μούνας εὔρε σαοφροσύνας.

<sup>73</sup> He was considered Zeno's pupil, Ael. V. H. 12, 25, Ἀντίγονος Ζήνωνος.

<sup>74</sup> Diog. L. 7, 23 = Arnim 324; ἄλλος ἐγώ. <sup>75</sup> Ib. 7, 15.



to some boisterous supper-party, not at all to the taste of that retiring ascetic, who would slip quietly away as soon as he could.<sup>76</sup> Zeno understood absolutely how to keep his independence and dignity with his over-mastering pupil. He rebuked him severely for drunkenness.<sup>77</sup> He refused at a later time to make any petitions to him on behalf of third persons, though he knew they would be granted as soon as asked.<sup>78</sup> To one who quoted at him the verse that he who associated with a tyrant became a slave, he replied that it depended entirely on your own state of mind.<sup>79</sup> With great skill he avoided politics, and escaped the risks of his school becoming stamped as pro-Macedonian, like the Colonnade;<sup>80</sup> and the Athenians, though slow to learn his value, ended by honouring him no less than did Antigonos.<sup>81</sup>

Yet it was not merely a case of the attraction of two opposites. It is perhaps not quite right to call Antigonos definitely a Stoic, though his sympathy with some of the Stoic tenets, and the amount which he owed to Zeno, will appear when we come to consider his character as king of Macedonia: but it may be noted here that to some small extent his mind and Zeno's worked on parallel lines, and that some of the things which Zeno could tell him fitted in with what he had already learnt in the school of life. If we seek the bond of union between these two opposite natures, we shall probably find that it consisted in a kind of savage honesty common to both, a desire for the thing as it really is.<sup>82</sup> It is certain that Antigonos, whose admiration and respect for Zeno knew no bounds, refused to recognize between them any difference of rank or race, or anything but the generous rivalry of a common aim.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Ib. 7, 13; cf. Athen. 12, 603 d.

<sup>77</sup> Ael. V. H. 9, 26 = Arnim 289.

<sup>78</sup> Diog. L. 7, 14, with the note in Wilamowitz' *Antigonos*, p. 117. The story, as told about Demochares, has an improbable ring; but see Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 172.

<sup>79</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 33 D = Arnim 219. He altered Sophokles to οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος, ἦν ἐλεύθερος μόλη.

<sup>80</sup> Ael. V. H. 7, 14, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ Ζήνων ἐπὲρ Ἀθηναίων ἐπολιτεύσατο πρὸς Ἀντίγονον, seems to me to be in contradiction with everything else we know.

<sup>81</sup> Ch. 10, p. 309.

<sup>82</sup> For Antigonos, see ch. 8, p. 250.

<sup>83</sup> Diog. L. 7, 14, 15; Ael. V. H. 9, 26 = Arnim 289, Ζήνων . . . δι' αἰδοῦς ἄγαν καὶ σπουδῆς ἤγεν Ἀντίγονος; and especially *Ind. Stoic. Herc.* col. ix

Somewhat such, however imperfectly sketched, were the teachers of the future king.

= Arnim 24, πρὸς) μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνον (Zeno), ὡς πρὸς ἴσον τε καὶ ὅμοιον, αὐτῷ (Antigonos) φιλονεικίαν ἡδεΐαν καὶ κεχαρισμένην ὑποκεῖσθαι, τὸν (δ') ἄνδρα θαυμάζειν καὶ τι(μῶ)ν καθ' ὑπερβολήν. ἴσον and ὅμοιον are to some extent Stoic catchwords (see Zeller, *l.c.*, p. 267, n. 1): all good actions are *equal*, but all are not *alike*. Antigonos, however, treats his friend not only as an equal, but an equal without any dissimilarity of rank, race, &c.

## CHAPTER II

### THE EMPIRE OF DEMETRIOS ON LAND

DURING the five years which elapsed from 294 to the peace of 289, Demetrios was employed in extending the new Empire which he had won, and in attempting to consolidate his forces for a yet greater undertaking. It may be emphasized at the commencement that his kingship of Macedonia was never much more than an accident, and that he never regarded the country in any other light than that of a starting-place from which to recover his father's Asiatic empire and perhaps aim afresh at the rule of the world. What he is seeking during these five confused years is so to order matters in the Balkan Peninsula that he shall acquire sufficient force for his undertaking, and shall be at liberty to use it. He does not indeed pursue his design with unbroken plan or unswerving tenacity; such was not Demetrios' nature. But he does pursue it. The Greek possessions which required looking after are during this period under the government of Antigonos; Macedonia seems largely to have looked after itself. Demetrios had no fear of interruption from Kassandros' heirs. Kassandros' surviving nephew, Antipatros, son of his dead brother Philip, and his dead son Alexander's widow, Lysandra, had taken refuge at the court of Lysimachos: according to one version, which may perhaps be believed, Kassandros' son Antipatros was still alive and there also. He had married Lysimachos' daughter Eurydike; and the king of Thrace now married Lysandra to his own son Agathokles. Lysimachos was a man of long views; it might one day be of service to him that he had thus gathered into his own hands all the claims of the house of Kassandros.

In the spring of 293 Demetrios turned southward to conquer or receive the submission of Thessaly; and on the Gulf of Pagasai he founded himself a new capital to bear his

name. For one who desired to be a Greek as well as a Macedonian king, Pella was too far to the north; Kassandreia was better placed, but identified with the fallen dynasty. To found a capital on conquered territory may seem strange; but in fact, as will be explained later, the kings of Macedonia regarded their title to Thessaly as perfectly legal, as, in form, it was. The exact site of Demetrias is unfortunately unknown. It may be accepted with confidence that it was not the town situated on the hill of Goritza, near Volo; it is perhaps just as difficult to believe that it was only a new name for Pagasai, seeing that Pagasai retained its separate identity.<sup>1</sup> It may be that the actual city of Demetrias was rather in the nature of an enlargement of, and comprehended, Pagasai, somewhat as London comprehends Westminster; but further excavation alone can solve its problem. Politically, however, Demetrias was something greater than its actual stones. Demetrios, in founding it, seems to have consciously imitated the arrangement which had originally made his beloved Athens into a great city. The town was an example on a large scale of a synoikismos, the combination of several communities into one; and, beside Pagasai, the greater part of the little towns of Magnesia—eleven at least are known—became members of Demetrias,<sup>2</sup> perhaps bearing much the same relation to the capital as the Attic demes to Athens; and Demetrios and his successors took over the conduct of the national Magnesian festival, the Hetairideia, traditionally founded by Jason.<sup>3</sup> Only a few small towns in

<sup>1</sup> Demetrias has been generally identified with Goritza, about a mile from Volo; the city there excavated is described, as Demetrias, by C. Friedrich, *Ath. Mitt.*, 1905, p. 221. I think Beloch has shown that this was not Demetrias; *Klio*, 1911, p. 442. He himself identifies Demetrias with (a possibly enlarged) Pagasai, on the strength of Pliny, *N. H.* 4, 8 (15) (oppidum Pagasa, idem postea Demetrias dictum), and other evidence. The difficulty is, that Pagasai kept its identity and name as a *κῶμη* of Demetrias (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 790). Demetrias therefore can hardly have been *merely* identical with Pagasai, enlarged or not. Only excavation can help.

<sup>2</sup> *κῶμαι*. See *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 790 = *I. G.* ix, 2, 1109; Strabo 9, c. 436. These two sources combined give twelve names, Pagasai, Iolkos, Halos, Aiolos, Spalauthra, Korope, Nelia, Ormenios, Rhizous, Olizon, Boibe, Sepias. This synoikismos explains why Demetrias so dominated the later Magnesian league; at the same time, without some independent towns there could have been no league. See Dittenberger's notes.

<sup>3</sup> Hegesandros ap. Athen. 13. 572 d.

the north of Magnesia seem to have retained their independence; and the city territory included the whole of the long Magnesian promontory extending to Cape Sepias. It was as well for the Lord of Demetrias to have in his own hand the land connexions with the important Euboea.

It is not known whether Demetrias ever became a seat of art or learning, of wealth or commerce. But on one point tradition is clear. It was a very great fortress; a virgin fortress, impregnable to any direct assault. From their palace in this stronghold, like eagles from their eyrie, the Antigonid kings could look south across the Gulf of Pagasai to the Euripos, where lay the second of the three fortresses—Demetrias, Chalkis, Corinth—which gave them their grip on Greece: while northward it dominated the mountains as far as the Pass of Tempe, which gave the Macedonian entrance into Thessaly.<sup>4</sup> The eagle, poised in the air over their stronghold, would see behind it Pelion rising fold upon fold, and over Pelion the pointed cone of Ossa, and on the north horizon, serrated against the sky, the snows of Olympos. It is the ladder of the Aloidai, lying as they dropped it; the ladder which the giants, in Homer's story, raised on end in order to scale heaven and master the gods. They raised it Olympos uppermost, with its foot on earth near Demetrias; a fitting site for the capital of the last and greatest of those who dreamt of climbing to the highest, and mastering the undivided heritage of Alexander.

Passing on southward, Demetrios invaded Boeotia, and made a treaty on moderate terms with the Boeotians; but with the summer the Spartan Kleonymos came north with an army, and Boeotia rose in revolt. The leader in the movement was Pisis of Thespiæ, a man who had been prominent in the state since, in 313/2, he had helped Ptolemaios, the general of Antigonos I, to drive Kassandros' garrison out of Opous, an exploit celebrated by an *ex-voto* of the Boeotian confederacy at Delphi. Now, from an anti-Kassandrean and friend of the Antigonids, he had become an anti-Demetrian, a change of view which was to be common enough in the Greek world since Demetrios had taken Kassandros'

<sup>4</sup> Strabo, *l.c.*



place. Demetrios met the revolt with his usual energy; he brought up his siege train; Kleonymos, unable to face him, retired; Thebes surrendered. Boeotia, as will be seen presently, was so necessary a part of Demetrios' state system that he behaved with every clemency; and though a war indemnity was exacted, Pisis was not only pardoned but made polemarch of his native city. As governor of the country Demetrios left one of his best officers, Hieronymos of Kardia, the future historian.<sup>5</sup>

These events had occupied the year 293. Next spring Lysimachos started on his expedition against Dromichaetes, king of the Getae; by summer, Demetrios had the news that the king of Thrace was a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. Demetrios at once set out for Thrace, hoping to seize the kingdom in Lysimachos' absence; but on his way he received information both that Dromichaetes had released his prisoner and that Boeotia had again risen. He returned as quickly as he had gone, to find that his son was already master of the situation. Antigonos had collected what troops he could, defeated the Boeotians in open field, and shut them up in Thebes. It appears that this his first battle was an extremely hard-won victory, if it be here that belongs the death of the Boeotian cavalry-leader Eugnotos of Akraiphia. The inscription on his statue recorded that the Boeotians were outnumbered, that he himself charged eighteen times at the head of his squadron, and at the end flung himself on the enemy's spears, disdaining to survive defeat; Antigonos restored the body of the patriot, unstripped and unspoiled, to lie in the tombs of his ancestors.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Generally, Plut. *Dem.* 39. Delphian *ex-voto* for Pisis; Homolle, *B. C. H.* 1900, p. 170. The people of Oropos set him up a statue in the Amphiaraiion, dedication 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1886, p. 54, no. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 39. Epigram on the statue of Eugnotos at Akraiphia, erected by his wife and daughter, representing him (it seems) charging on horseback; P. Perdrizet in *B. C. H.* 1900, p. 70, who suggested that it belongs to this battle. It does not appear where else it could be placed. The 'enemies' of l. 12 are then Antigonos:

τὸ[μ μ]ὲν ἄρ' ἀσκήλευτον, ἐλεύθερον αἶμα χέοντα,  
δῶκαν ἐπὶ προγόνων ἥρια δυσμενέεις.

For the dates from 294 to 292 see generally Beloch 3, 2, 198 seq.; A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, 221.



Boeotia, however, had not risen without prospect of support; she had made overtures to Demetrios' old protégé, Pyrrhos king of Epeiros, and possibly, though this is quite uncertain, to Aetolia. While Demetrios was pressing on the siege of Thebes, Pyrrhos attempted to create a diversion by raiding Thessaly. He actually penetrated as far as Thermopylai; but he had not yet got to the length of facing his former benefactor in the field, and he retired quickly when Demetrios, leaving Antigonos to continue the siege, appeared in pursuit. Demetrios did not follow him, and returning to Thebes threw new energy into the assault on the town. He brought up the celebrated Helepolis or 'Taker of Cities', a huge ironclad tower of his own invention, running, or rather crawling,—(for it took a month, it is said, to travel a furlong),<sup>7</sup>—on eight wheels, and moved by 3,400 picked men to the sound of the trumpet; it was divided into nine stages, each furnished with portholes for the discharge of different sorts of missiles, and these again protected by mechanically controlled ports made of leather bags stuffed with wool, impervious to stones thrown from catapults. Thebes held out strongly against the Taker of Cities, and Demetrios' attacks became so expensive that Antigonos felt compelled to remonstrate with him on the unnecessary waste of life. Demetrios flew into a rage, and far from sparing his men's lives began merely to expose his own, and ended by getting a bolt from a catapult through the neck. Nothing, however, would loosen his grip; and some time in the summer of 291 the protracted siege ended in the fall of Thebes. Demetrios again showed clemency of a sort, hanging only thirteen and banishing a few others; but Thebes was deprived of self-government and of course strongly garrisoned. Boeotia did not trouble Demetrios again.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Doubtless a great exaggeration. If it could be moved at all, it could be moved more than seven yards a day.

<sup>8</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 39, 40; *Pyrrh.* 7; Diod. 21. 14. The Helepolis is described Diod. 20, 91, doubtless from Hieronymos, who had seen it; see also Plut. *Dem.* 21 and Athen. 10, 415 a, and Beloch 3, 1, 233, n. 1. On the attitude of Aetolia, Beloch, *l.c.* I think, from the wording of the *ithyphallos* (Douris ap. Athen. 6, 253 d) that in 290 Demetrios had not yet been embroiled with Aetolia, consequently she did not help Boeotia.—Dates: It seems certain that the *ithyphallos* was sung on Demetrios' return from Kerkyra (Demochares ap. Athen. 6, 253 b), that the Pythia celebrated by Demetrios at

The trouble in Boeotia had not been without its effect on Athens. The traditional position of parties there<sup>9</sup> had been, that the democrats stood for an Athens free and independent, even if not Imperial; while the oligarchs had been the friends of Macedonia, and their aim (they would have said) before all things was peace and good government. From 317 to 307 Kassandros had ruled Athens through the oligarchs and Demetrios of Phaleron; peace and good government had indeed been the lot of Athens, presented to her on the points of Macedonian lances. In 307 Demetrios had freed the city, and been welcomed by the democrats with open arms as their helper against Kassandros; the most violent of the oligarchs of Kassandros' faction had been banished. But some of the democrats,—Stratokles, Dromokleides, and their friends,—had disgraced their cause and their city by the most noisome adulation of Demetrios, (though we may suspect that their misdeeds have lost nothing in transmission); the party began to break up; there were changes in the government, and in 303 one of the most prominent men among the democrats, Demosthenes' nephew Demochares, who had kept his self-respect, was exiled. He seems, as was natural in an opponent of Demetrios, to have gone to Lysimachos' court.<sup>10</sup>

Athens were those of 290 (Beloch 3, 2, 198), and that the *ithyphallos* belongs to the same year as the Pythia. Consequently Demetrios went to Kerkyra either autumn or spring 291/0, returning spring or summer 290. I cannot believe he went before Thebes fell, therefore Thebes fell summer or autumn 291. I cannot follow Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 30, pp. 73, 108, in putting Demetrios' visit to Kerkyra 289. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 10 does not show this; and Demochares was a contemporary. See also Klotzsch, p. 184, n. 1; A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 221.

<sup>9</sup> On the parties at Athens in the early third century see Ferguson in *Klio*, 5 (1905), p. 155 seq., with E. Meyer's Nachwort, a most valuable paper. I do not know if the author would agree with me that after 293/2 the old labels lose their meaning, and we get in effect two new parties.

<sup>10</sup> Demochares' banishment: Plut. *Dem.* 24; Laches' decree (Plut. *Vit. X. Orat.* 851 D); Ferguson *l. c.*, and *Priests*, 141-2. (He had been active in 305/4; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 181, l. 34.) The point is, how to reconcile Plutarch's statement, that he was banished by Stratokles, with that of Laches, ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον. Ferguson (*Klio*, 5, 174) does it by supposing that Demochares held Stratokles responsible for the oligarchy of 301, it being a reaction against him. I think myself, with Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 30, 106, and many others, that Laches refers to the power behind Stratokles, Demetrios. When Laches wrote the words he looked back on two events, that Demetrios had ended by turning to the oligarchs and that Athens, under democratic government, had just fought a hard war with Gonatas; and he was praising an enemy of both kings. And if Demetrios was instrumental

With the fall of Demetrios at Ipsos fell the democratic government in Athens. It was succeeded in 301/0, not by the oligarchs,—all the extreme oligarchs were in exile,—but by a government of moderates, men of different shades of opinion but who on the whole stood half-way between the Kassandrian oligarchs on the one hand and the vehement partisans of Demetrios,—Stratokles and his friends,—on the other. They governed Athens from 301/0 to 296/5; their aim was to be independent of all kings, and their ambition to lead a quiet life.<sup>11</sup> It was a good aim; but they shared the common fallacy that it takes two to make a quarrel, and they believed that if they threw away the sword none other would bear the sword against them. They threw away the sword accordingly; Athens renounced the compulsory military service which she had instituted after Chaironeia.<sup>12</sup> The reward came quickly enough, for in 296/5 Kassandros' friend Lachares, perhaps at the head of the more oligarchic section of the moderates, succeeded in a *coup d'État* and made himself tyrant,<sup>13</sup> to be expelled after a severe siege by Demetrios.

Demetrios in forming his new government in 295/4 aimed at bringing about a union of parties. For a moment it seemed as if he might accomplish this. Naturally he looked primarily to the democrats, his friends of aforetime; Stratokles again came to the fore, and a strong democrat and opponent of Kassandros' old friends, Olympiodoros, became eponymous archon for 294/3. But Demetrios sought also to win the moderate oligarchs, the men who had governed Athens since 301 and had been overthrown by Lachares. Phaidros of Sphettos he gained outright, as will be seen; and in 294/3 Stratokles moved a decree in honour of another moderate

in banishing Demochares, we see why the latter refused to return to Athens under the amnesty of 293/2, or until Demetrios fell.—On Demochares generally, ch. 4, p. 6. That he went to Lysimachos is Ferguson's most probable conjecture, *Athens*, 137.

<sup>11</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 30. Ferguson calls this government oligarchic; Meyer, a moderate democracy. It seems to have been served by moderates of both shades, e.g. Phaidros of Sphettos, ex-oligarch, and Philippides of Kephale, moderate democrat.

<sup>12</sup> Ferguson, *Priests*, 162–6.

<sup>13</sup> Lachares, the friend of Kassandros (Paus. 1, 25, 7), must have been an oligarch; Ferguson, *Klio*, 5, 160, inclines to this view.

oligarch, Philippides of Paiania, who had been active under the late government.<sup>14</sup>

But two things overthrew Demetrios' plans. The first was that in 294 he himself became king of Macedonia and so stood in the place of Kassandros; the other was that in 293/2 he carried his idea to its logical conclusion by issuing a general amnesty and recalling the friends of Kassandros, the old oligarchs who had gone into exile on the fall of Demetrios of Phaleron.<sup>15</sup> The consequences were immediately seen. All the better elements of the democratic party fell away from Demetrios, and indeed took up an attitude of hostility to the new king of Macedonia, who had recalled the Kassandreans; Demochares even refused to avail himself of the amnesty and remained in exile. This left Demetrios nothing but Stratokles and the rump of the party, and inevitably threw him into the arms of the moderate oligarchs, the men of 301, who were not necessarily hostile to Macedonia on principle. This was the main line taken by the new division of parties; but in fact there was some cross-division, for every man in Athens had to reconsider his political position. Henceforth the old labels of democrat and oligarch lose much of their meaning; the dividing line of parties was now tending to become simply this: were you for or against the house of Antigonos? In answering this question men considered their individual desires as well as their former party names. The result was the formation at Athens of two new parties: a new Nationalist party, of which the nucleus was composed of the sturdier wing of the old democrats, and who were to come into power on Demetrios' fall; and a party of the 'king's friends', whom it will be easiest to call pro-Macedonians, and who undoubtedly tended to absorb oligarchs of all shades. That each party, like every party, had a more advanced and a more moderate wing, goes without saying. But, taken as a whole, the pro-Macedonians were the party that was to support Antigonos Gonatas throughout his long reign; and fortu-

<sup>14</sup> *I. G.* ii, 302. This Philippides (not to be confounded with Philippides of Kephale) had in 299/8 moved a decree in honour of Poseidippos for helping the envoys sent to Kassandros; *I. G.* ii, 297 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 188.

<sup>15</sup> Dion. Hal. *Deinarchos*, 9.



nately the career of one of them can be traced with exactitude.

In 275/4, when Antigonos was firmly in the saddle, the pro-Macedonians put out what may be called the political confession of faith of their party in the guise of a decree in honour of one of their most prominent men, Phaidros of Sphettos.<sup>16</sup> His father Thymochares had been a devoted adherent of Kassandros, to whom he had rendered many services on sea and land as commander of the Athenian contingents that aided Kassandros against the elder Antigonos; and Phaidros also started life as an oligarch, a friend of Kassandros.<sup>17</sup> He seems, however, to have managed in 307 to avoid banishment, and he served as one of the generals under the moderate Government of 301/0-296/5: and he continued to serve under Lachares when the latter made himself master of the city.<sup>18</sup> On Lachares' fall he again managed to avoid banishment; he went over to Demetrios. He must have possessed considerable pliancy and considerable popularity to have enabled him to steer so successfully between Scylla and Charybdis. However, to his credit, having once joined Demetrios, he never changed again. The king bridged over any awkwardness there might have been in utilizing Phaidros' services by permitting him to be sent as Athenian envoy to Egypt, to seek corn for the empty granaries of the city; and by 292, after his return, his political development had completed itself, and the oligarch, the friend

<sup>16</sup> *I. G.* ii, 331 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 213; Polyektos' year. It is necessary to emphasize the rather obvious fact that the words of a decree must be construed with some regard to the circumstances under which it was passed and the political complexion of those who proposed it. That this decree was passed by a pro-Macedonian government is abundantly proved both by the single superintendent of the administration and by the wealth of excised references to Demetrios. l. 38 Phaidros persuaded the people to contribute [what Demetrios wished]; l. 43 he spoke and did what good he could on behalf of the people [and of King Demetrios, his queen and family, cf. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 192, ll. 10-12; *I. G.* ii, 5, 323 b]; l. 49 he obeyed the decrees of the boule and demos [and carried out Demetrios' policy, &c., with an allusion probably to his fall]. For another set of suggestions, see Ferguson, *Athens*, 142, n. 1. But I cannot take the references down so late as he does; Phaidros could not hold office after Demetrios fell; on Xenophon's year see App. 2, p. 422.

<sup>17</sup> l. 19 τὴν αὐτὴν αἴρεσιν ἔχων τοῖς προγόν(γο)νοισι.

<sup>18</sup> Follows from his being general ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν twice in Nikias' year; see Ferguson, *Priests*, 139.

of Kassandros, had finally become a moderate, the friend of Demetrios. He held office regularly during Demetrios' rule, and the party emphasized his loyalty to the king up to that monarch's fall.<sup>19</sup> We shall meet him once later.

In 293/2 Demetrios, as already mentioned, issued a general amnesty, under which he recalled Kassandros' friends, the old oligarchs banished in 307. In what temper they returned may be guessed from many a similar event in Greek history. In 292 trouble was threatening at Athens, and the Boeotian revolt can hardly have been unconnected with the designs of the old oligarchs. Phaidros, however, who seems to have been the able man in the Government, kept his head; he succeeded alike in preventing any *coup d'État* on the part of the returned exiles, and in keeping Athens clear of the war, a service to Demetrios as well as a service to the city; and when he laid down his office at the end of the year it could be declared by his friends, without any overwhelming absurdity, that he left the city governed by its own laws under the form of democracy, and left it, as a friend of the king might construe the word, 'free.'<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> He held a number of undated generalships, though some may fall 301/0-296/5. Two of his generalships, under Kimon and Xenophon, are emphasized with dates and particulars, both for services to Demetrios.

<sup>20</sup> For various interpretations of the *καιροὶ δύσκολοι* of *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 213 see Beloch iii, 1, 233, n. 1; Ferguson, *Priests*, 150, *Athens*, 142. I go part of the way with Ferguson; it seems to me that the primary reference is certainly to the return of the banished oligarchs. The phrase is perhaps more applicable to a *στάσις* than to a war; but the real point is the words *καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατουμένην αὐτόνομον παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς νόμους κυρίου τοῖς μεθ' ἐαυτὸν*, which seem to have been rather overlooked. How could a member of Demetrios' oligarchic government *circ.* 292/1 keep the city 'free and democratic'? The solution is, to look at it from a pro-Macedonian point of view (see n. 16), the point of view of such men as after the Lamian war had honoured Antipatros as a 'benefactor' of Athens (A. Wilhelm, *Jahresh.* 1908, p. 90, no. 5). Phaidros, then, had to do with men who would have abrogated the existing laws, abolished the form of a democracy (it has nothing to do with the democratic *party*), and 'enslaved' the city. These are not external enemies, but men meditating an unconstitutional government, whether a close oligarchy or a tyranny. The pro-Macedonian authors of the decree, composing it under the suzerainty of Gonatas, could not for their own sakes admit that the city, though garrisoned by and governed for Demetrios, was anything but 'free' and 'democratically governed'; all *forms* of course remained. The returned oligarchs in 293/2 did not manage to set up an oligarchic government; Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 30, 1905, p. 105, on Philochoros fr. 146. The words *κοινῆς σωτηρίας* imply that the returned oligarchs were hostile alike to Demetrios and to the freedom of Athens. At the same time, by 275/4 they were merging, wholly or in part, in the pro-Macedonian



The fall of Thebes gave Demetrios peace for the moment and leisure to settle his score with Pyrrhos, who had made on him an unprovoked attack. An opportunity, as it happened, offered itself of repaying Pyrrhos for his raid while still avoiding an actual war with Epeiros. Pyrrhos, after the death of his Egyptian wife Antigone, had married Lanassa, the daughter of Agathokles of Syracuse, who brought him Kerkyra as her dower; but Pyrrhos held the same polygamic views as Demetrios, and for political reasons proceeded also to wed Birkenna, the daughter of the Illyrian king Bardylis. Lanassa's pride refused to endure the concurrence of the barbarian woman, though she were a king's daughter; she ran away to her dower town Kerkyra, and from there, being ambitious and no more overburdened with morality than her husband, she issued an invitation to Demetrios to come and see her. Demetrios, notoriously easy-going on the subject of wives, came, saw, and married Lanassa; she put Kerkyra into his hands.<sup>21</sup>

party; (in 262/1 Antigonos made a son of Demetrios of Phaleron thesmothetes); hence their new friends refer but vaguely to their former shortcomings. In the mouth of a nationalist, *σωτηρία* and *ἐλευθέρια* would import a revolt from Demetrios (see App. 2, p. 420); nothing of the sort is of course in question here. I think Kimon's date must fall as soon as possible after the return of the exiles, i.e. 292/1 rather than 291/0; and as the reference to a money contribution for getting in the crops implies an external enemy *also* (cf. *I.G.* ii, 334 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 232, ll. 10, 11), the reference here must be to the Boeotian revolt.

<sup>21</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 10 = Demochares ap. Athen. 6, 253 b. Pyrrhos certainly married Birkenna, as Plutarch says (*Pyrrh.* 9); and her son Helenos is treated as legitimate (ib.). Equally, Demetrios married Lanassa; she sent for him *δεομένη γάμων βασιλικῶν*, and was not likely to hand over Kerkyra on any other terms. Beloch disputes this last (3, 1, 214, n. 1), taking the view, which I cannot think well founded, that the kings never had two wives at once (3, 1, 380, n. 4). Was Phila then twice divorced and twice remarried? There is not a hint of it in the tradition; and she was most certainly Demetrios' wife in 307, when he married the Athenian Eurydike. All it comes to is, that he tried to prevent two queens meeting: Plut. *Dem.* 14 is explicit enough. Pyrrhos married daughters of Bardylis, Audoleon, and Keraunos within ten years: were some kings content to give their daughters as concubines? Did Lanassa's father Agathokles cultivate good relations with Demetrios on those terms? Did Lanassa make her state entry into Athens as Demeter without being married? Pyrrhos and Demetrios were as frank polygamists as Philip II and Alexander; and the conventional stuff that came to do duty for the history of Pyrrhos is nowhere more amusingly illustrated than in Justin's reference to his *vita sancta* (25, 5, 3). The question is examined at length by E. Breccia in Beloch's *Studi di storia antica*, fasc. 4 (1903), p. 151 seq., who decides that the first generation of the successors were polygamists, but with no very regular system.

It was probably in the spring of 290 that Demetrios went to Kerkyra, though it is possible that he passed the winter of 291/0 there with Lanassa. For the moment his thoughts had turned to the west; he occupied himself in cultivating good relations with his new father-in-law, Agathokles; the tyrant sent his son to Demetrios, who sent him back in the company of his trusted friend Oxythemis, son of Hippostratos, to ratify the treaty which had been negotiated. Demetrios also planned to cut a canal through the Isthmus of Corinth, a work which had to wait twenty-two centuries for its accomplishment; but the story that he sent an embassy to Rome to complain of some pirates of Antium, whom he had captured, is at least doubtful. He seems also to have acquired Leukas; whether by conquest from Pyrrhos, or by gift from Lanassa, cannot be said.<sup>22</sup>

Pyrrhos took the loss of his wife philosophically enough, a matter on which he was presently to be taunted by the other kings; but the questions at issue between himself and Demetrios were the outcome merely of an inordinate ambition on either side,<sup>23</sup> and Lanassa was far less important than Kerkyra. But the loss of Kerkyra meant war; and Pyrrhos strengthened himself for the inevitable conflict by a definite alliance with the Aetolians. Aetolia, prompted alike by ambition and policy, was ready enough to join him; and Demetrios' absence at Kerkyra was her opportunity. Whether it was during the winter of 291/0 that Delphi came into Aetolian hands, or whether this most important event is to be placed earlier, is quite uncertain; but at any rate the Aetolians, in the summer of 290, used their authority over

<sup>22</sup> The treaty; Diod. 21, 15.—Oxythemis, *ib.*; Athenian decree for him, *I. G.* ii, 243 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 179; see Athen. 6, 253 a and 14, 614 f.—The story given by Herakleides Lembos (Athen. 13, 578 b) is a demonstrable tissue of absurdities; there is no ground for the view of Niese (1, 370) and Beloch (3, 1, 214, n. 2) that the Antigonos there referred to is meant for Gonatas.—The canal: Plin. *N. H.* 4, 4 (5); Strabo 1, 54.—Rome: Strabo 5, 232. But Rome in 290 could not be said *στρατηγείν τῆς Ἰταλίας*; and in 337 she had captured Antium, burnt its ships, and forbidden its people the sea.—Leukas: I read Demochares (ap. Athen. 6, 253 b, c) to mean that Leukas stood in the same relation to Demetrios as Kerkyra. Beloch 3, 2, 314 made it part of Lanassa's dower: Klotzsch, p. 148, n. 2 and p. 185, makes it part of Akarnania throughout. It is impossible to say.—Dating, see n. 8.

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch's life of Pyrrhos is a treatise on this vice of *πλεονεξία*.

Delphi to fortify the passes and exclude all adherents of Demetrios, including the Athenians, from the Pythian games of that year.<sup>24</sup>

Demetrios returned to Athens in the summer of 290; he probably brought Lanassa with him. It appears that she desired to be initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries; and the two made a state entry into Athens as the divine pair Demeter and Demetrios.<sup>25</sup> Demetrios found excitement running high over the insolent action of the Aetolians. Not merely were his friends excluded from Delphi; it was reported that some of them, probably some Athenian citizens, who happened to be there, had been illtreated, and had only been saved by the intervention of Aischron son of Proxenos, a man whom Athens afterwards rewarded with citizenship. Popular songs were sung in the streets, invoking Demetrios as a god, and begging him to put down this new Sphinx which was despoiling Hellas, and to restore peace. Demetrios agreed that this was his business. But as Athenians could not go to Delphi, the king took the extraordinary course of celebrating an opposition Pythian festival at Athens; he then returned to Macedonia to prepare for the inevitable campaign.<sup>26</sup>

Pyrrhos had out-manœuvred his teacher; he had committed Demetrios to the difficult business of an attack on

<sup>24</sup> It has often been supposed that the decisive step which made Aetolia supreme over Delphi was taken about this time. See, however, Edmund Bauer, *Untersuchungen zur Geographie und Geschichte der nordwestlichen Landschaften Griechenlands nach den delphischen Inschriften*, p. 30 seq., who argues for the possibility of an earlier date, perhaps *circ.* 315. It may have been a gradual process; for even after 279 their authority did not reach its maximum for many years, see ch. 7, p. 210. This seems also to be the view of A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, pp. 216, 224; the Aetolians did not occupy Delphi till 291, but had dominated it for some years previously. Klotzsch dates the occupation 293 (p. 179, n. 1), as a set-off to Demetrios' occupation of Northern Phokis (which is now certain, see n. 29).

<sup>25</sup> A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, pp. 221, 222. Certainly the name *Δήμητρα* in the third line of the ithyphallos (see next note) is a conjecture to fill a gap; but *some* goddess entered with Demetrios, and if Svoronos is right in seeing Lanassa as Demeter on certain pieces of Kerkyra (quoted by Reinach, *l. c.*), the conjecture becomes almost certain. The Eleusinia were those of 290.

<sup>26</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 40; Demochares ap. Athen. 6, 253 b. The ithyphallos; Douris ap. Athen. 6, 253 d. The real Sphinx harried Thebes; the new Sphinx, Aetolia, harried Thebes and all other friends of Demetrios; therefore Thebes was already his (and not on Aetolia's side, as Beloch 3, 2, 200).—Aischron, *I. G.* ii, 309; grant of Athenian citizenship in Diokles' year 288/7 for something he did at Delphi.

Aetolia, with himself in reserve. This country of mountains and difficult forest paths, with few important towns and an elastic federal constitution, resembled one of those amorphous organisms which can be slashed in any direction and close again after the blow; magnificently adapted for guerrilla warfare, Aetolia could not be subdued by a blow at the heart, for heart there was none. Demetrios stormed through the country, laying it waste; and leaving his general Pantauchos with a large part of his force behind, he passed on to look for Pyrrhos, while Pyrrhos started to look for Demetrios. They missed each other; Demetrios did some raiding in Epeiros, but Pyrrhos' Aetolian allies brought him down on Pantauchos. The ensuing battle was a complete victory for the Epeiroi, and established his already considerable reputation as a general; he himself struck down Pantauchos with his own hand.<sup>27</sup> Demetrios was forced to evacuate Epeiros and Aetolia and return to Macedonia. Here he fell ill; and while he lay in Pella, Pyrrhos raided the country as far as Aigai, the old capital. This roused Demetrios from his sick bed; Pyrrhos fled before him, but was attacked on his retreat and lost part of his army.

To Demetrios the whole thing was an annoying episode, a hindrance to the development of his real ambition. He therefore came to an arrangement with Pyrrhos, on what terms is not known, except that it must have included the Aetolians and recognized their possession of Delphi; Demetrios kept Kerkyra. By the late autumn of 289 Demetrios was at last at peace with all men.<sup>28</sup>

Demetrios had at this time, to outward seeming, the strongest power in the world, or at any rate the world east of the Adriatic. He had taken scant pains, it is true, to secure his position in Macedonia itself; he seems to have taken Macedonia for granted; but he had displayed considerable energy in carrying out his policy in Greece. His policy was fairly simple; he desired to have a definite preponderance of

<sup>27</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 7, *Dem.* 41. Pantauchos can hardly be the man of the same name who was one of the trierarchs of Alexander's fleet on the Indus 37 years earlier (Arr. *Ind.* 18, 6).

<sup>28</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 10, *Dem.* 43.



strength, not over this or that state, but over all the independent states of the Balkan peninsula taken together, neglecting of course the 'barbarians' to the north of Epeiros and Macedonia. Why he sought this is not quite so easy to see. He may have looked on it as a necessity in order to guarantee himself,—and he had numerous enemies,—against any conceivable combination; he may have taken it simply for granted, a legacy of the days of Philip and Alexander. In any case, he sought it merely as a step to something further, to reconquest in Asia. There was a touch of the Oriental about Demetrios; and his ideas, if sometimes grand, were also sometimes grandiose. One thing, however, was quite clear; the preponderance of strength which he sought could only be obtained by bringing over to his side a large part of Greece. To this end the efforts of five years had been directed: and on the whole with success. He seems never to have considered the question whether he could found a stable state in Macedonia apart from the control of Greece. It was a question that had not occurred to any king of Macedonia for two generations; and it was not a question in which Demetrios, being such as he was, was likely to feel any interest.

On the whole, his five years had brought him success. He controlled Thessaly and the smaller peoples who went with Thessaly; Elateia and the northern part of Phokis; probably the Eastern Lokrians; certainly Boeotia and Attica with Athens. The possession of Megara and (more especially) of Corinth gave him the Isthmus, and these, together with the great island of Euboea, also his, guaranteed him complete control of the communications with the Peloponnese. In the Peloponnese itself he held Argos and the Argolid, Achaea, and most of Arkadia, the exceptions being Mantinea and such other towns as had always looked to Sparta. Of the independent powers three only were of real importance; Epeiros and Aetolia in the north, Sparta in the south. Of the smaller independent states, Elis, and perhaps some of the little Amphiktyonic peoples, lay under Aetolia's shield; Messene perhaps alone was in a situation to enjoy a true neutrality.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Most of this is straightforward; references in Beloch 3, 2, 302-3. Nor-

Omitting Macedonia, all the states of the north of Greece had one typical constitution, the koinon or League.<sup>30</sup> Its peculiarity was that, generally speaking, it was not founded on city-organization. Omitting the Boeotian, which was a city-league and on a different footing, the Leagues in Northern Greece whose existence prior to this epoch can be proved are those of the Molossians, Aetolians, Thessalians, Phokians, Ainianes, and Akarnanians; possibly also those of the Eastern Lokrians, the Phthiot Achaeans, and of this or that small people of the Amphiktyonic circle.<sup>31</sup> These Leagues were definitely cantonal. Each one, in all probability, had started as the natural organization of one particular stem, one Ethnos

thern Phokis is now certain, as Antigonos still garrisoned Elateia *circ.* 285; *B. Ph. W.* 1912, 507, inscription from Delphi for Xanthippos son of Ampharetos, on a second monument near the bronze lion (*ib.* 477), with Pomtow's commentary. Eastern Lokris rests on a combination, Beloch 3, 2, 358-9; but now that Northern Phokis is certain, it is perhaps to be accepted on geographical grounds. For Euboea there is a very important inscription recently published by K. Kourouniotes, *Εφ. Ἀρχ.* 1911, p. 1, no. 1; line 21 refers to the use of Demetrios' money in the island, line 36 refers to a festival for his worship, named Demetrieia, which was to be celebrated alternately at Histiaia, Chalkis, Eretria, and Karystos. A group of proxeny decrees for Macedonians (*ib.* p. 25, nos. 7, 10-12) also seem to belong to Demetrios' rule, but perhaps date from before Ipsos.

<sup>30</sup> H. Francotte, *La Polis grecque (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, vol. i, 1907)*, uses 'confédération' for the permanent union, Bundesstaat, and keeps 'ligue' for the union for a temporary object, Staatenbund. It would simplify matters if one could do likewise in English, and it is obviously absurd to use the same term for the Achaean League and the League of Corinth; but the word 'League' for the confederacies of Aetolia and Achaea is so engrained in English that I do not see how to alter it.

<sup>31</sup> On these Leagues generally, see Francotte, *l. c.*; G. Fougères, *κοινόν in Dar.-Sagl.*—The *Thessalian* League existed in 422 (Thuc. 4, 78), and was reorganized by Pelopidas on the Boeotian model, with an archon and four polemarchs, one for each of the four districts of Thessaliotis, Pelasgiotis, Phthiotis, and Hestiaiotes; cf. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 108.—The *Phokian* League is attested by an old federal coinage going back perhaps to the sixth century; Head<sup>2</sup> 338. It was reconstituted in 239 by Athens and Thebes; in the third century its eponyms were the *Φωκάρχαι*.—The League of the *Ainianes* is proved for before 279 by *G. D. I.* 1430 = *I. G.* ix, 2, 4. *G. D. I.* 1429<sup>b</sup> = *I. G.* ix, 2, 3 may also refer to the League, perhaps just after Kassandros' death (see Wilamowitz' note in *I. G., l. c.*). It had a federal coinage *circ.* 400-344; Head<sup>2</sup> 291.—The *Akarnanian* League is proved for 391 by Xen. *Hell.* 4, 6, 4, 7.—The League of the *Opountian* or *Epiknemidian Lokrians* depends on *I. G.* ix, 1, 267, which may be older than the third century; *I. G.* ix, 1, 334 does not use the term *κοινόν*.—The supposed federal coinage of the *Phthiot Achaeans* is now attributed to the Achaean League; Head<sup>2</sup> 416. Their League, therefore, may not antedate the third century; it is proved for the third century itself by *I. G.* ix, 2, 205 II, p. xi, see M. Laurent's commentary in *B. C. H.* 25, 1901, p. 343.



or Folk; even in the second century, in the case of a League so important as the Thessalian, Folk and League could be used synonymously.<sup>32</sup> In this natural organization of the Folk the original unit was the territory of some particular sept, with its villages: the town members, which must have come later, are more or less of an accident. This can be proved for the Leagues of the Molossians and the Aetolians;<sup>33</sup> and it must be true of all. It takes some mental effort to realize that over a large part of what passed as Hellas there were really few cities of much importance, (unless like Ambrakia or Naupaktos they had been founded by intruders from the south), and that the typical organization of the State had nothing to do with cities at all.

But many of these Leagues had not been able to maintain their independence. With Thessaly, Northern Phokis, and perhaps Eastern Lokris in the hands of Demetrios, Akarnania subject to Pyrrhos, Western Lokris and Delphi controlled by Aetolia, the Greek-speaking world north of Boeotia was really at this time divided between three powers; and the reality of the division, with whatever changes of boundary, was to be emphasized increasingly for many years with the growth of the Aetolian League.

Macedonia was still much the greatest of these three powers. But it was not the Macedonia of forty years before. The population had suffered heavily, both from constant war and from settlement abroad; Paionia was independent again under its king Audoleon, while the border provinces of Parauaia and Tymphaia had been ceded to Pyrrhos. A consideration of the social and political condition of the country may be deferred until Antigonos' accession;<sup>34</sup> but two things

<sup>32</sup> A decree of Larisa of the second century, *I. G.* ix, 2, 508, uses τὸ κοινὸν Θεσσαλῶν and ἔθνος τὸ Θεσσαλῶν indifferently. Therefore, when the Delphic inscriptions refer to small peoples, such as the Malians, Dolopes, and Oitaians, as ἔθνη, it is not necessary to suppose that they were still in the very primitive stage when the κοινόν had not yet replaced the ἔθνος.

<sup>33</sup> The cantonal character of the Aetolian League was emphasized by Freeman. Its territory was divided into districts called τέλη; Francotte, *l. c.*, p. 160. E. Bauer (*op. c.*, p. 12 seq.) has shown that most of the Aetolian ethnics refer to tribes that have no city centre, and that the same applies in part to West Lokris.—For the Molossian League, *G. D. I.* 1347 Μολοσσοὶ Ὀμφαλες Χιμῶ[λαιοι], the clan and village names.

<sup>34</sup> For Macedonia see ch. 7.

may be noted here which among others tended to distinguish Macedonia very sharply from its neighbours. All the Leagues of Northern Greece, like most other federations, were founded round about a religious centre, often one of great antiquity.<sup>35</sup> Macedonia had no religious centre. There was never anything in Macedonia which meant for the country what Dodona meant for Epeiros, what Thermos had meant and Delphi was to mean for Aetolia, what the worship of Athene Itonia was to Thessaly, or that of the Aktian Apollo to Akarnania; and Macedonia got on perfectly well without it. This was one of the things which made Macedonia seem alien to Greek eyes; another was its monarchical constitution. This went much deeper than the mere fact that Macedonia was always, and always had been, a monarchy. For the people themselves were devoted adherents of the monarchical principle; if they got a king they disliked they certainly ejected him, but merely took another. Even Epeiros, before the end of the century, was to kill off the surviving members of Pyrrhos' line and become a republic; but republican principles never took any real hold of the Macedonian.<sup>36</sup> He remained devoted to his

<sup>35</sup> The religious centre is not necessarily always known, especially for the smaller *κοινά*.—For the Akarnanian League, that the temple of Apollo at Aktion was the religious centre is proved for the early third century by the treaty between Aetolia and Akarnania published by Soteriades ('Εφ. Ἀρχ. 1905, p. 55), and for the second century by the *ιεραπόλος* of Apollo giving his name to the year (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 482 = *G. D. I.* 1379; *G. D. I.* 1380 *a* and *c*; *I. G.* ix, 1, 513, 515, 517).—For the Thessalian League. In 274 Pyrrhos, who considered himself at the time ruler of Thessaly, divided the spoils taken from Antigonos and dedicated the Macedonian shields at Dodona, the Gallic to Athene Itonia; *Plut. Pyrrh.* 26; *Paus.* 1, 13, 2-3. So Perseus sets up a decree in three temples, Delos, Delphi, and that of Athene Itonia; *Polyb.* 25, 3, 2. *Theoroi* from *Kos circ.* 250 go to the festival Itonia; *R. É. G.* 1910, p. 319 (this decree will be 87 in the *Kos* section of the *Corpus*). On these facts I would adopt the brilliant suggestion of Fougères (*l. c.*) that the hieromnemones of *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 108 were the federal hieromnemones of the cult of Athene Itonia. The site of the temple is unknown (see this discussed by Wace, Droop, & Thompson, *B. S. A.*, No. 14, p. 199); the festival was celebrated in the fourth century (? if always) at Krannon (*Polyaen.* ii, 34).

<sup>36</sup> In saying this I do not overlook the *κοινόν* Μ[ακεδόνων] of *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 262: the restoration, it seems, must now be definitely accepted, for P. Roussel writes (*B. C. H.* 1911, p. 441, n. 3) 'on a trouvé en 1904 un fragment de cette base, lequel garantit la restitution Μ[ακεδόνων]', and suggests that the fragment *B. C. H.* 28, p. 112, no. 5 may refer to the same *κοινόν*. As to date, it must be connected, I think, with the change in the royal style from the *Βασιλεὺς* 'A. Μακεδόν of Gonatas to the *Βασιλεὺς* A. or Φ. καὶ Μακεδόνες of Doson and Philip V (*J. H. S.* 1902, p. 269, and see ch. 13, n. 61); we do not know the

monarchy till the Roman forced 'liberty' upon him at the sword's point.

Epeiros is perhaps the first known instance of a state adopting a combination of the federal and monarchical principles. The country had only recently begun the astonishing development which, for a generation, was to raise it to importance for the present at the expense of its whole future. Its unification was comparatively recent. The population was a mixed one of many layers; so far as can be traced, Greek septs had entered the land at a very early period, overlaying the peoples they found there, people who worshipped at Dodona a god of running waters and provided him with priests of curious customs; but the Greek invaders had been in turn driven out or overlaid by the pressure of the Illyrian advance from the north. The Illyrian tribes had divided, some swamping a large part of northern Greece, others crossing the Adriatic and forming settlements in the south-east of Italy. To what extent Greeks again entered Epeiros after the Illyrian settlements is doubtful. It is doubtful if Greek nationality can even be conceded to Pyrrhos and the royal house; and a great number of the Epeirot personal names are not Greek. That the people were largely Illyrian by blood, and had derived their Hellenic civilization from the Corinthian colonies on the coast, seems to be a conclusion that is likely to become definitely established.<sup>37</sup>

The leading tribe, the Molossians, appears under Alexander I (342-326) in the form of a League, which dates by the

style of Demetrios II, but the obvious inference is that the *κοινόν* was an outcome of the difficulties that marked the beginning of the reign of Doson. But the point I wish to make is, that the reigns of Doson and Philip (on which our information is fairly full) show that the *κοινόν* apparently never had any influence or effect, or ever circumscribed the royal power.

<sup>37</sup> On the ethnology, see Paul Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Gesch. d. griech. Sprache*, p. 254 seq.; A. Fick, *Vorgriechische Ortsnamen* (1905), pp. 84, 85, and *Hattiden und Danubier in Griechenland* (1909), p. 31; J. Kaerst, *Epeiros*, in *P.W.*; M. Kiessling in *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (1905), p. 1015; Martin P. Nilsson, *Studien zur Geschichte des alten Epeiros* (1909) and a review of this work by H. Swoboda, *W. Kl. Ph.* 1910, p. 937; Klotzsch, p. 2, n. 1, and literature there cited. According to Nilsson the place-names are mostly Greek (he gives a list (p. 12) of those that are not Greek, and Fick has some that are certainly not); but very many of the personal names are not Greek. For the royal house, see Nilsson, p. 8.

king and by one of its own officials,<sup>38</sup> the League being constituted, as has already been mentioned, by clans and villages.<sup>39</sup> It is probable, however, that the Molossian League antedates the fourth century, and it is possible that others of the large Epeirot tribes were similarly organized;<sup>40</sup> but it is certain that the Molossian League presently expanded beyond its own limits, for an unknown League is found inquiring of the god of Dodona if it shall join the Molossians.<sup>41</sup> The process by which the Molossian League became the 'Epeirot alliance' is obscure.<sup>42</sup> It may be that we have here a successful attempt at self-assertion on the part of the Thesprotians and Chaonians;<sup>43</sup> but however it came about, it is certain that by the end of the fourth century we find that the official designation of the tribes of Epeiros is 'the allies of the Epeirots'; nevertheless they continue to date by the Molossian official called 'prostates', and the king.<sup>44</sup> It seems probable that the Molossian League retained its separate existence, while forming part of the larger confederation;<sup>45</sup> and the most helpful way of regarding it is undoubtedly the analogy put forward by a German writer, that the Molossians and their king in Epeiros had somewhat the position of Prussia and her king in the German Empire.<sup>46</sup> The state so

<sup>38</sup> *G. D. I.* 1334. The League is τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Μολοσσῶν, and the official προστάτης Μολοσσῶν, on whom see Nilsson, p. 61 seq., Klotzsch, p. 29 seq.

<sup>39</sup> *G. D. I.* 1347. On the sub-stems generally, Nilsson, p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> *G. D. I.* 1370. [τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Θεσπρωτῶν] is probably a correct restoration, but a little dangerous to argue from.

<sup>41</sup> *G. D. I.* 1590 = Michel 844.

<sup>42</sup> See Nilsson, p. 61.—The intermediate stage of the σύμμαχοι τῶν Μολοσσῶν, given by Francotte, *l. c.*, depends upon A. Fick's restorations of *G. D. I.* 1337 and 1343. Klotzsch, pp. 31 and 53, has utilized the restoration of 1337; but in fact both the stones are too broken for restorations to be anything but guess-work, and they must be abandoned. (On the right reading of what of 1337 is on the stone see Nilsson, p. 59, n. 2.)

<sup>43</sup> Nilsson, p. 64.

<sup>44</sup> *G. D. I.* 1336 = Michel 317. More tribes are known than the 14 or 11 of Theopompos ap. Strab. 7. 323; Nilsson, p. 47.

<sup>45</sup> According to Nilsson, p. 64, the 'Molossian League' did not co-exist with the 'Epeirot Alliance'; and it may be noted that the coins with Μολοσσῶν are now placed before 342, those with ΑΠΕΙΡΩΤΑΝ at some time prior to 238 (Head<sup>2</sup> 321, 324). But, in fact, the evidence for Nilsson's view seems entirely negative; the prostates of the Molossians remained; and it is more probable that the Molossians continued to be organized federally, within the kingdom, see Klotzsch, p. 29, n. 1.

<sup>46</sup> Klotzsch, p. 53.



evolved contained both elements, the republican and the monarchical; and it is believed that the official called the prostates of the Molossians, who presided in the popular assembly, played the same part as the ephors at Sparta in representing and perhaps upholding the rights of the people against the principle of monarchy embodied in the king.<sup>47</sup> This belief, and the frequent division of power between two kings, may tempt us to compare the Epeirot state with the Spartan, not without reference to the Illyrian origin of the two peoples; but such a comparison is probably misleading. There is no real evidence for the part that has been assigned to the prostates of the Molossians; it is far from certain that the actual division of power in Epeiros between two kings had ever a legal basis;<sup>48</sup> and time was to show that the strongest element in the Epeirot state was the federal principle. The state formula under Pyrrhos was 'Pyrrhos the king and the Epeirot';<sup>49</sup> and the money that bears the legend 'of the Epeirots' probably belongs to the time of the kings and not to the Epeirot League that was formed on the extinction of Pyrrhos' house.<sup>50</sup> Though the king led in war, his power had certain very definite limits. Apart from the continued existence of the prostates of the Molossians, the people never abandoned their ancient right of removing a king whom they disliked;<sup>51</sup> and once a year, in the assembly of the people at the holy place at Passaron, the king covenanted with them that he would rule them according to the laws, and they with the king that they according to the laws would maintain his kingship.<sup>52</sup> The history of Epeiros is of great interest as an illustration of the difficulties inherent in its combined constitution; and if the struggle between the principles of monarchy and republicanism appeared to be settled in favour of the former by the activity of Pyrrhos, it was in fact definitely decided in favour of republicanism two generations later.

A kingship of this kind, however, in a military age must

<sup>47</sup> Ib. p. 30; Guy Dickins, *J. H. S.* 1912, pp. 1, 14.

<sup>48</sup> Nilsson, p. 71, regards it as a legal double kingship; *contra* Klotzsch, p. 59, n. 1.

<sup>49</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 203.

<sup>50</sup> See n. 45.

<sup>51</sup> Nilsson, p. 70.

<sup>52</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5. On Passaron see Klotzsch, p. 32.



depend much on the personality of the king; and in the hands of the energetic Pyrrhos it no doubt came to differ little, for a time, from an absolute monarchy. It was about 295 that Pyrrhos had attained to sole power by the unification of all Epeiros in his hand alone; and the difference was soon felt. The country had no great tradition, and had for a time been little but the humble vassal of Macedonia; but Pyrrhos possessed both inexhaustible ambition and military talent, and seems to have been well backed up by his people, who did not forget that the great Alexander had had an Epeirot mother, and that their king was the Conqueror's cousin. Pyrrhos accordingly soon developed his kingdom both in extent and military resources. As the price of aid rendered to Kassandros' son Alexander, he had obtained the two western provinces of Macedonia, Tymphaia and Parauaia, together with the cession of the then subject-peoples of Akarnania, Ambrakia and Amphilochia.<sup>53</sup> At the same time he must have acquired Atintania, which from its situation could hardly have maintained its independence any longer; he thus bordered to the north directly upon Illyria, and somewhat later was able to extend his kingdom much further northward at Illyrian expense, and bring under his sway the considerable Greek city of Apollonia,<sup>54</sup> though Dyrrachion remained in the hands of the Illyrian king Monunius, who had his mint there and was on friendly terms with the Aetolians.<sup>55</sup> Pyrrhos' marriage with Lanassa had already given him Kerkyra;<sup>56</sup> and though he lost the island to Demetrios for a time, it was afterwards recovered. Roughly

<sup>53</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6. It is tempting to suppose that Atintania is meant instead of Akarnania; but one cannot alter the text. Of course, as Nilsson points out (p. 57, n. 1), every one does tacitly alter Plutarch's text by adopting the readings *Τυμφαίαν* and *Παραυαίαν*; but there seems to me to be all the difference in the world between altering a known name and altering a meaningless collocation of letters. — On Atintania and Akarnania see further Klotzsch, pp. 171–4, who tries (I think unsuccessfully) to explain the Akarnanian 'mercenaries' of Pyrrhos' expedition to Italy by supposing that Pyrrhos merely became head of the Akarnanian League in the same way as he was head of the Epeirot alliance. But, even so, he could have called out the Akarnanian troops. See ch. 5, n. 20.

<sup>54</sup> Beloch 3, 2, 318.

<sup>55</sup> His coins, *B. M. Cat., Thessaly-Aetolia*, p. 80; Head<sup>2</sup> 316. They show the jawbone of the Kalydonian boar, hence some connexion with Aetolia.

<sup>56</sup> Beloch 3, 2, 313.

speaking, therefore, his kingdom lay right along the Adriatic, stretching from the gulf of Corinth well into the barbarism of the north; his eastern frontier in its northern part adjoined Macedonia, while in its southern it lay along the Acheloos coterminous with Aetolia; he had completely cut Macedonia off from access to the western sea. With his back to Greece and his face to Italy, his sphere of action naturally appeared to include that Greater Greece which lay west of the Adriatic.

The acquired Greek character of his kingdom was well reflected in its spiritual capital. Far in the north of the Molossian territory, in a pleasant valley under Mount Tomaros, there lay among its fountains and huge oak-trees the famous sanctuary of Dodona. Its ancient spring-god, who had spoken to his votaries by his bubbling spring or ever the Greek came into the land, had long since acquired a respectable identification with the god of the conquerors as Zeus Naïos; and the successors of his primitive priests, whose sanctity had been bound up with a very un-Hellenic abstinence from ablutions, now wrote the answers of the god upon their quaint lead tablets in good Greek surroundings. Pyrrhos may himself have built some part of the theatre and porticoes of modernized Dodona, and may have either founded or enlarged the festival, Naïa, held in the god's honour. He cannot have been insensible to the strength that it conferred on Epeiros, in Greek eyes, to contain the second in fame of Panhellenic oracles; and he himself dedicated the spoils taken from the Macedonian and the Roman in the temple of the Dodonaean Zeus.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> On the Zeus of Dodona, see a series of articles by A. B. Cook, 'Zeus, Jupiter, and the Oak,' in *Class. Rev.* 1903 and 1904, especially 1903, p. 174. I note two points: (1) his Water-Zeus is either a god of rain, 'Υέτιος,' 'Ομβριος, or of the sea, Θαλάσσιος, 'Ενάλιος; no direct evidence is adduced that Zeus was ever a god of running-water or springs; (2) on the original function of Zeus as a sky-god, the author says (1903, p. 179), 'It must be admitted that the conception of Zeus as a sky-god, if present at all, was very much in the background at Dodona.'—If, then, Zeus of Dodona had much of the spring-god and little of the sky-god, the natural inference is that he replaced an older spring-god; and Dodona thereon falls into line with various other prae-Hellenic water-worships in Thrace and Macedonia, that of the βέδν for instance, ch. 7, n. 26. The customs of the Helloi or Selloi seem too to be best explained as survivals of the customs of a (non-Hellenic) primitive priesthood;

As Dodona was the spiritual, so Pyrrhos made Ambrakia the political capital of his country, and adorned it with works of art.<sup>58</sup> The Gulf of Ambrakia became the centre of gravity of his power; he had already founded, on the isthmus where Nikopolis afterwards stood, the town of Berenikis, named after Antigone's mother, a name which sufficiently indicates the philo-Egyptian policy of Epeiros at this period.<sup>59</sup>

The forces of which Pyrrhos could dispose can only be arrived at by an approximate reckoning. It will suffice to say here that Greater Epeiros, as it existed in his time, reckoning in Ambrakia, Akarnania, and the two Macedonian provinces, could probably raise a field force of from 18,000 to 20,000 men, omitting mercenaries.<sup>60</sup>

Aetolia at this time was a land altogether undeveloped, but becoming conscious of a national life and considerable

(see on this, and for other cases of such survivals, Leaf on *Il.* 16, 233, and cf. Nilsson, *op. c.*, p. 35, n. 2). I am supposing that Naïos means 'god of the spring', as generally thought, and that the cult of Zeus Naïos at Athens and Delos was probably an importation from Dodona (see Cook, *l. c.*, 186). Various other meanings of Naïos have been suggested (Cook, *l. c.*, 178, 181). For 'god of the ships' there is little to be said. The meaning of 'god in the tree-trunk', or 'he who dwells' (in the oak), if correct, might have come in with Zeus, whatever form of deity Zeus displaced: whether the original spring-god had any connexion with the oak, or (like βέδν) with the air (wind in the oak-tree), is a matter I am not competent to discuss. The latter is possible, seeing that in historical times the god gave responses both by the sound of the spring and the sound of the wind in the oak (Farnell, *Cults*, 1, 38). A third interpretation, 'Zeus of the Temple,' has been brought forward afresh by Th. Reinach (*Rev. Arch.* 1905, ii, p. 97), though hesitatingly, and could be supported by the occurrence of Zeus βαμῶς in Syria (*Class. Quart.* 1909, p. 231); but it can hardly be accepted, for the god of Dodona must surely have antedated any temple. What seems to me very strong, however, against both 'god of the tree-trunk' and 'god of the temple', is the fact that neither will explain, either the divination by the sound of the spring, or the close connexion with Acheloos, the typical running-water; the oracle often told inquirers to make offerings to Acheloos (see *Acheloos* in *P. W.* and Roscher's *Lexicon*, i, p. 8), and by a curious coincidence we know of the very appropriate performance of Euripides' *Acheloos* at the Dodonaean games, Naia, in honour of Zeus Naïos (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 700; the games again mentioned, as Naia, *C. I. G.* 2908).—Buildings at Dodona, Polyb. 4, 67: see Kern, *Dodona* in *P. W.*—Pyrrhos' dedications, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 203; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26; and Paus. 1, 13, 2-3.

<sup>58</sup> Strabo 7, 325: see Klotzsch, p. 176.

<sup>59</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6. The connexion with Egypt may be illustrated from Phylarchos (ap. Athen. 3, 73 b = *F. H. G.* 1, fr. 50); in the time of Pyrrhos' son Alexander, the Egyptian bean was to be seen growing in a marsh in Thesprotia and nowhere else in the world. Athen. 5, 203 a, though obscure, points to some connexion of Ptolemy I with Dodona.

<sup>60</sup> See App. 3, p. 426.

ambitions. At bottom the people had a close affinity to the Epeirots. Greek clans had held the land in the old heroic days of the hunt of the Kalydonian boar; they had been in part driven out or overlaid by the same Illyrian invasion that had swamped Epeiros,<sup>61</sup> and, isolated in their mountains, the people had been slow to acquire or reacquire Hellenic civilization. The barbarian descent of some of the Aetolian tribes was a common subject of reproach;<sup>62</sup> and in the fifth century, on the testimony of Thucydides, their principal clan, the Eurytanes, still ate raw flesh and spoke the most unintelligible dialect in Hellas.<sup>63</sup> They had kept some of the faults of the barbarian; they were fond of raiding their neighbours,<sup>64</sup> and they had been known to be deceitful and cruel.<sup>65</sup> But with barbarian faults went barbarian virtues; bravery, and a fierce love of freedom. It was said of them to the end that they were readier to die than any other men.<sup>66</sup> Alone of Greek states, save Sparta, they had never yielded one foot's breadth to the Macedonian; and though only an accident had prevented Antipatros from attempting to chastise them, their land had in fact afforded the one refuge open to those who, for whatever cause, feared the regent's vengeance. In truth, the rugged country, with its absence of important towns and the immense adaptability of its people to guerrilla warfare, was almost unconquerable.

The origin of its famous League is lost in obscurity; though perhaps first mentioned in 314, it certainly antedates the third century, for these cantonal Leagues were the common inheritance of all the states of Northern Greece. Compared with such Leagues as the Boeotian or Thessalian, it was a very democratic form of government; hence no doubt some part of its popularity. Army and people were synonymous; the army was the folk under arms. The head

<sup>61</sup> On Aetolian nationality, see Kretschmer, *l. c.*, p. 254 seq.; Kiessling, *l. c.*, 1015; H. von Gaertringen, *Aitolia* in *P. W.* To Fick (*Hattiden*, pp. 52, 53) the Aetolians are substantially Greeks, as they are to Beloch.

<sup>62</sup> Polyb. 18, 5, 8 = Livy 32, 34, 4.

<sup>63</sup> Thuc. 3, 94.

<sup>64</sup> So the *ithyphallos* of 290 (ap. Athen. 6, 253 d); *Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἀρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας*.

<sup>65</sup> Siege of Agrinion, Diod. 19, 68, 1.

<sup>66</sup> Agatharch. ap. Athen. 12, 527 b.



of the League, the strategos or war-leader, possessed very great power during his year of office; as was usual in these Leagues, he combined the offices of military and civil head, Commander-in-Chief and President, though the provision for him of a permanent council, the Apokletoi, no doubt restricted his powers. Twice a year the whole folk, or all who chose, assembled in general council; the one council, called Panaitolika, was held before the campaigning season, in February or early March, and in all the principal cities of Aetolia in turn: the other, Thermika, was held in the autumn at Thermos after the harvest. The Council of the League, the synhedrion, has been claimed, on very insufficient grounds, as an early example of representative government.<sup>67</sup>

The religious centre of the League was the temple of Apollo Thermios, an old sixth-century Doric building. It stood on a plain on the east of Lake Trichonis, in the very centre of the land. Thermos was as it were the citadel of Aetolia; the approaches to it were difficult, and easy of defence. No city stood about the temple; but a century later, when Philip sacked it, there were some houses and porticoes there, apparently rather storehouses of treasure than dwellings. It is described always, not as a town, but as a 'place'; it was the holy place of the Aetolians, where they deposited their booty, kept their archives, and worshipped their god. The temple itself, which seems to have stood on the site of a still older altar, was entirely built of wood faced with baked polychrome tiles; the columns were also of wood, perhaps painted or faced so that no wood actually showed. It was not replaced by a stone building till after the sack by Philip V.<sup>68</sup>

Aetolia had already begun to expand her League prior to 290. Her first acquisition was Naupaktos, presented to her

<sup>67</sup> I am not concerned here with the constitution of the League. — The ἀπόκλητοι, Polyb. 20, 1. — *Two* general assemblies; M. Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1905, 362 (see Th. Sokoloff, *Klio*, 7, p. 71), and Holleaux, *ib.*, p. 294, followed by H. Swoboda, *Klio*, 1911, 450, 456. The synhedrion as an example of representative government; Sokoloff, *l.c.*, p. 67.

<sup>68</sup> Description of Thermos; Polyb. 5, 6–8. The temple is described by G. Soteriades, who excavated it, 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1900, 161 seq.; 1903, 71 seq. (the latter on the metopes).



about 339/8 by Philip II; this town gave her a good seaport and some of her most intelligent citizens. The incorporation of the Western or Ozolian Lokrians followed, at an uncertain time, and, still at an uncertain time, she took the great step of annexing Delphi. The annexation appears as an accomplished fact in 290; the narrative would lead us to suppose that it took place only shortly before.<sup>69</sup>

With the commencement of the expansion one of the sources of strength of the democratic people appeared. The Aetolians, though a people composed of several tribes and federated in a League, had an extremely close consciousness of national unity. Their League was, typically enough, not so much a League as an expanded Ethnos or Folk.<sup>70</sup> Aetolia had a meaning quite other than that of (say) Boeotia or Achaea; for instance, while a statue of Achaea or Boeotia is unthinkable, a statue of Aetolia seems natural enough. She was not a League of units, she was one united people. And any state that entered into 'sympolity' with her, and joined her League, became by that act a part of the Aetolian people. The man of Doris or Keos could add to his own insignificant citizenship something far larger; he was not merely a member of a state that had federated with Aetolia; he became and was an Aetolian.<sup>71</sup> The attraction of this, as Aetolia began to bulk large in the world, undoubtedly made for the League's popularity.

The new aims and ambitions which dawned on Aetolia with the annexation of Delphi may be dealt with later. But she had already formulated a policy which she was to adhere to steadily for a good many years yet; the policy of attempting to preserve a kind of balance of power by always supporting

<sup>69</sup> See n. 24.

<sup>70</sup> E. Bauer, *l. c.*, p. 13, n. 3.

<sup>71</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 240, 248, and 249, where Boukris son of Daitas is called indiscriminately *Ναυπάκτιος*, *Αἰτωλὸς ἐκ Ναυπάκτου*, and *Αἰτωλός*. So Aetolius ex Amphissa, *Αἰτωλὸς ἀπὸ Μελιτείας* (E. Bauer, *op. c.*, p. 61); and *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 247 = *I. G.* xii, 5, 526, *ὡς Αἰτωλῶν ὄντων τῶν Κείων*. This, in spite of the reference to *φιλία*, must show that the *φιλία* had been turned into sympolity and the people of Keos had become members of the Aetolian league (contra, H. von Gaertringen, *Aitolia* in *P. IV.*, col. 1122); this, too, follows from the fact that the Keians had been made citizens of Naupaktos (same insc.). The same inscription shows that the members of the League who were not Aetolians were called *οἱ ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ πολιτεύοντες*; more briefly still we have *Αἰτωλοὶ καὶ αἱ πόλεις*, *B. C. H.* 1909, p. 482, n. 4.

the second state in the north against the first. She had aided Athens against Antipatros, Aiakides of Epeiros<sup>72</sup> and Demetrios<sup>73</sup> in turn against Kassandros, Pyrrhos against Demetrios; and it will be seen, in the history of the next few years, how consistently this policy was to be carried out. Of the forces of which Aetolia could dispose we have, as usual, no very clear account; but it is safe to suppose that the country could raise at least 12,000 men, and probably for home defence a good many more. Even 12,000 would imply a very scanty population per square mile; but the habit of allowing their young men to leave the country and serve as mercenaries elsewhere,—a habit not fully developed till later,—tended to keep their force somewhat low. Probably the proportion of peltasts to hoplites in their armies was larger than was usual; they still used light-armed troops; at a later date their cavalry was famous.<sup>74</sup>

A glance at a map would appear to show that Macedonia with Thessaly would be far more than a match for Epeiros and Aetolia combined. Nothing of the sort was the case. Macedonia was thinly peopled, and had never been able to raise field armies in proportion to its size; still less could it do so now, with provinces shorn away, exhausted by many wars, and terribly in need of time to recuperate. The fairly trustworthy figures that remain show that the most that Demetrios could have raised for field service from Macedonia and Thessaly would be from 30,000 to 35,000 men,<sup>75</sup> the latter quite an outside figure. He had of course a large force, perhaps 20,000 men, locked up in garrisons, especially in Greece and on his western and northern frontiers, on the latter of which, besides barbarians, Audoleon of Paionia had to be watched; he was no friend to Demetrios.<sup>76</sup> Such garrisons,

<sup>72</sup> Diod. 19, 74.

<sup>73</sup> Ib. 20, 100.

<sup>74</sup> In 322 Aetolia raised 10,000 men against Antipatros and Krateros, and next year 12,000 to invade Thessaly (Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, 186, 187). In 279 they sent more troops to Thermopylae than Boeotia, which sent 10,500; 12,000 would be a minimum, and, counting in guerrillas in Aetolia itself, they must have had far more under arms that autumn (see ch. 6). — They furnished peltasts and light-armed, as well as hoplites; treaty with Akarnania 'Eφ.

<sup>75</sup> *Ap. X.* 1905, p. 55.

<sup>76</sup> See App. 3.

<sup>76</sup> Audoleon a friend of Kassandros, Diod. 20, 19. Pyrrhos married his

however, were a permanent factor and were generally composed of mercenaries;<sup>77</sup> but it may be that, as mercenaries were not so numerous yet as after the Gallic invasion and the fall of Lysimachos, (which latter event threw open to recruiting many Thracian tribes broken by the Gauls), Demetrios had to use a larger proportion of Macedonians in garrison than was usual later, reducing his field force.

The result then, as regards the three chief states of the north, was a balance of power. Demetrios could put into the field at most about 30,000-35,000 men; Pyrrhos and Aetolia combined at least 30,000-32,000. It is true that Kassandros had fought Aiakides of Epeiros and Aetolia combined and been victorious; but Aiakides had not had the full force of Epeiros behind him, and the country had meanwhile expanded very largely, in part at the expense of Macedonia, while Aetolia had also taken in new territory. Epeiros, too, had produced a commander who was a match for Demetrios, at least upon land; and the events of 290 seemed to have shown that the two sides were not unequally matched.

If now we turn to the Peloponnese, we find existing much the same state of things. Here one power of distinct importance was still independent. Sparta was, perhaps, as yet not fully conscious of the grave economic difficulties that were to call out the reforms of Agis and the revolution of Kleomenes; at any rate, they did not affect her external policy. Areus her king is traditionally responsible for the introduction of 'luxury' into the city about this time;<sup>78</sup> but the luxury was not particularly luxurious, from our point of view, and its introduction merely corresponded to what must have been taking place in every state since Alexander's conquest had thrown into circulation vast masses of hoarded

daughter; and in 288, as his help to Athens shows, he, like Pyrrhos, joined the coalition against Demetrios (see ch. 4, n. 7). Paionia had an anti-Macedonian tradition; the Athenians in 356/5 allied themselves with three kings who were enemies of Philip's, one of whom was Lyppeios of Paionia; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 114, Diod. 16, 22, 3. Audoleon took the title of king, and as the Gauls frequently imitated his money he must have struck a good deal of it.

<sup>77</sup> Demetrios' garrison at Aigosthena consisted of mercenaries; *I.G.* vii, 1. So did his garrison in the Mouseion at Athens; ch. 4, n. 16.

<sup>78</sup> Phylarchos ap. Athen. 4, 141 f = *F.H.G.* 1, fr. 43. He struck the first Spartan coins with the king's name and portrait; Head<sup>2</sup> 434.

Persian gold. It had certainly done nothing to impair the spirit of the proudest nation in Greece. And Sparta was ineradicably hostile to the Macedonian. The two peoples were probably close of kin,<sup>79</sup> and Spartans believed that, whatever the one 'Dorian' kingdom might do in the north, headship in Hellas proper was the appurtenance of the other. Sparta consistently carried out her view. Like Aetolia, she had never yielded for a moment to the Macedonian. Alexander had done her the honour of excepting her by name from participation in his dedication of the spoils of Persia;<sup>80</sup> she had given Antipatros a harder fight than had been any of the more renowned victories of Antipatros' king. During the century that was to elapse between Antipatros' hard won victory at Megalopolis and Antigonos Doson's hard won victory at Sellasia, Sparta fought desperately and unceasingly with the greater state; invariably defeated, for the odds were heavy against her, she returned time after time to the unequal contest with a spirit that can only arouse the utmost admiration. Save for her one year of heroism against the Persian, it is the most glorious epoch of Spartan history: and Sparta had the good fortune to find a historian who was not afraid of panegyric, and who can still move us even with the echoes of his stories of the defence against Pyrrhos, the death of the noble Agis, the gallant struggle of Agis' greater successor. We have, it is true, a dark picture of the years immediately preceding the attempt of Agis at reform; but it is always conceivable that Phylarchos deliberately darkened his colours in order to enhance the splendour of Kleomenes.


The primary business of Demetrios in the Peloponnese, as it had been of Epameinondas, was to arrange matters so as to hold Sparta in check without his perpetual intervention. Epameinondas' two foundations in this behalf had taken different courses; while Megalopolis remained hostile to Sparta and friendly to whatever northern power had the hegemony, Messene was by no means an uncompromising foe of her greater neighbour,<sup>81</sup> and confined her undoubted

<sup>79</sup> See ch. 7, p. 178.

<sup>80</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 16.

<sup>81</sup> Messene, for instance, was prepared to aid Sparta against Pyrrhos, while Megalopolis joined him; ch. 9, n. 33.



strength, with considerable success, to ensuring her own independence and neutrality. It is conceivable that Messene, with her fruitful plain and impregnable capital, was at this time the happiest place in Greece: she has no history. Another city, however, was committed, even more than Megalopolis, to the friendship of the great power of the north. From the days of Xerxes, Argos had been ever ready to join Sparta's enemies; and there was a real meaning behind the belief that the old royal line of Macedonia could trace descent from the Temenid kings of Argos. A preponderating party in the town was friendly to Macedonia; and Argos and Megalopolis acted as Macedonian watchdogs, to hold in Sparta. 

When we come to consider the figures for the several Greek states, we find that often it is not possible to say how their population and armed strength in the third century compares with that in the fourth, and in the following comparison it has often been necessary to use fourth-century figures,<sup>82</sup> of course with all necessary reserve. But as, about the beginning of the third century, Sparta and Boeotia were of much the same strength as before, the same may be reasonably assumed for other states, where there is no definite reason to the contrary, as for instance there is in regard to Athens and Corinth.

The Peloponnesian possessions of Demetrios, then, could probably supply him with a field force of some 16,000 to 17,000 men.<sup>83</sup> The other states of the Peloponnese, if united,

<sup>82</sup> I have the advantage here of the figures worked out by Beloch, partly in his book *Die Bevölkerung der griech.-röm. Welt*, partly in two articles in *Klio*, 5 and 6. They are not likely to be too high; this only renders more marked than ever the enormous superiority in strength of Greece to Macedonia.

<sup>83</sup> (a) Argos and the Argolid, with Corinth and Sikyon. Total force at beginning of fourth century (omitting Megara with 1,500-2,000 men), 14,500 to 16,000 men (*Klio*, 6, 57), say 9,500 to 10,500 on a two-thirds levy. But in the fifth century Corinth raised 3,500 hoplites, at the beginning of the second perhaps barely 1,000 (*Bevölkerung*, 121); and as Corinth's service under the Antigonids must have been chiefly naval, deduct another 1,500, and say 8,000 to 9,000 on a two-thirds levy. (b) Arkadia, without Mantinea and district. *Klio*, 6, 76, 77: total Arkadian force at beginning of fourth century 12,000, i.e. 8,000 on a two-thirds levy, and deduct 2,000 for Mantinea, leaving 6,000. But I give 6,000 with every reserve on account of two new unknown factors; the tendency of Arkadians to serve as mercenaries would lower, the existence of Megalopolis would raise, the figure. Probably 6,000



might dispose of an army of perhaps 15,000 to 16,000 men, of which not more than 6,000 would be Spartans.<sup>84</sup> Sparta's field force had for a long time been a practically constant quantity; more than 6,000 men she could not or would not put in the field, and of these only a proportion were Spartiates. Sparta had always with her her standing danger, the Helots, and this no doubt did more to hamper her action than did anything external to herself;<sup>85</sup> but 6,000 men gave no measure of her potential strength, should it ever happen that her internal circumstances should be such as to enable her to use her reserve power. In fact, when the revolution did take place, her war strength more than doubled on the spot; Kleomenes put 14,000 Lacedaemonians into the field at Sellasia.<sup>86</sup> The great potential possibilities of Sparta, over and above her actual field force, were then a matter with which an enemy had to reckon; and allowing for this, and for the fine Spartan quality, Demetrios' position in the Peloponnese was anything but safe. Sparta often knew how to gain the help of Elis;<sup>87</sup> of Mantinea she was sure; on the day that Messene should join her Demetrios would be absolutely insecure. Demetrios knew all this well enough; hence his desperate and unsuccessful attack on Messene in 295, an attack sometimes treated as mere irrational lust of conquest. Time, in fact, was to show that Argos and Megalopolis were not strong enough to contain Sparta; and Demetrios would scarcely have been able to claim even a balance of power in the Peloponnese without the additional security furnished by his garrisons of mercenaries.

Granted Demetrios' policy, that it was vital to him to have

is rather low. (c) Achaea; at least 2,000; *Klio*, 6, 75.—All told, some 16,000 to 17,000 men.

<sup>84</sup> Sparta; *Klio*, 6, 67-74. Elis: total levy in round figures, 5,000 (*Klio*, 6, 74); say 3,000 on a two-thirds levy; on the same basis, 2,000 for Mantinea and district (*Klio*, 6, 75). Messene; no reliable figures, but surely not under 4,000-5,000 men; after Sellasia it was rated for the same contingent as Sparta; see *Bevölkerung*, 148.

<sup>85</sup> On the effect of this in the fifth century, G. B. Grundy in *J. H. S.* 1908, p. 77.

<sup>86</sup> *Klio*, 6, 74.

<sup>87</sup> In 331 B.C. against Antipatros; Diod. 17, 62. Probably in 280, against Antigonos; Justin 24, 1, 2. In the Chremonidean war; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214 = *I. G.* ii, 333.

a preponderance of strength in the peninsula, we can now understand his actions during his five years of rule. In the north there was a balance of power between his kingdom and Epeiros with Aetolia. In the Peloponnese he barely balanced the independent states. He could redress the situation with mercenaries; but so could Pyrrhos or Areus, to both of whom the feel of Egyptian gold was not unknown. There was but one permanent way to safeguard himself; he must control Central Greece absolutely. It was no mere greed of territory, or love of adventure, that drove him south from Demetrias; it was the iron necessity, as he saw it, that lay on him to secure a preponderance of power. For the moment the decision lay in the hands of 10,000 Boeotian hoplites; and for their sake he forgave Boeotia again and again, while risking even his life to retain the country in his empire.

Boeotia was still the first military state of Central Greece. Her levy in 279, when she sent 10,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry to Thermopylai, shows that her federal force still remained at about the level at which it stood on paper at the beginning of the fourth century, 11,000 hoplites and 1,100 cavalry. The introduction of compulsory military service in the fourth century had compensated for any loss of power due to the destruction and rebuilding of Thebes; the ephebe lists show that the causes which were to lead later on to the decadence of the country were not yet operative.<sup>88</sup> The other states of Central Greece, without Athens—Phokis, Euboea, Lokris, Megara—could probably furnish some 7,000 to 8,000 men.<sup>89</sup>

What Athens could do at this time is absolutely uncertain. She had adopted compulsory military service after the disaster of Chaironeia, but, unlike Boeotia, she had dropped it again. The ephebe lists show that the conscription, if

<sup>88</sup> Fourth century; the Oxyrhynchos historian. Compulsory service and the ephebe lists, *Klio*, 6, 41-9. Forces in 279, Paus. 10, 20, 3.

<sup>89</sup> Phokis; 3,500 in 279; Paus. *l. c.*, see *Bevölkerung*, 175. Euboea doubtful; perhaps 3,000, as in 394; *Bevölkerung*, 179, 180. But no doubt the service of Chalkis was naval. Megara; 1,500 to 2,000; *Klio*, 6, 57. This is much higher than *Bevölkerung*, 172, where the ephebe lists would give a paper total of 1,100. We cannot reckon more than 1,000 on a two-thirds levy, if as much. In 279 she only sent out 400 men; Paus. *l. c.* Eastern Lokrians; 700 in 279; Paus. *l. c.*

continued, would have given her a field force at this time of some 8,000 men; but the forces she did raise, on returning to a voluntary system, were trifling. She could still man her walls for desperate resistance to a besieger; but in none of her third-century struggles do we hear of an Athenian army taking the field, though the destruction of her naval power had freed the lowest class of citizens for service on land, if necessary. The small force of 1,500 men which she sent against the Celts perhaps gives something of the measure of the impotence in arms of the once Imperial city; ~~she was fast ceasing, outside the circuit of her own walls, to be a military factor at all, and she habitually employed mercenaries.~~ But for the actual defence of Athens, a call to arms could no doubt still raise a large volunteer force.<sup>90</sup>

The strength of Central Greece, then, under Demetrios' control, may be fairly put at something like 18,000 to 20,000 men,<sup>91</sup> if in fact he controlled all Phokis and the eastern Lokrians. This gave him the preponderance of power in the peninsula which he required. His total strength, on paper, was exceedingly great. If the figures here arrived at for his available troops be added up—Macedonia with Thessaly some 30,000 to 35,000 men, Central Greece about 18,000 to 20,000 men, the Peloponnese about 16,000 to 17,000—it is seen that Demetrios had a potential force of somewhere from 60,000 to 70,000 men, all Europeans, and excluding mercenaries. It is not to be supposed that he could have put anything like the whole into the field as an army;<sup>92</sup> but what it

<sup>90</sup> Athenian reorganization after Chaironeia, and the ephebe lists; *Klio*, 5, 351-5. Note that the figures on p. 354 (6,500 to 7,000 men) refer only to the year 323, when the compulsory system had not yet produced its full effect. When in working order it would have given  $500 \times 30 = 15,000$  men of twenty to fifty years; allow at least 3,000 for deaths and unavoidable absences; this gives a maximum two-thirds levy of 8,000 for the men of twenty to fifty years.—Abolition of the compulsory system; Ferguson, *Priests*, 162-6; *Athens*, 127 seq. That it was abolished before 283/2 is certain; Ferguson thinks in 301. It may be noted that the Ithyphallos of 290 represents Athens as considering herself defenceless against Aetolia; l. 25 κοῖκ' ἔχω μάχεσθαι.—Athenian force in 279; Paus. 10, 20, 5, *I. G.* ii, 323 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 205. See in ch. 6.

<sup>91</sup> I.e. Boeotia, 10,000 to 11,000; Athens, 1,000 to 2,000; Phokis, (see n. 29), Eastern Lokris, Euboea, and Megara, 7,000 to 8,000.

<sup>92</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 43 gives Demetrios' army as 98,000 foot and nearly 12,000 horse; and this may therefore be quite correct, if we suppose with Niese

does mean is that he disposed of resources which, compared with those of any other single state, were very great indeed. Always omitting mercenaries, the supreme effort made by Egypt at Raphia produced 40,000 men, of which perhaps 15,000 to 17,000 were of European blood; while Syria at Raphia had not more, if as much, European blood in the 60,000 troops put into the field.<sup>93</sup> Demetrios had easily the greatest power in the Greek-speaking world.

But it is worth while for once reading the figures another way. If we can suppose such a thing as a united Greece, including Aetolia but excluding Greater Epeiros and Thessaly, that united Greece could have put into the field something like 60,000 to 65,000 men. A united Greece, that is, would have been *on paper* more than a match for Macedonia and Epeiros combined, and could have dealt as she pleased with any of the Eastern powers; Rome apart, she would have held in her hand the destinies of the world. Greece, therefore, and no other kingdom or kingdoms, is the central fact in the politics of the time; and the nightmare of the other kings is, that Demetrios may unite the whole of Greece in his own hand, and become irresistible. D

(1, 374) that the figures are meant for the total, not of what he could put into the field, but of his Army List, a paper catalogue of the numbers on which he could draw, including his garrisons, his mercenaries, and perhaps even his allies the pirates.

<sup>93</sup> For Egypt and Syria, see App. 3, pp. 427, 428.

## CHAPTER III

### THE EMPIRE OF DEMETRIOS OVER THE SEA

SUCH being the state of things on the mainland, the position of Demetrios at sea and in the islands has to be considered ; for this purpose it will be necessary to go back a little.

The three fleets of any importance in the Eastern Mediterranean in the latter part of the fourth century had been the Persian, the Athenian, and the Macedonian. The former had become absorbed by Alexander upon his conquest of the Persian Empire ; and the Athenian fleet, which remained intact until after Alexander's death, had finally gone down before Antipatros' admiral, Kleitos, in the two days' battle off Amorgos which ended the Lamian war. Kleitos may well have assumed the insignia of Poseidon ; for the seas east of the Carthaginian-Syracusan sphere were now definitely Macedonian. But as on land, so on the water, the question soon arose who was to govern, and how ; for several of the contending generals had fleets at their disposal, notably Kassandros and Ptolemy.

It was the elder Antigonos, however, who showed the firmest grasp of the meaning of sea-power and the firmest resolution to win it. In 315, when he had disposed of Eumenes, was master of most of Asia, and was definitely aiming at the whole empire, he had found himself confronted by a coalition of Ptolemy, Kassandros, and Lysimachos. To make head against them he required in the first place that Kassandros should not control the material forces of Greece, and in the second, that he should be cut off from his allies, and they from each other. Either purpose could only be achieved by obtaining command of the sea, or at any rate local command in the Aegean ; only thus could Antigonos reach Greece himself and cut the oversea lines of communication which bound the coalition together. For this purpose



the prime necessity was a powerful fleet, and he at once set to work, collecting what ships he could and building others, till he had raised 240 altogether, some of large size.<sup>1</sup> But Antigonos, a man of considerable ideas, desired more than this, something which force could not give him. He wanted public opinion on his side; and there was only one public opinion in the world at the time; it was alike formed and expressed by the states of the Greek homeland, and primarily by Athens.<sup>2</sup> It was not only the desire to damage Kassandros, it was also the desire to stand right with Greece, which led Antigonos to issue his famous proclamation that the Greek states should thenceforth be free, ungarrisoned, and self-governing;<sup>3</sup> with the unexpressed corollary that he would free them.

Probably Antigonos really meant what he said.<sup>4</sup> It is of great interest to see him, in the political struggle, making the same moves against Kassandros as Ptolemy II was afterwards to make against Antigonos' grandson when he sat on Kassandros' throne. But it is sufficient here to note that his proclamation hit one of the marks aimed at. Delos had long hated the Athenian domination; and she seized the opportunity of shaking herself free from her ancient mistress,<sup>5</sup> then ruled by Demetrios of Phaleron in Kassandros' interest. This move of necessity imported alliance with Antigonos; with Delos went some of the Cyclades; and one of Antigonos' squadrons, commanded by his nephew Dioskourides, at once appeared in the Aegean, in order to ensure that every island which had as yet neglected to do so should forthwith become 'free'—that is, should join its liberator.<sup>6</sup> Thereupon, either at once, or within the next few years, the 'League of the Islanders' took shape.<sup>7</sup>

The idea of some form of combination among the Islands

<sup>1</sup> Diod. 19, 58; 61, 5; 62, 7-9.

<sup>2</sup> Beside Alexander's well-known saying, see Plut. *Dem.* 8, and the description of Athens as *σκοπή τῆς οἰκουμένης*.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. 19, 61, 3. Antigonos, it is true, only copied Polyperchon; but the results were far-reaching.

<sup>4</sup> The best commentary on his good faith is his letter to the Skepsians and their decree, *O. G. I.* 5, 6.

<sup>5</sup> Autumn 314; see Ferguson, *J. H. S.* 1910, pp. 193, 208; *Athens*, p. 50.

<sup>6</sup> Diod. 19, 62, 9.

<sup>7</sup> See App. 5.

of the Aegean was very old, dating in fact from the original independent Ionian amphiktyony of the Cyclades, known to us from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, which had its centre in Delos. The fifth century had seen the great Athenian confederation, known as the Confederation of Delos; here again Delos was the nominal centre, and at first the treasury. This confederation, it may be remarked, had nothing federal about it. It was an alliance, not a league; and the smaller islands soon passed from the position of allies of Athens into that of tributaries. From the point of view of the Islanders, the difference from the original Ionian amphiktyony was great indeed; independence had passed away, and the confederation included islands of Dorian, no less than those of Ionian, blood.

By the end of the fourth century it seemed clear that independence had passed away for good and all: for no state which islands like the Cyclades could form, of however loose a construction, could exist save under the aegis of some protecting power. Nevertheless, the islands were of importance. The Aegean was the home-sea of the Greek world, and the islands provided, not only excellent harbours, but as it were stepping-stones to cross that sea in every direction, no small thing in the days of galleys. But their real value was, that they included Delos and the temple of the Delian Apollo.

For centuries, under diverse political forms, Delos had been in law and in sentiment the centre of the home-sea; and admiral after admiral, from Nikias and Lysandros downward, makes his offering in her temple, till we can almost trace sea-power by an examination of the votive offerings there brought to Apollo.<sup>8</sup> This was a sentiment which grew only stronger with time; and in that long connected period of naval history which opens with the annihilation of the Athenian sea-power by Macedonia at Amorgos, and closes with the final defeat of Antiochos III by Rome at Myonnesos, every conqueror at sea, from Kleitos to each of the Roman admirals of the Syrian war, brings his gift to Delos.<sup>9</sup> For this is the period during

<sup>8</sup> Homolle, *B. C. H.* 6, 1882, pp. 152-62; *B. C. H.* 15, 168.

<sup>9</sup> The absence of many of the names that might be expected, especially in the fourth century, is to be accounted for by so many offerings being lumped

which, put concisely, men of Macedonian blood dominated the Aegean; and the Macedonian, a comparative stranger, felt more strongly even than the Greek the need of propitiating the local god. On the home-sea, Apollo was at home; none could rule there save in his name.<sup>10</sup>

Now, when independence seemed gone for good, came the proclamation of the strongest ruler in the world, calling all Greeks to freedom. Did the Islands, under that proclamation, federate themselves? The answer is to compare any existing Greek federation with the League of the Islanders; the first glance shows that, in the latter, we are dealing with a new political type. The ordinary Greek federation of city states was formed to safeguard the freedom and autonomy of its several members; and the whole (unless brought into subjection by some other power) composed a free federal community, a distinct state *vis-à-vis* other states, holding its own federal assembly, coining its own money, electing its own civil head and military officers, raising its own armed forces, maintaining its own independence as best it could. But the League of the Islanders was nothing of the kind. So far as we know, it had no ekklesia or assembly;<sup>11</sup> it neither raised nor disposed of armed forces,<sup>12</sup>—anyhow till its reconstruction in the second century under the headship of Rhodes,—and consequently had no military officers to elect; no civil head is heard of;<sup>13</sup> the money it used was

together in *ῥυμολ* in the third-century inventories, without names; see Homolle, *B. C. H.* 1882, p. 155.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Homolle, *Archives*, p. 34.

<sup>11</sup> The inscriptions give nothing but meetings of *σύνεδροι* or delegates. It is tempting to see here one of the first tentative essays toward representative government, as has been done in the case of the senate of the Boeotian league, where also there was no popular assembly (R. J. Bonner, *Class. Philol.* 1910, p. 405), and the senate of the Aetolian league, where there was (Th. Sokoloff, *Klio*, 7, p. 67). But we do not know how the governing body was chosen; perhaps merely by lot. On the judicial functions of the Synedroi see J. Delamarre, *R. Ph.* 26, 1902, p. 291 seq.

<sup>12</sup> The inscriptions of the period of Rhodian hegemony in the second century often refer to contingents from the Islands, *τὰ νησιωτικὰ πλοῖα*; it cannot be chance that we have no such references in the third century (see Delamarre, *R. Ph.* 28, 1904, p. 99, n. 4). Zeno's squadron of aphracts (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 193 = *I. G.* ii, 5, 309 b; *O. G. I.* 773 = *I. G.* xii, 5, ii. 1004) were Egyptian ships on Egyptian service; see *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 253; ch. 4, p. 92.

<sup>13</sup> The nesiarch was not such, at any rate under Ptolemy II; see *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 251 seq.

that of its master ;<sup>14</sup> and its master provided for its security in face of the rest of the world. Most important of all, it paid to that master taxes.<sup>15</sup> It enjoyed, indeed, a considerable measure of autonomy ; to independence it possessed no claim whatever at any time of its history.

How and why then was it formed, seeing that the usual reason for the formation of a federation—mutual protection against enemies—did not come into play ? It should be obvious from this alone that the constituent islands cannot have formed the League by themselves of their own mere motion ; states do not form a league merely that it may repose under the protecting aegis of a great Power. That the League began by reposing under the aegis of Antigonos and Demetrios seems certain ;<sup>16</sup> and it must therefore, if not formed by the constituent states, have been actually formed by Antigonos himself. Nor is the reason far to seek.

Antigonos required the command of the sea, and the good-

<sup>14</sup> No federal coinage is known. Demetrios' money circulated in the islands (Delamarre, *R. Ph.* 28, 1904, p. 81, no. 1), and afterwards Ptolemy's (F. Dürbach, *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 115, no. 7, a decree of the League mentioning a *ξένια* of δ[ραχμῶν Πτολεμαϊκῶν]).

<sup>15</sup> For the taxes paid to Demetrios see ch. 5, n. 4, and especially Delamarre, *R. Ph.* 28, p. 81, who shows (p. 96) how the towns of Amorgos had to borrow to pay Demetrios' taxes. The money borrowed by Karthaia from its own temple of Apollo early in the third century may have been for the same purpose (*I. G.* xii, 5, i. 544 B 2, l. 14 seq.; see Graindor, *Musée Belge*, xi, 1907, p. 98); also the moneys owing by the Islanders to Delos just after Demetrios' fall (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 209, decree of Delos for Philokles, on which see ch. 4, p. 108). These taxes were abolished by Ptolemy I; ch. 4, n. 39. But no doubt Ptolemy reimposed taxation. The important inscription as to this is *I. G.* xii, 5, ii. 1066 (being *I. G.* xii, 5, 533 with the addition published by Graindor, *Musée Belge*, xi, p. 98, no. 2), a decree of Karthaia in honour of a Ptolemaic official, Philotheros. He was not a tax-collector (see Graindor, *l. c.*), for he came often to Karthaia and used to give them time to pay, and he could not have always been giving time for debts due to Ptolemy II his master; yet what he had to collect was something in which Ptolemy had an interest. Having regard to the manner in which the islands had had to borrow from the temple of Delos in order to meet Demetrios' taxes (see Delamarre, *l. c.*), I can only conclude that the same thing happened again, and that Ptolemy in effect used Apollo's temple as a State bank. The temple made loans to (e.g.) Karthaia to enable the city to meet its taxation, and did so readily, with Ptolemy behind it; the taxes thus came in easily to the treasury at Alexandria without Ptolemy having to incur the odium of putting on pressure; and if the loans were not properly repaid to Apollo, Ptolemy could and did *then* intervene on Apollo's behalf, a blameless display of zeal in the service of so useful a deity. The obscure decree from Samos, *B. C. H.* 5, p. 477, no. 1 = Michel 370, may relate to Ptolemy's taxation.

<sup>16</sup> App. 5.



will, active or passive, of the Greek states. Into each of these two very practical objects of statecraft a question of sentiment entered. In the latter case, the sentiment was that curious feeling which throughout history urged the Macedonian to stand well, if he could, with the Greek; the Greek states were, therefore, to be ranged on his side, not by conquest, but by gratitude for the proclamation of their freedom. In the former case, the sentiment was the one previously alluded to, that in order to control the Aegean one must stand well with the local god; Apollo of Delos must be, in some visible way understood by the world, one's own god and not the god of one's opponent. Mere sea-power was a matter (let us suppose) of acquiring bases, building ships, winning victories—things to be obtained by force; but to be stable, it involved the control of the Delian Apollo, and that could not be obtained by force. Delos had just been invited to free herself from Athenian domination; on this and similar facts Antigonos was depending to draw the Greek world to his side; if he took forcible possession of any liberated island, and most of all of Delos, he more than stultified himself in the eyes of the Greek world. But if he did not take possession of Delos, some one else, probably Ptolemy, most certainly would and could; and in that case what would become of the gratitude of Apollo?

In these circumstances Antigonos devised and formed the League. The small weak islands of Ionian blood grouped round Delos were combined into a federation, autonomous indeed and as free as circumstances would permit, but entirely dependent, as against other powers, on Antigonos' protection. It solved the double problem very neatly; in form, Apollo was free before the world; in fact, he was bound to Antigonos.

The formation of the League by Antigonos, in the circumstances already described, explains the peculiar fact that it was formed upon a purely Ionian basis. As we find it under Philadelphos, the islands actually known to be members, apart from Delos itself,<sup>17</sup> are Andros, Naxos, Kythnos,

<sup>17</sup> As to Delos, see App. 4.



Amorgos, Herakleia, Mykonos, and Keos.<sup>18</sup> There can be no real doubt of the membership of Paros, Ios, and Syros, though exact demonstration is lacking.<sup>19</sup> Tenos and Siphnos are demonstrated only for the period of Rhodian hegemony, but were probably members throughout;<sup>20</sup> of Seriphos, Gyaros, and Oliaros nothing is heard. There is nothing whatever to show that the Egyptian head-quarters in the Aegean, Samos and Thera, were ever members.<sup>21</sup> Now while many different lists of the Cyclades exist in ancient writers,<sup>22</sup> it is quite certain that Amorgos and Herakleia were never reckoned among them; and the Island League is therefore the wider term of the two, though no doubt the islands of the League were often referred to as 'the Cyclades'.<sup>23</sup> All the more remarkable, therefore, is the non-inclusion of islands of Dorian, or even of non-Ionian, blood,—the Lemnian Sikinos, for example. As nothing in Dorian sentiment was opposed to such inclusion—for instance, the great Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, during the most flourishing period of the League, sent yearly *theoriai* to Delos<sup>24</sup>—the reason must be sought elsewhere; and the explanation is, that the founder of the League desired to avoid the associations of the two confederacies that had been formed in the fifth and fourth centuries under the presidency of Athens—confederacies which had included islands of non-Ionian blood—and there-

<sup>18</sup> The first three in *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202. Amorgos, *I. G.* xii, 7, 13 and 506 b; Herakleia, *I. G.* xii, 7, 509; Mykonos, *B. C. H.* 28, 1904, p. 115, no. 7, l. 22; Keos, *I. G.* xii, 5, 1069 (this may be later; Karthaia is certain from *I. G.* xii, 5, 1061). On Herakleia, see App. 13, n. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Paros: gift of *προξενία* to the nesiarch Apollodoros, Michel 534. Ios, presence of an Egyptian squadron and the nesiarch Bacchon, *O. G. I.* 773 = *I. G.* xii, 5 (ii), 1004. Syros was a member of the League after the battle of Kos (see App. 13 B).

<sup>20</sup> *I. G.* xii, 5 (ii), 817. For Siphnos in the third century, see references, App. 13, p. 470.

<sup>21</sup> Samos; the assembly of the synhedroi there, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202, was a very special matter, and not an ordinary meeting; see Delamarre, *R. Ph.* 20, 109, and Dittenberger, *ad loc.* Thera; for an explanation of the nauarch's authority over this island, *J. H. S.* 1911, 257-9. I need not quote mere opinions, either way.

<sup>22</sup> Collected by H. von Gaertringen, *I. G.* xii, 5 (ii), p. xxi.

<sup>23</sup> Theoc. 17, 90; *O. G. I.* 54, 8.

<sup>24</sup> See the Delian inventories of Hypsokles' year (279; *B. C. H.* 1890, p. 389 = Michel 833 = *I. G.* xi, 161), and Sosisthenes' (250; *B. C. H.* 1903, p. 64 = *I. G.* xi, 287). The Koan *theoriai* have been collected by Herzog, *Koische Forschungen und Funde*, p. 153.

fore went back for his model to the original purely Ionian amphiktyony.<sup>25</sup> This exactly agrees with the position of Antigonos in the years following 314, when Delos had just revolted to him from Athens, and Athens, governed in the interests of Kassandros, was his enemy.

One of the first acts of the newly formed League was to do honour to its founder. Antigonos had grasped one of the ideas of Alexander, that an excellent way of holding together a complex of autonomous cities was to become their god,<sup>26</sup> thus gaining in each city a footing which from the political point of view was impossible of acquisition; and he accordingly took his place beside Apollo as one of the gods of the Islanders. The exact date of the foundation of the federal fête of the Antigoneia cannot be ascertained, but it was probably coeval with the foundation of the League; and it is heard of as being celebrated every second year when, shortly after the great victory at Salamis, the Islanders gave similar divine honours to Demetrios and commenced to celebrate his festival, the Demetrieia, in alternate years with that of his father.<sup>27</sup>

The Island League, naturally, could only be controlled by Antigonos if and so long as he possessed the command of the sea. The command of the sea, in the history of this time, is a phrase to be used with considerable caution. In the first place, sea-service was not yet specialized; the same men commanded afloat and ashore; and as, given timber, a fleet of galleys could be easily and quickly improvised, any power that possessed enough fighting-men, and controlled a few Greek cities to supply trained steersmen and masters, could at any time challenge the ruling sea power with a fair prospect of success. Moreover, owing to the small radius of action of the galley, tied to her water supply and unable to face a storm, the sea was not one sea but many, and a power might control one compartment without in the least affecting

<sup>25</sup> Dürrbach, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 223.

<sup>26</sup> See Kaerst, vol. ii (i), p. 398.

<sup>27</sup> Decree of the League founding the Demetrieia in addition to the Antigoneia; Dürrbach, *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 93, no. 1; *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 208. The Antigoneia are mentioned again in 296; *B. C. H.* 1905, p. 447 seq., no. 144 (= *I. G.* xi, 154) A, l. 42 (inventory of Phillis I). See generally App. 5 A, p. 433.

another; for instance, the complete authority which for forty years Ptolemy II exercised over the Eastern Mediterranean never affected the seas west of Syracuse. Again, no power kept the sea in any force in time of peace; true standing fleets were unknown prior to Augustus, and galleys, when laid up, quickly deteriorated.<sup>23</sup> The command of the sea, then, in the only sense in which it can be used in this book, means a purely local command in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Aegean, as the case may be, and means also, not that the power exercising it really controlled even that part of the sea in our sense, but that such power had a very good prospect, if challenged, of getting to sea a fleet that could defeat the challenger.

From this point of view, Antigonos hardly commanded the sea from 315 to 306. Ptolemy, though not particularly successful, managed to keep the sea in his despite down to the peace of 311; and in 308, when possibly Antigonos was not yet ready for a new war, Ptolemy sailed to Greece and attempted to unite the Greek States, on pretext of freedom, under his own leadership.<sup>29</sup> It was an important expedition, for it formulated for the first time what became the standing policy of Egypt for two generations; to stir up trouble for the Antigonid in Greece by posing as the champion of Greek freedom. Ptolemy, however, failed; he had no resource left but to fight seriously; fortune threw into the scale against him a really great admiral; and the result was Demetrios'

<sup>28</sup> Rome kept permanent fleets in commission throughout the second Punic war, but only for the war. On the life of a galley, see the statistics collected by W. Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 26, 1901, p. 386 seq., from the Athenian records. About twenty years was an average life for a trireme, but many were scrapped much earlier; twenty-six years seems to be the longest known (*Ἀσκληπιάς*, p. 389).

<sup>29</sup> Diod. 20. 37; see App. 5 B, p. 437. One may treat this expedition as having no effect at all on the history of the islands. But I cannot agree with Beloch (3, 1, 149, n. 3) and Dürrbach (*B. C. H.* 1907, p. 220) that Ptolemy was in accord with Antigonos at the time. (See Kaerst ii, 1, p. 63, n. 6, who decides against this; also König, *Der Bund der Nesioten*, p. 16.) Doubtless they might have agreed to co-operate against Kassandros; but their own enmity was deep seated, as events showed, and Antigonos could never have agreed to Ptolemy's attempt to refound the League of Corinth, which would have strengthened Ptolemy immeasurably as against himself. Besides, he trumped Ptolemy's proposal the next year as soon as the sea was open. I look on Ptolemy's abortive expedition of 308 as directed essentially against Antigonos.

victory over him at Salamis in 306, one of the most decisive naval battles of antiquity. Never again, while he lived, did Demetrios have to fight at sea.

Thenceforth Demetrios ruled the Aegean absolutely down to his fall in 288, or even later.<sup>30</sup> Ipsos, which destroyed the Asiatic empire that his father and himself had built, seems to have made no difference in this respect, for Ptolemy could not face him at sea in 294.<sup>31</sup> He lost territory once and again, as Cyprus; but his grip on the sea itself remained unshaken by any vicissitudes on land. Though only one inscription—the before-mentioned decree of the Islanders voting him divine honours—has survived to attest his suzerainty of the Island League, the fact cannot be doubted. His money circulated in the Islands, a circumstance in itself sufficient to imply political domination;<sup>32</sup> an island is found doing honour to a Macedonian proxenos;<sup>33</sup> Demetrios had in his service an official called nesiarch or governor of the islands;<sup>34</sup> a Delian inventory refers to him simply as ‘the king’;<sup>35</sup> and when, at one of his lowest ebbs of fortune, he was rehabilitated by Seleukos’ marriage with his daughter, the ruler of Asia celebrated his alliance with the sea-king by dedicating two silver models of warships in the natural centre of a sea-king’s rule, the temple at Delos.<sup>36</sup>

An estimate of the naval strength of Demetrios and of his principal rival, Ptolemy I, can be made with confidence.

<sup>30</sup> Even in 287 Ptolemy made no attempt to prevent him from crossing to Asia.

<sup>31</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 33.

<sup>32</sup> Delamarre in *R. Ph.* 28 (1904), p. 81, No. 1 [*Δημητρίσιον*].

<sup>33</sup> Ios, *I. G.* xii, 5, (ii), 1,001.

<sup>34</sup> Homolle, *Archives*, 67, n. 1.

<sup>35</sup> App. 5, A (v), p. 436.

<sup>36</sup> Α *τριήρης* and a *τετρήρης*; the former first in Hypsokles, B, l. 78 (279); the latter in a fragment of an inventory published by Dürrbach, *B. C. H.* 1905, p. 543, no. 182, and p. 563. Homolle called the *τριήρης* a vase. Dürrbach also called the *τετρήρης* a vase; but no vase of this name is known, and I cannot agree with him that there is no doubt that a *τετρήρης* of 1,700 drachmai is the same as a *τριήρης* of 1,544 drachmai. Besides, there were trireme-vases at Delos, and they appear as *κρατήρες τριηρητικοί*; Michel 815, ll. 131, 135 (fourth century). To call Seleukos’ offerings ‘vases’ misses the whole point. Dittenberger’s note on *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 588 (Demares), l. 31, that Seleukos must have dedicated this trieres before 306, as he is not called *βασιλεύς*, is ill-founded; he is *βασιλεύς* in the corresponding passage in Hypsokles, and the inventories are absolutely untrustworthy as to titles, &c., unless the actual *ἐπιγραφή* be quoted.



There is no need now to insist on the general excellence of the nineteenth and twentieth books of Diodoros; and the fleet figures which he gives are moderate in themselves, agree well with one another, and are careful to distinguish warships from transports or service vessels, a very rare blessing in an ancient writer.<sup>37</sup> This last fact shows incontrovertibly that the items in Diodoros have come down from some practical man who knew; it is hardly possible therefore that their source can be any one but Hieronymos, a sufficient guarantee of their general trustworthiness.

Taking these figures, and reckoning warships only, it appears that in 315 Antigonos controlled 240 warships;<sup>38</sup> in 313 about 250;<sup>39</sup> at Salamis Demetrios had 118 ships in action, raised to 198 after the battle, which would give a total of somewhere about 330 ships in the possession of the two kings at the end of 306.<sup>40</sup> For the expedition against Egypt Demetrios mobilized 150 ships,<sup>41</sup> of which a good many were lost in a storm, and next year against Rhodes 200,<sup>42</sup> which still left a certain reserve. Here Diodoros' figures unfortunately fail us. When Plutarch says that Demetrios sailed to Greece in 304 with 330 'ships',<sup>43</sup> he of course includes transports. But we know that Demetrios did some building between 306 and 288;<sup>44</sup> and though Plutarch's statement that in 294, after losing most of his fleet in a storm, he was still able to collect 300 ships, must be exaggerated, it is certain that the fleet so collected was large enough to cause

<sup>37</sup> e.g. 20, 47, 1; 52, 4; 73, 2; 82, 4. On the merits of books 18-20 see E. Schwartz, *Diodoros* in *P. W.* He cites the fact, among others, that military operations are carefully distinguished by winter quarters, a thing unknown elsewhere in Diodoros.

<sup>38</sup> Diod. 19, 62, 8.

<sup>39</sup> Polykleitos with 50 ships had captured the whole of Antigonos' Rhodian contingent (Diod. 19, 64); if we say 40 ships, it would be a large number for Rhodes. Against this Dioskourides had taken the greater part of 20 ships (ib. 68), and Medeios 36 (ib. 69), giving Antigonos somewhere about 250 by 313, of which 150 were at sea (ib. 77).

<sup>40</sup> Diod. 20, 50. In the battle Demetrios lost 20 and captured 40 ships (ib. 52, 6); and Plutarch (*Dem.* 16) states, as Diodoros implies, that Menelaos' 60 ships surrendered afterwards.

<sup>41</sup> Diod. 20, 73, 2.

<sup>42</sup> Ib. 82, 4.

<sup>43</sup> *Dem.* 23. So probably do the 190 ships given to Demetrios at Salamis, unless Plutarch's figures come ultimately from quite a different source to those of Diodoros, Douris for instance.

<sup>44</sup> Diod. 20, 92, 5; Plut. *Dem.* 43.



an Egyptian fleet of 150 sail to retire without risking an action.<sup>45</sup> When to it were added what remained of the fleets of Kassandros and Athens, Demetrios as king of Macedonia may well have again controlled 300 warships, an overwhelming force.

The strength of Egypt at sea up to Salamis is consistently represented as a maximum of 200 ships.<sup>46</sup> After that battle the only fleet of which the number is known was 150 strong. It is interesting therefore to note that, prior to the final fall of Demetrios, the full strength of Egypt is about the same as the full strength of Carthage at the time of the first Punic war, 200 warships, while Demetrios, in number of vessels, was distinctly more powerful on paper than Rome ever was in the third century.<sup>47</sup> But numbers do not quite give the relative measure of Demetrios' strength as king of Macedonia. His empire included all the best material—Athens, Corinth, Sidon; <sup>48</sup> for marines he could ship Macedonian troops. He controlled the western sea-board of the Aegean from Nauplia to Abdera, with all its harbours and naval bases; Macedonia and Magnesia gave him unlimited timber, the islands provided his galleys with stepping-stones across the sea. Above all he (or his father) had been the first to realize that quadriremes and quinqueremes were not the extreme limit of human progress. These galleys, rowed by some twenty-five oars aside, with four or five men to each oar respectively,<sup>49</sup> formed the fleets of Egypt till after Salamis,<sup>50</sup> and formed the fleets of Rome, Carthage, and Rhodes, throughout the third and second centuries. History in the long run has justified the nations that adhered to moderate-sized vessels; but on this obscure subject it is not possible to do more than point out that while the question of large

<sup>45</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 33.

<sup>46</sup> In 315 Seleukos and Polykleitos each have 100 ships; Diod. 19, 58, 5 and 62, 4. At Salamis Ptolemy and Menelaos have 140 + 60 = 200; Diod. 20, 49. I do not reckon in guardboats on the Nile; Diod. 20, 76, 3.

<sup>47</sup> See *J. H. S.* 27, 1907, p. 48 seq., dealing with Polybios' figures for the first Punic war. The highest Roman figure for the third century is 280 in the year 208; but these were all at sea, or ready to go. The Carthaginian maximum was about 200.

<sup>48</sup> See ch. 4, n. 33.

<sup>49</sup> *J. H. S.* 1905, pp. 137, 204; *Class. Rev.* xx, 75.

<sup>50</sup> Diod. 20, 49, 2.

versus moderate-sized warships was never properly tried to an issue, our scanty records of such trials as were made in the Eastern Mediterranean in the third century point to a certain measure of advantage in the larger vessels.<sup>51</sup> The performance of Demetrios' heptereis at Salamis certainly revolutionized existing ideas in the kingdoms of the Successors, and a race in building large ships began. Demetrios' fleet, therefore, when he was king of Macedonia, must undoubtedly have contained many ships larger even than heptereis; his flagship, as early as 300, had been a triskaidekeres.<sup>52</sup> These ships were adapted to carry, not only heavy catapults, but also a large force of fighting-men; and it is consequently impossible to estimate the power of Demetrios' fleets merely by the number of ships, as we should estimate a fleet of the fourth or fifth century, though it is tolerably certain that the average size would fall short of the quinquereme.<sup>53</sup>

One note of caution, however, must be sounded, in an estimate of Demetrios' strength. His total force cannot be ascertained by adding together the army and the fleet, for they overlapped to an unknown extent. To get to sea a fleet of 200 large warships, properly equipped with fighting-men, entailed a considerable drain on the land forces; and no power in the third century except Rome was ever able to put out its full strength on land and sea at the same time.

No other organized state, save Egypt, was ever in a position to think of challenging Demetrios at sea; no other state had a fleet of the first class. Seleukos had little coast line and no naval force worth speaking of. Lysimachos must have had some ships; but his strength at sea cannot have been great till he acquired Herakleia, and the importance of his navy dates from after Demetrios' fall. Probably the most important state navies, other than those of Demetrios and

<sup>51</sup> Salamis itself; Gonatas' defeat by Keraunos, Memnon 13; Gonatas' later victories, see ch. 13 and references. The reaction began with the battle of Chios in 201, apparently. — Actium was of course not an issue between big and little ships.

<sup>52</sup> Probably a vessel whose motive power, in relation to that of a quinquereme, was meant to be expressed by the ratio 13 : 5, whether it had thirteen men to the oar or otherwise.

<sup>53</sup> See App. 10, p. 457.

Egypt, were still owned by three independent Greek towns. Herakleia and Byzantion could each dispose of an effective, if moderate, force ;<sup>54</sup> while Rhodes, though not yet the Rhodes of the second century, and though her strength on paper was never really great,<sup>55</sup> had already given the world an object-lesson of what one free city could still do, and had begun to make good the proud boast that every Rhodian was worth a warship.<sup>56</sup>

But if Demetrios held absolute command of the sea as against any organized state, the Aegean was nevertheless infested by an irregular and very active sea-power, that of the pirates ;<sup>57</sup> and they maintained themselves in force throughout the third century, careless of whether the Macedonian or the Egyptian were nominally lord of the sea. Piracy had been endemic in the Eastern Mediterranean from the dawn of history ; the rulers of the Aegean in the third century could not suppress it, and it does not even appear that they took such serious steps to hold it in check as were taken from time to time by the little island of Rhodes. The evil had been a growing one toward the end of the fourth century, in spite of the strong Athenian navy. We hear of triremes being sent out expressly to watch for corsairs ;<sup>58</sup> and about 325/4 Athens was founding a colony on the shores of the Adriatic, under a leader of the auspicious name of Miltiades, to form a base whence corn ships could be protected against the pirates of Etruria.<sup>59</sup> For this was the time when the ~~Etruscans were the most dreaded of sea-rovers ;~~<sup>60</sup> and at the beginning of the third century they were invading the Aegean. Demetrios had to complain to Rome of the

<sup>54</sup> Ib., p. 454.

<sup>55</sup> An analysis of the war between Rome and Antiochos shows that, during its course, Rhodes got to sea in all about 77 ships, chiefly quinqueremes and quadriremes, and by no means all at once.

<sup>56</sup> Diogenianos, *παροιμίαι* 5, 19 ; ἡμεῖς δέκα ῥόδιοι δέκα νῆες.

<sup>57</sup> A good page in Holm (4, 87, Eng. Tr.).

<sup>58</sup> Dockyard insc., *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 530 = *I. G.* ii, 804 (not in Boeckh) ; l. 280, ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν λειστών.

<sup>59</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 153 = *I. G.* ii, 809. The reference to quadriremes shows that Dittenberger's date, 325/4, must be about right. Cf. Hypereides' speech περὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν Τυρρηνῶν.

<sup>60</sup> Strabo 10, p. 477, gives as the great succession of pirates, Etruscans, Cretans, Kilikians ; and see *Ath. Mitt.* 20, 223. It must have been about the beginning of the third century that Etruria's mantle fell upon Crete.

depredations of their confederates the Antiates;<sup>61</sup> and in 298 Delos borrowed a large sum from Apollo to put herself in a condition of defence against the Etruscans,<sup>62</sup>—a year, be it noted, when Demetrios was in Asia. Demetrios had no desire for foreigners poaching in his sea; but indeed the power of Etruria was fast failing, and the Aegean was soon to be left to the home-bred buccaneer. One of the last acts of the broken Athenian navy, at the time when Antigonos was beginning to grasp at sea-power, had been to rescue the island of Kythnos from a pirate named Glauketas, capturing him and his ships, 'and making the sea safe for those that sailed thereon.'<sup>63</sup> Glauketas was probably acting in Antigonos' interest; for it is certain that Demetrios, while lord of the sea, so far from repressing home-grown piracy in the Aegean, was on extremely good terms with those who professed it. The arch-pirate Timokles aided him in the siege of Rhodes with some excellent ships;<sup>64</sup> and 8,000 pirates formed part of the army with which, in 302, he invaded Thessaly,<sup>65</sup> a figure which, if even approximately correct, shows that the rovers of the sea disposed of no contemptible force.

All through the third century numerous traces of their activity are found. In Lysimachos' reign one Pythagoras attempted to plunder the sanctuary at Samothrake, but was caught by the king's troops.<sup>66</sup> A new arch-pirate, Ameinias of Phokis, whose force included 'pirates' from Aetolia, took ~~Kassandreia for Antigonos Gonatas.~~<sup>67</sup> Ptolemy II also employed them, both in his war against Antiochos I, and to aid Alexander of Corinth against Gonatas.<sup>68</sup> But this did not hinder them from plundering Ptolemy's possessions when they had a mind. Twice they attacked Thera, the Ptolemaic head-quarters in the Aegean; on one occasion they landed at Oia, in the north of the island, and were beaten off by the Egyptian nauarch, Hermaphilos, son of Philostratos, who

<sup>61</sup> Strabo 5, 232. They shared in the Etruscan raids. But see ch. 2, n. 22.

<sup>62</sup> *Eis tēn φυλακὴν τῶν Τυρρητῶν*, *I. G.* xi, 148, l. 73, and references.

<sup>63</sup> *I. G.* ii, 331 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 213. That Glauketas was a pirate is proved, *not* by his ships being *πλοία*, but by the reference to the safety of the seas.

<sup>64</sup> Diod. 20, 97.

<sup>65</sup> *Ib.* 110.

<sup>66</sup> *I. G.* xii, 8, 150 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 190.

<sup>67</sup> Ch. 7, p. 172.

<sup>68</sup> Paus. 1, 7, 3. *I. G.* ii, 5, 591 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 220.



fortunately happened to be there ;<sup>69</sup> at another time pirates from Allaria in Crete carried off some men, whether citizens of Thera or mercenaries is uncertain, and persuaded them to turn pirate also.<sup>70</sup> The Ptolemaic strategos of the Hellespont had to fortify Samothrake against them ;<sup>71</sup> a little later they succeeded in sacking Aigiale in Amorgos.<sup>72</sup> At the end of the century Rhodes took energetic measures ; a treaty remains, made between her and Hierapytna in Crete, which provides for joint action against pirates and for the disposal of the captives and their vessels,<sup>73</sup> doubtless only one of many similar treaties made by Rhodes with a view to getting the scourge under. But it still persisted ; for in 190 another arch-pirate, Nikandros, aided Antiochos III in his war against Rome, putting himself under the orders of Antiochos' admiral.<sup>74</sup>

What is to be understood by 'piracy' in any case is a difficult question, since the Greek language has only one term for pirate and privateer. The Aetolian pirates, for instance, were privateersmen, like that Dikaiarchos who about 205 received twenty ships from Philip V with the congenial order to go a-pirating in the Aegean, raid the islands, and help the Cretans against Rhodes.<sup>75</sup> Aetolia had no state navy, and privateering was her recognized method of marine warfare.<sup>76</sup> The corsairs of Illyria and Crete were sometimes authorized by their governments, such as they were ;<sup>77</sup> but if sometimes privateersmen, they were generally pirates pure and simple, and even in the case of Aetolia the distinguishing line was often remarkably thin.<sup>78</sup> Naturally states backward in civilization drew no very fine distinctions ; some of the

<sup>69</sup> *J. G.* xii, 3, 1291.

<sup>70</sup> *Ib.* 328 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 921.

<sup>71</sup> *J. G.* xii, 8, 156 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 221.

<sup>72</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 255.

<sup>73</sup> Michel 21. Rhodes had always done her best ; cf. *Diod.* 20, 81, 3 (end of fourth century) ; *Strabo* 14, 652 (general).

<sup>74</sup> *Livy* 37, 11.

<sup>75</sup> See on this Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 107.

<sup>76</sup> *Polyb.* 4, 6, 1, the Aetolians send out 'pirates', i.e. privateers. The great powers did the same when they chose, e.g. Rome after 249, *Zonaras* 8, p. 397 A ; Philip v, *Livy* 31, 22, 6 ; but Aetolia had no other force, and no *ναυαρχος* among her officials. — There was of course a tendency to apply the term pirate to the sailors of a state you disliked, just as the Spaniards did to those of Elizabeth. — The movement for making *ἀσουλῖαι* was in part directed against privateering ; see *Hiller von Gaertringen, Thera*, iii, p. 89.

<sup>77</sup> e.g. *Polyb.* 2, 4, 8.

<sup>78</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 241, 244.



Cretan towns cannot have been much better than Algiers, and even more respectable communities than the Cretan may not have been above winking at the sea-captain who for the nonce turned buccaneer. After all, it was not so long since even Athens had given her blessing to those of her citizens who might contemplate a short cruise at their neighbours' expense.<sup>79</sup>

But the pirates who furnished Demetrios with ships against Rhodes and troops against Kassandros, who took Kassandrea for Antigonos, and fought for Antiochos against Rome, always under the orders of an arch-pirate, were none of these. These must have been broken men, escaped slaves, bankrupt debtors, with a sprinkling perhaps of exiles and unemployed mercenaries,<sup>80</sup>—at their head some who found organized society tedious and desired a life of adventure,—men who lived in this or that little stronghold round the Aegean,<sup>81</sup> avoiding cities, but recognizing a community of interest and a chief. No doubt the governments could have put them down; but all the governments had their hands pretty full, and it suited them better to wink at the evil. For pirates could be capable allies on occasion, and one had not to be too particular as to what percentage of loss fell on them. Besides, apart from warfare, the pirate had a most useful place in the economy of the old world; he was the general slave merchant. But for him and his living cargoes, State mines might have to close down and State forests remain unfelled; so long as he did not do too much harm to one's own subjects, he was rather a person to be encouraged. Probably 'arch-pirate' was a very honourable appellation.<sup>82</sup> It was only states like Rhodes, subsisting entirely on sea-borne commerce, or Athens, dependent on sea-borne corn, that felt any real interest in clearing the seas.

<sup>79</sup> A law of Solon had put an association of men setting out for piracy (ἐπὶ λείαν οἰχόμενοι) on the same footing as an association of traders; Gaius, *Digest*, 47, 22 (cited by Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 105).

<sup>80</sup> For the last see Plut. *Mor.* 223 D, no. 8; Strabo 10, p. 477.

<sup>81</sup> Diod. 20, 110 speaks of them as being all sorts and coming from many places, παντοδαπῶν . . . συντρεχόντων.

<sup>82</sup> As among the Vikings of the tenth century, when one of the Norse kings of the Isles is found signing himself Archipirata; A. Lang, *Hist. of Scotland*, 1, 498.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE FALL OF DEMETRIOS

To such a kingdom, and to such power, was Antigonos again heir.

But the power was illusory, and the kingdom built on sand. Demetrios could conquer; he could not govern. He could win the hearts of strangers; he could not keep the hearts of his own people. The Macedonians had been accustomed to a line of kings who were the fathers of their people, kings whom the common man served willingly because he felt that they were national kings, having much in common with that same common man whose acclaiming voice, as one of the Macedonians in army assembled, was necessary to call them to their kingship. The king was not king of Macedonia, but of the Macedonians; a true distinction. The common man would have been loyal to Alexander's house had he had the chance; but the old line was extinct, and the common Macedonian, the sturdy farmer who served in the phalanx and had helped to conquer the world, and who had the full pride of what he had done, had lost his bearings. Kassandros had possessed his full share of military and political ability, and seems to have done his duty by Macedonia as he conceived it; but the memory of Kassandros was execrated as that of a butcher, popular tradition believed that he had paid for his sins by a peculiarly horrible death, and it was at least doubtful whether any popularity that Demetrios might gain as the husband of Antipatros' daughter was not more than counterbalanced by the dislike he incurred as the husband of Kassandros' sister.<sup>1</sup> The Macedonian army, too, had merely

<sup>1</sup> See Plut. *Dem.* 37. For a moralizing view of Kassandros' crimes, Just. 16, 1. He was eaten of worms (Paus. 9, 7, 2), a fate also assigned to Herod the Great (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* 17, 169) and Herod Antipas (Acts 12, 23). No doubt he really died of consumption (Euseb., *Schoene* 1, 231), like his own son Philippos (Paus. 9, 7, 3) and Antigonos Doson (Polyb. 2, 70, 6).

hailed him king in default of a better choice. Taken all round, it was a situation that required extremely careful and delicate handling on his part if it were to attain to elements of permanence.

But careful handling of the situation was the last thing that occurred to Demetrios. Bred up as a king over Orientals, where Oriental methods of rule were not merely pardonable, but certainly expected and perhaps required, he merely transferred the same methods to his government of the proudest nation in Europe. The generous impulses with which he had started on his career in Europe were running low; and ostentation began to replace ideas. Moreover for the last twelve years or more he had been worshipped as a god by subservient partisans in Greece,<sup>2</sup> a proceeding which, (countenanced by the old Antigonos in Asia as a useful political measure), had appealed to the weakest side of Demetrios' nature. It had not even been an ordinary State worship; he had lived in the Maiden's Temple like Athene, he had given his oracles like Apollo. And at the same time he had learnt the bitter lesson that those who treated him as a god could not be trusted as men; and disillusionment had grown with self-exaltation. The natural consequences followed. What Macedonia required was rest from fighting for a while, and a statesmanlike government that should work among the people for forgetfulness of the past and attachment to the present ruler; what it got was careless tyranny and ceaseless war. Men might have pardoned the mere show of the play-actor, the luxury of the court, the double diadem and the slippers of gold and purple, even the display of the famous mantle that pictured the whole host of heaven,—the mantle that was left half finished and that the proudest of his successors dare not wear.<sup>3</sup> They might have thought it little that the king, following the conceit of Kassandros' half-mad

<sup>2</sup> Demetria in Athens, *Plut. Dem.* 12, Douris ap. *Athen.* 12, 536a; at Delos, *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 93, 1907, p. 208; in Euboea, celebrated alternately at Histiaia, Chalkis, Eretria, and Karystos, *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1911, p. 1, no. 1, l. 36.

<sup>3</sup> The dress and mantle come from Douris, *Athen.* 12, 535f; and *Plut. Dem.* 41 (end) must be from the same source. Notwithstanding the form in which Athenaios quotes Douris, there cannot have been more than one mantle with this particular embroidery.

brother Alexarchos, should let himself be addressed as the Sun,<sup>4</sup> or be portrayed charioted on the globe of the earth as its master;<sup>5</sup> for these things were done in a Greek city, and not in Macedonia. But there were more serious matters than Eastern trappings and vanities. The Macedonians had been accustomed to kings who went in and out among them, hearing complaints and doing justice; Demetrios made himself inaccessible to his subjects, and his most faithful officer has spoken to his harshness.<sup>6</sup> If on the road he received petitions, it was to drop them into the first river he crossed. It is recorded how an old woman once shamed him into doing, for a time, the duties of a king. Envoys were subjected to long delay, or received with small courtesy. Add to this his long-continued absences from Macedonia, and it must have been clear to close observers that little effort would be needed to cut away the props of Demetrios' power.

But Demetrios himself seems to have had no misgivings. To him Macedonia was but a means to an end; his ambition was the recovery of his father's kingdom, and his rule over Asia, probably as a step to universal dominion. In the autumn of 289, being at peace with the world, he commenced his preparations to this end. A fleet of five hundred ships was to be got together, and the invasion of Asia undertaken on a grand scale; the dockyards of Corinth, Chalkis, and Piraeus, the shores of the lake on which stood the Macedonian capital of Pella, once itself a seaport, rang with the axe and hammer of shipwrights; the king himself hurried from point to point, ordering, superintending, taxing his mechanical talent for new and stupendous inventions; it was now that he launched those galleys of fifteen and sixteen men to the oar which excited universal admiration, not merely for their beauty, but for their speed and efficiency at sea.

The other kings saw the imposing exterior and the mighty preparations, and took fright. That winter a new coalition

<sup>4</sup> The Ithyphallos of 290 (Douris ap. Athen. 6, 253 d) addresses Demetrios as the Sun; and he may have been so portrayed on the mantle. For Alexarchos see ch. 7, p. 185.

<sup>5</sup> Douris ap. Athen. 12, 536 a; at the Demetrieia at Athens.

<sup>6</sup> Χαλεπὸς καὶ τραχὺς, Plut. *Dem.* 42. Probably from Hieronymos, see F. Reuss, *Hieronimos von Kardia*, p. 108.



was formed by Seleukos, Ptolemy, and Lysimachos, to curb the would-be world-conqueror, and they succeeded in persuading Pyrrhos to break his treaty, partly by taunting him with having allowed Demetrios to carry off his wife. It is probable that the coalition was also joined by Audoleon, king of Paionia. The plan of campaign was comprehensive; Lysimachos was to invade Macedonia from the east and Pyrrhos from the west, while Ptolemy was to sail for Athens with his fleet and attempt to raise Greece. Seleukos apparently had no part in the projected operations.<sup>7</sup>

The coalition succeeded in striking the first blow. In the spring of 288,<sup>8</sup> before Demetrios was ready with his preparations, and while his existing fleet was, apparently, still laid up for the winter, the three kings started together. Leaving Antigonos to look after Greece, Demetrios hurried to meet the invaders of Macedonia; in face of the danger by land, there was no time to think of getting the fleet to sea. Of the three kings, Ptolemy had far the easiest route, and was not opposed. Some time prior to July, i. e. before the end of the archon-year 289/8, an Egyptian squadron appeared before Athens; the actual ships sent were probably the division of aphracts or light cruisers mentioned afterwards as under the command of one Zeno, for the battle fleet must have been engaged in blockading or observing Demetrios' naval bases, Corinth and Chalkis. On the advent of the Egyptians the nationalist party in Athens rose and overthrew the existing government, with the usual accompaniments of such a change; the then magistrates went, or were driven, out of office, and were replaced by others, and Athens declared herself independent. Demetrios had no time to attend to the town; what Antigonos was doing is not known, but no doubt Demetrios had most of the troops immediately available; and although Antigonos held the Piraeus, Zeno the cruiser captain succeeded, shortly before the eleventh day of Hekatombaion 288, in throwing a supply of corn into the town, for which the

<sup>7</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 43, 44. He does not mention Audoleon, but the reference in *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 195, l. 15 to Audoleon—*συ[v]εργῶν εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερ[ί]αν τῆς [π]όλει*—before the storming of the Mouseion shows that he joined the coalition.

<sup>8</sup> On the date see App. 2, pp. 418–22.



Athenians passed him a vote of thanks on the spot. Athens was now safe for the time, and Ptolemy was free to turn his attention elsewhere.<sup>9</sup>

In Athens the change of government, brought about with the help of an Egyptian fleet, made the political situation very precise and definite. Every one had to make up his mind to which of the two parties he belonged. All Demetrios' friends, such as Phaidros, were of course excluded from office;<sup>10</sup> but any enemy of Demetrios might serve the nationalist government, whatever had been his previous political label. We know a little of some of the more prominent nationalists of this time.

First came Demosthenes' nephew Demochares, whom the nationalists at once recalled from exile. He was a man passably honest as politicians went; it was claimed for him that he was one of the few democrats in Athens who had never served under any other form of government. His sphere was finance, his policy retrenchment; he is said to have had some success here, and doubtless a revision of expenditure was entirely necessary after six years of Demetrios. He had been responsible for the repair of the walls and the strengthening of the fortifications of Athens at the time of the four years' war against Kassandros, and also for the alliance with Boeotia: and he was to put one considerable feat to his credit before he died. But on the whole, in spite of undoubted patriotism, he gives an impression of ineffectiveness. He was a man of words rather than of deeds; his tradition was that of the speaker, and for the time being the day of formal oratory was over. He indeed made himself remembered as one who did not hesitate to say what he thought; but his provocative manner seems to have achieved little for him but a nickname and a number of enemies, among them the historian Timaios. It

<sup>9</sup> The evidence for all this, together with other systems of dating, is considered in detail in App. 2, on the question of the date of Diokles. Zeno's squadron (*I. G.* ii, 5, 309<sup>b</sup> = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 193) is mentioned again a little later as policing the Cyclades after they had become Egyptian; *O. G.* I. 773 = *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 1004.

<sup>10</sup> Phaidros does not appear between Xenophon's year 289/8 (see App. 2) and that of Nikias Otryneus 282/1, i.e. as long as the nationalist government lasted.

is unpleasant too to think that he had been among those whose idea of making war on Kassandros had been to attempt to drive Aristotle's school out of Athens through the medium of Sophokles' law. At best, it shows that he could only look back and not forward; for with the philosophers lay the future. The truth about him may well be that he deserves neither much praise nor much blame, but that he was simply the mediocre nephew of a great statesman, and heavily handicapped by that fact.<sup>11</sup>

Philippides son of Philokles of Kephale was a well-known writer of comedies, and a great personal friend of King Lysimachos of Thrace, in which capacity he had been able to render much service to Athens after Ipsos, securing the release of the prisoners whom Lysimachos had taken. He first came into prominence in the years that followed Demetrios' liberation of Athens in 307; he seems at the time to have been a moderate democrat, bitterly hostile to Stratokles, and making full use of his position on the comic stage to assail him unsparingly. The friend of Lysimachos and the enemy of Stratokles was bound to be the enemy of Demetrios also; and when the democratic government fell after Ipsos and was replaced by a moderate oligarchy, Philippides, though not holding office in the new government, found himself so far in accord with them as to go as their envoy to Lysimachos in 299/8 to ask for corn for the city. There cannot at this time have been much difference of opinion between the moderate democrat Philippides and the quondam oligarch Phaidros, who held office under this government. The careers of the two men, thus for a time moving in the same orbit, furnish an instructive comparison; for after 295/4 they

<sup>11</sup> Laches' decree in his honour; Plut. *X orat. vit.* 851 D. — His retrenchment, *φεισαμένῳ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*; (he succeeded, aorist). — Timaios on Demochares, Polyb. 12, 13. His nickname Parrhesiastes, given in the otherwise worthless story in Seneca, *de Ira* iii, 23, is borne out by Polyb. u.s., *πεπαρησιάζονται πολλοί*. — He defended Sophokles, Athen. 13, 610f. On this law, soon after repealed, Diog. L. 5, 38. No philosopher was to teach in Athens without a licence from the government. — I am compelled to say 'passably honest' by the story in Diog. L. 7, 14 (semble, from Antigonos of Karystos), that he once asked Zeno to make interest for him with Antigonos, to Zeno's disgust. — See generally, Susseml 1, 552; Beloch 3, 2, 374; Swoboda, *Demochares*, in *P. W.*; Ferguson, *Athens*, *passim*. Wilamowitz' celebrated but vitriolic picture in his *Antigonos von Karystos* goes too far.

diverge sharply; while Phaidros joined Demetrios, Philippides, finding a moderate position no longer tenable, swung straight back and cast in his lot with the nationalists. Exactly when he took this step is not known; he is not heard of again till after Demetrios' fall.<sup>12</sup>

Glaukon son of Eteokles, of Aithalidai, better known as the brother of Chremonides than on his own account, must have been a comparatively young man, though he was general twice under this government and agonothetes in 282/1. He had the prestige of an Olympian victory in the chariot race; he was also proxenos of Rhodes. But his more important activity falls later.<sup>13</sup>

But the best man at Athens at the time seems to be the one of whom we know the least. Olympiodoros was both a democrat and a friend of Theophrastos, and a noble example that a Peripatetic could still be a patriot. He was a veteran of the wars against Kassandros; and in the year of Ipsos, when the whole world was in arms against Demetrios and Antigonos, he had won a great name by meeting Kassandros and beating him back from Elateia, one of the last acts of Athens in Demetrios' interest.<sup>14</sup> He had naturally taken no part in the events of 301/0-296/5; but he must be the archon-eponymos of 294/3, the year of the attempted union of parties. The attempt, as has been seen, miscarried, and Olympiodoros was not again active till Demetrios fell.

These were the men of the reaction of 288; and to a certain extent they were ready to fight for their beliefs. But either they or the people were not very earnest in the matter; for

<sup>12</sup> The decree for Philippides, passed in 285/4, is the chief authority (*I. G.* ii, 314 and ii, 5, 85 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 197); see also *Plut. Dem.*, *passim*. It seems that all the instances given by Plutarch of the abuse of Stratokles by Philippides belong to 307-301. Perhaps in 294 political pasquinades were dangerous; and Stratokles must have died soon after. — Why Ferguson exiles Philippides (*Athens*, p. 144) I do not know. Had he thus suffered for his opinions, the decree for him must not only have mentioned the fact but gloried in it, like Laches' decree for Demochares.

<sup>13</sup> *I. G.* ii, 1291 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 200; other references in the notes to *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 200 and 222. The Olympic victory must come early in his life. Date of the Rhodian proxeny unknown. The Delphic decree is later, and *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 222 much later.

<sup>14</sup> *Paus.* 10, 18, 7 and 34, 3. The Elateians dedicated a bronze lion at Delphi; and a statue of the Phokian leader Xanthippos was set up there; statue-base *B. C. H.* 1899, p. 388; see *B. Ph. W.* 1912, p. 477.

they took no steps to improve the Athenian military organization, or to restore compulsory service;<sup>15</sup> the kings their friends would save them from Demetrios. One can only praise them half-heartedly. But the beginning was good. Olympiodoros called for volunteers; a few of the citizens remembered (it is said) the glorious deeds of their ancestors; and at the head of what men he could raise, including boys and grey-beards, Olympiodoros attacked Demetrios' garrison in the Mouseion, the garrison that held the city down. The 'Macedonians' sallied out and were beaten in the field; a captain of mercenaries, Strombichos, came over with his men; Olympiodoros followed up and stormed the fortress, one Leokritos being the first man over the wall; and for the moment the city was free. Leokritos' shield was dedicated to Zeus, the Giver of Liberty; and those who fell at the wall were buried beside the long row of tombs where lay the men who, during two hundred years, had died for Athens.<sup>16</sup>

While these events were passing in Greece, Demetrios had hurried north to meet the invaders of Macedonia. He first faced Lysimachos, as the more pressing danger. But the temper of the Macedonians was unsatisfactory, and a steady dribble of men left his camp, nominally to go home, in reality to join Alexander's old general. Demetrios suddenly altered his plans, and turned instead to face Pyrrhos, who had reached Beroia; he at least was no companion of Alexander's. But the pillars of sand suddenly crumbled away. The Macedonians refused to fight any longer for Demetrios' ambition. Part of the army, crowning themselves with the Epeirot oak-leaf, went over to Pyrrhos openly; the rest commenced to plunder the camp; a few had the courage and honesty to tell Demetrios to his face that all was over, and that he had better save himself. The king changed his

<sup>15</sup> Ch. 2, p. 43.

<sup>16</sup> Paus. I, 26, 1 seq., and 29, 13. — Decree for Strombichos; *I. G.* ii, 317, 318 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 198, 199. — All that is known of Olympiodoros comes from Pausanias. But Pausanias says he saw the tombs (I, 29, 13), a picture at Eleusis (I, 26, 3), and decrees preserved in the Akropolis and the prytaneion; this, coupled with the decree for Strombichos, gives no reasonable room for doubt. The name of the commander of the garrison, Spintharos, shows that the 'Macedonians' were entirely composed of mercenaries.



clothes and fled to Kassandreia ; Pyrrhos and Lysimachos divided Macedonia between them.<sup>17</sup>

At Kassandreia Demetrios found Phila. That sorely tried woman could support the blows of fortune no longer, and took poison. The reason is given as the loss of Demetrios' kingdom ; but this at best can be but the last of many reasons. Her life as Demetrios' wife can hardly have disposed her to desire yet to live ; and it adds but a small touch to her tragedy that in a few years she might have seen a king of another type in her son.<sup>18</sup>

From Kassandreia Demetrios, giving up Macedonia as lost, hurried to Greece to save what he could from the wreck. Laying aside all insignia of royalty, he went round the cities in the garb of a private man, the traditional method of the playwright for exciting sympathy. But Demetrios was something other than a king in a tragedy, and his talents were never either so conspicuous or so formidable as when he appeared to be hopelessly beaten. There was a sudden reversal of the situation. The friends who commanded his garrisons rallied to him ; his mercenaries stood by their oath ; he secured Boeotia by restoring to the Thebans their constitution ; and almost before the world had realized that he was not absolutely powerless, he was under the walls of Athens with a formidable army.

The alarm of the Athenians was great. They had fought against him before, and been forgiven ; but were they not this time committed past redemption ? They had received Ptolemy's fleet, and honoured his captains ; they had stormed the Mouseion, and slain Demetrios' men ; they had recalled Demochares, and proclaimed Athens free. They had put their trust in princes, and rejoiced openly at Demetrios' fall ; and Demetrios was at their gates, while Ptolemy's fleet was back in harbour, and the princes were far off. Messengers

<sup>17</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 44, 45 ; *Pyrrh.* 11, 12 ; Just. 16, 2, 2-3. I can make nothing of the story in Paus. 1, 10, 2 of Demetrios defeating Lysimachos ; it will not fit either here or in 294, where Niese (1, 365) placed it. Polyæn. 4, 12, 2, (Lysimachos takes Amphipolis), should belong here. — The line of this partition of Macedonia is unknown : Klotzsch, p. 197, suggests the Axios. Certainly Kassandreia belonged to Lysimachos. — Bronze coinage struck by Pyrrhos as a Macedonian king, Head<sup>2</sup>, p. 230.

<sup>18</sup> See Beloch 3, 1, 237.



were hastily sent off to both Pyrrhos and Lysimachos for help ; but for some reason unknown Athens was not minded to close her gates and stand a siege, as she had so often done before and was to do again : possibly the walls were out of repair, while Demetrios still held Piraeus and all the forts. The arm of the flesh had failed ; Athens turned to the arm of the spirit. It is one of the least honourable episodes in her history. She called on the aged Polemon to save her ; and though the revered head of Plato's School would not break his rule of quietude, he, as Achilles in like case, sent his friend. At the head of an embassy of philosophers, Krates of the Academy went out to meet Demetrios, and conjured him to spare the violet-crowned city in the name of her illustrious dead. Demetrios received his honoured suppliants with the respect due to their persons and their position. He was perhaps glad of an excuse to spare the city of memories ; he was perhaps not uninfluenced by the fact that the arm of the flesh, in the shape of Pyrrhos, was coming unpleasantly close ; certain it is that the philosophers gained the indulgence prayed for. Demetrios had already raised the siege when Pyrrhos arrived hot-foot to the help of the city. There remained nothing for him to do, and he and Demetrios made peace on the basis of the *status quo* ; Pyrrhos had no mind to leave his share of Macedonia at Lysimachos' mercy, while all that Demetrios wanted was freedom to turn elsewhere. Pyrrhos entered the city, sacrificed to Athene, and went his ways, after brusquely telling the people that if they had any sense they would never admit another king within their gates. Athens was yet free.<sup>19</sup>

Demetrios still had a considerable power. He retained all his Greek possessions but Athens ;<sup>20</sup> he possessed a fair

<sup>19</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 45, 46 ; *Pyrrh.* 12. The date is spring-summer 287 ; Demetrios required time to collect a new army, whenever he left Kassandreia. — I think no one now doubts the embassy of philosophers. — I cannot agree with Beloch (3, 1, 240, n. 1), that Lysimachos was a party to the treaty between Demetrios and Pyrrhos. Rather, the treaty under which Pyrrhos and Lysimachos partitioned Macedonia contained, as was inevitable, a provision for mutual defence against Demetrios ; while Pyrrhos' treaty with Demetrios was doubtless (as Klotzsch suggests, p. 201) partly dictated by fear of Lysimachos.

<sup>20</sup> He may also have taken Lemnos and Imbros from Athens either in 287 or 286 ; Beloch 3, 1, 240, n. 1.

force of mercenaries, and a good three-quarters of his fleet, even if Lysimachos had secured the ships at Pella ; above all, he felt himself unhampered by any form of obligation. It was too late to think of conquering the world ; but it was not too late for great adventures and a great revenge. Of the coalition there was one king who in Demetrios' eyes stood on a different footing to the rest. Accommodation with Ptolemy or Pyrrhos was possible ; with Lysimachos it was not. The reason of the intense personal hatred which these two felt for one another is unknown to us ; the fact of it is attested over and over again, and written in every page of their histories. And as after Ipsos, when Demetrios had lost one kingdom, he had at once sailed to attack the king of Thrace, so now the same causes produced the same result ; he had lost a second kingdom, and his first thought was to turn and rend his personal enemy. Equipping what ships he could, and putting on board every mercenary that could possibly be withdrawn from the force left with Antigonos in Greece—he shipped 11,000 foot and some horse—he sailed for Karia, where he still held Miletos and Kaunos. The Egyptian fleet made no sign ; Demetrios may still have been more than a match for it at sea, and perhaps Ptolemy was not sorry to see him quit Greece and throw himself against some power other than Egypt. Demetrios landed his force successfully at Miletos. There he was met by Eurydike, Phila's sister, the divorced wife of Ptolemy Soter, with her daughter Ptolemais, to whom Demetrios had been betrothed when he made peace with Ptolemy in 299. Demetrios married Ptolemais, and in the spring of 286 set out northward, summoning Lysimachos' cities as he went.

He had been popular in Asia ; Lysimachos was not. Some of the cities opened their gates ; some he stormed ; men gathered to the great adventurer's standard. Certain of Lysimachos' old generals came over with money and troops ; even the impregnable Sardis fell into Demetrios' hands. Then came hurrying south Agathokles, Lysimachos' capable son, with all the power he could raise. Demetrios felt unable to risk an encounter in the field, and retired inland through Phrygia, with the desperate purpose (it is said)

of crossing the Armenian highlands into Media and raising the upper satrapies against Seleukos,—a design feasible enough could he have reached them, as Diodotos of Bactria was to show; but Agathokles hung on his rear, cutting off all supplies, and at last forced Demetrios in sheer hunger over the Tauros passes into Seleukos' province of Kilikia. The rest of the tremendous story hardly concerns this history. It is not necessary to relate in detail how Seleukos first spoke his father-in-law fair and then attacked him; how Agathokles closed the Tauros passes, so that there was no escape northward; how Demetrios, driven to bay, turned on Seleukos, defeated him in every action, and mastered the passes into Syria, till Seleukos trembled even for his throne, and men flocked to Demetrios' banner believing that he would yet win a *third* kingdom; how at the critical moment Demetrios fell ill, and his army melted away like the summer snows; how Seleukos at length hunted him into a corner; how Demetrios tried one more attack with his starving few, and even so was invincible, till Seleukos, taking his courage in both hands, dismounted and ran forward bare-headed to the little band of mercenaries who had kept their oath to the end, begging them to come over and save useless slaughter; how Demetrios and his friends made one last vain attempt to reach Kaunos and the ships; and how at the end, in utter starvation, he surrendered to Seleukos. The world was to see no such man-hunt again till the days of Mithridates.<sup>21</sup>

The foregoing narrative has anticipated the course of events in Greece, where Demetrios in the autumn of 287

<sup>21</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 46-9. There also belong here Polyæn. 4, 7, 12; 4, 9, 2 & 3 & 5. — On the dates. Demetrios may have crossed to Asia autumn 287 or spring 286; the former is more likely, as it allows a reasonable time for his marriage with Ptolemais. Anyhow, his campaign against Agathokles falls in 286, and his captivity spring 285. See generally Beloch 3, 2, 66. As Demetrios died in the third year of his captivity, and as Antigonos, who certainly died 240/39, reigned forty-four years from Demetrios' death, Demetrios must have died in 283 prior to July and surrendered in 285 prior to July, (286/5); I see no room for doubt. W. Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 1905, p. 109, who puts Diokles in 287/6 (see App. 2), has to make Demetrios leave Macedonia summer 287, and appear before Athens the same autumn. This seems to me impossible. But Kolbe agrees that he surrendered in spring 285. — Ferguson, *Athens*, agrees that Demetrios crossed in 287, but puts his captivity in 286 (p. 151), which appears to give insufficient time for the intervening events.

had left Antigonos as his governor, with probably no more troops than were necessary to garrison the fortresses, and a treasury by no means overflowing. Antigonos regarded himself merely as a governor, and during 286 confined himself to the measures necessary to preserve intact what yet remained to his father. Meanwhile the new government in Athens was not idle. So soon as Demetrios withdrew from the city walls in 287, it had begun to send envoys to the various kings, with a view to strengthening its position. Philippides was sent to his friend Lysimachos, others to Audoleon of Paionia and Spartokos of the Crimea. They were to announce that Athens was free, and to pray for help to maintain that freedom and to recover Piraeus and the other forts, help in men if possible, in money anyhow; for the vital necessity of the city was corn. Spartokos sent them a little corn; Audoleon not quite so much, and some promises; Lysimachos sent his compliments, and said that Philippides had behaved very nicely. Obviously, Providence was going to help those who helped themselves. But whatever steps Athens might take to help herself, she could not feed herself; and next year another embassy went off to Lysimachos, headed by Demochares in person. The orator succeeded where the poet had failed; Lysimachos, in the throes of his struggle with Demetrios, was persuaded that any enemy of the latter was worth his support; the close-locked doors of his treasury opened a little way, and the democracy of Athens honoured its ambassador for returning with thirty talents in his pocket, the gift of a king. It was not perhaps as bad as it sounds; Demochares no doubt would have put it, in private, that he had plundered one king of the means to fight another. But many of those who acclaimed him were to live to realize the difficulties of casting out Satan by the help of Satan.<sup>22</sup>

But thirty talents were by no means enough to be of much

<sup>22</sup> Philippides to Lysimachos, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 197, l. 31; the words in l. 36, καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων τῶν π[ί]πτων πολλάκις μεμαρτύρηκεν αὐτῷ ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβεύοντας Ἀθηναίων, coupled with the fact that no result of the embassy is mentioned, show Lysimachos' evasion of an answer.—Audoleon: *I. G.* ii, 312 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 195; Spartokos, *I. G.* ii, 311 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 194.—Demochares to Lysimachos; Laches' decree.



use to Athens. Demochares returned to Lysimachos, and this time succeeded in extracting a hundred talents from him and twenty more from his son-in-law, Kassandros' son Antipatros. He also moved for an embassy to go to Ptolemy; they went and returned with other fifty talents. The nationalist government had now plenty of money.<sup>23</sup>

Lysimachos, however, took more effective measures against Demetrios than subsidizing Athens. He approached Pyrrhos, and persuaded him to break the treaty he had just made with Demetrios and to attack Antigonos. It was the second time that Pyrrhos had so acted; but, to be just, it is extremely probable, on this occasion, that the prior treaty under which Pyrrhos and Lysimachos had partitioned Macedonia would contain a provision for mutual aid if either were attacked by Demetrios, and, as Demetrios was now attacking Lysimachos in Asia, this provision would have come into force, and Lysimachos might very properly claim that it must override any subsequent arrangement between Pyrrhos and Demetrios to which he was not a party. Pyrrhos at once proceeded to invade and overrun Thessaly; Antigonos could save nothing but Demetrios; and Pyrrhos duly appears in the list of Thessalian kings. He also attacked Antigonos' garrisons in Greece; but it does not appear what success he had, or whether the attack was pressed.<sup>24</sup> Pyrrhos may have been busy elsewhere; for though it appears that his recovery of Kerkyra must fall later,<sup>25</sup> it may well have been about this time that he succeeded in conquering the southern part of Illyria and incorporating it in his kingdom.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, Antigonos was in no position to do more than stand on the defensive. Possibly he thought it his business to do so; but probably also he had no more men than were required for garrisons. He was not even in a position, quite apart from any treaty that his father may

<sup>23</sup> Laches' decree.

<sup>24</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12. The list of Thessalian kings in Eusebios, Schoene, p. 241; see Beloch 3, 2, 74.

<sup>25</sup> Paus. 1, 12, 1; Just. 25, 4, 8. One would naturally suppose it took place soon after Demetrios' fall; but Klotzsch, p. 215, rightly points out that 281 is the earliest possible date, because of Ptolemaios' age; even so, he would only have been fourteen at the time.

<sup>26</sup> App. *Ill.* 7.



have made with the town, to attempt to recover Athens; on the contrary, it was Athens that was desirous of attacking *him*. Some time between autumn 287 and spring 286 Demochares had achieved the important success of driving Antigonos' garrison out of the fort at Eleusis; an attempt made by Antigonos to recover the place had been defeated by Olympiodoros, in whose ranks Eleusinian volunteers found a place. And throughout the year 286 the nationalists were rejoicing in the belief that the days of Macedonian rule in Athens were definitely numbered. So long as Demetrios still commanded an army, they could count on the support of the other kings; and thanksgiving was the business of the hour. In January a decree was passed thanking Spartokos for his help. By April contracts were got out for the completion of the long-deferred work on the Stoa in the holy precinct of Eleusis. In June a vote of thanks for his assistance was accorded to Audoleon, and another to an officer of his, who had successfully landed the corn at one of the open Athenian roadsteads. Philippides, who had been elected agonothetes for the new year 286/5, was busy with preparations for a special festival which he intended to celebrate in honour of Demeter and Kora, as a memorial of the liberation of Athens. Demochares and his fellow envoys were home, bringing with them 170 talents from Lysimachos and Ptolemy. Above all, the recovery of the Mouseion and of Eleusis had shown plainly that garrisons of mercenaries were neither incorruptible nor invincible; and in the autumn of that year the recovery of Piraeus itself was hopefully taken in hand.<sup>27</sup>

Piraeus must have been the key which Demochares had used to unlock Lysimachos' treasury; and Lysimachos doubtless was ready to see that he received an adequate return for his 130 talents. Unfortunately the Athenians made the

<sup>27</sup> Decree for Spartokos in Gamelion of Diotimos' year, 287/6, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 194. Decree for Audoleon in Skirophorion of the same year, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 195; and for an officer of his, same date, *I. G.* ii, 313 (fragmentary). — Philippides' agonothesia, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 197. — Eleusis was in Athenian hands by Mounychion of Diotimos' year 287/6, which dates Demochares' capture of the fort, given in Laches' decree; for the date, and circumstances of the work on the Stoa, see H. Lattemann on *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 538 in *Klio*, 6 (1906), p. 140. This is confirmed by *I. G.* ii, 5, 614 c = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 505, which shows that in Menekles' year 283/2 Eleusis had already been in Athenian hands for some years.

mistake of trusting to Lysimachos' gold rather than to their own swords, and discovered, too late, that all mercenaries were not mercenary. Herakleides, who held Piraeus for Antigonos with 2,000 men, was loyal; but two of the Athenian generals, Hipparchos and Mnesidemus, managed to open communications with one of his captains, a Karian named Hierokles, as had been done before with Strombichos. Hierokles led them on, promised to open the gates, and then laid the matter before Herakleides; at the appointed time the gates were opened; Mnesidemus and 420 Athenian burghers were admitted, and promptly cut to pieces. The Athenians buried them near the men who had stormed the Mouseion; but for that year enterprise was checked.<sup>28</sup>

This chapter may fittingly conclude with some reference to the fate of the Aegean after Demetrios' downfall,<sup>29</sup> a story bound up with that of the somewhat enigmatical Phoenician who is known to us only under the Greek name of Philokles.<sup>30</sup> This man, a prince of Sidon, had long been in Demetrios' service;<sup>31</sup> and, as he appears later on as king of the Sidonians, he no doubt commanded the contingent of ships

<sup>28</sup> Polyæn. 5, 17. I cannot put it quite as early as Beloch does (end 287 or early 286), for Athens had first to get the money to bribe Hierokles, which entailed three separate embassies to Lysimachos, and they must have been able to show the king some good reason why he should give 100 talents. The reference to Lydia in Polyænus goes with the appointment of Herakleides, not with the Athenian attack. — The tombs, Paus. I, 29, 10.

<sup>29</sup> The facts that have to be accounted for, and which the following sketch tries to explain, are: (1) That there is no trace of any fighting; we go straight from Tyre, Sidon, and the sea-command in the possession of Demetrios to the same in the possession of Ptolemy. (2) That Philokles was originally in Demetrios' service. (3) The extraordinary honours conferred by the Delians upon Philokles, and the language of their decree for him. (4) The new and extremely powerful position subsequently occupied by Philokles, an Oriental, in the Egyptian service. — The two documents of primary importance are the decree of the League of the Islanders found on Nikouria, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 = *I. G.* xii, 7, 506, and the decree of Delos in honour of Philokles, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 209. The former can be dated with confidence to 280; as Samos is in Ptolemy's hands, it must be later than Lysimachos' death in autumn 281; and it must precede by a reasonable interval the first celebration of the Ptolemaieia at Alexandria (for which it is part of the preparations), in the winter of 279/8. The first Ptolemaieia on Delos seem to have been founded in 280 (see ch. 5, n. 50), an additional reason for assigning the Nikouria decree to that year.

<sup>30</sup> Philokles was son of Apollodoros, *I. G.* ii, 1371 = Michel 1261. The Phoenician names of both father and son are unknown. For theories as to who Philokles was, see R. Dussaud, *Rev. Arch.* 1905, p. 1; F. C. Eiselen, *Sidon*, 1907. I have not seen this last; see *R. É. G.* 1908, p. 205.

<sup>31</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 176, with Beloch's commentary 3, 2, 257.

sent by Phoenicia to Demetrios' fleet, perhaps the most important sent by any one country.<sup>32</sup> Demetrios still held Tyre and Sidon in 287,<sup>33</sup> and Philokles must have been high in command in his navy at this time. But when news came to the fleet at Miletos that Demetrios was flying eastward before Agathokles, the question of self-preservation at once occurred to the Sidonian king. The enormous importance of Phoenicia to Ptolemy, if he could obtain it, makes it exceedingly probable that he had already sought to open negotiations with Philokles; and in 286 Demetrios' adherents in Miletos were thinking of saving themselves, each in his own way. The Milesians opened their gates to one of Lysimachos' generals. That part of the fleet which remained loyal transferred its head-quarters to Kaunos; but Philokles, unlike the starving mercenaries who followed Demetrios to the end, went over in comfort to the wise and wealthy king of Egypt, carrying with him part of Demetrios' fleet, the Phoenician ships at any rate, perhaps others. This put Tyre and Sidon peaceably into Egyptian hands, and transferred the whole balance of sea-power. Next year, on Deme-

<sup>32</sup> Philokles' position and powers *under Ptolemy* had nothing whatever to do with his being king of the Sidonians, as I gather was thought by J. Delamarre (*Rev. Phil.* 20, 1896, p. 110), Beloch (3, 2, 257), and Bouché-Leclercq (vol. iv, addition to 1, 155). It is true that a king of Sidon seems to have commanded the Phoenicians in Xerxes' fleet *under* the Persian admiral of that division (see the writer in *J. H. S.* 1908, p. 207), and that a king of Sidon commanded the Phoenician contingent at Knidos, Diod. 14, 79; and no doubt Philokles commanded the Phoenician contingent of Demetrios; but such commands have nothing to do with the great powers presently bestowed on Philokles by Ptolemy. The proof of this is, that his successors in the office of nauarch were not kings of Sidon, but Kallikrates a Samian, Patroklos a Macedonian, and Hermaphilos a Cretan (see *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 253).

<sup>33</sup> It is obvious that, so long as Demetrios held Sidon, Philokles could not serve any one else. Demetrios held Tyre and Sidon, and garrisoned them extra strongly, at some date between 300 and 296, Plut. *Dem.* 33. Against this, the statement of Paus. 1, 6, 8 that Ptolemy took *Σύρον τε καὶ Κύπρον* on Antigonos' death in 301 is valueless. According to Plutarch, *Dem.* 35, in 295 Lysimachos took Demetrios' cities in Asia, and Ptolemy took Cyprus except Salamis. If Ptolemy also took Phoenicia, surely Plutarch must have mentioned it; for, as it is, the passage deprives Demetrios of more than he really lost; for instance, he kept Miletos and Kaunos. Phoenicia cannot have been lost, of course, between 294 and 288; and probably not till a year or two after 288. For in 287 Demetrios is still supreme at sea, though he must have lost some Macedonian ships to Lysimachos; had he also lost the powerful Phoenician contingent, his supremacy must have vanished.

trios' surrender, that part of the fleet which had remained loyal returned to Antigonos; and Philokles rounded off his work by capturing for Ptolemy Kaunos, the last possession of the Antigonids in Asia.<sup>34</sup>

For twenty years Demetrios, through every vicissitude of fortune, had been unquestioned Lord of the Sea; and he had now lost the sea without a struggle, owing to the faults of his policy on land. It was a marvellous piece of fortune for Egypt. She had not struck a blow; the command of the sea had just fallen into her hands as a ripe pear falls; and with it went much else, Phoenicia, the Islands, Delos. It may have been some little time before the rule of Egypt was established on what Egypt herself considered a thoroughly sound basis; there is reason for supposing that Ptolemy II did not consider himself free from all danger till Lysimachos fell at Kouroupedion.<sup>35</sup> But the actual liberation of the Islands, that is to say, their transfer from the rule of Demetrios to that of Ptolemy, can be dated with tolerable certainty to the year 286, or very early in the year 285;<sup>36</sup> it thus coincides with the only time that can be assigned for the defection of Philokles. That the two are connected is an obvious inference. The men of Delos gave Philokles his place alongside Ptolemy as their deliverer;<sup>37</sup> and whether he was actually the instrument used by Ptolemy to bring

<sup>34</sup> Miletos belonged to Demetrios in 287, Plut. *Dem.* 46. It certainly passed to Lysimachos about this time, Beloch 3, 2, 271; cf. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 189. The evidence is not very good; but the fact that Demetrios at the end tried to reach *Kaunos*, where he expected to find his ships (Plut. *Dem.* 49), seems to show that Miletos had already gone over, and the fleet, or what of it was loyal, had gone to Kaunos.—It has often been thought that Philokles' capture of Kaunos (Polyaen. 3, 16) may belong to the first Syrian war (*circ.* 273) rather than here. But it is by no means certain that he was then alive; for though the date when Kallikrates succeeded him cannot be fixed for certain more nearly than some time prior to May-July 270, it is quite possible that he was already nauarch before the repudiation of Arsinoe I (see *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 253 seq.).—It is possible that Demetrios also held Erythrai and that it also passed to Ptolemy at this time; it was Ptolemaic *circ.* 278, see *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 210, and a decree of Erythrai published by G. Zolotas mentioned *R. É. G.* 1909, p. 310.

<sup>35</sup> This depends chiefly on the dating of the foundation of the first Ptolemaieia to 280; see ch. 5, n. 50. The vase foundations which are here (after Schulhof) referred to as the first, second, and third Ptolemaieia are to be distinguished from the federal festival of the Island League (see note 43) of the same name; see App. 11.

<sup>36</sup> See note 40.

<sup>37</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 209; see *post.*



about the secession of the Islands from Demetrios or not, the phrase at any rate recognizes that it was his action, in transferring the balance of sea-power,<sup>38</sup> which had enabled Ptolemy to carry out his policy, a policy which the Islanders favoured.

For certainly, if we may take the Nikouria decree literally, Demetrios' downfall was popular in the Islands. The Antigonid rule, which had begun with the proclamation of freedom and autonomy, had ended with the imposition of heavy taxation. But the wealthy Ptolemy began by remitting all taxation;<sup>39</sup> it is also said that he 'freed' the cities and 'restored their ancestral constitutions'. As a fact, he did not restore any ancestral constitutions; the inner autonomy of the cities had never been diminished; while as to outer relationships, what Ptolemy did was to continue the League under his own officers and his own rule.<sup>40</sup> But the phrase in fact had no real reference to a real constitution. It had acquired a stereotyped meaning in Greece; to 'restore the ancestral constitution' in a state meant to overthrow a tyrant.<sup>41</sup> Demetrios, that is to say, was treated as an overthrown tyrant; and the liberated League passed under the benevolent aegis of Egypt. Ptolemy was not a

<sup>38</sup> See *post*.

<sup>39</sup> There has been much division of opinion as to whether the words τὰς πόλεις τῶν εἰσφορῶν κουφίσας in the Nikouria decree (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202) mean that taxation was lightened (Beloch 3, I, 341, n. 4, and formerly Delamarre) or abolished (Dittenberger *ad loc.*, and Delamarre in a note to *I. G.* xii, 7, 506). A cursory collection of parallels appears to show that there are two distinct phrases. (i) τὰς εἰσφοράς κουφίσαι, to *lighten* tribute; *O. G. I.* 90 (Rosetta stone), l. 12, where no ambiguity is possible. (ii) κουφίσαι τῶν εἰσφορῶν τὰς πόλεις, to *abolish* tribute. Diod. 13. 64 κουφίσαι τὸν δῆμον τῶν εἰσφορῶν. *O. G. I.* 751; the people of Amblada ask Attalos II to remit their taxation altogether, κουφίσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν δύο ταλάντων; he lets them off part. *O. G. I.* 4, l. 14 ἐκούφισσε τὰμ πόλιν (τῶν εἰσφορῶν understood from context; meaning not doubtful). Consequently *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 seems to mean *abolishing* tribute.

<sup>40</sup> It is of course possible that Ptolemy dissolved the League and then re-formed it; but if so it was done very quickly. For the Nikouria decree shows that the League had paid divine honours to Ptolemy I, and this must have been done prior to the association of his son (afterwards Ptolemy II) with him in the kingship, or *both* must have been worshipped, just as they were a little later (see *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 340, no. 3, a decree of the League for Sostratos, being *O. G. I.* 67 enlarged). The League therefore was in existence under Ptolemaic overlordship at some date prior to 285/4. As Demetrios was still supreme at sea in 287, the League must have come under Ptolemy's power in 286 or early in 285.

<sup>41</sup> Instances in App. 5, pp. 437, 8.



hypocrite; the whole 'liberation' was no doubt perfectly genuine; but the nature of things was too strong for him. He had to protect the Islanders, just as Antigonos and Demetrios had had to do; he had to reimpose taxes in order to pay for the fleet which policed their waters; similar causes produced similar effects; and his rule became to all intents and purposes precisely the same thing as the rule of Demetrios.<sup>42</sup>

The Islanders, meanwhile, welcomed Ptolemy as 'Saviour', built him an altar at Delos by that title, decreed to him divine honours, and carried the decree into effect by the foundation of the federal festival of the Ptolemaieia, the festival in which the League of the Islanders celebrated the worship of the god Ptolemy Soter.<sup>43</sup> They presumably abolished at the same time the federal festivals of the Antigoneia and Demetrieia, which are not heard of again. Philokles, too, came in for his share of decoration. The pressure of Demetrios' taxation had compelled many of the Island communities to borrow the money to discharge their obligations to the tax-gatherer, and they had of course borrowed from the most natural source, the temple of Apollo at Delos. Apollo was pressing for repayment, and could not always get it, though some communities borrowed from their own local temples in order to pay their debt to him.<sup>44</sup> Apollo had to appeal to Ptolemy, and Ptolemy ordered Philokles to take the matter up.<sup>45</sup> An admiral in such cases had powers denied to a god; and Philokles set the precedent of using a great fleet as a debt-collecting agency. His arguments were irresistible; the Islands paid; and the grateful Delians voted to Philokles the most exceptional honours.

A gold wreath of 1,000 drachmai was nothing out of the common; but in addition they passed a resolution to sacrifice soteria on his behalf both to the gods of Delos in Delos and

<sup>42</sup> On Ptolemy's taxation of the Islands see ch. 3, n. 15.

<sup>43</sup> Mentioned *B. C. H.* 4, p. 323, no. 2, and again *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 340, no. 3. In its original form, and before enlarged to take in the worship of Ptolemy II also (*B. C. H.* 1907, *l. c.*), it must be the *ισόθεοι τιμαί* for Ptolemy I to which the Nikouria decree refers. Founded *circa* 286; see n. 40.

<sup>44</sup> See a case ch. 3, n. 15.

<sup>45</sup> What follows is founded on *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 209.

to Zeus the Saviour in Athens, in return for his piety towards Apollo and his benefits to the people of Delos. It is this most instructive decree, passed by the Delians in Philokles' honour, which has enabled us, taken in conjunction with the statue which the Athenians erected to him,<sup>46</sup> to reconstitute to some extent what happened. It marks, for one thing, the formal reconciliation of those old enemies, Athens and Delos, under the aegis of the king of Egypt, a happy turn of events for which Philokles was largely responsible; and it shows that the honours decreed to Philokles related to other matters beside debt-collecting. Debt-collecting for the Temple was 'piety toward Apollo'; it conferred no benefit on the people of Delos as such, it had no possible connexion with Athens, and it could hardly be rewarded with sacrifices offered under the high-sounding title of Soteria, 'the feast of deliverance.' Philokles therefore must have done some great thing which was equally beneficial to Delos and to Athens; and no explanation seems possible other than the transfer of the control of the sea to Ptolemy, the event which had enabled Delos and Athens alike to become 'free'.

As was the greatness of his services, so was the measure of his reward at the hands of his new master. Egypt governed her conquered provinces by means of strategoi or generals; but the Islands, at any rate those in the League, could not be treated like conquests such as Cyprus or the Red Sea littoral, for they had not been conquered. In theory the League of the Islanders was an autonomous state in friendly relationship with Egypt. No strategos of the Cyclades was therefore ever appointed; but the powers that he would have exercised, had he existed, were conjoined with the office of admiral of all the fleets of Egypt and certain high civil powers, and the whole was bestowed upon Philokles. In effect he became Ptolemy's Viceroy of the Sea. His powers were continued in the line of Egyptian nauarchs or admirals; but no Asiatic, in any Macedonian kingdom, was again to hold a position comparable to his.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> *I. G.* ii, 1371 = Michel 1261.

<sup>47</sup> On his powers, office, and successors, see my paper, *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 251.

*...blame should be put on the king for  
whose son of Eumenes got the crown*

## CHAPTER V

### ANTIGONOS AS PRETENDER

DEMETRIOS' first act after his surrender was to send off messages to his commanders in Corinth, Piraeus, and Demetrias, telling them to trust no orders that purported to come from him, even if sealed with his ring, but to treat him as dead and to hold the fortresses for Antigonos. He was under no delusions as to what Seleukos would do. Seleukos was not a cruel man; but in fact he had no choice. He treated his prisoner, indeed, as a king, assigning him a royal residence with pleasure gardens and chases; but he kept him too strongly guarded for escape to be possible. Passionately Antigonos offered to put every fortress he still held into Seleukos' hands, and to come himself as hostage, if Seleukos would free his father; but he offered in vain; the king could not take the responsibility of again loosing Demetrios upon a troubled world. On the other hand, Lysimachos, whose hatred mastered his accustomed miserliness, offered Seleukos an immense sum of money to put Demetrios to death. The king of Syria rejected the bribe with scorn; and the 'dirty piece of savagery', as he called it, merely deepened the distrust which he already felt for the king of Thrace. It was evident indeed already that at no distant date Asia would not be large enough to hold both kings.<sup>1</sup>

The surrender of Demetrios made large alterations in the balance of power and in the relations of the several states to one another. Lysimachos was now secure in his half of Macedonia, and had gained important accessions of territory in Asia Minor; Pyrrhos was little less secure, it seemed, in

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 50-2; Diod. 21, 20, 1. The place of Demetrios' captivity was the piece of land called Chersonese in a loop of the Orontes near Apameia; a natural prison, but low-lying and marshy. See Strab. 16, 752.

the other half of Macedonia. Ptolemy, without a struggle, had added to his empire the best part of Phoenicia, the Islands of the League, and the command of the Eastern Mediterranean. Alone of the kings, Seleukos, on whom the brunt of the fighting had fallen, had gained nothing by Demetrios' captivity.

Pyrrhos, in possession of half of Macedonia and of most of Thessaly, in addition to his own greatly enlarged kingdom of Epeiros, must have appeared to the Greek cities to be the most powerful prince of the peninsula; for the centre of gravity of Lysimachos' kingdom lay far away on the Hellespont, and his real strength was not so much in men's eyes. Pyrrhos' friends the Aetolians had, in consequence, to consider their position. Their consistent policy, as already explained, was to support the second state of the peninsula against the first. Recently they had been supporting Pyrrhos against Demetrios; but now that Epeiros had become the first power, they were careful to reinsure themselves by offering their friendship to him whom they considered the second, Lysimachos: and two towns, called respectively Lysimacheia and Arsinoe, were founded by them in the heart of Aetolia, in honour of Lysimachos and his consort Arsinoe; the queen may even have been given the honorary title of founder of her name-city.<sup>2</sup>

But if, to Aetolia, Pyrrhos appeared threatening, Pyrrhos himself took a very different view. He knew the real strength of Lysimachos; he knew the old man's consummate ability in the field; he knew that nothing but fear of Demetrios had kept him in check. With Demetrios a captive, and Aetolia at the best uncertain, he looked round for a make-weight, and thought to find one in Antigonos.

Demetrios' message to his captains in Greece had been, to all intents and purposes, his abdication; and Antigonos had thenceforth to act as though he were sole king of the

<sup>2</sup> Good relations are shown by *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 196. On the two towns, Strab. 10, 460; see Beloch 3, 1, 249, n. 4. While certainly Aetolian foundations, I do not know why Arsinoe should not have been honorary *κτίστρις*, as a compliment. Both are often mentioned. Arsinoe: Polyb. 9, 45; *I. G.* ix, 2, 61 = *G. D. I.* 1439; *G. D. I.* 2529, 2530. Lysimacheia: *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 924, l. 5; *Ἐφ.* *Ἀρχ.* 1905, p. 55; *B. C. H.* 26, p. 274, no. 508; *G. D. I.* 2527, 2531.



possessions of his house in Greece and as though Demetrios were dead, though he did not call himself king as long as his father lived.<sup>3</sup> His position was far from an easy one in the spring of 285. To rule Greek cities with any success, a king required an assured kingdom of his own at his back: and more than ever did he require it if he refused or was unable to find a place in such cities as their god. For, (apart from some fiction of divinity), the king had no place at all in the city state, and no standing in regard to it save such as his own kingdom might give him; if he had no other kingdom, he had no standing at all. It was not possible for any kingdom to absorb the city state; the city remained an enclave, an island in the kingdom, however cordial its relations with the king. The kingdom could no more assimilate the autonomous city than the constitution of the autonomous city could assimilate a king. The oil and the water might lie very comfortably in the same vessel; but they could not mix. But a king whose kingdom consisted *only* of enclaves, of cities in which he had no place, would have been no real king at all; he would have been an anomaly, theoretically unthinkable and practically impossible.

Antigonos could not have maintained himself for a moment

<sup>3</sup> There are two conflicting statements in the tradition here. One is that Antigonos reigned forty-four years (Medios in Lucian, *Makrob.* 11; Euseb. 1, 237 Schoene, i.e. Porphyry), the other that he reigned ten years in Greece before he reigned in Macedonia (Euseb. *l. c.*). As his death in 240/39 is certain, being fixed by the reign and death of Demetrios II as given by Polybios, a reign of forty-four years is correct as from the death of Demetrios I in 284/3. But if ten of these elapsed before he became king of Macedonia, the latter event took place in 274/3; this is out of the question, for the third life of Aratos makes him become king of Macedonia in Ol. 125, i.e. 277/6 at latest, and Athens was officially sacrificing for him in Polyeuktos' year, 275/4; *I. G.* ii, 5, 323 b. The ten years' kingship in Greece is therefore a separate tradition from the forty-four years; and this is the more certain because Porphyry, in turning regnal years into Olympiad years, gives Antigonos thirty-seven years (see the table in Beloch 3, 2, 76), while some of the Eusebian tables have attempted to reconcile the inconsistent figures ten and forty-four by giving Antigonos thirty-four years only (i.e. in Macedonia). It appears then that Antigonos was king, i.e. had the royal title, for forty-four years, 284/3 to 240/39; that he exercised independent rule in Greece for ten years before acquiring Macedonia, i.e. from 287/6, when Demetrios crossed to Asia, to 277/6, when he became king of Macedonia; and that he was king of Macedonia thirty-seven years. See generally, and for details, the discussion of the lists of Macedonian kings in Beloch 3, 2, pp. 71-81; and see further App. 5, n. 6.



as king in Greece without *some* kingdom of his own to fall back on. His kingdom, in fact, at this time was his army of mercenaries, and nothing else: and what he had really inherited was a number of garrisons posted in different Greek cities. Probably they were none too large for their work; Demetrios must have taken with him all the available floating supply of troops. More mercenaries could be raised; but the supply of Greek mercenaries was no more unlimited than were Antigonos' pecuniary resources. Mercenaries had to be fed and paid; and Antigonos, with no revenue of his own to draw on, had to tax the city states under his rule, as Demetrios had done. He started with a burden of unpopularity due to the heavy taxation imposed by Demetrios for his expedition to Asia. His own taxation must have been resented, and caused unrest; unrest necessitated enrolling more mercenaries, which in turn entailed heavier taxation; Antigonos was held in a vicious circle from which there seemed no escape. It was not exactly a brilliant opening for the reign of a philosopher.<sup>4</sup>

Of the three possible ways of ruling Greek states, he was absolutely committed by inheritance to the system of garrisons. Demetrios had begun his career in Greece with a programme of freedom and union of hearts; he had been completely disillusioned, and it must have been an axiom

<sup>4</sup> No direct reference to Antigonos' taxes exists; but they must follow from those of Demetrios. Demetrios received a yearly revenue of 200 talents from Euboea (Diog. L. 2, 140, no doubt grossly exaggerated); he exacts a special contribution from Athens or Thessaly, Plut. *Dem.* 27; his total revenue was said to be 1,200 talents a year, Ael. *V. H.* 9, 9, *sed quaere*; the Islanders rejoice at the abolition of his taxes, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202. On his taxation of the Islands, see J. Delamarre in *R. Ph.* 28, 1904, p. 81, and ch. 3. n. 15: what is true of them is probably true of his other possessions. His *εἰσφοραί* in *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 are certainly regular taxes and not special requisitions, *εἰσπράξεις*. H. Francotte (*Musée Belge*, 1907, p. 53) makes *εἰσφορά* the extraordinary requisition, as opposed to *φόρος*, the ordinary tribute; and so König, *Der Bund der Nesioten*, p. 80. It may mean so occasionally, e.g. *O. G. I.* 4, l. 10, where the context is clear; but as a rule *εἰσφορά* is the ordinary tax, so called to avoid the hated sound of *φόρος*, while the special requisition is *εἰσπράξις*. See Suidas, *βασίλεια* (3), (which neither Francotte nor König quotes), where some unknown Stoic distinguishes the tyrant who makes *τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ μεθ' ὕβρεως εἰσπράξεις* from the true king who makes *τὰς σὺν λόγῳ καὶ φιланθρωπία τῶν εἰσφορῶν ἀπαιτήσεις*. Consequently Demetrios' *εἰσφοραί* were, as Delamarre supposed, a regular system of taxes; and if in the Islands, then elsewhere.

with his son that a union of hearts was of no use as practical politics. The third way, that of ruling through some party or individual in the city without a garrison, was to be Antigonos' own choice; but once the garrison was there, it could not be withdrawn. The only strong points about his position were, that his army, being entirely composed of mercenaries, was competent; that the Greek mercenary was usually loyal to his oath; and that he commanded the services of a few men of capacity and experience, such as Hieronymos, and Phila's son Krateros, his own half-brother.

No policy worth the name, beyond attempting to keep his Greek possessions together, can have commended itself to him. It is true that he still held everything in Greece that Demetrios had held, except Athens; in his hands were the great fortresses of Demetrias, Chalkis, Piraeus, and Corinth, while doubtless Corinth brought him in a certain amount of revenue from duties on its trade and harbour dues. But elsewhere there must have been already beginning that change in Greek temper which was to show itself openly five years later. Boeotia was of course entirely uncertain, and so were many of the smaller cities; and if Argos and Megalopolis were of necessity loyal to the northern power, as against Sparta, it did not follow that they considered Antigonos, rather than (say) Pyrrhos, as the prince who could claim their loyalty. In addition to this he was definitely, if not very energetically, at war with Athens, with the initial disadvantage of possessing no fleet till some time later in the year, when the loyal ships returned to him from Kaunos.<sup>5</sup> And his kingdom, such even as it was, without Athens was merely a kingdom of disjected fragments. All that it seemed in his power to do was to wait and to hope for one of those turns of Fortune's wheel of which he had already had such plentiful experience. His intimate friends knew that he looked on the kingship of Macedonia as his; and his conduct on a later occasion seems to show that he had little doubt of his ultimate destiny.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> That they did return is shown by his possession of a fleet in 283.

<sup>6</sup> Menedemos spoke of his acquisition of the crown of Macedonia as of the return of an exile to his own country (ch. 6, n. 104); and when Antigonos was driven out by Pyrrhos he still wore the purple.

This was the position in 285 when Pyrrhos, the consistent enemy of Antigonos' house, who had attacked and broken faith with that house on every opportunity, and who had just deprived Antigonos of nearly the whole of Thessaly, veered round and made overtures to Antigonos for an alliance. The attraction to Pyrrhos was the army of mercenaries, many of them doubtless veterans, and a fleet in being which might act as a make-weight against that of Lysimachos.

Antigonos was really between the hammer and the anvil. He was unpopular in Greece on account of the taxation, and the world probably regarded him as untried: and he was no match, in strength, for Pyrrhos, who had just been threatening his Greek possessions. On the other hand, Athens was to him the point of greatest importance; he was at war with her, and the nationalist government were on very good terms with Lysimachos. It might suit Lysimachos, at any moment, to interfere in the affairs of Greece, and avenge himself on the son of his ancient enemy; and in Athens he had a pretext ready to hand. And as between Pyrrhos and Lysimachos, Antigonos can have had no doubt as to which would prove the more dangerous antagonist; indeed he seems to have felt a natural contempt for Pyrrhos and his methods.<sup>7</sup> It was inevitable, therefore, (no accommodation with Lysimachos being possible), that when Pyrrhos proposed to him a bargain of mutual insurance against Lysimachos he should accept; and probably his first act as an independent ruler was the negotiation with Pyrrhos of the famous 'secret treaty'. It owed both its origin and its secrecy to a common fear of Lysimachos. Naturally we are no better informed of its contents than were contemporaries. It may have been essentially a treaty of defence against Lysimachos on the basis of the *status quo*, each party respecting the possessions

<sup>7</sup> This comes out in several stories; the best is that in Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8, where Antigonos says that Pyrrhos would be the best of generals if he should ever grow out of childhood, *ἀν γηράσῃ*. The fact that the saying is obviously modelled on Plato, *Tim.* 22 B, where an Egyptian priest is supposed to say to Solon, "Ἕλληνες αἰεὶ παῖδες ἐστέ, γέρων δὲ Ἕλληνα οὐκ ἔστω", is in favour of, rather than against, its authenticity; for Antigonos, who was always quoting, was at least as likely to allude to the *Timaios* as some Alexandrian man of letters.

of the other; but it is obvious from the course of events that it bound Antigonos to aid Pyrrhos if attacked, and that it gave Antigonos a free hand as regarded Athens. Pyrrhos, of course, was more or less in a position to insert his own terms.<sup>8</sup>

The need of the treaty, from Pyrrhos' point of view, was quickly enough seen. Once the immediate fear of Demetrios was removed, Lysimachos, who had but recently prevailed on Pyrrhos to break his treaty with Demetrios, showed no hesitation in tearing up his own treaty with Pyrrhos and in invading Pyrrhos' half of Macedonia. Antigonos sent troops to support Pyrrhos, according to the treaty; and Pyrrhos and his allies took up a strong position near Edessa, the old capital, perhaps too strong to be openly attacked. Anyhow, Lysimachos did not attack him; but he reduced him to such straits, on the one hand by cutting off his supplies, and on the other by tampering with all the leading men of his party, that Pyrrhos abandoned the contest, and went home with his Epeirots and Antigonos' mercenaries, having lost Macedonia as quickly as he had won it.<sup>9</sup> That country, which had recently conquered half the world, was now being tossed from one prince to another at the careless arbitrament of the sword; the fate of Alexander's kingdom seemed as unhappy as had been the fate of Alexander's son.

The immediate effect of this change, which took place in the campaigning season of 285, was to make Lysimachos in his turn much the strongest of the kings. His power was now very great. He held Macedonia and most of Thessaly; parts of Thrace, and its coasts as far north as the Danube; and a large part of Asia Minor, including practically all the

<sup>8</sup> The secret treaty, ἡ σιωπώμενη ὁμολογία, is known only from a fragment of Phoinikides' *Ἀλληγρίδες* (Kock 3, 333). I know of no warrant for Ferguson's supposition that by it Antigonos ceded the Cyclades to Egypt (*J. H. S.* 1910, p. 191, n. 12); the only parties to it are given as Antigonos and Pyrrhos. If Ptolemy be held to have become a party as being Pyrrhos' ally (Ferguson, *Athens*, 151, 160), so must Lysimachos; a *reductio ad absurdum*.—It created a precedent; in 220/19 Sparta and Aetolia made a similar treaty, δι' ἀπορρήτων, Polyb. 4, 16.

<sup>9</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 12 (where Antigonos' troops are the *συμμαχική δύναμις*); Paus. 1, 10, 2.—Klotzsch, p. 205, suggests that Pyrrhos had also Aetolian allies. If my view of Aetolian policy be correct, Aetolia cannot have joined him till later; see pp. 111, 119.



great coast cities from the Hellespont down to Seleukos' westernmost province of Kilikia. Only in the north of Asia Minor and on the Bosphoros did any independent states exist to vex him. Byzantion was free; and Byzantion had always been friendly to the house of Antigonos. The half-barbarian Bithynians had successfully defied him; and in their little territory at the mouth of the Sangarios their tribesmen maintained a fierce independence. Further to the east, the beginnings of the kingdom of Pontos intervened between Lysimachos' territory and the Black Sea. But even here he had strengthened his position enormously by the acquisition, in 289, of the great maritime city of Herakleia, with its dependencies and its territory. Its territory lay along the Black Sea, a wedge thrust in between Bithynia and Pontos; and Herakleia gave Lysimachos free access to that sea. From his capital Lysimacheia, in the Thracian Chersonese, he kept guard over the Hellespont, watching the traders from the Euxine pay his tolls and help to fill his well-managed treasury; and if Byzantion was still independent and wealthy, he had her in a vice of which the jaws were Lysimacheia and Herakleia. The strength of his empire, with its great number of Greek cities, must have been far superior to that of the loosely knit and unwieldy collection of kingdoms that formed the realm of Seleukos.<sup>10</sup>

It would seem too as if Lysimachos had ambitions in the Aegean. With the acquisition of Macedonia he may have looked on himself as Demetrios' heir; and he grudged that a slice of the inheritance should have fallen to Ptolemy without that astute monarch having had to strike a single blow. Lysimachos had now a fair navy; Herakleia supplied him with an efficient nucleus; he had secured some portion of Demetrios' fleet, at any rate the ships at Pella if nothing else; and he could draw on a number of towns in Asia. While Demetrios was flying before Agathokles, Lysimachos' fleet had made haste to annex what it could in the Aegean; and Lemnos, Imbros, and Samothrake had fallen into his

<sup>10</sup> Herakleia; Beloch 3, 1, 241 and refs.; Bithynia, *ib.* 242.—Friendship of Byzantion for Antigonos I and Demetrios; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 170, 171, 172; *I. G.* ii, 251 = Michel 1475; Diod. 18, 72, 6; Polyæn. 4, 6, 8.



hands.<sup>11</sup> He already ruled on both sides of the North Aegean, and he may have looked forward to the day when he should oust Ptolemy from the Cyclades; for he had already begun to turn his attention to Delos.<sup>12</sup>

The effects of the campaign of 285 on Antigonos' position were speedily apparent. In order to send a force to aid Pyrrhos, he had had to weaken his garrisons; and Athens was not slow to profit by the opportunity for a fresh attempt on the Piraeus. As Antigonos stood with Pyrrhos, Athens took occasion, in September 285, to pass a decree in honour of Lysimachos' friend Philippides, and, by implication, of Lysimachos himself. The decree refers to Philippides' continuous requests to the king for aid to recover Piraeus and the forts as soon as possible. Whether Lysimachos spared any aid for Athens is not known; but the city received the help of a force from the island of Tenos, help that can hardly have been given without the countenance of Ptolemy. This time the work was entrusted to the right hands, those of the veteran Olympiodoros; and he crowned his many services to Athens by expelling Antigonos' garrison from Mounychia and recovering the Piraeus.<sup>13</sup>

It must, too, have been at the same time that another veteran, Xanthippos of Elateia, supported by the friendship and gold of Lysimachos, succeeded in expelling Antigonos' garrison from his native city and freeing Phokis, or so much of it as was not Aetolian.<sup>14</sup> The coincidence in time with Olympiodoros' recovery of the Piraeus is noteworthy, and

<sup>11</sup> Lemnos; Phylarchos ap. Athen. 6, 255 a; cf. *I. G.* ii, 5, 318 c: Samothrake; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 190. He can only have taken both on Demetrios' downfall.

<sup>12</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 918.

<sup>13</sup> The decree for Philippides (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 197) was passed in Boedromion of Euthios' year. The Athenian vote of thanks to Tenos (*I. G.* ii, 5, 345 c, second half) was passed in Ourios' year. See generally, and on the dating, App. 2.—Olympiodoros' capture of Piraeus; Paus. i, 26, 3. I see no reason to doubt this, in view of the epigraphic sources for Olympiodoros' exploits to which Pausanias refers. He also says it was a greater feat than the recovery of the Mouseion. If so, it could hardly be either in 307 or 295/4, as Ferguson suggests (*Athens*, 152, n. 4), which would mean that Olympiodoros took it in Demetrios' interest; this would have been no great feat in 307, while in 294 it was handed over by resolution and not taken at all (Plut. *Dem.* 34).

<sup>14</sup> Inscription on Xanthippos' statue at Delphi; Pontow in *B. Ph. W.* 1912, p. 507. I quite agree that the two 'tyrants' are Kassandros and Gonatas.

no doubt points to concerted action. For sixteen years before, Xanthippos and Olympiodoros, acting in Demetrios' interest, had together saved Elateia from Kassandros;<sup>15</sup> and their joint action against Demetrios' son is but one instance the more—we have seen many such—of the manner in which Demetrios' friends had had to change their attitude as soon as he sat on Kassandros' throne. As some make-weight to these losses, however, Aetolia, true to her consistent policy and alarmed by the recent exhibition of Lysimachos' strength, ceased to court the king of Macedonia and, formally or informally, joined Pyrrhos and Antigonos.<sup>16</sup>

The loss of Piraeus, joined to that of Athens, cut Antigonos' realm, such as it was, in half; while the loss of Elateia left his Boeotian garrisons isolated. His position in the spring of 284 was certainly far from brilliant. He was committed to an alliance with the unstable Pyrrhos, which so far had merely provoked Lysimachos to no purpose; and the latter, as the friend of Athens, might be expected to attack him in overwhelming force whenever it should please him to do so. Even at sea Lysimachos was probably more than his match.<sup>17</sup> The expected attack, however, did not take place. Lysimachos, with an old man's caution, decided first to make all safe in his rear, and spent the campaigning season of 284 in reducing Paionia. Audoleon was dead, and his son Ariston exiled, for what reason is unknown; Lysimachos brought the young man back to his kingdom, and he was duly installed after undergoing the 'royal bath' in the river Astibos. Perhaps he was not a sufficiently docile puppet; anyhow Lysimachos turned him out again and annexed Paionia, while Ariston escaped to what became henceforth the common refuge of kings in misfortune, the Dardanian court. It is recorded that the treasure of the Paionian kings had been buried in the bed of a diverted river, the water then being

<sup>15</sup> See ch. 4, n. 14, and in particular Pomtow's commentary in *B. Ph. W.* 1912, p. 507 seq., on the inscription mentioned in the last note.

<sup>16</sup> The fact is shown by Pyrrhos recruiting Aetolians for his Italian expedition, Dion. Hal. 20, 1, and Aetolia being Gonatas' ally in 280, Just. 24, 1, 3. As to the date, it must follow Lysimachos' campaign of 285, which opened Aetolia's eyes, and precede Lysimachos' setting-up of an independent Akarnania, probably in 283—a measure in part directed against Aetolia.

<sup>17</sup> Shown by his defeat by Lysimachos' fleet under Keraunos in 280.

let back and all the workmen put to death; Audoleon's trusted friend Xermodigestos betrayed the place to Lysimachos.<sup>18</sup>

Once sure of Paionia, Lysimachos, probably in the campaigning season of 283, followed up his attack upon Pyrrhos; he must have thought him more dangerous than Antigonos, and he was evidently working on a methodical plan. He took advantage of Pyrrhos' absence, perhaps in Illyria, to invade Epeiros. It does not appear that he recovered the border provinces of Parauaia and Tymphaia, for this could hardly have escaped mention; he merely overran part of the country and perhaps secured his own frontier, while some of his Thracians brought discredit on him by plundering the tombs of Pyrrhos' ancestors, a deed which Pyrrhos was one day to repay in kind.<sup>19</sup> But Lysimachos had a definite purpose in his raid, and inflicted on both Pyrrhos and Aetolia a severe blow; for, following Kassandros' precedent, he freed Akarnania, and set it up again, with Leukas restored to it, as an independent state. Pyrrhos made no attempt to reconquer Akarnania while Lysimachos lived, and by 281 he had plans in view compared with which that country was of small importance; it suited him better to be on good terms with her, so that he might recruit mercenaries for his Italian expedition in her territory.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Ariston; Polyæn. 4, 12, 3. The treasure; Diod. 21, 13. A similar hiding-place was found for the plunder taken from Rome by Alaric.

<sup>19</sup> Paus. 1, 9, 8 (from Hieronymos). Pyrrhos got his revenge at Aigai (see ch. 9, p. 265). See generally Klotzsch, p. 212.

<sup>20</sup> Akarnania was ceded to Pyrrhos by Kassandros' son Alexander in 294. When Pyrrhos crossed to Italy in 281 he took Akarnanian *mercenaries* (Dion. Hal. 20, 1), and the only conclusion to be drawn, in my opinion, is that Akarnania was then independent. (Klotzsch, pp. 172-4, has argued for the contrary view, but in my opinion without success. See ch. 2, n. 53.) And if Akarnania was independent in 281, it must have been Lysimachos who freed her from Pyrrhos. In my view, the independence of Akarnania is amply confirmed by the treaty between Akarnania and Aetolia, of which the copy at Thermos has been published by Soteriades, 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1905, p. 55. (A fragment of the copy at Olympia has been identified by A. Wilhelm, 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1910, 147.) Soteriades concluded that the date was *circ.* 273. It cannot be before 285, as Lysimacheia in Aetolia is mentioned; and Soteriades' observation, that if it were before 279 the Akarnanian troops must have appeared against the Celts, is valid. On the other hand, I cannot follow the view of H. Swoboda (*Klio*, 1910, p. 397) that Akarnania never got free of Pyrrhos during his life, and therefore the treaty is later than 272. (Rejected also by A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 239.) He points out

The overwhelming nature of Lysimachos' power was now plain to every one, while it could not be foreseen that domestic tragedy was to prevent the further realization of his ambitions. But, so far, he had given no sign of what his intentions were with regard to Greece proper, or whether he had any intentions at all; and Antigonos, relieved of danger from the north-west, and bound to find employment for his mercenaries, was able to throw himself with more earnestness into his war with Athens. He had settled that the most important matter for himself was the recovery of Piraeus; and perhaps already by the autumn of 284 he had brought his fleet up and formed the siege of that fortress.<sup>21</sup>

that one of the Akarnanian strategoi (see l. 22) comes from Leukas, which he says belonged to Pyrrhos all his life. But, even if Pyrrhos reconquered Leukas after Demetrios' fall (see ch. 2, p. 48), Lysimachos probably freed it with and joined it to Akarnania, as would be natural. And the treaty ought to be placed as far as possible from the partition of Akarnania by Aetolia and Alexander of Epeiros; a decent interval must have elapsed. Soteriades' date, though not free from difficulty, seems to me very near the mark; only I would put it in 276/274, before Pyrrhos returned (see ch. 7, p. 212); for I think that Aetolia made the treaty for her own advantage, and that it was not a case (as supposed by A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 236, and Klotzsch, p. 175) of Pyrrhos uniting his dependant, Akarnania, to his friend, Aetolia; there seems no point in this, and Akarnania certainly contracts as an independent power. It is annoying to think that there is said to exist an unpublished treaty between Pyrrhos and Akarnania (Swoboda, *l. c.*, p. 400, n. 2), which could hardly fail to throw light on the whole question.

<sup>21</sup> With this war of Antigonos against Athens is connected the amazing statement of Eusebios under the year 285/4, 'Antigonos Gonatas Lacedaemonios tenuit'; in Jerome it comes under Ol. 124, 2 = 283/2, 'Antigonos cognomento Gonatas Lacedaemonem obtinuit.' This obvious confusion with the capture of Sparta by Antigonos Doson would not even deserve notice had not Beloch (3, 2, 304) argued that it was true, and Ferguson followed him (*Athens*, 152). I trust that my narrative has shown that the capture of Sparta by Gonatas at this time would have been an historical miracle; he could not even take Eleusis! Eusebios is full of similar blunders; e.g. Schoene 1, 237, 238, a hopeless confusion of Demetrios the Fair and Demetrios II; so 239; ib. 243, confusion of Pyrrhos with his son Alexander; ib. 235 & 249, Ptolemy Keraunos is son of Lagos. See the similar confusion from Aristeas and Josephos given in note 43.—Beloch quotes in corroboration Just. 24, 1, 3: 'omnes ferme Graeciae civitates, ducibus Spartanis, . . . ne cum Antigono, sub cuius regno erant, bellum coepisse viderentur, socios eius Aetolos adgrediuntur. . . . Huic bello ducem deligunt Area,' &c. He takes, that is to say, the subject of *erant* to be Spartani (implied). Surely it is quite plain; the subject of *erant*, as of *deligunt*, is 'omnes ferme Graeciae civitates'. It does not seem to bear on the question at all.—On the other hand, the tradition is quite clear that Doson was the first who took Sparta or who caused it to cease to be independent. Phylarchos, fr. 46 = Athen. 6, 251 d, 'Ἀντιγόῳ τοῦ κληθέντος Ἐπιτρόπου τοῦ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐλόντος. Just. 28, 4, 14, 'a quo solo capta sit'; cf. 4, 2, 'pro inlibata libertate.' Paus.



In the spring of 283 Demetrios' long imprisonment drew to its close. Seleukos, who had realized that the threat of his liberation might be a very useful weapon to employ, if necessary, against Lysimachos, had held out to his captive a prospect of release when Antiochos and Stratonike should come from the eastern satrapies; his freedom should be a gift to his daughter and his daughter's husband. But Antiochos had tarried, perhaps on purpose; and at the end of two years the most brilliant figure of the age, unable to support enforced idleness and hope deferred, had drunk himself to death in his captivity. His stormy life had shaken the world; but he left nothing behind him save some improvements in siege-trains and shipbuilding, and a son.

The world had already discounted his death; and the only person affected was Antigonos. Seleukos sent back the remains, and Antigonos, letting the siege be, put to sea with his whole fleet and met the funeral-ship in mid-Aegean. There he received the casket containing the ashes of the great sea-king, and turned his prows homeward. Plutarch has left a picture of the fleet entering the harbour of Corinth; the mourners swollen by contingents from every city they had passed; the golden casket set high on the flagship's poop, covered with Demetrios' purple robe and crowned with his diadem; the huge oars of the warships beating time to the sacred melody of the flute-player Xenophantos; the wailing crowds answering from the shore; and Antigonos, plain to see, standing by the ashes with bowed head and streaming eyes. From Corinth the fleet sailed to Demetrias; there they buried Demetrios, in the city which he had founded to bear his name.<sup>22</sup>

The death of Demetrios heralded the passing of the generation that had known Alexander. That winter died

1, 13, 6, Sparta had seen three invaders before Pyrrhos, viz. Epameinondas, Antipatros, Demetrios; Pyrrhos was the fourth.—See Addenda.

<sup>22</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 52, 53.—I do not think that Seleukos sent back the ashes till the year after, 282, when he desired Antigonos' goodwill in view of his coming conflict with Lysimachos. Also Xenophantos the Theban was at Delos in 282 (Kleostratos' year), when he took part in the Apollonia (Homolle, *Archives*, 69, = *I.G.* xi, 106, l. 16). A crown offered by him appears in 279, Hypsokles B, l. 89.



Ptolemy I in Egypt, having seen his son firmly seated on the throne. It was perhaps the just reward of his prudence and foresight that he, in contradistinction to the majority of the Successors, died quietly in his bed. Only two men of the age of giants now remained; would they perhaps, after all, die quietly also? Fate was to fall otherwise.

Lysimachos in advanced years had married a young girl, Arsinoe, eldest daughter of Ptolemy I and Berenike, and full sister of Ptolemy II, who was to be the most extraordinary woman of her time; and Demetrios had once declared that she was not exactly the old man's Penelope. But on any matter connected with Lysimachos a statement made by Demetrios is as valueless as may be; and though scandal was busy enough with Arsinoe's name, the story it had to tell—that she made advances to her step-son Agathokles, which were repulsed—is every bit as worthless as most of the other court gossip of antiquity. The flaw in Arsinoe was not perhaps immorality but ambition, an overmastering ambition to which she was ready to sacrifice most things; and it is not necessary to suppose her a bad woman merely because she became a great ruler. Even her ambition was as much for her children as for herself; she had in fact something very like a fixed idea, to get the crown of Macedonia for her eldest son Ptolemaios. The numerous coin-portraits that remain of her, many of them struck some time after her death, give her handsome features, sometimes with prominent eyes; but there is one, differing slightly from the usual type though resembling it in the general lines, which we would gladly believe to be her true likeness. It shows a finely chiselled face of purest Greek type, pensive, remote, and austere, the nun-like effect only enhanced by the usual long, heavy veil: nothing can be less like the Arsinoe of tradition, and no lovelier face has come down to us from the Greek world. No doubt it is idealized; but it may serve to remind us that Arsinoe was not only a political intriguer, but the close friend of the devout and religious Stratonike.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> On this and the subsequent events at Lysimachos' court, Memnon 8 (*F. H. G.* iii, 532); Trog. *Prol.* 17; Paus. i, 10, 3-4; Just. 17, 1; Strabo 13, 623; Euseb. i, 233, 234 (Schoene).—Demetrios' remark, Plut. *Dem.* 25.

What really took place at Lysimachos' court is unknown. Perhaps it never was known. The court had always been a refuge for other states' exiles, who had their uses; and at this time it sheltered an important fugitive, *Ptolemy*, eldest son of Ptolemy I and Eurydike, disinherited by his father in favour of Berenike's son, but for all that *lawful claimant to the crown of Egypt*. When first exiled he had gone to Seleukos, who had promised to seat him on the throne of Egypt when his father died; but his father was dead and Seleukos had done nothing, so he had left Seleukos and gone to Lysimachos.<sup>24</sup> This violent and unscrupulous man was one storm-centre; *Arsinoe may have been another*. There was intrigue and counter-intrigue; we seem to see Arsinoe and Agathokles' wife Lysandra working against each other, each for her own children; while Ptolemy probably acted on the view that any form of trouble could hardly fail to advantage himself, and it is quite uncertain if he sided with his sister or his half-sister, or with either. But it was clear that there was no opening for him so long as Agathokles lived. Here we lose the thread entirely, and only emerge at length upon a fact, that *Lysimachos had Agathokles put to death for supposed treason*. It was whispered that Ptolemy had executed the sentence with his own hand; but however that may be, the popular voice threw the blame on Arsinoe.<sup>25</sup>

—Arsinoe's friendship for Stratonike, *O. G. I.* 14 (the date is not before 293; see ch. 12, p. 349).—J. N. Svoronos, τὰ νομίσματα τοῦ κράτους τῶν Πτολεμαίων, iv, 86, is very emphatic on Arsinoe's beauty. He selects in particular the portrait on a coin struck in Cyprus, Pl. 15, 1. (See on Arsinoe's portraits in general, on the Ptolemaic gold coinage, Svoronos in *Journ. Intern.* 2, p. 183.) But the portrait to which I refer in the text is to my mind much more beautiful. The coin is a tetradrachm, with rev. eagle on thunderbolt, and legend Ἀρσινόης Φιλαδέλφου; *B. M. Coins, Ptolemies*, Pl. viii, no. 3; Svoronos, *νομ. Πτολ.* ii, p. 66, no. 410 (Pl. 16, no. 13). The plate in Svoronos, however, gives no idea of the face; that in *B. M. Coins* is absolutely correct, as I ascertained by comparison with the original. The five known tetradrachms of this series are dated by Svoronos (i, p. ρνθ', Synopsis no. 5) to the years 271–265; if so, the portrait was cut during Arsinoe's lifetime. These dates, it is true, are far from certain; see, however, Head<sup>2</sup>, p. 847, who concludes that Svoronos' arrangement has 'established a claim to at least provisional acceptance'.

<sup>24</sup> It is clear, from the dates, that Seleukos' promise to Ptolemy was made long before Kouroupedion. This is supported by Porphyry (Euseb. i, 235, Schoene; Syncell. in *F. H. G.* iii, p. 696), who says that Seleukos received him ἐκ φυγῆς. Hence he was *twice* at Seleukos' court.

<sup>25</sup> The truth about Agathokles' death is hopelessly lost. But we must

Lysimachos' power leant and tottered forthwith. An earthquake that shook his capital shortly before Agathokles' death had terrified the superstitious of his subjects; they had now better cause for alarm in the execution of all who were suspected of sympathizing with the dead prince. Those who could escape fled to Seleukos and sought his intervention; among them was Lysandra with her children. But Ptolemy stayed with Lysimachos; it is probable, from what happened later, that he held a command in the army, and was seeking to make himself indispensable, perhaps to the old king, deserted by so many of his friends, certainly to the troops.<sup>26</sup>

While Lysimachos' action abroad was thus paralysed by domestic troubles, Antigonos had been besieging the Piraeus.<sup>27</sup> It seems certain that the Long Walls were already, if not in ruins, at any rate useless for military purposes, and that Athens and Piraeus were already two separate fortresses, though it cannot be said exactly when this first took place.<sup>28</sup> Athens had taken into her service the mercenaries under Strombichos,<sup>29</sup> and she evidently made a good fight; and Antigonos does not seem to have had force enough both to carry on the siege and to capture the outlying Attic forts,

x

follow Memnon-Nymphis where possible. Nymphis was alive at the time, and belonged, though an exile, to a city afterwards friendly to Keraunos (Memn. 11); and I cannot discard his plain statement (Memn. 8) (as Beloch does, 3, 1, 228, n. 1) that Keraunos was the murderer, though I should like to. Justin and Pausanias are worth little here; Pausanias says, very honestly, that his version is mere gossip. — Klotzsch's theory (p. 203, n. 2) of a joint plot of Keraunos and Agathokles seems to conflict with Memnon.

<sup>26</sup> It is obvious from Memnon 12 (after Kouroupedion Keraunos *ὑπ' αὐτὸν* (Seleukos) *ἔτελει, οὐχ ὡς αἰχμάλωτος παρορώμενος* κτλ.) that Keraunos was Seleukos' prisoner, that is, that he stayed with Lysimachos to the end; as is required, too, to explain his acceptance later by Lysimachos' old army. He was presumably Lysimachos' right hand after Agathokles' death, holding high command. This is not the version found in modern histories; but Thirlwall (8, 48) rightly saw that he accompanied Lysimachos to the end.

<sup>27</sup> As Antigonos held Piraeus in 279 (ch. 6, n. 50), and always subsequently, his operations for its recovery must have formed the central point of the war.

<sup>28</sup> The only definite data appear to be, that the Long Walls were repaired in 307 seq., when the fortifications of Athens were remodelled, and were in ruins in 229; for the evidence see Ferguson, *Athens*, pp. 113, 211. But the story demands that, anyhow from 288 onward, Piraeus was a separate fortress from Athens, and the Long Walls useless for military purposes.

<sup>29</sup> *I. G.* ii, 317 & 318 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 198 & 199 = Michel 127 & 1481, thanks to Strombichos for past services and help in the present war, passed Jan. 281; two copies.

for in 283/2 Eleusis was still in Athenian hands.<sup>30</sup> It was probably in 282 that Antigonos put to sea to bring home Demetrios' ashes;<sup>31</sup> and it is possible that this was the occasion on which he made the truce with Athens to which we have reference made, supposing the story to be true.<sup>32</sup> Certainly war was going on during some part of the year 283/2;<sup>33</sup> and in February 282 sacrifice was offered in the Little Mysteries at Eleusis for the safety of the people of Athens and their friends.<sup>34</sup> How the truce ended we do not know; but hunger ended the war. Antigonos at some time during the struggle captured Piraeus, garrisoned Mounychia, and gave his mind to starving out the city; to his commander in Mounychia, who had been strengthening its defences, he wrote that he must not only make the dog-collar strong, but the dog lean.<sup>35</sup> Military operations had laid waste the country, while Antigonos' fleet and the loss of Piraeus prevented the entry of corn. The Athenians might offer sacrifice for their friends; but none of their friends were going to help them. Lysimachos' hands were tied; Pyrrhos was Antigonos' ally; Ptolemy II was not fond of war, and was too intent on what would happen in the north to move. Seleukos was making what friends he could in view of the now inevitable struggle with Lysimachos, and had earned Antigonos' gratitude by sending back Demetrios' ashes; Antigonos was a natural

<sup>30</sup> *I. G.* ii, 5, 614 c = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 505 = Michel 1522; Menekles' year.

<sup>31</sup> See note 22.

<sup>32</sup> Polyæn. 4, 6, 20, whatever the story means. It is generally placed in the Chremonidean war, which I find incredible; for one thing, that was a war to the death, while this war was not, and this war contains a natural place and occasion for a truce. But I cannot think that the story, just as Polyæn. gives it, is very probable.

<sup>33</sup> *I. G.* ii, 316 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 520, praise of the ephebes of 283/2 who had garrisoned the Mouseion, passed Sept. 282.

<sup>34</sup> *I. G.* ii, 315 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 649.—Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 154, ends the war before this, and adds: 'so that Soteria could be sacrificed at Eleusis in Feb. 282.' The decree has the usual reference to sacrifice offered in the Little Mysteries by the ἐπιμεληταί of the mysteries ἐφ' ὑγείαι καὶ σωτ[ηρί]αι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου; and then continues: 'and whereas the ἐπιμεληταί of the mysteries did so and so in the Great Mysteries, καὶ νῦν τεθύκασιν τὰ σω[τήρ]ια [τα]ῖς θεα[ί]ς ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου'; that is to say, the 'Soteria' refer to the sacrifice ἐπὶ σωτηρία, and are here not a *thanksgiving* but a *prayer*. It is a strange use, but I do not see that an analysis of the language offers any alternative.

<sup>35</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 754 b.—It must belong here; Antigonos would not have been recently fortifying (ὠχυρωμένῳ) Mounychia in the middle of the Chremonidean war.



enemy of Lysimachos in any case, and the civility cost nothing but the price of a casket. Athens decided to make peace while terms could still be had; and peace was made some time in 282/1, probably in early spring. At the Great Dionysia, celebrated in March, sacrifice was offered for the safety of the crops in the field, an event unique in Athenian history and eloquent of the straits to which hunger must have reduced the city.<sup>36</sup>

But if Athens was exhausted by hunger, Antigonos, too, greatly desired to be quit of the war. Though some months yet were to pass before the decision of Lysimachos' fate should fall at Kouroupedion, it must have been evident already to shrewd observers that things were not well with him; and Antigonos, with his eyes always set upon Macedonia, must have desired a free hand for eventualities. For whatever might happen in the north, he had to conserve his strength; if Lysimachos pulled through, he would have a day of reckoning to face; and if Lysimachos fell, there might be chances in Macedonia. Hence the terms of peace seem to have been favourable for Athens. The nationalist government was of course removed, and was replaced by one composed of the friends of Macedonia, among them the now veteran Phaidros: and Athens had to acquiesce in the accomplished fact, the loss of Piraeus. But no other changes were made; we do not even know if Athens became subject to Antigonos' suzerainty or not.

<sup>36</sup> I think Ferguson (*Athens*, 154) has ended this war a year too soon. The crucial fact is that in 282/1, year of Nikias Otryneus, both Glaukon and Phaidros were ἀγωνοθέται (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 200, 213); and Ferguson (see *Klio*, 8, p. 345 seq.) has not noticed that the two men could not possibly have served in the same government. It does not much matter, on this point, whether Ferguson is right in saying there were two ἀγωνοθέται each year at this time or Sundwall in saying there was only one; [I myself agree with Sundwall; how can one explain away, e.g. *I. G.* ii, 302, τοῖς ἀγῶν[α]ς τοῖς θεοῖς ἐτέλειεν, by saying it was only *some* agones to *some* gods?]; the point is that Glaukon the nationalist could not be a colleague of Phaidros the pro-Macedonian. Consequently there was a change of government from nationalist to pro-Macedonian in 282/1, i.e. the war ended. Obviously the decree for Strobichos, Jan. 281, was passed while the nationalists were still in power. I incline to think that the unique prayer for a good harvest, *I. G.* ii, 5, 318 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 636, was offered *after* peace; if so, the war ended about Feb. 281.—Ferguson's view, that what Phaidros celebrated with display was the Great Panathenaia of July 282, depends on his view of the ἀγωνοθεσία. If we agree with Sundwall, I should suppose it was the Great Dionysia of March 281.



X Lysimachos fell. His adherents went over to Seleukos in masses, till at last, about July or August 281, the two old men—Lysimachos was eighty and Seleukos seventy-seven—met on the plain of Kourous in Lydia in the last of the great battles between the Successors.<sup>37</sup> All details are lost; we know only that Lysimachos died hard, as he had lived, and that, almost unsought, the whole of Alexander's empire, save Egypt, suddenly lay at Seleukos' feet.

Seleukos spent the autumn in gathering up the broken fragments of Lysimachos' realm in Asia. Arsinoe with some difficulty escaped to Ephesos, and with her sons reached Kassandreia, a city where Lysimachos had been worshipped and where the feeling in his favour may have been strong; she may have attempted to take possession of Macedonia for her son. Ptolemy, who may or may not have been in the battle, came into Seleukos' hands, but was well received by him and treated, not as a captive, but as a prince and an honoured guest. Seleukos saw that the rightful claimant to the only Macedonian throne still independent might be a very useful piece in the game. Meanwhile the crash of Lysimachos' ruin carried far; and even among unknown Celtic clans beyond the Danube word went round that the great barrier to a further advance southward was broken.

For Antigonos, Seleukos' success had been too complete.

<sup>37</sup> Trog. *Prol.* 17; Just. 17, 1, 9; Paus. 1, 10, 5; Memnon 8; Appian *Syr.* 62, 64; Eusebios (Schoene) 1, 233; epitaph of a Bithynian, Menas, who fell there, *B. C. H.* 1900, p. 380, *R. Ph.* 26, 1902, p. 257; Beloch 3, 2, 384.—The spelling varies; the epitaph gives Κούρου.—Date: several dates are here interdependent. Beloch made Kouroupedion July-August 281, and Keraunos' death spring 279. G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, 1907, vol. ii, p. 390, n. 2, says July-August 282, and July-August 280, respectively, and is followed by Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 154 seq.; while Klotzsch, p. 208, comes to the same conclusion simply from a consideration of Eusebios' dates. I cannot follow de Sanctis, though it would make some points easier. The following is common ground to both him and Beloch (3, 2, 67-70):—Ol. 124, 4 = 281/0, Pyrrhos crosses; Ol. 125. 1 = 280/79, Γαλατῶν ἐφόδος (Polyb. 1, 6, 5); Ol. 125. 2 = 279/8, Gauls destroyed at Delphi. Both, too, put Keraunos' death in Ol. 125. 1, i. e. outside Ol. 124; therefore the περί of Polyb. 2, 41 does not favour one more than the other. What decides me is this: Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 22) says Pyrrhos first heard of Keraunos' death after Asculum, i. e. definitely later than May 279; I find this quite incredible if Keraunos died August 280, for the matter was vital to Pyrrhos to know. (I think this has not been noticed.) I also feel a difficulty, if the Gauls killed Keraunos in summer 280, in making them waste so much of the good campaigning season of 279 as to get caught by the snow at Delphi. I therefore follow Beloch.

He was at the moment on good terms with him and bound to him in gratitude; and he could not forthwith invade a country that *de iure* belonged to Seleukos. He could still do nothing but watch events in the north; and they looked so hopeless that he even turned over some of his transports to Pyrrhos for his expedition to Italy.<sup>38</sup>

Events in the north, however, moved quickly enough. On the old Seleukos, master of half the world, had fallen the home-longing; he would end his days as king of Macedonia, on the throne of Alexander; and in the winter of 281/0 he was preparing to enter upon his kingdom with an irresistible force. But he reckoned without Ptolemy. Ptolemy saw that with Seleukos' decision to occupy Macedonia his chance of getting anything out of the wreck of Lysimachos' fortunes, whether on his own account or as regent for Lysandra's son, the rightful heir, was at an end; while as for his claim to the crown of Egypt, Seleukos might covet Egypt also—had he not once worn Alexander's diadem?—and seek to use him as a puppet. He decided to strike quickly; he must for some time have been preparing his ground with the army. He waited till Seleukos, in defiance of the advice of Apollo of Didyma, had crossed the Hellespont and was at the gates of Lysimacheia. There Ptolemy slew him with his own hand, and escaped on a swift horse into the city. The city revered the memory of its founder; Lysimachos' veterans welcomed one who posed as Lysimachos' avenger; on all lay the glamour of the name of the murderer's father, the wise and just king of Egypt. Seleukos' forces, on the contrary, were left without a head; his son Antiochos was far off; and Lysimachos' old army, captivated by Ptolemy's fiery energy and address, hailed him king of the Macedonians by the name of Keraunos, the Thunderbolt, and prepared to bring him to his kingdom.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Just. 17, 2, 13.

<sup>39</sup> Memn. 12; Trog. *Prol.* 17; Just. 17, 2; App. *Syr.* 62; Euseb. (Schoene) 1, 235, 236. On Seleukos' title to Macedonia, see C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 5, 244; 7, 449; 9, 248, who argues that he was king *de iure* by choice of the army; *contra*, F. Reuss, *Rhein. Mus.* 62, 595; *Klio*, 9, 76, he had nothing but the conqueror's right to take possession if he could. The evidence is defective.—On Keraunos' motives, Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 5, 253, who thinks

His kingdom did not seem likely to be a bed of roses, for rival claimants were numerous and powerful. Antiochos was bound to attack him, both to assert his own pretensions and to avenge his father. Antigonos would probably attack him, in prosecution of his own hereditary rights. Pyrrhos, as ex-king, had many friends in the western provinces, and might be expected to fight. Lysandra must use all her influence for her own children; and her influence cannot have been negligible, for Agathokles had been popular, and had had many partisans. The last surviving member of Kassandros' house, his nephew Antipatros, had a following in some part of Macedonia. Finally, there was Arsinoe, for the last seven months firmly established with her mercenaries in Kassandreia, and possibly actually governing as much of the country as she could in the name of her eldest son by Lysimachos, Ptolemaios, now about sixteen years of age.<sup>40</sup>

How Keraunos dealt with Lysandra and her children we do not know, but may perhaps guess; they vanish from history. Pyrrhos was fully engaged at the moment with his preparations for crossing to Italy. But Antiochos and Antigonos at once made ready for war; whether independently or in conjunction does not appear.

Of Antiochos Keraunos probably took little heed. The new king of Asia had troubles enough of his own; for revolts had broken out in his unwieldy kingdom on the news of Seleukos' death, and a ring of enemies cut him off from crossing to Europe, even had he so desired. Zipoites of Bithynia was the most important of them. His people had, naturally, aided Seleukos against their enemy Lysimachos; but, with Seleukos in Lysimachos' place, they had been quick to perceive the fresh danger that threatened their independence, and now prepared to resist the new ruler of Asia Minor as they had resisted the old. The powerful city of Herakleia had recovered her freedom after Kouroupedion, and had no intention of surrendering it again to the Seleukid;

he aimed at being Regent.—Lysimachos must have been popular with his army, Diod. 21, 12, 1.

<sup>40</sup> Just. 17, 2 has a list of pretenders, but incomplete.—Trog. *Prol.* 24 says that Ptolemy 'Arsinoen imperio Macedonicarum urbium exiit', which looks as if she was ruling *de facto* much more than Kassandreia.

she entered into a league with Byzantion and Chalkedon for the maintenance of their independence, and they were joined by the Persian prince Mithridates of Pontos, who, like the Byzantines, had been a friend of Demetrios. Seleukos had sent an army against him, which had been cut to pieces by Mithridates' Kappadokians; and the victorious coalition was now making head against Antiochos. Probably they were well disposed towards Keraunos; anyhow Herakleia placed her excellent fleet at his disposal.<sup>41</sup>

Antigonos, however, who had been watching events, was unencumbered and ready. Shipping his men on transports, he set sail with his whole fleet for Macedonia in the early spring of 280, hoping to anticipate Keraunos. But Keraunos was as quick as he; he intercepted him at sea with Lysimachos' old navy, and in a great battle completely defeated him, a result which the patriotic historian of Herakleia attributes in chief to the bravery of the ships of his own city: the Herakleot flagship, a monstrous vessel mounting Lysimachos' badge, the image of a lion, carried off the palm for valour in the action. It began to look as if the practical world had no use for philosophers in high places.<sup>42</sup>

So men thought in Greece. Antigonos' prestige, never high, was shattered by this the first defeat ever sustained by Demetrios' navy; even our all but vanished tradition still echoes the disaster, and shows the impression which it made.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Bithynian aid to Seleukos, see Menas' epitaph (note 37). Seleukos' defeat, Trog. *Prol.* 17. The coalition, Memnon 11.

<sup>42</sup> Memnon 13; Just. 24, 1, 8. Justin (17, 2, 10 and 24, 1, 1) may or may not mean that Antiochos and Antigonos made common cause.—The lion, or head of a lion, frequently occurs on Lysimachos' coins, no doubt with reference to the story in Plutarch, *Dem.* 27.—See Addenda.

<sup>43</sup> Memnon 14 refers to Gonatas as 'the man who was beaten at sea', [ὁ] ἡττηθεὶς τῷ ναυτικῷ.—This battle turns up again in a very curious place. Aristes (ed. Wendland), p. 180, and Josephos, *Ant. Jud.* 12, 93, mention a great victory of Ptolemy Philadelphos over Antigonos, the anniversary of which was always celebrated at Alexandria. Niese apparently took this literally (ii, p. 130, n. 6); Beloch thought it a perverted echo of Kos (3, 2, 431, n. 1). The story, however, refers to the very beginning of Philadelphos' reign, for (1) Menedemos is supposed to be at Alexandria (Arist. 201; Jos. 12, 101), and he died soon after 273; (2) there is reference to queen Arsinoe and her children (Arist. 185; Jos. 12, 51), therefore Arsinoe I, who was divorced before 274, is still queen; (3) in Josephos, Demetrios of Phaleron is still librarian, whereas Philadelphos banished him as soon as he had the power. There is no doubt therefore that the battle of Josephos and Aristes is a



Discontent in Greece must, too, have reached breaking point with the new exactions that Antigonos must have found necessary to equip his expedition; and on the news of his defeat Greece rose. Sparta, pursuing her consistent policy, seized the opportunity to put herself once more at the head of a Peloponnesian league; and even Argos and Megalopolis, whose policy and whose necessities made it impossible for them to join with Sparta, expelled Antigonos' garrisons and proclaimed freedom and neutrality; Antigonos was not the only friend to be found in the North. Boeotia and Megara joined in the revolt. But for Corinth, Antigonos might have been swept out of the country.<sup>44</sup>

Corinth saved him from irremediable disaster. It cut the revolution in two; Sparta and Boeotia could not join hands. With the remains of his fleet, Antigonos had hurried straight to Boeotia on the news that it had risen;<sup>45</sup> but he was no longer a match even for Boeotia single-handed. Of the course of events we know nothing, save that in that year Boeotia regained her independence; Megara in her wake did the same; so no doubt did Eastern Lokris, unless it had already become free in 285. But Antigonos saved Euboea and Piraeus from the general wreck, and with them maintained his communications between Corinth and Demetrias; had the Peloponnesian army been able to move northward, the result might have been very different.

The Peloponnesians had chosen the Spartan king Areus to lead the army of the new league. Beside Sparta, the members probably included most of Arkadia save Megalopolis,

garbled recollection of Keraunos' victory, and one more proof of the hopelessness of incidental allusions in late writers on other subjects.

<sup>44</sup> Just. 24, 1. To take Justin literally, Greece rose *during* Antigonos' war with Keraunos, i.e. instantly on the news of his defeat.—The successful revolt of Boeotia and Megara is to be deduced from the fact that they were free in 279.—Megalopolis seems to be independent in 279; she sent no troops against the Gauls because Sparta would not undertake not to attack her territory, Paus. 8, 6, 3 (where Megalopolis must primarily be meant); therefore Antigonos was no longer defending the city, which was still free in 273, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26. One must suppose that Megalopolis expelled Antigonos' garrison in 280.—Argos is free in 273, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 31, and therefore probably expelled her garrison in 280; but it may have been a little later.—If Megalopolis and Argos acted thus, Justin's hyperbole, '*omnes* ferme Graeciae civitates,' is explained.

<sup>45</sup> Memnon 13.



some of the towns of the Argolid,—Argos itself was neutral, and others, such as Troizen, may still have been held for Antigonos,—Elis, and the four westernmost towns of Achaea, Patrai, Dyme, Tritaia, Pharai. There is no reason to suppose that Messene departed from her accustomed neutrality. As he could not move north by the Isthmus, Areus very naturally marched to Patrai and there got shipping; but instead of making for Boeotia to aid that country against Antigonos, he invaded Aetolia. The Aetolians were friends, perhaps allies, of Antigonos, and Areus' action may have been properly meant to draw them off from assisting the king; but the reason given in the tradition is the old religious pretext that they had occupied the Kirraean plain. Anyhow, Areus suffered the usual fate of those who thrust their hands into that hornet's nest: the Aetolians caught his army scattered and plunder-laden, and inflicted on him a considerable defeat. Areus desired to continue the war in the spring of 279, but several states refused to follow him further; Antigonos had been brought so low that they thought Spartan ambition the greater danger to the liberties of Greece. The most important result of the campaigns of 280 had been, not the liberation of Boeotia, but a small and scarcely noticed union entered into between the four little Achaean towns; for it was the germ of the Achaean League.<sup>46</sup>

Meanwhile Keraunos, fortified by his victory, had made himself master of the whole of Macedonia and Thessaly outside Demetrias. He had no difficulty in making peace with Antiochos; but before this he had disposed of yet another pretender by coming to an arrangement with Pyrrhos. He had probably already made overtures to Pyrrhos before his victory; and he found him accommodating. The Epeiros

<sup>46</sup> On the allies, I differ somewhat from Beloch 3, 2, 305.—Troizen; Polyæn. 2, 29, 1; after 277, from the mention of Krateros, who probably did not govern in Greece till Antigonos became king of Macedonia.—Elis. This depends on whether the statue of Areus which they set up at Olympia belongs to this war or the Chremonidean.—A similar uncertainty attaches to Ptolemy's statue of Areus, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 212; we cannot say if Egypt stood behind the rising of 280. It is possible that it was Antiochos.—Spartan ambition. Beside Justin, Niese (2, 8, n. 2) here put Plut. *Mor.* 219A, 9. But, again, this might belong to 266/5.—Aetolia: Just. 24, 1.—Achaean League: Polyb. 2, 41, 11–12; *circ.* spring-summer 280.

king was on the eve of sailing for Italy, and had no thought for anything else ; Keraunos supplied him with 5,000 Macedonian troops and some Thessalian horse, and gave him a daughter in marriage, and Pyrrhos, far from fighting for Macedonia, was content to trust his own denuded kingdom of Epeiros, during his absence, to Ptolemy's honour, whatever that might be worth. Antipatros seems to have given no trouble ; and this left Ptolemy only one claimant to settle with, his half-sister Arsinoe.<sup>47</sup>

But Arsinoe was his hardest problem. Kassandreia was very strong, and in feeling very independent ; Arsinoe had plenty of money, and therefore plenty of men ; but above and beyond this was her own personality ; she had more than a man's spirit, one of the ablest heads in the world, and the king of Egypt for own brother. To storm Kassandreia was out of the question ; Ptolemy resorted to fair speech. To keep his brother of Egypt from interfering he sent him humble letters, abjuring all claim to the Egyptian throne ; and he set himself to attack Arsinoe on her weak side, the side of her ambitions. She desired to be herself again a queen, and to see her eldest son on the throne of Macedonia. Ptolemy promised her both ; he would wed her himself and adopt her children, thus securing to her the immediate possession, and to her eldest son the reversion, of the throne. He even pretended to be in love with her, so that she might believe that she would manage him as she had managed Lysimachos ; and when Arsinoe, who knew him too well, still hesitated, he did not shrink from confirming his good faith by the most solemn oaths known to the Macedonian religion, swearing among other things to have no wife but her, an oath at least which the outraged gods saw to it that he should keep. In

<sup>47</sup> Trog. *Prol.* 17 ; Just. 17, 2, 13-15 and 24, 1, 8. Pyrrhos left Keraunos 'vindicem regni'.—Klotzsch, p. 216, n. 2, thinks this is all a blunder ; the 'vindex regni' was Pyrrhos' son Ptolemaios, and the daughter of Keraunos an error for the daughter of Ptolemy I. Of course, such errors are common enough (see note 21) ; but seeing the especial pains Trogus took about names (*J. H. S.* 1909, p. 265 seq.), I would not suppose one in Justin without a reason. In this case, Antigone was *not* a daughter of Ptolemy I (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4) ; and even if Ptolemaios had been left to govern Epeiros, the kingdom, denuded of troops, was nevertheless at Keraunos' mercy. I therefore follow Justin.

vain Arsinoë's eldest son Ptolemaios warned his mother that Keraunos meant treachery. Ambition finally conquered fear; Arsinoë gave her half-brother her hand, and was proclaimed queen in the presence of the army. She threw open the gates of Kassandreia; Keraunos entered as a bridegroom, occupied the citadel, and at once proceeded to slay Arsinoë's two younger sons in her arms, while she vainly tried to shield them with her body. She herself was allowed to take sanctuary at Samothrake; her eldest son Ptolemaios escaped to the Illyrian king Monunius, with whose aid he proceeded to wage unsuccessful war on the murderer. We shall meet him again.<sup>48</sup>

The one state that had gained enormously by the troubles of the last few years was Egypt. She alone of the great powers had suffered not at all; secure between the desert and the sea, she had watched the shipwreck of her rivals. But yesterday the world that ringed the Eastern Mediterranean had numbered four great empires; to-day those of Demetrios and Lysimachos were in ruins, and that of Seleukos was torn by internal struggles; the Egypt of Ptolemy remained untouched. Lysimachos might have interfered with Egypt's new-found sea-power, and he was gone; Demetrios' son might have sought to do so, and he had just been hopelessly beaten both by sea and on land. Keraunos had too much to do at home to think of the Aegean; and Ptolemy II held, for what it was worth, his half-brother's written renunciation of the crown and dominions of Egypt. At last Egypt felt herself absolutely secure in that rule of the sea which had fallen to her by default. In this year, 280, Ptolemy II issued invitations to the League of the Islanders and the other Greek states to send theoroi to the great festival in

<sup>48</sup> Trog. *Prol.* 24; Just. 24, 2 and 3.—Keraunos was a murderer; but I distrust profoundly this narrative of Justin's. Justin's only interest in history is to show how the villain is punished at the end of the fifth act; as Keraunos' punishment was undoubted, the temptation to provide sufficient villainy was great.—Arsinoë, as daughter of a king of Egypt, could still *call* herself queen; I refer to the reality of the position.—Samothrake had belonged to Lysimachos, *I. G.* xii, 8, 150 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 190; and Arsinoë as his queen had dedicated there a round temple, the Arsinoëion, *I. G.* xii, 8, 227 = *O. G. I.* 15.—Monunius, ch. 2, n. 55. He was on good terms with Aetolia, a country naturally opposed to Keraunos as Lysimachos' successor.

honour of his father which he was about to institute in Alexandria, and to declare that it should be of equal standing with the Olympic games; <sup>49</sup> and it was probably in this same year that he founded at Delos the festival in honour of Apollo which we call the first Ptolemaieia.<sup>50</sup> For this festival (which must not be confused with the federal Ptolemaieia in which the Islanders worshipped Ptolemy Soter) Ptolemy II endowed the temple with a sum of money, from the interest on which every year a vase was to be purchased and dedicated to the gods of Delos, Apollo, Artemis, and Leto, and sacrifice and other incidents of a festival performed, the actual offering of the vase being made by the choir of young girls

<sup>49</sup> Nikouria decree: *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 = *I. G.* xii, 7, 506. For the date, see ch. 4, n. 29.

<sup>50</sup> The beginning of the first Ptolemaieia was dated by Homolle to 283 (*Archives*, 59, 60; see E. Schulhof, *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 106). Going upon this without examination, which was not then possible to me, I formerly suggested 285 (*J. H. S.* 1909, 278). There seems little doubt that both dates are wrong. — Taking the list of the vases of the first Ptolemaieia as given in four inventories, Sosisthenes, 250 (*B. C. H.* 1903, p. 64 = *I. G.* xi, 287 B, l. 100 seq.), Akridion, 240 (*I. G.* xi, 298 A, ll. 70-5), Boulon, 234 (*I. G.* xi, 313, ll. 57-61), and Menethales, 229 (*I. G.* xi, 320 B, ll. 20-4), we get the following: the first dated vase is under Sosimachos, 276; then seven dated vases are missing, that is, four next after Sosimachos and three next after Kallinos (with the variant that Sosisthenes gives a vase to Meilichides II which the others give to Meilichides I); but there are a number of undated vases, i. e. no archons given but identified by *ταμία* or *ἐπιστάται*. Seven of these are common to all four lists. Akridion, Boulon, and Menethales have two more in common (one *ἐπιστατοῦντος Πολύβου*, one without *ταμίας* or *epistates*); this makes nine. There follows in Boulon one of its characteristic blanks, which *may* mean another vase; but Menethales certainly gives one other vase, with *epistates* Aischylion (?), and there follows a blank with room for yet one more. The total then is certainly ten, with a possibility of eleven. Taking ten as certain, we fill the seven gaps, and put three before Sosimachos, which makes the first vase appear in 279; it is no objection that no vase appears in Hypsokles, 279, as we know that the actual vase was often not received (or listed) till a year too late; Boulon, for instance, is full of gaps for the insertion of the last vase of each series, an insertion for some reason never completed. This date, 279, is confirmed by two other (now recently published) inventories, Sosimachos, 276 (*I. G.* xi, 164 B, ll. 3, 7), and Antigonos I, 274 (*I. G.* xi, 199 B, ll. 69, 92); the latter mentions six vases including that of 274, therefore the first vase is 279. — The inscription on the vases of the first Ptolemaieia is not known, I think; it is not given in Akridion, on which we generally depend for the actual *ἐπιγραφαί*. — This note is based on copies of the unpublished inventories which Prof. Dürrbach kindly lent me for perusal, and on information and arguments supplied by him; and the suggestion that the undated vases must go in the gaps is his. In working it over I find, however, that my arithmetical process has differed from his; but it reaches the same year, 279. I should like, however, to feel certain that Menethales did not give an eleventh vase.



who are called Deliades, the maidens of Delos. Of the numerous vase festivals at Delos this, though not the earliest, was the first to be founded by a king, with a political motive; it emphasized the fact that Egypt now thought herself secure at sea. It was probably too at or about this time that the federal Ptolemaieia of the Island League was enlarged to include the worship of Ptolemy II alongside that of his father.<sup>51</sup>

The early spring of 279 saw Antigonos at the lowest ebb of fortune that he ever reached. Beside Corinth and Demetrias, Piraeus and Euboea, he held nothing but a few places in the Argolid and the eastern half of Achaea; and the movement to independence was working so strongly in the Peloponnese that he could have no certainty of being able to retain even these. Whether Athens, exhausted by the late war, had actually joined against him is uncertain; but the government of his friends had been overthrown, and the nationalists had again seized the helm. In 280/79 Demochares was again active in politics; it was in this year that he moved a decree in honour of his uncle Demosthenes.<sup>52</sup> It was of course to some extent an academic matter; Demosthenes was long since dead, and the line of his opponent Philip long since extinct; but Antigonos was grandson of the regent to whom, it was thought, Demosthenes owed his death, and the decree could never have been moved under a pro-Macedonian government. But it was very carefully worded; no Antigonid was named; Athens did not want to challenge Antigonos if she could avoid it. And if any challenge was meant, Antigonos did not take it up. The amount of territory he had lost had, it is true, had the effect of throwing upon his hands a number of mercenaries who no longer garrisoned anything; and they had to be employed and fed. But it was not Athens that he was to attack; events were shaping themselves very differently.

<sup>51</sup> *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 340, no. 3 completing *O. G. I.* 67. This had not been done at the time of the Nikouria decree (*ib.*, p. 342). But it cannot be much later.

<sup>52</sup> Decree in *Plut. Mor.* 850 F. — Date, *ib.* 847 D, Gorgias' year. — That the government had again become nationalist is perhaps also shown by the fact that in Pyanepsion of Glaukippos' year 277/6 the administration was superintended by a board; 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1910, p. 19 = Michel 1483, l. 23, τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει].



For suddenly, in the spring of 279, news came to men in Greece before which their obscure struggles lost, for the moment, all importance. A great host of fair-haired Northerners had burst into Macedonia; Keraunos, headstrong and rash, had not waited to mobilize, but had hurried to meet them with the first troops at hand; his army had been cut to pieces, himself wounded and taken, and the victorious Gauls, with the severed head of the Macedonian king paraded on the point of a spear, were plundering far and wide through the land.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE COMING OF THE CELTS

WHEN Ephoros wrote the first universal history, he rounded off the world as he knew it with four blocks of largely unknown peoples: Ethiopians on the south, Indians on the east, Scythians on the north, and on the west, lying along the pathless ocean, Celts.<sup>1</sup> His knowledge of the Celts was of the vaguest, and in the rhetoric of himself and his followers they were posed as people of gentle manners, Philhellenes, devoted to the refining influences of music,<sup>2</sup>—a sort of fourth-century counterpart of Homer's 'blameless Ethiopians'. And more exact information was slow in finding its way to Greece. Dionysios I had used Celtic mercenaries as early as 368, and had allied himself with Celtic stems against the Etruscans;<sup>3</sup> Agathokles of Sicily had also employed Celts;<sup>4</sup> Alexander, before starting for Asia, had received an embassy from some Celtic tribe, men who talked to him a good deal about their own courage, but in whose friendship he may have found, during his absence, a useful counterpoise to the turbulent Illyrians on his frontier.<sup>5</sup> Kassandros is said to have besieged a Celtic clan who had fortified a camp in the Haemus,<sup>6</sup> and another tribe threatened Thrace during Lysimachos' reign.<sup>7</sup> This about sums up the actual knowledge of the Celtic world

<sup>1</sup> Ephoros fr. 38 = Strabo I, 34; Ps.-Skymnos, l. 170 seq. (*G. G. M.* I, p. 201).

<sup>2</sup> Ephoros ap. Strab. 4, 199, φιλέλληνas; Ps.-Skymnos, l. 183 seq.,

Χρῶνται δὲ Κέλτοὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν Ἑλληνικοῖς . . .

συν μουσικῇ δ' ἄγουσι τὰς ἐκκλησίας,

ζηλοῦντες αὐτὴν ἡμερώσεως χάριν.

—'Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros.' The third century exactly reversed the picture, see p. 145.

<sup>3</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 7, 1, 20; Diod. 15, 70; Just. 20, 5, 4-6.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 20, 64, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Ptolemy I ap. Arrian. *Anab.* I, 4 = Strabo 7, 301, 302.

<sup>6</sup> Pliny, *N. H.* 31, 53; Theophrastos ap. Senec. *Quaest. Nat.* iii, 11, 3.

<sup>7</sup> Paus. 10, 19, 5.

which at the beginning of the third century was possessed by the Greek world east of Marseilles. Marseilles no doubt knew a good deal more ; but Marseilles was somewhat apart from the main currents of Greek life and thought, and she sometimes knew too much to be readily believed, as the reception given to the narrative of her very great traveller Pytheas shows.

Long before the fourth century, Celtic tribes had outgrown their early homes in the north and had set out southward to win themselves new countries. It had been a wandering of the peoples that took long years to fulfil, but the upshot had been the settlement of races, afterwards known to Greeks and Romans as Celtae, in large parts of Gaul and of the north of Italy, of Spain and of the British Isles, in the valley of the Upper Danube, and over much of Central Europe, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Bohemia. These were the Celts of the first migration. Their more southern tribes, in the valleys of the Po and the Danube, adopted a settled life and made advances in civilization ; their state of culture can be seen in that of the period known to archaeologists as that of La Tène. To a large extent they began to amalgamate with the natives of the conquered countries, a process easily traced in the case of Caesar's Celtae in Gaul and of the Gaelic-speaking peoples of the British Isles. Whether the Celts of the first migration included relatives of the Goidels no less than of the Brythons, *q* men as well as *p* men ; whether *q* men can be traced on the continent at all ; whether the Celts were indeed divided into *q* men and *p* men till a much later date,—these things are matters of controversy, of which the existence alone need be noted here.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> On the Celtic migration generally : Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Celtes* (1900) ; C. J. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, vol. i (1908) ; B. Niese, *Galli* in *P. W.* (1910). — For the civilization of the southern Celts, beside Jullian, see especially A. Bertrand and S. Reinach, *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube* (1894 ; vol. ii of *Nos Origines*). — Bibliography of the La Tène culture in Jullian, p. 370, n. 2. — On the Celtae of Gaul as a mixed race, ethnologically, T. Rice Holmes, *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*, p. 281. — Goidelic-speaking people on the continent : J. Rhys, 'Celtae and Galli,' *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. ii, 1905-6, p. 71, and 'The Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy', *ib.*, p. 273 ; he has proposed for them the name Celtican. The distinction of *q* men and *p* men as early as Caesar's time has been denied by Arbois de Jubainville (*Rev. Celt.* xi, 1890, p. 377 ; *Les premiers habitants de l'Europe*,

In the fourth century the North again became straitened for room. Very vaguely, great migrations can be discerned, initiated perhaps by the tribes afterwards known as Germans, heretofore cooped up at the base of the Schleswig-Holstein peninsula, but already, with a brave and overflowing population, beginning that great expansion which in the course of a few centuries was to break down all the barriers of the civilized world. The Germans seem to have displaced a number of tribes dwelling between the Elbe and the Rhine,<sup>9</sup> and these drove forward upon Central Europe, starting movement after movement in widening circles, like a stone thrown into a pond. Wild fighters, as yet untouched by the civilization of the settled lands, these tribes fell on the settled Celts, here driving them out, here collecting and sweeping them forward on their onward march, here again entering their service as mercenaries against the common foe.<sup>10</sup> The Greeks and Romans were to know them as Belgae or Galatae; <sup>11</sup> they are the Celts of the second migration. Both names, Celtæ and Galatæ, soon came to be used indiscriminately; it could hardly be otherwise, when the men of the new migration brought with them men of the old. Some of the new-

2, pp. 283, 292, 294); but this had reference to Prof. Rhys' earlier argument, based on the name Sequana, and not to his more recent one, in which he inclines to identify Arbois de Jubainville's 'Ligurian' with his 'Celtican' as 'the continental idiom akin to Goidelic'.

<sup>9</sup> Arbois de Jubainville, *Premiers habitants*, vol. ii, p. 329.

<sup>10</sup> e.g. the Gaisatoi of Polyb. 2, 22, 1. Polybios calls them Galatae and says that their name simply means 'mercenaries'. But I gather that *gaesatus*, like Goidel, probably means 'spearman'; J. Rhys in *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 1905-6, p. 344.

<sup>11</sup> Identity of Belgae and Galatae; Jullian 1, 313-19. (I believe the term Belgae first occurs in the name of the Gallic leader of 279, Belgius or Bolgios, and the term Galatae in Pyrrhos' dedication of Gallic shields to Athene Itonia in 274 (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26 = Paus. 1, 13, 3).) This identification, together with the treatment of these two names as proper to the second migration, seems to me a great help in bringing order out of chaos. Of course, Greek and Roman writers generally use both Celtæ and Galatæ indiscriminately—how could they help it?—but it is something to get the distinction of the thing. Niese (*Galli* in *P. W.*) will not listen to the distinction between Celtæ and Galatæ, as it is unknown to Polybios; and, since Diod. 5, 32 is decisive, he calls Diodoros late evidence: but this will not do, for Diodoros here is Poseidonios; see Schwartz in *P. W.*, Diodoros 38, col. 678, and compare Diod. 5, 31, *εἰσὶ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ποιηταὶ μελῶν, οὓς βάρδους ὀνομάζουσιν*, with Athen. 6, 246 d, which shows it comes from Poseidonios. In Latin, 'Galli' gradually swallowed up every other term for the men of both migrations, just as 'Celt' has done in English.

comers conquered and settled Belgium, Northern France, and the south and east of England, even gaining a footing in Ireland;<sup>12</sup> others crossed the Alps and fought hard fights with Rome; others again followed down the ancient highway of the Danube, drawn by the storied treasures of the yet untouched world beyond the Balkans. These presently crossed the Danube and turned southward; a legend remains which perhaps narrates how one of their chief tribes, the Scordisci, was led across the great river by a woman.<sup>13</sup> Their first new conquest, some time in the fourth century, was Pannonia, the country to the north-west of Illyria, comprising the eastern part of Austria and the western part of Hungary. From here they continued to follow the right bank of the Danube, fighting with the Illyrian tribes already in occupation: one body conquered the Autariatae, who occupied Bosnia, Servia, and the northern part of Albania, another the Ardiaei of Dalmatia.<sup>14</sup> These movements brought them fairly within the purview of the Macedonian monarchy.

It was unfortunate for Macedonia that her king at the time was Ptolemy Keraunos, a man surrounded by foes, overconfident and rash, and doubly branded as a perjurer and a murderer. It has been conjectured that one of his enemies may even have persuaded the Celts to attack him;<sup>15</sup> but in fact the Celts needed no persuading. Pressure from behind, and the need of a new home, drove them on even more certainly than the desire for plunder. The Illyrian tribes, whose lives for generations had consisted in border warfare with their Macedonian neighbours, recognized that both peoples were involved in a common danger; and the king of the Dardanians offered to Keraunos the aid of 20,000 men, an aid which he is said to have declined in insulting terms, saying that Macedonia would no longer be Macedonia if, after conquering Asia by herself, she could not guard her own

<sup>12</sup> A colony of the Menapii: J. Rhys, *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 1903-4, p. 70; Arbois de Jubainville, *C. R. Acad. Insc.* 1907, p. 17.

<sup>13</sup> G. Dottin in *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1906, p. 123; C. J. Jullian, *ib.* p. 124.

<sup>14</sup> Pannonia: Just. 24, 4, 5. Autariatae, Polyaen. vii, 42. Ardiaei, Herimippos ap. Athen. 10, 443 b. There is no need to credit the identical stratum in either case.

<sup>15</sup> Ptolemaios, son of Lysimachos, was, or had recently been, at the court of the Illyrian king Monunius, Trog. *Prol.* 24.



marches without help from Dardania.<sup>16</sup> The Dardan king promptly took counsel for his own safety, and joined the invaders.<sup>17</sup>

These swept forward in three bodies, each doubtless led by different tribes. The first host, under a chief named Belgius or Bolgius, was destined to invade Macedonia by way of Illyria and the Aoos pass; the second, under Brennus and Acichorius, was to overrun Paionia, follow up the Axios, and enter Macedonia by way of the Iron Gate; the objective of the third, under Cerethrius, was Thrace.<sup>18</sup> The leaders were followed by a mixed multitude; settled Celts from Austria and the Danube, Illyrians like the Autariatae and the Dardanians, Thracians like the Maedi,<sup>19</sup> slaves of every nationality armed and unarmed, traders and camp followers, with a long convoy of wagons bearing the women and children, the household goods and the plunder;<sup>20</sup> while at their head marched the half-wild Galatae from the North Sea, men mighty of limb, their strong rough-hewn faces, so strange to Greek eyes, surmounted by huge shocks of red hair, their throats circled by gold torques,<sup>21</sup> men who in action flung away target and plaid and charged half naked with their claymores,<sup>22</sup> as their kinsfolk in Britain were to do later at the Battle of the Standard and on many another field.

Their aim was to find a new land in which to settle. Plunder was by the way; they did not bring their women and

<sup>16</sup> Just. 24, 4, 9.

<sup>17</sup> App. *Illyr.* 5.

<sup>18</sup> Paus. 10, 19, 7.

<sup>19</sup> Autariatae, App. *Illyr.* 4; Dardanians and Maedi, ib. 5. The Maedi, however, were generally reckoned as Thracians; Strabo 7, 316; Livy 26, 25, 7 and 28, 5, 7; Pliny, *N. H.* 4, 11 (18). The Scordisci, whom Appian also turns into an Illyrian tribe following the Celts, were Galatae; Athen. 6, 234 a; Justin 32, 3, 6-8 (perhaps from Poseidonios). The material thing is to note the manner in which the Celts carried along with them parts of the various conquered tribes.

<sup>20</sup> For a Celtic host on the march, see Diod. 22, 9, 1; Polyb. 5, 78, 1 and 2, 28, 5.

<sup>21</sup> The surviving representations of the Galatae in Pergamene art have been collected by P. R. von Biénkowski, *Die Darstellungen der Gallier in der hellenistischen Kunst* (1908). The faces repay study; the Pergamene artists have caught, beneath the ruggedness, all the pathos of the men of the 'losing battle'. — For Gauls in Alexandrian art, see A. J. Reinach, *Mon. Piot.* 1911, pp. 37-115. None of the faces here are striking.

<sup>22</sup> For this custom among the Gauls see Polyb. 3, 114, 4; Livy 22, 46, 5 and 38, 21, 9; and in particular Polyb. 2, 28, 8; 29, 7; 30, 2, 3, the best account of Celtic methods of fighting.

children and household goods with them merely for the sake of plundering. In part too they effected their object. The Scordisci were to succeed in founding a kingdom in Servia, with its capital at Belgrade; an unknown tribe or tribes were to establish in Thrace the realm known as that of Tylis; three other tribes, the Tectosages, Trocmi, and Tolistoagii, were to settle as complete political units in Asia Minor. It is well, in considering Brennus' campaign in Greece, to bear in mind what the ultimate object of the Galatae was.

What manner of men these Gauls really were is a little difficult to understand. We have only the accounts of enemies—enemies who were at first half mad with terror, and who took a long time to attain to a juster and more sober judgement;<sup>23</sup> and terror is a state of mind which hardly makes for impartiality. An elaborate portrait of the Gaul at large can be put together from the Greek writers,<sup>24</sup> the main lines of which can be summed up in one word, instability; but something seems wanting to a true picture, something that perhaps will have to be supplied, not by the historian, but by the poet.<sup>25</sup> Instability in all its forms may be but the common attribute of all peoples at a certain stage of emergence from barbarism. No enemy ever questioned Gallic courage; and if many of their women resembled Chiomara,<sup>26</sup> they could have taught some of the facile queens of Hellenism a valuable lesson. A people whose war-leader was named 'Rede-giver'<sup>27</sup> must have had at any rate a dim idea that there were matters more to the point than mere blows. Their poetry they had already begun to make; they had bards,<sup>28</sup> who chanted lays before the host, lays perhaps akin to those which afterwards, in another land, were to grow into the

<sup>23</sup> For an ultimate reasoned judgement, see Polyb. 2, 35.

<sup>24</sup> As has been done by Jullian, *op. c.*, vol. i, p. 343 seq.

<sup>25</sup> As was done for the Germanic tribes by William Morris.

<sup>26</sup> Polyb. 21, 38; Livy 38, 24; Plut. *Mor.* 258 D.

<sup>27</sup> According to Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Celtes*, p. 200, Brennus has nothing to do with the Welsh *brenin*, king, but is a masculine form of the Irish *brian*, 'parole.' Brennus therefore would mean 'he who speaks the word', 'counsellor.'—If Brennus can only be explained from the Irish, does this not point to his being the chief of some settled tribe of the earlier migration, and not (properly speaking) a Galatian at all?

<sup>28</sup> Poseidonios ap. Athen. 6, 246 d. He says they were poets μετ' ᾠδῆς ἐπαίνους λέγοντες.

story of the heroic feats of Cuchulainn or the witching charm of Deirdre; even as, centuries before, other fair-haired Northerners had burst in on an older Greece, with songs of the glorious deeds of their heroes,<sup>29</sup> songs perhaps akin to those from which grew the mighty tale of the wrath of Achilles.

That these Gauls were aggressive and undisciplined, quarrelsome and vain, drunken and passionate,—these things mattered little to the world. But the Greek writers bring against them the definite accusation of cruelty; and the accusation is perhaps true in the main, though it is to be remembered that the literary men of the third century did not confine this reproach to the Gauls.<sup>30</sup> But we do know that their contemporaries were in fact terrified by the idea of their cruelty;<sup>31</sup> a picture of it remains, doubtless not under-coloured, in the horrors of the sack of Kallion; the accusation goes on echoing through the Roman poets till the last days of the Western Empire. We need not accuse the Greek of cant in the matter. It is easy enough, in both Greek and Macedonian history, to pick out cases of what seems to us to be horrible cruelty. But, on the whole, manners were softening in the third century. It was no longer customary, on taking a town, to slay the men and sell the women and children for slaves; though the right of the conqueror to do this was undoubted.<sup>32</sup> It was no longer customary, even, to sell the men into slavery in lieu of death; and when this undoubted right was exercised, as for instance by Antigonos Doson and the Achæan League in the case of Mantinea, it provoked a storm of protest, which we can still hear raging in the pages of Polybios.<sup>33</sup> When we do meet with sheer downright

<sup>29</sup> Κλέα ἀνδρῶν.

<sup>30</sup> e.g. Douris accused Perikles of ὀμότης, Plut. *Per.* 28; and Phylarchos, Doson and the Achæan League, Polyb. ii, 56.

<sup>31</sup> Decree of Olbia for Protogenes, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 226, l. 109, τὴν τῶν Γαλατῶν ὀμότητα. So the decree for Sotas of Priene, *O. G. I.* 765, ll. 8, 29. Note that this latter decree, in spite of the strength of its language, only records *one* act on the part of the Gauls that was not usual in the warfare of the time, temple-burning.

<sup>32</sup> On the legal position see Coleman Philippon, *International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome*, 1911, vol. ii, p. 251 seq., with instances.

<sup>33</sup> Polyb. 2, 56-61, a most illuminating attack on Phylarchos for having accused the Achæans of cruelty.

cruelty, such as that of Philip V at Abydos, it strikes us as something monstrous.

The tendency of the age was in another direction. It can be seen in the number of *asyliai* that begin to grow, places inviolable, immune from the operations and cruelties of warfare; a movement into which Delphi, always ready to use her influence to *humanize war*, heartily threw herself.<sup>34</sup> It can be seen in the innumerable boundary-arbitrations that appear in the inscriptions of this time.<sup>35</sup> Nothing had caused more fighting between city states than disputed territory; and every one of the numerous arbitration awards now met with is a strangled war. It can be seen again in a new note of chivalry in war, largely due to the great Macedonians. The conduct of Philip II in liberating his Athenian prisoners without ransom; the conduct of Alexander to the family of Darius; the courtesies of Demetrios toward the Rhodians during the great siege; Pyrrhos' treatment of his Roman prisoners; Antigonos' treatment of Pyrrhos' son; these things all tended to make war somewhat less dreadful.<sup>36</sup> Even the universal employment of mercenaries was in the nature of a gain; they fought hard, but without the personal hate and bitterness that citizen troops had used to import into their fighting. In particular, it is difficult to see how far the movement in favour of arbitration might not have gone in the Greek world, had it not been swamped, with so much else, in the monstrous wake of Rome. We can see, in fact, that the insistence of the Greek writers on the cruelty of the Gaul

<sup>34</sup> See ch. 7, n. 133.

<sup>35</sup> Greek states had gone to arbitration from the fifth century onwards; but the strength of the movement in the third century is shown, not merely by the increase in the number of actual arbitrations, but by the growth of a new spirit. To give just two instances. In the fifth century, Argos and Sparta, cities of high standing, made a treaty containing an arbitration clause, Thuc. 5, 79; but in the third century two piratical Cretan towns, Hierapytna and Priansos, are found doing the same, Michel 16. Again, few quarrels had produced more wars than the secular dispute between Samos and Priene; even Alexander had failed to settle it; but in the third century it was referred to the arbitration of Rhodes and really settled definitely (*B. M. Inscr.* iii, 403, and Introduction).—A valuable list of arbitrations in Philippon, *op. c.*, 2, 131-48.

<sup>36</sup> Philip; Aesch. *de fals. leg.* 16, Polyb. 5, 10. Alexander; Arrian 2, 12, 3. Demetrios; Plut. *Dem.* 22. Pyrrhos; Cic. *de Off.* 1, 12, quoting Ennius 'Nec cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes'. Antigonos; ch. 9, p. 274.



means, not that there was anything very specially cruel about the Gaul, but that Greece resented the phenomenon of the natural man again obtruding himself on a society that was beginning to outgrow his ways.

Belgius was the first of the Gallic leaders to enter Macedonia, in the spring of 279, after feeling his way with an offer of peace for cash down, an offer which Keraunos naturally rejected with scorn. But Keraunos had not the patience to wait for his levies; he met the Gauls at the head of a few troops, was defeated and slain, and his army cut to pieces. Panic ruled in Macedonia; men flocked into the towns, and the towns closed their gates; the barbarians at any rate would not understand siege works.<sup>37</sup> Keraunos' brother, or uncle, Meleagros, was made king by the army, and deposed by it after two months as incompetent; it thereon offered the crown to Kassandros' nephew Antipatros, who met the same fate for the same reason after forty-five days, having gained nothing but the scornful title of Etesias, king of the Dog-days—the period for which his rule had lasted.<sup>38</sup> Thereupon one Sosthenes, a Macedonian, who was of humble birth but had perhaps been one of Lysimachos' generals, took command of the army; he succeeded in reorganizing it, and inflicted a check upon the second Celtic host under Brennus, now attempting to enter the country. The army would have made him king; but he refused the perilous title, and had the troops take the oath to him merely as general *de facto*. He seems to have been an able man, and for more than a year he held Macedonia together as far as possible; but he could not keep back Brennus, or prevent the outlying parts of the country breaking off. Paionia was in Brennus' hands, Kassandreia and perhaps other cities were virtually independent; and in a second battle Sosthenes was defeated by Brennus and compelled for a time to abandon the open country.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Just. 24, 5; Diod. 22, 3, 4; Paus. 10, 19, 7; Memnon 14.

<sup>38</sup> Euseb. 1, 235 (Schoene). He calls Meleagros Keraunos' brother; Diod. 22, 4 calls him a brother of Ptolemy, son of Lagos; the usual sort of confusion.

<sup>39</sup> Sosthenes; Euseb. 1, 235; Just. 24, 5 and 6; Diod. 22 fr. 4; Beloch 3, 2, 412. — Possibly he was already in high command under Keraunos, if he had been one of Lysimachos' generals, *O. G. J.* 12, l. 12. The restoration



Belgius now drops out of the story; according to one account, he left Macedonia with his plunder;<sup>40</sup> Brennus henceforth appears to hold undivided command. It appears, however, that he had lost a good many men in his battles with Sosthenes, and perhaps considered that to attempt to maintain himself in Macedonia was too expensive; anyhow, in the autumn of 279 he passed south through Thessaly, on his way to invade Greece. Some Thessalian nobles and Ainianian chieftains are said to have joined him.<sup>41</sup>

Of the numbers with him we cannot pretend to form any kind of an estimate. The Greek writers give impossible figures; and it is hopeless to deduce the number of the fighting-men in an army from a total which is not only uncertain in itself, but must obviously have included the women and children, the old men and dependants, the slaves and the camp followers, and all the unwarlike apparatus of a nation shifting its home. It is not in the least likely that Brennus had anything even remotely approaching the 160,000 fighting-men of tradition; but to attempt to analyse the traditional numbers is waste of time.<sup>42</sup> The statement, however, that every horseman was accompanied by two armed and mounted slaves<sup>43</sup> may well be true, as it suits a conquering aristocracy.

is not certain, but it is evident from the phrase in Eusebios (I, 325, Schoene) that he was known to be *δυνατὸς στρατηγεῖν*; and if he had held high command it would explain Justin's reference to a man of humble birth as 'unus de Macedoniae principibus'.

<sup>40</sup> Paus. 10, 19, 7.

<sup>41</sup> Just. 24, 7, 2; cf. Paus. 10, 22, 9 and 23, 13. The MS. reading in Justin is 'Emanus et Thessalorus duces'; but Schorn's emendation, 'Aenianum et Thessalorum,' is absolutely certain as regards Thessalorum.

<sup>42</sup> Paus. 10, 19, 9: 152,000 foot and 61,200 horse. Just. 24, 6, 1: 150,000 foot and 15,000 horse. Diod. 22, 9, 1: 150,000 foot and 10,000 horse. Suidas, *s. v.* Γαλάται: 280,000 men at Thermopylai. — I cannot follow the reasoning which leads Jullian (p. 285, n. 11) to think Pausanias' figure correct. What the figures do show is, that in the first three authors cited the infantry totals derive from a common source while the cavalry totals do not: the common source for the infantry totals is therefore a good way back, i.e. the exaggeration started early, as one would expect. Any one desiring to accept 150,000 should remember that the Gauls under Leonnorius and Lutarius, who held up Asia Minor for years, were only 20,000 men, of whom only 10,000 were armed when they crossed (Livy 38, 16; Suid. *l. c.*); and only 18,000 fought at Lysimacheia (Just. 25, 1, 2). If we divide 150,000 by five, the average number of a family, we shall be a good deal nearer Brennus' fighting infantry than the tradition is.

<sup>43</sup> Paus. 10, 19, 11, *τριμαρκσία*. The word comes from good Celtic roots; see Frazer, *ad loc.*

The arms of the Galatae were sword and shield only; and though the more settled Celts had some defensive armour, such as greaves,<sup>44</sup> none seem to have adopted the cuirass. That their swords were long sweeping blades, two-handed and double-edged, adapted for cutting only and not for thrusting, seems beyond question. It is true that the Pergamene sculptors of a later day invariably represent the Gauls of Asia with a short, one-handed, thrusting sword; but it must be supposed that this weapon was adopted by them after their arrival there. Their equipment was not of a nature to render them a match, individually, for the heavy-armed Greek.<sup>45</sup>

The Greek resistance to Brennus took its place, in the Greek national consciousness, with the Greek resistance to Xerxes two centuries earlier; these were the two great deeds of Hellas against the barbarian. Unfortunately, later Greek writers were quite aware of this, and indulged in a conscious parallelism which makes it uncertain whether some recorded incidents have any foundation whatever in fact. The main lines of what happened are, however, tolerably certain; and the contemporary inscriptions not only afford great help in winnowing away those parts of the story that are valueless, but bear witness to the merits of portions of the detailed account left by Pausanias.<sup>46</sup>

Brennus, with Acichorius as his second in command,

<sup>44</sup> Polyb. 2, 30, 2. Greaves are shown on the Aetolian monument at Delphi; A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 184.

<sup>45</sup> Literature of the Gallic sword in Jullian, *op. c.*, p. 372, n. 4. The two-handed two-edged sword without a point, which literary tradition assigns to the Gauls, corresponds to the swords of La Tène II and III. The swords in the Pergamene sculptures, though no originals remain, were certainly one-handed stabbing swords. This sword was probably adopted by the Gauls after crossing to Asia; it is not likely that it has anything to do with the short pointed sword of La Tène I, which is supposed to come between the later (short and pointed) Hallstatt swords and the long swords of La Tène II. — The much criticized story of Polybios, 2, 33, 3, that the Gallic swords bent in battle and the Gauls straightened them again on their knees, is explained by S. Reinach, *L'Épée de Brennus* (*L'Anthropologie*, 1906, p. 343), from a religious rite. The sword in fact was bent before burial so as to 'kill' it. See such a bent sword, in the shape of an S, figured on p. 168 of *Les Celtes dans les vallées du Pô et du Danube*. The provenance of these bent swords is examined by D. Violler, *Rev. Arch.* 1911, p. 130, who concludes that the rite was not practised before the third century, and then only by certain families.

<sup>46</sup> On Pausanias' account see App. 6.

passed south through Thessaly, where his men are said to have committed the usual acts of lawlessness;<sup>47</sup> but as he gained the adherence of some of the Thessalian nobles, it may be supposed that Brennus, who is called an understanding man,<sup>48</sup> was putting pressure upon them to join him so as to exempt their lands from plunder. He directed his march toward Thermopylai, where a Greek army had assembled to guard the pass; outmanœuvred its advance guard, which was holding the line of the Spercheios; succeeded in crossing the river; compelled the natives to build him a bridge, and left his Thessalian allies to guard it; and, advancing, sat down before Herakleia. He had, however, no chance against the walls of the town, which had recently joined the Aetolian League, and into which the Aetolians had thrown a garrison;<sup>49</sup> he therefore masked it and moved on to the pass.

The burden of the defence of the pass had fallen entirely on north and central Greece, the countries most immediately threatened. Antiochos and Antigonos had indeed each sent a small force of 500 mercenaries, and it seems that Antigonos' general in the Piræus equipped a few Athenian triremes to co-operate;<sup>50</sup> but Egypt held aloof altogether, as did the states of the Peloponnese. In part this was due to their mutual jealousies; Messene and Megalopolis were afterwards at pains to explain that they had not been able to move because Sparta had refused to give them an undertaking not to invade their territories while their men were absent.<sup>51</sup> Another reason given, that the Peloponnesians in general trusted to the fortifications

<sup>47</sup> Paus. 10, 20, 1, τὰ ἐς Θεσσαλοὺς παρανομήματα.

<sup>48</sup> Ib. 20, 6, οὔτε πάντα ἀσύνητος . . . ὥς ἂν τις βάρβαρος.

<sup>49</sup> Ib. 21, 1.

<sup>50</sup> The small but identical number of mercenaries sent, 500, points to an arrangement between Antiochos and Antigonos. — It is quite clear from *I. G.* ii, 323 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 205 that Athens, as Athens, sent no fleet. Yet I cannot believe that Pausanias' very detailed statements in two separate books as to the co-operation of Athenian ships rest on no foundation; and as the decree only shows that no Athenian *oreus* were sent, the obvious explanation is that in the text; Athenian hulls, manned by Antigonos' governor with mercenaries for marines and slaves or metics for oarsmen. Many reasons arose for concealing the fact of Antigonos' co-operation, and Pausanias, or his source, often atticizes. — Had the ships been Egyptian, the only conceivable alternative, Kallimachos must have seized on the fact in his hymn to Delos, where he was very hard up for matter for his ξυνὸς ἄεθλος.

<sup>51</sup> Paus. 4, 28, 3; 8, 6, 3.

of the Isthmus, sounds like reasoning of the days of Xerxes;<sup>52</sup> but it is not so absurd as it sounds. What they trusted to was not their own fortifying of the Isthmus; it was not theirs to fortify. But they knew that Antigonos could and must hold Corinth, and that the Gauls could neither storm it nor (without a fleet) turn it; they were absolutely secure. It would need an Aristophanes to do justice to the spectacle of the Peloponnesians, who were actually in the middle of an attempt to turn Antigonos out of Greece, sheltering in comfort behind his lines. Antigonos must have stiffened the garrison at Corinth and perhaps drawn his lines right across the Isthmus; it may be that in the winter of 279/8 he was there in person.

Pausanias gives the Greek roll of honour, the defenders of the pass. The list unfortunately contains a mistake at the one point where it can be checked; the Athenians did not, as Pausanias says they did, send a fleet. Otherwise the list is probable enough; the names and the numbers suit with facts otherwise ascertained; and the chances are of course that such a catalogue would be correctly preserved. Boeotia sent her full levy, 10,000 hoplites and 500 horse, under four Boeotarchs. Phokis sent 3,000 foot and 500 horse; Lokris 700 foot; the Megarians 400 and a few horse. Athens sent 1,000 picked hoplites under Kallippos, and 500 horse. Aetolia sent the largest contingent of all; it cannot well have been under 12,000 men, of whom 7,000 were hoplites; and it may have been more. There was an obvious difficulty in Aetolians commanding Boeotians, or vice versa; the supreme command was therefore given to the Athenian Kallippos.<sup>53</sup>

Brennus is said to have made a frontal attack on the pass, and to have been beaten back. He must have seen at once that under such conditions his half-armed warriors had no chance against an adequate force of heavy-armed Greeks: and he reasoned that if he could remove the most dangerous force, the Aetolians, his task would be more feasible. He thereupon detached a body of men under Orestorius and

<sup>52</sup> Paus. 7, 6, 7.

<sup>53</sup> Paus. 10, 20, 3-5. For the strengths of Boeotia and Aetolia see ch. 2, pp. 69, 64. The Athenian decree *I. G.* ii, 323 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 205 shows that the Athenian hoplites were ἐπιλεκτοί.



Combutis, who retired across the Spercheios bridge into the friendly Phthiotis, and thence invaded Aetolia. Their objective was the little town of Kallion; their orders, presumably, were to make such an example as should draw off the Aetolians to defend their homes. Their orders were carried out only too well. Kallion was taken, every living creature butchered with outrages inconceivable, if true, and the town fired. For the moment, Brennus achieved his purpose. The Aetolians at Thermopylai left their post and hurried home; and with them the whole of Aetolia, old and young, men and women, rose as one to avenge their countrymen. Laden with plunder, the Gauls had turned northward again, after severely handling a little band of hoplites from Achaia who had crossed over to assist their neighbours, and who made the mistake of attacking in formal order. The Aetolians fought differently. Every path in that land of mountain and forest was beset, every tree hid its man; the Gauls, with no defensive armour but targets, were helpless against arrows and javelins; if they pursued, the foe's knowledge of the country bore him off; as they left pursuing, he returned once more to the attack, urged on by the women, who fought even more bitterly than the men. Less than half of the Gauls struggled back to the main body. Kallion was well avenged, and the Aetolians had, of their necessity, made the discovery, to be made later by the Romans, that the Gaul was only formidable if permitted to come to close quarters.<sup>54</sup>

The exact details of what meanwhile took place at Thermopylai are not particularly trustworthy, but the main outline is clear. Brennus' object was to clear Thermopylai and let his people through. Even without the Aetolians, the Greeks

<sup>54</sup> On the Kallion episode, Paus. 10, 22, 2-7, see G. Soteriades, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 303; A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 228. Note that Phthiotis is friendly to the Gauls. — It seems that Kallion is Veluchovo, the πόλις Καλλιπολιτῶν of *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 919; see Dittenberger, *ad loc.*, and Soteriades, *l. c.* The inscriptions give both ethnics, Καλλιεύς and Καλλιπολίτας; the numerous references are collected by Reinach, *l. c.*, p. 237, n. 3. Kallion was rebuilt at once (Εφ. Ἀρχ. 1905, p. 55 gives Καλλιεύς, and is *circa* 276-274; see ch. 5, n. 20); perhaps with help sent by Pyrrhos (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 919 cannot well be *before* its destruction). Reinach, *l. c.*, thinks that the old name Kallion was replaced by Kallipolis sometime after 273. — Soteriades, *l. c.*, thought he found at Kokkalia the battle-field on which the destroyers of Kallion were slain. But Pausanias describes a long running fight.

could perhaps still have held their position against a direct assault ; but they could now spare but few men to guard against a flank attack, and Brennus at once resolved to try the effect of turning the pass in the traditional manner. He himself led the turning force, an unencumbered body of warriors, whose strength is given by Pausanias as somewhat less than one-fifth of the available fighting-men, as he conceived them. It was in fact a comparatively small flying column ; the bulk of the army, on Pausanias' own showing, remained with Acichorius.<sup>55</sup> The story runs that the Herakleots and Ainianes guided Brennus over the path by which Hydarnes had once marched to surprise Leonidas ; that, like Hydarnes, he drove off the Phokians who held the path ; and that the Greeks at Thermopylai were warned in time to avoid being surrounded, were taken off by the fleet, and scattered to their homes. The resemblances to Herodotos' story are patent ; but the differences are no less patent ; without affirming or denying details, it is sufficient to say that the pass was undoubtedly turned. Unlike Hydarnes, however, Brennus was unable to take the defenders in the rear ; he may have been too late, or he may not have been in sufficient force. But the news that the position was turned was enough ; the Greek contingents that were still at Thermopylai retired to defend their homes, and the pass lay open to Acichorius and the host. Brennus had achieved his purpose.

Whether Brennus had always intended to sack Delphi, or whether his raid was unpremeditated, must remain doubtful. Perhaps the former is the more likely view ; for unless his intention was known or suspected, it is impossible to see how Magnesians came from Asia, (if indeed they did come from Asia), in time to aid in the defence.<sup>56</sup> The idea that Delphi was no longer worth sacking may be dismissed. Two generations had elapsed since the Phokians had plundered it ;

<sup>55</sup> Paus. 10, 22, 10 : 40,000 men. Acichorius is left ἐπὶ τῇ στρατιᾷ. The smallness of the number of the defenders of Delphi, even allowing for a national Phokian rising, also shows that Brennus' force was not great. One in five was also the number sent against Kallion, Paus. 10, 22, 2 ; it may represent some Gallic custom of composing a flying column.

<sup>56</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 259, l. 9. It does not follow that Magnesia formally sent troops. The words of the decree would be satisfied if a few Magnesians had happened to be at Delphi and had joined in the defence.

and quite apart from the natural increment in the way of gifts from persons and cities, the damages assessed on Phokis had been regularly paid, and the temple had also received some very large sums of money from other sources.<sup>57</sup> Delphi was not of course the main object of the Gallic invasion, in any case; that object was settlement. It was now open to Brennus to rejoin Acichorius and continue the invasion of Greece in full force; and in deciding instead to raid Delphi, it appears that the Gallic leader, who had hitherto displayed capacity and resource, was carried away by the mere desire of plunder and committed a most serious error; both tradition and analysis point to the conclusion that he started on his raid in ignorance of the whereabouts of the largest body of the enemy, the Aetolians. According to tradition, he turned Thermopylai at the same time that the Aetolians were defeating Orestorius and Combutis; consequently it appears that he must have set out for Delphi before hearing of the defeat of this division of his men,<sup>58</sup> and in the belief that the Aetolians were fully occupied at home.

Meanwhile the victorious Aetolians, following up the beaten enemy, learnt that the pass was turned, and that Brennus with a flying column had entered Phokis, presumably making for Delphi, while nothing remained to bar the advance southward of the main body of the Gauls. The Aetolian leaders were faced with the responsibility of a tremendous decision; were they to attempt to save Greece or the temple of their god? To their honour they chose rightly; they detached a handful of men to help organize resistance at Delphi, and with their main body set out in pursuit of Acichorius.<sup>59</sup> That

<sup>57</sup> For instance, under Dion, (336/5 Pomtow), Apollo's temple received a sum of over 100 talents from an unknown source; *B. C. H.* 1900, pp. 124, 133.

<sup>58</sup> Paus. 10, 22, 8, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ; ib. 10, 23, 1 (22, 12), οὐδένα ἔτι ἐπισχόν χρόνον. This has been well brought out in A. J. Reinach's excellent account, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 231.

<sup>59</sup> Paus. 10, 23, 1, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ἀκμῇ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἐτράπετο ἐπὶ τὴν μετὰ τοῦ Ἀκιχωρίου στρατίαν. This action of the Aetolians is the key to the entire campaign, and obviously comes from some writer who understood the military position; and now that we have the Koan decree we see that it must be correct (see App. 6). The Aetolians were admitted afterwards to have been the saviours of Greece; (see e.g. Polyb. ix, 35, the admission of an enemy); and those modern accounts which, following the corrupt version which became current in Greek and Roman literary circles, treat Delphi as the

leader, leaving his Thessalian allies to hold the Spercheios bridge,<sup>60</sup> came rolling slowly through Thermopylai with his unwieldy train of women and children, baggage and wagons, guarded in front and behind by the warriors of the host. The Aetolians, wise in their recent experience, had no intention of risking a pitched battle; but they clung to his flanks and rear, pelting him with missiles, cutting off all stragglers and foragers, breaking off parts of the chain of wagons, absolutely preventing any provisioning, and killing whenever they had the chance. In these circumstances Acichorius had made but little progress by the time that the decision had fallen at Delphi.<sup>61</sup>

The defence of Delphi,<sup>62</sup> as formally narrated by later Greek writers, becomes a poetical duplication of the similar story in Herodotos; the stars in their courses fight against the impious invader, the crags of Parnassos fall on him and crush him, gods and heroes take the shape and the arms of men and hurl him back from the sanctuary. The main lines of what did happen were perhaps somewhat as follows.

Brennus made for Delphi by forced marches. Beside the Delphians, there had assembled for the defence of the sanctuary a handful of Aetolians, 400 Lokrian hoplites from Amphissa, and some part—how large we do not know—of the Phokian levies.<sup>63</sup> With them were a little body of men from Magnesia on the Maeander, who had perhaps crossed

objective of the campaign, and Brennus' force as the main Gallic host, make nonsense of this. — The letter A on the Gallic shields (see note 74) may also be a valuable corroboration of the fact that the Aetolians faced Acichorius and not Brennus.

<sup>60</sup> Paus. 10, 23, 13.

<sup>61</sup> Ib. 23, 1 (22, 13).

<sup>62</sup> For the defence of Delphi see Paus. 10, 23 and Just. 24, 8. On the miraculous element see further App. 6. If we strip this away, little of Justin is left; but Pausanias has various details from his good source, e.g. the way in which in the morning the Phokians worked round to Brennus' rear. The death of Aleximachos may be taken from his statue at Delphi. — The snowstorm is common to every account, and I hope we may believe in it. — It is possible that the Apollo Belvedere represents the god defending his temple, one of the two statues of Apollo that the Aetolians dedicated at Delphi, Paus. 10, 15, 2; (on this controversy see Frazer, *Pausanias*, vol. v, p. 345). If, however, I am right in the view taken in App. 6, the Aetolian version of the defence did not give the glory to Apollo.

<sup>63</sup> Paus. 10, 23, 1: levies from every Phokian city. But Paus. 1, 4, 4 says σφισιν . . . Φωκίων ἀντετάχθησαν οἱ τὰς πόλεις περὶ τὸν Παρνασσὸν οἰκοῦντες; so it seems that all the Phokians did not arrive at once.



from Asia to aid in the defence,<sup>64</sup> even as one trireme had come from Italy to fight against Xerxes. A battle was fought outside or on the walls, in which the Phokian leader Aleximachos fell; but his death was not in vain, for the Gauls were checked. Dark storm-clouds gathered over Delphi during the battle at the wall; the priests from the temple came down to the warriors as the storm burst, declaring that Apollo was with them; perhaps, among the excited defenders of the sanctuary, there were some who claimed that they themselves had seen the son of Leto manifest to his worshippers, riding the whirlwind and directing the arrows of his lightning against the impious invaders. Whether the Gauls actually entered Delphi or not must remain obscure; it is known that Apollo's own temple remained untouched and inviolate.<sup>65</sup> However it may have been, Brennus could not hold any footing he may have gained; he withdrew and formed a camp for the night outside the town.

That night the Greeks were strongly reinforced, for the entire Phokian people were rising to wipe out the stain of the Sacred War and fight their way back into the good graces of Hellas; there also came 1,200 Aetolians under Philomelos. Morning broke on a raging blizzard of snow and sleet, in the midst of which the Greeks attacked Brennus' camp, avoiding close quarters as usual, while some of the Phokians, secure in their local knowledge, worked along the flanks of Parnassos to take him in the rear. Suffering horribly under the hail of missiles, to which they could make no reply, the Gauls nevertheless held firm till Brennus himself was struck down; then they broke ground, slew all the wounded who could not follow, and set out on their backward

<sup>64</sup> See note 56. — Strabo (14, 647) says that these Magnesians were *Δελφῶν ἀπόγονοι τῶν οἰκησάντων τὰ Δίδυμα ὄρη ἐν Θετταλίᾳ*. As no tribe of Delphians in the Thessalian Magnesia is mentioned elsewhere, the word is generally treated as corrupt; but, if correct, it might point to some traditional connexion between Magnesia on the Maeander and Delphi through these Magnesian Delphians.

<sup>65</sup> The Koan decree (*C. R. Acad. Insc.* 1904, p. 165) is decisive that the Gauls did not plunder Apollo's temple, and it is no longer worth quoting late writers to the contrary. (All the literary references are given by S. Reinach, *ib.*, p. 158.) But it is still open to belief that they got some plunder from other buildings.

path, carrying their fainting leader and struggling on through an endless running fight with the whole Phokian nation.<sup>66</sup> Something of the horror of that retreat for the strangers, who could neither see their way nor retaliate on their foes, may still be gathered from the triumphant words of the Delphic hymn to Apollo, which celebrates their death 'in the drift of the wet snow'.<sup>67</sup> A remnant only reached Acichorius; but the news had travelled faster than they; the Athenians and Boeotians were already in the field again, and Acichorius turned back. The Aetolians, who had borne the burden of the campaign against him, now hung triumphantly on his rear, and chased him to his base camp outside Herakleia and thence north to the Spercheios, inflicting great damage; Brennus, it is said, slew himself in despair, while the Thessalians at the Spercheios changed sides and themselves fell on their barbarian allies.<sup>68</sup> The Gauls who got through retreated northward, and Greece was saved.<sup>69</sup>

As to who was her saviour, there were no two opinions. Most of the fighting had fallen upon the Aetolians; they had held back the main body of the enemy single-handed; theirs had been the first victory, theirs the tactics of every victory; and at the end they had followed up the routed foe till his last wagon recrossed the Spercheios. Phokis had fought well, and she received the reward she coveted, readmission to the Amphiktyonic League;<sup>70</sup> and she dedicated a statue of Aleximachos at Delphi.<sup>71</sup> But Aetolia, as was just, gained most from the war. She started forthwith on a new career. Her influence and the territory of her League steadily increased; her control of Delphi was no longer questioned, and

<sup>66</sup> Paus. 10, 23, 9-10.

<sup>67</sup> *B. C. H.* 1894, p. 355, ὧλεθ' ὑγρῶν χιόνος ἐν ζάλαι.

<sup>68</sup> Paus. 10, 23, 13.

<sup>69</sup> Brennus' host was annihilated to the last man at the Spercheios (Paus. 10, 23, 13); again on the subsequent retreat (Just. 24, 8, 16); and again by the Dardanians (Diod. 22, 9, 3). Those who survived all this founded the kingdom of the Scordisci in Servia (Just. 32, 3, 6-8, see Jullian 1, 302), and crossed to Asia to settle in Galatia (Livy 38, 16, 1-2). It may be suspected that the Scordisci were part of Belgius' command.

<sup>70</sup> Paus. 10, 8, 3; *I. G.* ii, 551: see H. von Gaertringen, *Delphi* in *P. W.*, col. 2569, and Beloch 3, 2, 326. — It seems obvious that at the same time the Phokians were released from the remaining instalments of their fine; see the notes to *I. G.* ix, 1, 110 and 111 on the time it would have taken them to pay.

<sup>71</sup> Paus. 10, 23, 3.

to it she added the control of the Amphiktyonic Assembly. At Delphi she set up many memorials of the repulse of the great invasion. Statues of the gods, two of Apollo, one of Artemis, and one of Athene;<sup>72</sup> statues of the Aetolian leader Eurydamas and her other generals;<sup>73</sup> a great statue of Aetolia herself, as an armed woman seated on a pile of Gallic shields;<sup>74</sup> chiefest of all, the actual shields of the vanquished Gauls, which, with a suitable dedication, balanced on the temple the Persian shields which the Athenians had taken from other vanquished barbarians at Marathon.<sup>75</sup> But Aetolia went further than this. She had saved Greece, and she knew it; and it was she who instituted at Delphi the festival in memory of the Deliverance of Greece, the Soteria. The Greek states adjudged its contests to be of equal importance with those of the Nemea in the athletic and of the Pythia in the non-athletic events; and theoroi were sent out all over the Greek world bearing invitations to the gathering which was to commemorate the victory gained over the barbarians

<sup>72</sup> Paus. 10, 15, 2.

<sup>73</sup> Ib. 10, 16, 4 and 15, 2.

<sup>74</sup> Paus. 10, 18, 7. The monument on which the figure of Aetolia sat has been found at Delphi, and published by A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 177; see also *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1911, p. 44. The statue appears on the Aetolian federal coinage; *B. M. Coins, Thessaly-Aetolia*, p. lvi seq.; Head<sup>1</sup> 283; Head<sup>2</sup> 335. Reinach, *l.c.*, p. 187, gives a complete list of all the coins bearing on the subject. The monument shows Gallic shields only; the coins generally give Gallic and Macedonian shields. Sometimes on the coins the shields bear letters, A on the Gaulish, AY on the Macedonian; see *B. M. Coins*, Pl. XXX, 5. A probably represents Acichorius; P. Gardner in *B. M. Coins, l.c.*; Head<sup>2</sup> 335; see G. F. Hill, *Historical Greek Coins*, 1906, p. 116, n. 4, who gives some other instances of letters on shields. Whether AY represents Lykiskos may be doubted. He was sent in 316 by Kassandros to govern Epeiros (Diod. 19, 36, 5); in 314 Akarnania also was put under him (ib. 67, 5); and in 312 (ib. 88, 2) he fought three battles with Alketas of Epeiros, winning the first and third. There seems to me nothing to show that the Aetolians ever defeated him (and Klotzsch suggests no such defeat, though A. J. Reinach, *l.c.*, p. 214, has arrived at a contrary conclusion). And if they did, why did they wait thirty-five years to celebrate the event? Moreover, the letters AY appear on at least two other coins (not counting Lysimachos'); a copper coin of Kassandros (G. Macdonald, *Greek Coins in the Hunterian Collection*, 1, 336, no. 20), and a tetradrachm of Philip Arrhidaios (J. N. Svoronos, *Journ. Intern.* 2, 291). The Gauls might have adopted shields from the spoils of Macedonia; or might they be meant for the shields of Brennus' Thessalian allies, just as after the Persian war the Athenians dedicated shields with the inscription: Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήδων καὶ Θηβαίων (Aesch. *c. Ctes.* 116)?

<sup>75</sup> Paus. 10, 19, 4. At the south-west corner was found a metope bearing the trace of a Gallic shield; Homolle in *B. C. H.* 1894, p. 176.

who had attacked the Greeks and the temple of Apollo, the common possession of Hellas.<sup>76</sup>

It is time to return to the affairs of Macedonia. That unhappy country, invaded, plundered, and reduced almost to anarchy, was perhaps getting some relief under the rule of Sosthenes; but Sosthenes was not uniformly successful in his contest with the barbarians, and he could not hold the whole country together; his refusal of the perilous crown left the way open for many intrigues. Antipatros, king of the dog-days, seems to have had a following in one part of the country; there were partisans of Pyrrhos, of Ptolemaios son of Lysimachos, perhaps of Antiochos; while the great city of Kassandreia had broken off from the kingdom altogether. It had been founded by Kassandros to replace Potidaia, and settled by the inhabitants of several Greek towns, including (it appears) many of the surviving Olynthians.<sup>77</sup> Ptolemy Keraunos had assigned it as a residence to his mother, Eurydike, sister of Kassandros and divorced wife of Ptolemy I; and in the troubles that followed on Keraunos' death, she, supported by mercenaries who garrisoned the citadel in her interest, ruled the town for her own hand. How long her rule lasted is not known; but after a time she disappears from the scene, and one Apollodoros stands forward as champion of the democracy, and prevails on Eurydike's mercenaries to hand over the citadel and join the popular cause. Apollodoros travels the usual course toward a tyranny; he institutes a festival in honour of Eurydike, who had given 'liberty' to Kassandreia, refuses a bodyguard, pays court to Eurydike's mercenaries, and in the fullness of time raises a revolt of slaves and artisans and seizes the supreme power.<sup>78</sup> He enlists a bodyguard of Gauls, attracts mercenaries by raising the standard rate of pay,<sup>79</sup> and begins

<sup>76</sup> Reply of the Athenians to the invitation; *I. G.* ii. 323 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 205. Of the Chians, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 206. It is possible that we possess a fragment of the reply of the League of the Islanders; see *R. E. G.* 1910, p. 315.

<sup>77</sup> *Diod.* 19, 52; *Pliny, N. H.* 4, 10 (17).

<sup>78</sup> *Polyaen.* 6, 7, 2.—The coins *Εὐρυδικέων*, which used sometimes to be attributed to Kassandreia, are now given to Smyrna, the Eurydike being Lysimachos' daughter; Imhoof-Blumer, *Jahresh.* 8, 1905, p. 229; *Head*<sup>2</sup> 592.

<sup>79</sup> *Diod.* 22, 5, 2.



to consider an ambitious foreign policy; it may be that his dream was, that Kassandreia should play the part once played by Olynthos.

Of those who had some claim to the vacant throne of Macedonia, far the most favourably situated appeared to be Antiochos. He had the resources of an empire at his back, and he had prepared his ground rather carefully. Perhaps he treated his accommodation with Keraunos as a personal matter only, a thing at an end with Keraunos' death; at any rate in 279 he was doing more than feel his way. How much he was doing it is impossible to say. It is possible that he had, or acquired, an actual footing in some part of Macedonia, as a city Antiocheia appears there, apparently near Arethousa: it is not, however, possible to say from what period it dates. Certainly he had partisans in the country, and he struck coins with Macedonian types and cultivated good relations with Aetolia.<sup>80</sup> Nor was Aetolia the only Greek power whose friendship he affected. He sought to win the favour of Athens;<sup>81</sup> it is almost certain that he did win the favour of Sparta.<sup>82</sup> Whether any power at all, either Ptolemy or Antiochos, had stood behind the upheaval of Greece in 280 is uncertain; it may have been a purely spontaneous conflagration. But by 279 it seems that Antiochos was supporting Sparta, and that this was one of the reasons why Greece took fright at Spartan ambition and refused to follow Areus on a second campaign that year. The common ground uniting Sparta and Antiochos was enmity to Antigonos.

The reason of the most obscure war which broke out in 279 between Antigonos and Antiochos thus becomes fairly clear.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>80</sup> The city: Pliny, *N. H.* 4, 10 (17), Antiochenses. I cannot find it mentioned elsewhere, and it might be an existing city renamed at a later time. — The coins: P. Gardner, *B. M. Coins, Seleucid Kings of Syria*, p. xxiii. — G. Macdonald, *Hunterian Collection*, iii, 17, says that satisfactory evidence of provenance is wanting. They may then not have been struck in Macedonia at all. Some of them show the jawbone of the Kalydonian boar, indicating some connexion with Aetolia.

<sup>81</sup> For the details of the restoration of Lemnos to Athens, begun by Seleukos and completed at this time by Antiochos, see Ferguson, *Athens*, pp. 155, 156.

<sup>82</sup> Because Sparta allied herself with his ally Apollodoros; see n. 88.

<sup>83</sup> This is the war of Memnon, 16-18, Antigonos' part in which is given in

Each claimed Macedonia; each thought the other his most dangerous rival. Whether Seleukos had been king of Macedonia *de iure* or not, Antiochos considered that he had;<sup>84</sup> consequently he himself, in his own eyes, *was* king of Macedonia. Antigonos always had his eyes firmly fixed on his father's kingdom, and no explanation of this war can be satisfactory which does not take account of this fact. Why Antigonos did not invade Macedonia itself on Keraunos' death it is hard to conjecture; it seems certain that he did not. He cannot have had much of a following there; and we may suppose that he thought that a man just beaten out of Greece stood little chance in Macedonia, and that it was best first to attempt to dispose of Antiochos' claims and incidentally regain some prestige. It is just possible that, in the course of the ensuing war, he did attempt to get a footing in Macedonia, and failed;<sup>85</sup> but it is certain that sometime in 279 he commenced operations by sailing to Asia Minor to attack Antiochos.<sup>86</sup> The two kings seem to have suspended hostilities in the autumn of 279 in order to send

18. See also Trog. *Prol.* 24; Just. 25. 1. — Date. It seems to me clear that Memnon places the origins of this war—both the war of Antiochos on Nikomedes and Gonatas' intervention—after the destruction (15) of Antiochos' first expedition by the Bithynians and therefore not earlier than 279; and again *before* the Gauls crossed to Asia (19), and therefore not later than 278, as the Gauls crossed in 278/7 (Paus. 10, 23, 14). I take the dating then to be, that Antiochos' expedition was defeated by Nikomedes (15) in 280; Antiochos then (279) makes war on Nikomedes, who gains the assistance of Herakleia (16), also in 279 (see 19); by this act Herakleia finds herself at war with Zipoites (279); and 'about the same time' (18) Antigonos and Antiochos go to war. Their war therefore began in 279; but I assume after Keraunos' death.—Trogus is not in conflict with this. For as he keeps the affairs of Asia and Europe separate, all we can say is that he puts this war between Keraunos' peace with Antiochos (*Prol.* 17) and the crossing of the Gauls to Asia (*Prol.* 25). — A. J. Reinach, *Rev. Celtique*, 1909, p. 47 seq., dates this war *after* Antigonos became king of Macedonia, and says that the war which damaged Kyzikos in 279/8 (*O.G.I.* 748 = 1, 23 in Hasluck's *Cyzicus*) was not the war between Antigonos and Antiochos, but that between Zipoites and Nikomedes. This last may be true in any case; but I cannot agree with his main thesis, which has no support in the tradition, and is directly at variance with Antigonos' marriage with Phila.

<sup>84</sup> A cuneiform inscription of 268 calls Seleukos 'king of the Macedonians'; Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 5, 248; 3, 539, n. 1.

<sup>85</sup> See n. 94.

<sup>86</sup> Ferguson, *Athens*, 155, thinks the reason of the war was a desire on Antigonos' part to assert a claim to Asia Minor. This will not account for Antiochos' combinations.

each a small force to Thermopylai ; but with the spring of 278 the war blazed out afresh.

Antiochos apparently occupied a strong position. He allied himself with Apollodoros, the ambitious tyrant of Kassandrea ;<sup>87</sup> and as Apollodoros also allied himself with Sparta,<sup>88</sup> —(an alliance which Sparta's enemies insinuated had been shamefully sold by her for money down),—and Sparta had the following of a number of Peloponnesian states, Antiochos appeared to be at the head of a strong combination of powers,<sup>89</sup> with a good gateway into Macedonia. But there was no real basis of union, and the want of sufficient sea-power definitely sundered Antiochos from Sparta and both from Apollodoros, while the latter meant to work for his own interests. And even by land Antiochos could not reach his allies.

Antiochos in fact was hemmed in by enemies. He could not cope at once with all the revolts in his great scattered kingdom ; and the new king of Bithynia, Nikomedes, barred his passage to Europe. Bithynia was fighting for her separate existence as a nation ; and while her people were still uncivilized enough to cling passionately to their national independence, their king was sufficiently inclined to the ideas of Greece to add to the national resistance such strength as the sciences of civilization could give. The Bithynians had already cut up one army sent by Antiochos ; and Nikomedes had secured the friendship of the powerful Northern League, formed by Herakleia, Byzantion, and their friends.<sup>90</sup> This combination against Antiochos naturally attracted Antigonos ; the Byzantines were his hereditary friends, and he had not so many friends that he could afford to neglect any of them. One of the reasons for his crossing to Asia in 279 was, no doubt, the invitation of the Northern League, and the perception of the fact that, if he were going to fight Antiochos, he must co-operate with those of his friends who were already making head against him. Between them, as against Antiochos, they undoubtedly controlled the sea.

<sup>87</sup> Polyæn. 6, 7, 2.

<sup>88</sup> Paus. 4, 5, 4-5.

<sup>89</sup> Memnon 18 on the support given to Antiochos.

<sup>90</sup> See Memnon 15, 16, 19. This last gives the other cities in the League, Chalkedon, Tios, Kios.



The actual events of the year 278 are extraordinarily obscure. It may have been at this time that the Spartan Kleonymos drove Antigonos' garrison out of Troizen.<sup>91</sup> Kyzikos in some way was damaged.<sup>92</sup> The fleets of Antiochos and Nikomedes met, but did not fight.<sup>93</sup> This statement, however, shows that Antigonos' fleet was not co-operating with his allies, but was elsewhere; and possibly with this fact should be connected the persistent tradition which associates Antigonos with Macedonia prior to 277.<sup>94</sup> That he did not become king of Macedonia till after his victory at Lysimacheia in 277 is the one quite certain fact of this time;<sup>95</sup> we may perhaps conclude, therefore, that the mystery of his movements in 278 conceals an attempt to get a footing in Macedonia, possibly in connexion with operations against Apollodoros. If so, it was an attempt that failed; that is, if by Macedonia we are to understand Macedonia proper rather than Thrace. Sosthenes may have had a firm hold of the army while he lived; and it is very possible that the strange phenomenon of a non-monarchic government in Macedonia was attracting the powerful friendship of the democratic Aetolians, who, though recently friendly to Pyrrhos and Antigonos, considered (as the event was to show) that of the two it was Pyrrhos who had the first claim on them. At any rate a city bearing Sosthenes' name appears soon after among the Aetolian towns, a fair proof of their sympathies at this time.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Polyæn. 2, 29, 1; Frontinus, *Strat.* 3, 6, 7; Beloch, 3, 1, 580, n. 2; 3, 2, 306. Of the three inscriptions which Niese ii, 12, n. 1, attributed to this event, *I. G.* iv, 748 is, according to Fraenkel, first half of fourth century; *I. G.* iv, 750 (which mentions Queen Stratonike, Lysimachos, and some captured ships, and might have been of extraordinary interest) is too mutilated to make anything of. *C. I. G.* 106 may well belong here. — Niese also thought (2, 24) that it was now that Kleonymos, as Apollodoros' ally, took Edessa (Paus. 4, 5, 4; Polyæn. 2, 29, 2). But I cannot imagine a Spartan army operating in Macedonia at this time; it is too remote from all third-century evidence, and how could they reach it? I have therefore adopted Beloch's view that he took it when in Pyrrhos' service; ch. 9, p. 266.

<sup>92</sup> *O. G. I.* 748; see n. 83.

<sup>93</sup> Memnon 18.

<sup>94</sup> Just. 25, 1: Antigonos is in 'Macedonia' before his battle with the Gauls, which is fought in that country. Memnon 14: Antigonos Πτολεμαίου ἀνιρημένου τὴν Μακεδόνων λαμβάνει ἀρχήν. See ch. 5, n. 42, Addenda.

<sup>95</sup> See n. 104.

<sup>96</sup> The ethnic Σωσθερείς occurs 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1905, p. 55, and again *G. D. I.* 2536 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 293.



It may be, however, that the tradition as to Macedonia means no more than that Antigonos obtained a footing in Thrace, a country recently part of Macedonia, but which cannot have been claimed or held by Sosthenes, and was completely cut off from Antiochos, who did claim it. Certainly Antigonos was operating there in the spring of 277; it was clear by then that Antiochos could not hope to conquer the Northern League, and by attempting to occupy Thrace Antigonos could both aid his allies and do something for himself. Then, once more, the Celts intervened.

One body of them had already come upon the scene in 278. After Brennus' host had withdrawn northward, a band of Gauls, composed either wholly or in part of those who had originally entered Macedonia with Brennus, began to pass eastward along the Thracian coast. They were 20,000 strong, but of these only 10,000 were armed; their leaders were Leonnori<sup>97</sup> and Lutarius. Naturally they did much damage; by one account, perhaps exaggerated, they even managed to enter, and plundered, Lysimacheia; ultimately they descended on the Hellespont, and began to bargain with Antiochos' governor for a crossing. The details are variously given; but Nikomedes forestalled Antiochos, and secured the promise of their aid if he brought them over. He brought them over; and they proceeded to aid him in a manner that may be understood from the inscriptions of the terrified towns of Asia. With them we have no further concern.<sup>97</sup>

Of the three bodies into which the Gallic invasion had divided itself, two—those of Belgius and Brennus—had now ceased to be a menace to civilization in the Balkan peninsula. Many had been slain, and the survivors had crossed to Asia or withdrawn into Servia, though possibly some scattered bands still ranged Macedonia for plunder. But there still remained the third body, the men who under Cerethrius had invaded Thrace; they seem, after the winter of 279/8, to have received an accession of strength, perhaps from some of Brennus' people. These overran Thrace, conquered the independent Thracian tribes of the interior, who had never yielded to Lysimachos or any other Macedonian king, and

<sup>97</sup> Memnon 19; Livy 38, 16. See next note.

by the spring of 277 were rolling seaward, threatening the Greek cities of the Chersonese.<sup>98</sup>

Somewhere near Lysimacheia lay Antigonos, his fleet drawn ashore, his army of mercenaries landed for the defence of the city. Whether he was there by accident or design, whether he had been seeking a footing in Thrace for himself, or whether the cities, terrified by the passage of the Gauls in 278, had sought from the one organized force at hand protection against this new danger, cannot be said. It is probable enough that in a combination of both reasons lies the cause of Antigonos barring the Celtic advance. The leader of the Gauls, whose strength is given as 18,000 men, commenced operations, as Belgius had done against Keraunos, by throwing out a feeler in the shape of an embassy. The story—a quite untrustworthy one in its details—runs that Antigonos received the envoys courteously, invited them to dinner, and showed them everything they wished to see, before dismissing them to their folk. Next night he abandoned his camp, and posted his army out of sight, leaving his fleet still ashore as a bait; for he felt certain that the Gauls would attack him, and that speedily. He was not deceived; the first onslaught of the barbarians wasted itself on the empty camp; laden with plunder, they proceeded to attack the ships, and found themselves trapped between the sea in front and Antigonos behind. Antigonos won a great and a bloody victory.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>98</sup> According to Polyb. 4, 46, 1, the Gauls who, under Comontorius, founded the kingdom of Tylis had left 'home' at the same time as Brennus' men and had escaped (or avoided) τὸν περὶ Δελφῶν κίνδυνον, and came to the Hellespont. They were therefore part of Pausanias' third division, that which under Cerethrius invaded Thrace; this body had been employed during 279 and 278 in conquering the Getae and Triballi, Just. 25, 1, 2. Seeing how fast the tendency grew to attach everything to Brennus and Delphi (see App. 6), it is wonderful that three clear notices of this division of Gauls remain. There can be no doubt that it was with some of them that Antigonos fought. — Droysen (ii, 2, 354 and iii, 1, 192) thought he fought with Comontorius' men, which is not far wrong; F. Stahelin, *Gesch. d. kleinasiat. Galater*<sup>2</sup>, 1907, p. 5, seems to agree. Beloch (iii, 1, 585) does not specify which Gauls. Niese, *Galli* in *P. W.* 1910, col. 619, rightly saw that it was *not* the men of Leonnorus and Lutarius, as had been supposed by A. J. Reinach, *Rev. Celt.* 1909, p. 47 seq. It is certainly tempting to follow Reinach in bringing the capture of Lysimacheia by the Gauls (if it be a fact) into connexion with Antigonos' victory; only, if so, it was not Leonnorus and Lutarius who captured it; and it seems better to keep to the tradition. In any case, its 'capture' may be as untrue as the once credited sack of Delphi.

<sup>99</sup> *I. G.* ii, 5, 371 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 207 = Michel 1482; Diog. L. ii, 141 (who

Its effects were far-reaching. The least of them was, that it stopped the advance of the Gauls towards the Aegean, and turned the energies of the remainder in a new direction, the foundation of the inland kingdom of Tyllis.<sup>100</sup> For it did much more than this. The Aetolians had indeed already defeated Gauls more than once, but in their own way and by their own guerrilla tactics, tactics which contained within themselves the confession that it was best not to let the barbarians get to close quarters in open field. But now an army of Gauls had been fairly met and cut to pieces. Antigonos had won more than a victory; he had won unique and invaluable prestige. The fear of him now was not only in the hearts of the Gauls; it was in the hearts of his neighbours.<sup>101</sup> Greek cities passed him decrees of thanks;<sup>102</sup> pictures of his exploits against the barbarians were dedicated at Athens to Athene the Giver of Victory:<sup>103</sup> he too was of those who had brought deliverance to men of Hellenic race.

Whether he now invaded Macedonia, or received an invitation to come, is nowhere told: but Sosthenes was dead, the country in absolute anarchy, and the Macedonian farmers were ready to welcome any man strong enough to hold the gates of the land against the barbarian. One way or the other, in the expressive words of his old teacher Menedemos, he 'came into his own'; the exile returned home; he became, at last, king of the Macedonians.<sup>104</sup>

gives the locality); Trog. *Prol.* 25. Details, more than dubious, in Just. 25, 1 and 2.

<sup>100</sup> Polyb. 4, 46; Trog. *Prol.* 25.

<sup>101</sup> Just. 25, 2, 7.

<sup>102</sup> e.g. Eretria (n. 104).

<sup>103</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 207 = Michel 1482.

<sup>104</sup> Decree of the Eretrians, moved by Menedemos, in Diog. L. ii, 142; the preamble runs *ἐπειδὴ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος μάχη νικήσας τοὺς βαρβάρους παραγίνεται εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα πράσσει κατὰ γνώμην* 'ἔδοξε κτλ. The phraseology expresses the return of an exile, (see e.g. Teles *περὶ φυγῆς*, Hense<sup>2</sup>, p. 24, l. 10, if you are an exile οὐδὲ ἐξουσίαν ἔξεις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν), and the decree is conclusive proof that it was his victory which gave Antigonos the kingdom of Macedonia and that he had not been king there before it.—The date of the battle, 277, is pretty certain. Antigonos became king of Macedonia *at latest* in the first half of 276 (first and fourth lives of Aratos), *at earliest* late in 277; and the battle was only shortly before. See generally Beloch 3, 2, 71–80.—The Eretrian decree is now confirmed by Apollodoros, (*Philol.* 71, p. 226), *εἰθ' ὕστερον* (after his defeat by Keraunos) *ἔ(τεσιν γ') (νικήσας Κελ) τοὺς τοῦ βα(σ)ιλ(ε)ύειν Μακε(δόνων) ἥρξατο*; if the restoration be correct.

## CHAPTER VII

### ANTIGONOS AND MACEDONIA

~~MACEDONIA, as Antigonos found it, was in a state of~~  
anarchy. For a while, after Keraunos' death, a kind of  
government had been kept together by the personality  
of Sosthenes; but Sosthenes died, probably in 278, and the  
country had since then had no effective government at all.  
~~Pretenders were numerous enough; Antipatros, king of the~~  
Dog-days, seems to have been exercising authority in some  
part of the country, where he had a following; possibly  
Arsinoe's son Ptolemaios was ruling another: we hear also  
of one Arrhidaios or Alexander, who from his name must  
have claimed kinship with the house of Philip II, and who  
perhaps represented himself to be a son of Philip Arrhidaios  
and Eurydike.<sup>1</sup> But none of the various pretenders could  
claim the allegiance of the people on any ground of descent:  
~~for even Antipatros the Regent had never been king; he had~~  
only ruled for another, and could give no better claim to his  
descendants than he had had himself. Antigonos himself, as  
Antipatros' grandson, had no better claim than the king of  
the Dog-days had; Antigonos as son of the *de facto* king  
Demetrios was in no better position than a son of the *de facto*  
king Lysimachos, and not in so good a one as Pyrrhos,  
who had been king himself, and who could at least, alone of  
all the pretenders, claim some connexion with the old royal  
line through the marriage of his second cousin Olympias  
with Philip II. Macedonia seemed like the apple of Paris,  
thrown down among men with the legend attached, 'To the  
strongest.' It had happened that the army had taken the  
view that this would prove to be Antigonos. The crown was

<sup>1</sup> Euseb. i, 235 (Schoene) gives Arrhidaios, Syncell. ap. *F. H. G.* 3, 696, Alexander. I take them to be the same person, named Alexander Arrhidaios.



legally in their hands, the hands of the Macedonian people under arms, to give to whom they would;<sup>2</sup> and Antigonos' title was derived direct from the Macedonian people, and not from any hereditary claim.

His first care was to diminish the number of his rivals. Pyrrhos, fortunately, was for the moment far off and fully occupied. Next in importance came Antiochos; and with the king of Asia, worried by the Northern League and the Galatian invasion, Antigonos was able to come to an arrangement, if indeed he had not made peace with him even before the battle of Lysimacheia. A line was drawn between their respective spheres,—probably it lay rather to the east of the old boundary between Thrace and Macedonia, the river Nestos, and gave Antigonos Abdera,—and it was agreed that Antigonos should not meddle to the east of that line or Antiochos to the west of it; Antigonos renounced his claims, if any, to the coast towns of Thrace, and Antiochos renounced his claims to the crown of Macedonia, which he could not hope to enforce in any case.<sup>3</sup> By a further term of the treaty Antigonos was to marry Phila, the daughter of Stratonike by Seleukos, who in the already involved relationship of the two houses was Antiochos' step-daughter and half-sister and Antigonos' niece. Henceforth there was peace and friendship between the two kings down to Antiochos' death.

This left Antigonos free to attack the king of the Dog-days. The name of Antipatros was one to conjure with, had this Antipatros been capable; he had a following, and Antigonos had to reckon up his means of settling with him. His own

<sup>2</sup> See n. 73.

<sup>3</sup> Justin 25, 1, 1, puts the peace before Lysimacheia. But the terms of the arrangement, which, though only a deduction from events, are a quite certain one, point to after. (This peace may be referred to in *O. G. I.* 219, l. 13.) These terms are not contradicted by Antigonos retaining the style βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος βασιλέως Δημητρίου Μακεδών, if Μακεδών imports Asiatic sovereignty (*J. H. S.* 1909, p. 269); such survivals are common enough in history. Neither are they contradicted by Antiochos I, in 268, calling himself in a Babylonian inscription, 'First-born son of Seleukos the king of Macedonia' (C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 3, 539, n. 1); for the statement was true, and the world at large did not read cuneiforms. It has been thought that Abdera was included in Macedonia, because neither Polybios nor Livy mentions it, at a later time, among the Ptolemaic possessions in Thrace (Beloch 3, 2, 279). Also it has no autonomous coinage at this time.

army of Greek mercenaries was not too numerous, and very precious; it was still his ultimate support, and he could not afford to waste it. To enroll Macedonians was quite out of the question. The country's most bitter need was rest and recuperation; nothing could have been more unpopular than an immediate levy in a domestic quarrel, and Antigonos had no popularity to spare. He was as yet nothing to any Macedonian, except a strong man who might give rest to the people; if he wanted to remain on the throne, he would have to walk warily. It was by no means certain that Macedonians *would* fight for him, whether against Kassandros' nephew or any one else. To engage more Greek mercenaries, even if they could have been obtained, was expensive; and in fact the supply was no more unlimited than the resources of his treasury.

In these circumstances he took the audacious step of imitating his barbarian friend Nikomedes of Bithynia and enlisting a number of Gauls.<sup>4</sup> The more part were probably the remains of the host which he had beaten at Lysimacheia; but it is quite possible that bands of Gauls were still moving about in Macedonia or on its northern frontier, and to enroll such would serve the double purpose of freeing the country districts from them and providing himself with troops. The first step once taken, every king is found enrolling Gauls as a matter of course. The Gauls were not the equal, man for man, of the heavy-armed Greek or Macedonian foot-soldier; but they were numerous, courageous, and above all (to begin with) moderately cheap.<sup>5</sup> Antigonos paid his Gauls, for the

<sup>4</sup> Polyæn. 4, 6, 17.

<sup>5</sup> On this obscure subject of mercenaries' pay, see the Koan decree, *B. M. Inscr.* ii, 343 (= Michel 642, *G. D. I.* 3624, Paton and Hicks 10), with Sir C. Newton's commentary; Beloch 3, 1, 323; A. J. Reinach on *O. G. I.* 266 in *Rev. Arch.* 1908, vol. xii, p. 174 seq., very full. The difficulty is the relationship between *στρηγεσιον*, *ὀψώνιον*, and *μισθός*; according to Reinach, the first two were originally distinct but came to be used indifferently, and the *στρηγεσιον* did include the *μισθός*—which after all is the natural interpretation of the Koan decree. What *citizen* troops got in the third century is clear, from four trustworthy inscriptions. Antigonos Doson paid Cretans from Eleutherna 1 drachma and at least 2 obols a day, and Cretans from Hierapytna 1 Alexander-drachma a day (*B. C. H.* 13, p. 47, nos. 1 and 2 = *R. Ph.* 26, 1902, p. 301, nos. 7 and 8); in the treaty between Aetolia and Akarnania of 276-274 (*Εφ. Αρχ.* 1905, p. 55), a peltast was to get a day 9 obols = 1½ (Corinthian) drachmai, a horseman a Corinthian stater (=

campaign against Antipatros, a lump sum of about 24 drachmai each; a Greek mercenary would have required a drachma a day at the very least. But the matter did not end there; for the Greek expected to be engaged by the year—the military year of either nine or ten months—and also expected provision to be made for him when past fighting, either by way of food or of an allotment of land; but the Gaul, at any rate at first, could be paid out of hand and dismissed. The Gauls swept Antipatros out of Macedonia; dead or otherwise, he vanishes from history, and with him the house of Kassandros.

Antigonos, however, had trouble with his Gauls when payday came. They had brought their families with them, and they now claimed that his promise of so much to 'each Gaul' included every woman and child in the camp, and threatened to kill the hostages in their hands if their demands were not complied with. Antigonos met them in the same sort; he sent for their chiefs to come and fetch the gold, seized

roughly 2 Attic drachmai), and a hoplite something between, presumably 2 Corinthian drachmai (= 1 Attic drachma 2 obols); (so A. Wilhelm, 'Eφ. Ἀρχ. 1910, 152; 12 obols); and a Rhodian trireme (Michel 21) got about 50 Rhodian drachmai a man a month, or over  $1\frac{1}{2}$  a day. For *mercenaries* there are no exact figures; but Reinach's conclusion (p. 202) of an Attic drachma a day, to cover both *συνπείσιον* and *μισθός*, may be correct; anyhow it cannot be too *high*, and may be too low. This makes the Gauls cheap. Antigonos gave them each a χρυσὸν Μακεδονικόν, a stater of Philip or Alexander; nominal value 20 drachmai (Head<sup>2</sup> 223-5), but it was merely bullion and worth what it would fetch, which in the time of Alexander was nearly 23 drachmai (Droysen<sup>2</sup> 1, 155; Head<sup>1</sup> 196); and gold may have risen a little in price since Alexander, so we may perhaps take it at 24 drachmai. If we take Polyænus in the natural sense, each man got this for the *campaign*; so if the campaign lasted a month or more, the Gauls got much less than a drachma a day, i.e. much less than a Greek. When Perseus was engaging Bastarnæ he offered a lump sum apiece, clearly for the campaign, as no duration is mentioned (Livy 44, 26, 4; App. *Mac.* 18, 2; I cannot agree with A. J. Reinach in *B. C. H.* 1910, p. 295, that he was to engage them for six months); this rather bears out the above.—Beloch, however (*l. c.*), takes it that Antigonos' Gauls got a stater a *month*. Antigonos paid altogether 30 talents = 180,000 drachmai, i.e. 7,500 men at 24 drachmai for a month, or 3,250 for two months. He *may* have engaged 3,000 men and a chief at so much a month for the duration of the campaign; but no other engagement of this nature is known. It seems better to suppose that he got 7,000 men at 24 drachmai (= 1 stater) a man for the campaign (the balance going to the chief), it being anticipated that one battle would suffice. The Gauls may not, as yet, have realized the market conditions. The very different lump sums offered by Antigonos and Perseus merely reflect the fact that the one campaign was to be against a pretender of little power, the other against Rome.

them, and exchanged them for his hostages, after which he paid the warriors alone.<sup>6</sup> The natural results followed; the barbarians conceived a new feeling towards a king who could neither be beaten nor bluffed; and three years later the Gauls in Antigonos' service died for him to the last man.

At the same time Antigonos got rid, somehow, of two other pretenders, Arrhidaïos, and Ptolemaïos the son of Lysimachos and Arsinoë, who vanishes for a while to reappear in very different circumstances. These various successes no doubt did something to settle the minds of the country people; but the towns were another matter. While the Gauls had been ravaging the open country, the towns had closed their gates and withstood them; and although details are only known in the case of Kassandreia, it is likely enough that some of the other large towns had also become somewhat detached from the central power, and had developed a desire for independence. Apollodoros of Kassandreia, however, was powerful and dangerous; he had been in alliance with Antigonos' enemies, and had to be dealt with as soon as possible. One of the consequences of the treaty between Antiochos and Antigonos must of course have been that Antiochos abandoned Apollodoros: and it may be that the tyrant had also undermined his position by his own wickedness. For scanty as our sources are, they are yet full of highly coloured references to the horrors of Apollodoros' rule. We read of such things as the cannibal feast by which, when he set out to obtain power, he bound his fellow-conspirators to himself; and of the nightmare dream in which, in return, he saw himself being flayed alive and eaten by Scythians, while his daughters danced round him with their bodies turned to flame, and his evil heart screamed at him from the caldron in which it was seething, 'See what I have done to thee.'<sup>7</sup> His cruelty passed into a proverb, and the sufferings of his townsfolk into a tragedy.<sup>8</sup> His teacher in wickedness is said to have been a Sicel called

<sup>6</sup> Polyæn. *l.c.*

<sup>7</sup> Polyæn. 6, 7, 2; Plut. *Mor.* 555 B; Diod. 22, 5, 1.

<sup>8</sup> If the sufferings of Kassandreia, which were long remembered (Paus. 4, 5, 5), gave Lykophron the material for his tragedy *Κασσανδρείς*, as Niebuhr thought, the stories in Plutarch and Polyænus may come from this source.



Calliphon, who had learnt his business in the promising school of some Sicilian tyrant; and by his advice all who owned property in Kassandreia were not only plundered but were put to the torture, men and women alike, if their contributions fell short of the desired amount.<sup>9</sup>

Antigonos was at last able to take Apollodoros in hand seriously. Of the course of this campaign only the termination is known, when Antigonos had already shut his enemy up in Kassandreia. Here he was confronted by the difficulty that the city was enormously strong for a siege,<sup>10</sup> and Gallic mercenaries were of no use against fortifications. It may have been at this time that Sparta attempted a diversion in favour of her ally against the remaining possessions of Antigonos in the Peloponnese, and took Troizen from him;<sup>11</sup> but this event more probably belongs to the war with Antiochos. In any case, Antigonos did not quit his grip of Kassandreia. But just as he had had to fashion a new instrument to dispose of Antipatros, so he saw that he required yet another to overcome Apollodoros; for he could not himself stay before the walls during a protracted siege. He found his instrument to his hand; the man who took Kassandreia for him was one Ameinias of Phokis, arch-pirate. Antigonos no doubt had some hereditary influence with the pirate chiefs, who had been Demetrios' very good friends; and it served him well. Kassandreia had already stood a lengthy siege when Ameinias was given a free hand. He at once opened sham negotiations with the garrison, lulled them into a sense of security, and then made a night attack on the walls, the head of the storming column being formed by ten Aetolian 'pirates' under the command of one Melatas. The attack succeeded; and Antigonos became master of the great city after a siege of ten months.<sup>12</sup>

The next step was the recovery of Thessaly, which during the troubles of the Gaulish invasion had shaken itself free of Macedonia. This must have been carried out by Antigonos

<sup>9</sup> Diod. 22, 5, 2.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Livy 44, 11.—There seem to have been some outlying forts; see *Λίγγος φρούριον Κασσανδρέων* (Apollodoros, fr. 88, Jacoby).

<sup>11</sup> See ch. 6, n. 91.

<sup>12</sup> Polyæn. 4, 6, 18. Ameinias is a good Phokian name; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 253.

concurrently with the siege of Kassandreia by Ameinias;<sup>13</sup> for it would appear that by the end of the campaigning season of 276 Antigonos was master of his kingdom. He naturally made no attempt at present to go beyond its existing bounds. It is not known whether the frontier provinces of Tymphaia and Parauaia were still in the hands of Pyrrhos, or whether they had been retaken by Lysimachos; but whatever the position, Antigonos did not seek to alter it, and he was also content for the present to acquiesce—(he may hardly have been in a position to do otherwise)—in the independence of Paionia. That country had regained its independence after the Gauls retired, but not quite in the old way. It had been severely plundered,<sup>14</sup> and Audoleon's line was perhaps extinct; in any case, one Dropion reorganized the country as the 'League of the Paionians', and the League honoured him as 'king of the Paionians and founder'.<sup>15</sup> On his coins, however, Dropion does not style himself king; they merely bear his initials and the legend 'of the Paionians': he sometimes restruck Lysimachos' money.<sup>16</sup> The League would be of interest, if anything were known about it, for it was an experiment in the combination of the principles of monarchy and federalism, such as has been already noticed in Epeiros. That a constitution of this sort emphasises a cleavage from Macedonia is clear; and it may be that Paionia took the obvious course of drawing near to Aetolia, for Dropion dedicated at Delphi the head, modelled in bronze, of a Paionian bison.<sup>17</sup>

By the end of 276 it would appear that Antigonos had peace, except for the persistent movement towards freedom in the Peloponnese. One of his earliest acts, probably in the winter of 276/5, was to celebrate at Pella, with much circumstance, his marriage with Phila. He bade come all

<sup>13</sup> For the approximate date, Beloch 3, 2, 326.

<sup>14</sup> This seems to follow from the numerous Gallic imitations of Audoleon's money; Head<sup>1</sup> 208.

<sup>15</sup> Syll.<sup>2</sup> 203.

<sup>16</sup> Head<sup>2</sup> p. 237. But the initials ΔΡ occur on tetradrachms of Lysimachos, and Head thinks that, as there is a coin in the British Museum reading Παιωνων with the initial Α (? Audoleon), the attribution to Dropion may be doubtful.

<sup>17</sup> Paus. 10, 13, 1, βίσωνος ταύρου.

his friends of the old days at Eretria and Athens, and Aratos of Soloi wrote the marriage hymn in praise of the great god Pan, who had stood by Antigonos at Lysimacheia and spread his panic terror among the barbarian host. It may have been at this time that Antigonos instituted the games called Basileia, 'the festival of kingship,' to commemorate his achievement of the Macedonian crown;<sup>18</sup> but it was the honours paid to Pan that were the keynote of the celebrations. He became something very like Antigonos' patron deity. His worship, not perhaps unknown at Pella, was now officially instituted there and lasted long.<sup>19</sup> Antigonos struck a new coinage of silver tetradrachms which continued to be issued throughout his reign, bearing the head of Pan, horned, on a Macedonian shield: he himself sat for the portrait of his protector, and in the features of the Arkadian god, on those of the coins which show Pan's head bound with the royal diadem, may be recognized the only surviving likeness of the Macedonian king.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The marriage: fourth life of Aratos.—The circle at Pella: ch. 8.—The games: *I. G.* ii, 1367, *Βασιλεία ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ* (see A. Körte in *Rhein. Mus.* 52, pp. 168, 175 seq.); analogous to those instituted by Attalos I to celebrate his assumption of kingship after his victory over Gauls; *O. G. I.* 268.

<sup>19</sup> Archelaos had commissioned Zeuxis to paint him a picture of Pan (Plin. *N. H.* 35, 36); and the types on coins of Pella in Roman times point to his being specially worshipped there, Head<sup>2</sup> 244. The connexion of Pan with Antigonos was first put forward by Usener, *Rhein. Mus.* 1874, vol. xxix, p. 36; the conclusion with regard to Pan in this brilliant study is not invalidated by the fact that its main thesis cannot be sustained.

<sup>20</sup> Antigonos' tetradrachms: Head<sup>2</sup> 231. (To this same period may belong the bronze coinage with a Macedonian shield and helmet, and on the shield Antigonos' monogram, *Α*; Head<sup>2</sup> 232.) Two specimens only in which Pan wears the diadem seem known; one given in Imhoof-Blumer, *Mounaies grecques*, Pl. D, n. 13; another, unique, at Berlin, with *βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου* in small letters round the head; this is the coin figured as frontispiece to this book; references in Imhoof-Blumer, *op. cit.*, p. 130, l. 3. That these are portraits of Antigonos, see C. T. Seltman in *Num. Chron.* 1909, p. 268. But the two heads are not very much alike, and it is difficult to say if either be an accurate representation of the king's features. The Berlin coin represents a man a good deal older than forty-three; and as it bears the calathus, which J. Six considered to be the distinguishing mark of the tetradrachms of this series struck at Athens (see Imhoof-Blumer, *op. cit.*, p. 130, n. 21<sup>a</sup>; Ferguson, *Priests*, 147; *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 196, n. 36; and *Athens*, p. 184), it may be that it was struck at Athens soon after the end of the Chremonidean war. The other coin, on this theory, was not struck at Athens; possibly therefore the Berlin one is the better likeness. Indeed, one might call the other Doson, only that the face seems too old. A study by some competent person of all heads on any of these tetradrachms which may bear on the

It may be well to pause here, and to take advantage of the peace which lasted from 276 to 274 in order to obtain some general view of the Macedonia of Antigonos and its relationships to other states, and in particular to the various states of Greece.

It has been strongly urged,<sup>21</sup> that we cannot form a true judgement on the inter-relationships of Greece and Macedonia without first seeking from ethnology an answer to the question, were the Macedonians Greeks or not? For, according as the answer be yea or nay, so must we consider the Macedonian either as the organizer of Greek unity or the destroyer of Greek freedom. The controversy over Macedonian ethnology has been much handled of recent years;<sup>22</sup> yet perhaps the one thing which it is safe to say on the subject is, that the old question will never again be asked in quite the old way. For before we can argue whether the Macedonian be a Greek or no, we must first answer the question, what is a Greek? And as soon as even the most cursory glance is given at those modern theories which make the bulk of the Spartan nation hellenized Illyrians,<sup>23</sup> or the bulk of the Athenian people hellenized 'Hittites',<sup>24</sup> it is

question is much to be desired; some of the undiademmed heads in the British Museum look also like portraits of a man.

<sup>21</sup> Beloch 3, 1, 1.

<sup>22</sup> The following discussions, among others, give a good view of the subject. P. Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte d. griech. Sprache* (1888), p. 284 seq. Kaerst 1 (1901), p. 97 seq. Beloch (1904) 3, 1, p. 1 (Einleitung). M. Kiessling, *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 1905, p. 1009. A. Fick, *Vorgriechische Ortsnamen*, 1905, p. 149 seq. and passim. O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* (1906). Review of Fick by F. Solmsen, *B. Ph. W.* 1906, 851. Reviews of Hoffmann by Fick, *W. Kl. Ph.* 1906, 1276; Beloch, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, 1908, 615; A. Thumb, *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, vol. xix, 1907, p. 76; and Kretschmer, *G. G. A.* 1910, 69. A. Fick, *Hattiden und Danubier in Griechenland*, 1909. Gawril Kazarow, *R. E. G.* 1910, p. 243 seq. (who cites several articles inaccessible to me).—To Beloch and Hoffmann the Macedonians are essentially Greeks; to Fick, Greeks over a non-Greek basis of population; to Kaerst, they are related to the Greeks, with barbarian admixture, which also seems to be Kretschmer's view. Thumb is very doubtful of Hoffmann's views, and agnostic. To Kiessling and Kazarow the Macedonian is essentially an Illyrian, mixed with Greek and Thracian elements.

<sup>23</sup> Kiessling, *l. c.*; W. Ridgeway, *Who were the Dorians?* (*Archaeological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, 1907, p. 295); C. H. Hawes, *B. S. A.* 16, p. 258 (from the anthropometric side).

<sup>24</sup> Fick, *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen*, p. 125; *Hattiden*, p. 5.



evident at once that the bald question, was the Macedonian a Greek, is already meaningless. Ethnology is hardly going to help our verdict on the issues between the Greek and the Macedonian.

When the tribe of the Makedones came down from Pindos and seized the Emathian plain,<sup>25</sup> they found the country, afterwards geographically known as Macedonia, already peopled by a mixture of races. Anatolian aborigines had long since built a city at Edessa, the site of the future capital, and named it from their aboriginal spring-god, the mysterious deity Bedu, a god both of water and of air, like perhaps in this to the prototype of the Dodonean Zeus;<sup>26</sup> and several other Macedonian cities show Anatolian name-forms.<sup>27</sup> But these Asiatics had been overlaid by invasion after invasion from the North, and the country, as the Makedones found it, was essentially Illyrian and Thracian. But we know that conquest has seldom meant more than a change of masters, and that the lower stratum of population in any country is remarkably persistent; and it is likely enough that to the end there was in the Macedonian, as in the Athenian, a fair modicum of Anatolian blood. That the

<sup>25</sup> Thuc. 2, 99.

<sup>26</sup> Tomaschek's derivation of Edessa from βέδν has been generally accepted (Kretschmer, *Einleitung*, p. 239; Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, p. 257; Oberhummer, *Edessa in P. W.*); and it is in its favour that the place is still called Water-town (*Vodena* from Slav *voda*, water; see Oberhummer, *l. c.*). But I cannot help feeling grave doubts: (1) there was another form of Edessa, Αἰδεσσα (Ptol. 3, 13, 39); (2) all the other compounds of βέδν kept the β to Greek ears, e.g. Βέδνς, Βεδόνσιος, Βεδόνδιος, Βέδαυρος (see Kretschmer, *op. cit.*, p. 239; Kazarow, *l. c.*, p. 247). But it does not seem to have been noticed that Edessa is certainly Anatolian, like the other well-known -ss- name-forms on both sides of the Aegean, and therefore, if it be connected with βέδν, the βέδν was not a Thracian god at all, but much older. This is likely enough, in any case. For while βέδν is said by Clement of Alexandria to be Phrygian for water (Kretschmer, *l. c.*, equates it with ὕδωρ), others are equally clear that it is the air (Neantes of Kyzikos, *F. H. G.* iii, 9, no. 27; Philyllios, *Kock I*, p. 287, no. 20), both from Clement (Fick derives it from a root *vē-*, to blow); and it is difficult to avoid a comparison with the aboriginal spring-god of Dodona (see ch. 2, n. 57), who may conceivably have been a god of both water and air. Another case of the Thracian invaders of Macedonia adopting an old water-god is the story of the capture of Seilenos by Midas at the fountain Inna on Mount Bermios; see a vase depicting this, H. B. Walters in *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 9, where all the literature is collected.

<sup>27</sup> Ἀλινδοία, Μελανδία, Σίνδος; see Fick, *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen*, p. 151. Add Ἀρυσσα, Τύρισσα, Ptol. 3, 13. This non-Aryan layer occurs all over Greece; see, too, Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*, 1910, p. 4.

name of the old capital of Macedonia is not even Indo-European merely brings the country into line with many of the Greek states; for Corinth is as Asiatic a name as Tiryns, Athenai as foreign as Mykenai. But it is noteworthy that the name of the national weapon of Macedonia is apparently Asiatic also.<sup>28</sup>

On the Illyrian and Thracian tribes fell the Makedones, conquering, expelling, absorbing. The land was divided into a number of small principalities, and unity was not effected until far later; and the princedoms of Upper Macedonia, Lynkestis, Orestis, Eleimiotis, Eordaia, and others, for some time retained their independence. But all by degrees passed under Macedonian supremacy, and by Alexander's time absorption was going on fast; some of his best generals came from Upper Macedonia;<sup>29</sup> and in the third century the men of all the outlying districts were ready to call themselves Macedonians.<sup>30</sup>

It is obvious that with the expansion of the dominant tribe, whatever its nationality, large Illyrian and Thracian elements must have been taken up into what subsequently was the Macedonian people. The Thracian element shows itself clearly in the Macedonian religion. The hellenizing kings brought in the Olympians;<sup>31</sup> but these were not the gods of the people. Their pantheon can still be traced; in Greek eyes it was essentially Thracian; we may suspect that part of it, the water-worships at any rate, dates from before the Thracians and goes back to the Anatolian aborigines. Beside Sabazios-Dionysos, we find a whole group of obscure deities; Darron, the god of healing; Thaumos or Thaulos, the god of war; the Arantides, possibly his atten-

<sup>28</sup> Σάρισα must be from the same language as Λάρισα, and therefore Anatolian. Even Hoffmann (p. 112) admits it is not Greek.

<sup>29</sup> Krateros and Perdikkas from Orestis, Ptolemy from Eordaia; Arr. *Anab.* 6. 28, 4; *Ind.* 18.

<sup>30</sup> *G. D. I.* 2765 (*circ.* 222, Pomtow); grant of proxeny by Delphi Φιλάρχωι Ἑλλανίωνος Μακεδόνι Ἐ[λ]ειμιώτ[η] ἐκ Πυθείου.

<sup>31</sup> e.g. the festival of Zeus founded by Archelaos at Dion. The worship of Athene Alkis or Alkidemos at Pella (Livy 42, 51) need not be very old; the type does not appear regularly on Macedonian coins before Antigonos Gonatas, though it occurs on a rare gold stater of Demetrios I (Svoronos in *Journ. Intern.*, vol. ii, p. 301), and was also used by Ptolemy I (Head<sup>2</sup> 848, 849), and by Pyrrhos (Head<sup>2</sup> 323, fig. 184). — Cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1, 11, 1.

dants; a local goddess of hunting, graecized as Artemis Gazoria; a strange god of sleep, Totoes; Bedu, the eponymous god of Edessa, identified now with the air, now with the water; the Sauadai or Thracian Seilenoi, old water spirits, afterwards made ministers of the god of wine.<sup>32</sup> An inscription shows a Macedonian of Europos in the third century calling himself by the name of his Thracian god.<sup>33</sup> The Illyrian element must be traced on other lines. The Macedonian capital of Pella was certainly an Illyrian foundation, as its old name Bounomos shows; and the same may be true of other towns also, though, except in the case of Pella, we know only the names which they bore in historical times.<sup>34</sup>

Into this land came, at a later time, the Greek. Chalkidike and the coast were full of his cities; and they must have begun at once to exercise an hellenizing influence on Macedonia, just as the Corinthian colonies did upon Epeiros. But on the Macedonian language their Ionic dialect produced no effect.

What now were the Makedones? The question is perhaps insoluble. Herodotos makes them close kinsfolk of the Dorians;<sup>35</sup> if then the Dorians were Illyrians, so were their

<sup>32</sup> On this pantheon see G. Kazarow, *l. c.*, p. 246 seq. See also, for Darron, Tümpel in *P. W.*, s. v.; Kazarow in *Klio*, 4, 116; Th. Reinach, *Rev. Num.* 1897, p. 121, on Apollon Derronaïos; for the Arantides, Tümpel in *P. W.*, s. v.; for Artemis Gazoria and Totoes, P. Perdrizet, *B. C. H.* 1898, pp. 345, 350; for the βέδν, n. 26 ante; for the σανάδαι, Kretschmer, *op. c.*, pp. 195-9; Fick, *Hattiden*, p. 47. With Thaulos compare the Thessalian Ζεὺς Θάυλιος; H. von Gaertringen, *Hermes*, 46, p. 154; F. Solmsen, *ib.* p. 286.—See Add.

<sup>33</sup> *G. D. I.* 2745 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 917, Μαχάτα[ι] Σαβυττάρα Εὐρωπαϊῶι [Μ]ακεδόني. *Circ.* 300; see P. Perdrizet, *B. C. H.* 1896, p. 475. He is called after Sabazios. Cf. also a gravestone from Alexandria, A.D. 8, εἰμὶ Μαχάων τοῦ Σαββαταίου κτλ.; W. Crönert in *Jahresh.* 1909, Beibl., p. 206.

<sup>34</sup> Bounomos is connected with the Epeiroi Βοῦνιμαι (*G. D. I.* 1339, a more correct form than Stephanus' Βοῦνειμα, see Nilsson, *op. c.* 12), and the Illyrian Βοῦννος; Kretschmer, p. 286; Fick, *Vorgr. Ortsnamen*, p. 85. What the later name of Edessa, Aigai, represents is doubtful. The usual derivation from αἶγες, κύματα (on this see Kretschmer, *op. c.*, p. 286; Hoffmann, *op. c.*, p. 257) is difficult to follow; what have high waves to do with inland springs? The name may be related to a numerous class of Greek names, such as Aigai in Aeolis, and Aigina, some of which have been explained from the oak (A. B. Cook, *C. R.* 1903, p. 405; 1904, pp. 77, 83, 86), or to Epeiroi names like Αἰγεσταιοί, and Aiginion in Tymphaia (Pliny, *N. H.* 4, 10 (17); Nilsson, pp. 14, 48), which may or may not be Greek.

<sup>35</sup> 1, 56; 8, 43.

kin. But the Dorians had a vote in the Amphiktyonic Council; and Hesiod affirms kinship of the Makedones with the Magnetes,<sup>36</sup> another Amphiktyonic people, a kinship that was an article of official belief in the third century.<sup>37</sup> If then the Makedones were not Greeks, we must perhaps suppose that the Amphiktyonic League included 'barbarians'—a considerable difficulty. If they were Greeks, the story of the admission of Alexander the Philhellen to the Olympic games becomes, as often noted, incomprehensible. What little historical material bears on the point has been quoted over and over again; neither side can convince, and it may be noted in passing that much of the evidence usually cited has no value at all. The references to a Macedonian language<sup>38</sup> are perfectly satisfied by a dialect; no Englishman could have followed a speech made in broad Scotch. On the other hand, the argument, that the Macedonian could not be an Illyrian because his history is characterized by opposition to Illyria,<sup>39</sup> is not valid; no two peoples ever fought longer or harder than the English and the Lowland Scotch, peoples identical in race, language, and culture. Neither is it any argument that, in the time of Perseus, some Macedonian nobles could not speak Illyrian;<sup>40</sup> there are plenty of Highland proprietors to-day, of unimpeachable Celtic descent, who can no longer speak Gaelic. Neither is it any use to quote lists of Macedonian towns with Greek names; for as at Pella an Illyrian name was certainly exchanged for a Greek one, any or all of the other town names may be equally modern.<sup>41</sup> Once Greek got a footing anywhere, it was, like English, a conquering tongue.

Language, in fact, gives little help. If every gloss in Amerias were shown to be good Greek to-morrow, it would not necessarily prove more than thorough hellenization; for the words cannot be dated: they cannot prove that the Makedones talked Greek to start with. Again, the fact that the language which the Macedonian spread throughout

<sup>36</sup> Fr. 23, Kinkel.

<sup>37</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 260, l. 3, Philip V and Magnesia on the Maeander.

<sup>38</sup> Including the well-known story in Curtius 6, 9, 35. They are remarkably few.

<sup>39</sup> Kaerst i, p. 102.

<sup>40</sup> Polyb. 28, 8, 9.

<sup>41</sup> See n. 34.



the world was Greek,<sup>42</sup> and not any speech of his own, proves nothing beyond thorough hellenization. An Irishman is not an Englishman because he speaks and spreads English. It has been argued that if any other Macedonian language existed the conquering Macedonians must have carried it overseas; whereas all that we find is traces of their own Greek dialect. But if certain modern phenomena be considered it is seen at once that no argument can be drawn from this one way or the other. The Highlander has gone in great numbers to Canada and taken his Gaelic with him; it is largely spoken in some of the eastern provinces. The Irishman has gone in great numbers to the United States and has *not* taken Erse with him; he has spread the alien tongue. From which of these two contrary examples is the case of the Macedonian to be argued?

Another argument against hellenization has recently failed also. It could once be said that the Macedonian must be a Greek because his terms for everyday things were Greek. But the example has recently been adduced of a Romance language which has borrowed many of the names of common things from its Slav neighbours.<sup>43</sup>

But if hellenization be the correct theory, it was an hellenization that was, as regards language, very old. For Macedonian Greek is akin to Thessalian, and is not influenced by the Ionic dialect of the cities of Chalkidike; it should therefore antedate their foundation. And some of the Macedonian proper names go back to the sixth and fifth centuries; while Hellanikos made Makedon a descendant of Aiolos.<sup>44</sup>

Thus far, then, there seems little against the view that the Makedones were an Illyrian tribe who early learnt, from their Thessalian neighbours, to speak Greek. And it must always be borne in mind that Macedonia differed in two most essential particulars from the other states of Northern Greece. As already noticed, she was monarchical through

<sup>42</sup> On traces of the Macedonian dialect found in Egypt see P. Perdrizet, *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1908, p. 336; *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 120.

<sup>43</sup> Roumanian. See Kazarow, *R. É. G.* 1910, p. 245.

<sup>44</sup> Steph. Byz. Μακεδονία.

and through, and was never organized as a League, at any rate till after Gonatas' death;<sup>45</sup> and she had no definite religious centre. But there remains one most important matter still to consider. If the Macedonian was a barbarian, he differed absolutely and in a most essential point from all the other barbarians whom the Greeks had hitherto met, even from the Epeirots; he, or at any rate his upper classes, possessed a quite unique capacity for hellenization. Of the common people we cannot speak; we know nothing. But the nobles took greedily to Greek culture, and this fact does suggest that their relationship to the Greek was not that of Illyrian barbarians. The fact is not, it is true, conclusive for any Greek affinity; for the same phenomenon appears in many Romans, and may merely be due to the not uncommon desire of a dominant and virile race to appropriate the best it can get, in culture as in other things. But it is so marked that it offers the firmest support we have for the theory that the Makedones were Greeks; and it may very well be that the truth will ultimately be found in the theory put forward by Kretschmer many years ago, that had the Makedones turned south instead of north they would have become a good Greek stem, while as it was they remained in a condition of arrested development.<sup>46</sup> It is perhaps, however, tolerably safe to say that under the general term Macedonian, in the third century, were comprised men of most divergent and mixed blood, Anatolian, Illyrian, Thracian, Greek, Macedonian proper, who had nevertheless made a nation, precisely as Scotland to-day includes men of every variety of descent, Iberian and Gael, Briton and Angle, Norseman and Norman.

Consequently, in considering the relationship in the third century of Macedonia to Greece—or, to be more accurate, to the various Greek states, many of whom had nothing whatever in common—the less we think about blood the better. Macedonia, or so much of it as counted, had become essentially Greek in language and culture; it could no longer

<sup>45</sup> Beloch (3, I, 388) suggested that the *κοινὸν Μακεδόνων* might have been formed in the anarchy after the death of Ptolemy Keraunos. I do not think this probable; see ch. 2, n. 36.

<sup>46</sup> Kretschmer, *op. c.*, p. 288.

be classed with the barbarian. But if the Macedonian were to be proved a Greek to-morrow, it would not prove that the League of Corinth was the accomplishment of Greek unity; for the material matter here is, that the Greeks refused so to regard it. What counted was not blood but mental attitude: true union imports a common will, and this was never present. Macedonian interference in Greece must be taken on its merits, and each case considered as we should consider the dominion of Athens over the Islands or the interference of Thebes in the Peloponnese. The circle of Greek culture had comprised a number of jarring units, of different and often mixed blood. Macedonia, on entering the circle, added a new unit, rather more powerful, more mixed in blood. New permutations and combinations of the jarring units became possible, and duly took place; they were no less ephemeral than the old had been. Macedonia was as far from unifying Greece in the fourth century as Athens had been in the fifth.

Whatever their blood, by the third century the Macedonians had acquired a strong sense of national unity, and their speech and culture were Greek. They stood nearer to their neighbours the Thessalians than to any other Greek people; their dialect, so far as known, was akin to the Thessalian.<sup>47</sup> The relationship between the two had, as we shall see, been translated to the field of politics. But the rustic Macedonian speech was not the language of the Court; that place was held by the Attic. How the common Macedonian regarded the common Greek is, as usual, unknown; it is likely enough that the phalangite, who had helped to conquer the world, affected to look down on the Greek mercenary, so often fated to be the mainstay of the losing side. But among the Macedonian upper classes there was no affectation of despising the Greek, as some have supposed. If they looked down on Eumenes personally, that was because Eumenes, while Alexander lived, had not wielded the sword but the pen; we do not hear of any difficulties incurred by the Cretan

<sup>47</sup> Hoffmann, *op. c.*, *passim*. Cf. Niese 1, 25. In prehistoric times there had been a great general resemblance in culture between Thessaly and Thrace; Wace and Thompson, *Prehistoric Thessaly*, p. 250.

Nearchos, while the Thessalian Lysimachos, after an extremely successful career, actually became king of Macedonia.<sup>48</sup> Alexander himself—it is true, in a rage—had said that Greeks among Macedonians seemed as demigods among beasts.<sup>49</sup> Antigonos' personal friends were all, as will be seen, Greeks. The Macedonians may perhaps have thought themselves better men in the field; further than that we certainly cannot go.

The Macedonian sense of nationality, moreover, had become strong enough to assimilate quite definitely any foreign elements. Philip II is said to have made large settlements of strangers in the country. Kassandros brought in 20,000 Illyrian Autariatae, possibly refugees from the Celtic advance, and gave them land in Mount Orbelos. At a later time we hear of Gauls and Illyrians planted in the very heart of the country, no doubt in large part time-expired mercenaries settled on the land by Antigonos and his successors. But there is no trace of any of these becoming a source of discord in the country.<sup>50</sup>

Upon the complete hellenization of Macedonia had followed the growth of its towns. Macedonia had originally been a land of farmers and villages, and the few towns which existed were not cities in the Greek sense, with a municipal life and organization, but military strongholds.<sup>51</sup> But by the fourth century the towns were becoming more populous and important; and, when in 382 Olynthos thought of including Pella and other Macedonian towns in her League,<sup>52</sup> we are perhaps to understand that they were already in some sense autonomous communities. It is difficult to avoid the belief that, in the third century, Pella enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy. How large a measure we cannot say; but the men of Pella are treated as though they were a definite body

<sup>48</sup> Euseb. I, 233 (Schoene), Θεσσαλὸς ὢν ἐκ Κρανῶνος; Syncell. in *F. H. G.* iii, 695, Λυσίμαχος ὁ Θεσσαλός. His father was a Thessalian of Krannon who had been made a citizen of Pella; see Beloch 3, 2, 86. Antigonos Doson was Thessalian on the mother's side.

<sup>49</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 51.

<sup>50</sup> Philip; Just. 8, 6, 1. Kassandros; Diod. 20, 19, 1. Gauls and Illyrians settled about Pella, Edessa, Beroia; Livy 45, 30, 5; these may be connected with the Gauls and Illyrians who fought for Doson at Sellasia.

<sup>51</sup> Thuc. 2, 100.

<sup>52</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 12-13.



of citizens,<sup>53</sup> and they must at least have managed their own internal affairs. Most unfortunately the terms of the only decree known to have been passed at Pella are ambiguous; and all that can be said about them is that they are consistent with the most complete autonomy.<sup>54</sup> It may, however, be pointed out that the mere fact of a decree being passed at all in the name of the inhabitants of Pella imports a body authorized so to pass it; for it does not bear the name of any governor or royal official, as does the decree of Thessalonike presently to be mentioned,<sup>55</sup> and it is dated by some unknown priest and not by the regnal year of Antigonos.<sup>56</sup> Whatever applies to Pella applies also no doubt to towns like Beroia or Edessa. One thing is certain; these towns formed no enclaves in the kingdom, as Greek cities would have done; they were an essential part of Macedonia, and their inhabitants described themselves indiscriminately either as men of such and such a town or as Macedonians.<sup>57</sup> The original

<sup>53</sup> The Delphians, about the end of the fourth century, granted proxeny to the men of Pella, Μακε[δόσι ἐκ] Π[έ]λλης, *G. D. I.* 2759; and the decree of Pella mentioned in the next note is headed Πελλαίων.

<sup>54</sup> Reply of Pella to the invitation of the Koans, *circ.* 253 (see ch. 12, p. 353), to declare the temple of Asklepios ἄστυον; see *Arch. Anz.* 1903, pp. 10, 197; *Ath. Mitt.* 1905, p. 178. Prof. R. Herzog kindly sent me a copy of this decree. There is no reference in it to demos, boule, or ekklesia, and the enacting words are ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει; one's first impression was that Pella was not a polis, but a king's town. In fact, however, a decree containing these words of enactment and no other reference to municipal organization is entirely consistent with the fullest self-government. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 234, decree of Messene, third century, ἔδοξε τῇ [πόλει τῇ Μ]εσανίων. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 289, decree of Megalopolis (183 B. C.), ἔδοξε τῇ [π]όλει. The well-known formula of enactment in Delphian decrees, ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει τῶν Δελφῶν ἐν ἀγορᾷ τελείῳι σύμψαφοις ταῖς ἐνόμοις (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 306, 922; *O. G. I.* 241, 303, 345; cf. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 925) is also in point; it is sometimes abbreviated to ἔδοξε τῇ πόλει τῶν Δελφῶν, *O. G. I.* 228 (reign of Seleukos II, 246-226). — Livy 42, 53 gives no help, for the 'civitates Macedoniae' there mentioned might be the admittedly autonomous Greek cities of the coast. The inscription which mentions a college of politarchs at Herakleia in Lynkestis would of course settle the matter, if there was any certainty that it antedated the Roman occupation; see n. 99.

<sup>55</sup> Michel 322; see notes 97 and 98.

<sup>56</sup> The decree of Pella is dated by the priest Asklepiodoros and the Macedonian month; what he is priest of is not stated. In this it resembles Kassandros' grant, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178, ἐφ' ἱερέως Κυδία. The decree of Kassandreia, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 196, is dated by the priest of Lysimachos. On the other hand, the letter of the crown prince Demetrios to Harpalos is dated by the regnal year of Antigonos; see App. 5, n. 6.

<sup>57</sup> Compare Εὐρωπαϊῶι [Μ]ακεδόνι (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 917 = *G. D. I.* 2745), with Εὐρωπαϊοί (*G. D. I.* 3286 = *I. G.* 4, 617), both early third century, apparently; Μακεδόνι ἐξ Αἰγέων (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 494, first half of third century) and Μακεδόνι ἐξ

Greek cities of Chalkidike and the coast were on a different footing. These cities had nothing in common with Macedonia, and had in many cases been brought within the kingdom by the strong hand. But Alexander had admitted their people to service in his army equally with the Macedonians,<sup>58</sup> and we hear nothing, save in one case, of any disloyalty; while there are certain indications to show that they were fast becoming an integral part of the kingdom.<sup>59</sup>

Antigonos, then, found himself at the head of a people who, as far as blood went, had become a united nation. As regarded feeling, however, there was a certain measure of the spirit of faction. Pyrrhos, for instance, (as the event was to show), possessed a strong following in the west of the country, whenever he should choose to call upon it; but this was probably due rather to the personality of Pyrrhos than to the workings of Epeirot blood in the frontier provinces. It is possible also that one of the towns of Chalkidike, Sane, retained a sentiment for Kassandros' house, so long as that house existed. For Kassandros' half-mad brother Alexarchos, who thought he was the Sun, had refounded it by the name of Ouranopolis, 'Heaven Town'; he had coined a new speech for the people, among other absurdities, and they had entered into the spirit of his whim; on their coins they call themselves, not 'men of Ouranopolis', but 'Children of Heaven'.<sup>60</sup>

Λιγυῶν (*G. D. I.* 2806, early third century) with [Ἀταλα]νταῖοι and ἐξ Ἑδέσσας (*I. G.* 4, 617, above); Μακε[δόσι ἐκ] Π[έ]λλης (see n. 53) with Πελλαίων (ib.) and Πελλαῖος (*G. D. I.* 2581 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 268, l. 104, early second century); Ἀλέξανδρον Μυλλ[έου Μακεδόνα] ἐκ Βεροίας (*I. G.* ii, 5, 2, 261 i, end of fourth century or later) with Ἀσανδρος (a name either Macedonian, *P. W. s. v.*, or Thessalian, *Ἑφ. Ἀρχ.* 1911, p. 123 seq.) Μενάνδρου Βεροιαῖος (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 848 = *G. D. I.* 2071, early second century).

<sup>58</sup> P. Perdrizet, *B. C. H.* 1897, p. 108.

<sup>59</sup> For instance, a man from Arethousa is willing to be called a Macedonian, *G. D. I.* 2762, Ἀρεθουσ[ῶν] Μακεδόνη; so too a solitary instance of a man from Amphipolis, *G. D. I.* 2764, Μακεδ[ό]νι ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως (both end of fourth century; usually Ἀμφιπολίτης). The same thing, of course, appears elsewhere; e.g. a man of Naupaktos could be called Ναυπάκτιος, Αἰτωλὸς ἐκ Ναυπάκτου, or Αἰτωλὸς simply; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 240, 248, 249, and see Dittenberger on 240, n. 3.

<sup>60</sup> Strabo 7 fr. 35; Pliny, *N. H.* 4, 10 (17); specimens of the language, Herakleides Lembos ap. Athen. 3, 98 E. The coins; *B. M. Coins, Macedon*, xxxii; Head<sup>2</sup> 206. The persistent types confirm the tradition that Alexarchos, like Demetrios, was the Sun; Clement, *Protrept.* 54, αὐτὸν κατεσχημάτιζεν εἰς

But the most important element of discord was the great city of Kassandreia, which could hardly become on a sudden an extravagantly loyal town. It had worshipped Lysimachos as a god,<sup>61</sup> and had been for a while independent of Macedonia, first under Lysimachos' widow Arsinoe, and then under Eurydike, mother of Keraunos, a prince who posed as Lysimachos' avenger and successor; and Lysimachos' heir still lived. Since then it had had a career of its own, powerful if unhappy, under Apollodoros, and had stood a long siege from Antigonos. It could hardly regard itself at once merely as an integral part of Macedonia. It contrasted strongly in this with its near neighbour Thessalonike, Kassandros' other great foundation, formed like itself of the inhabitants of various Greek cities. The tendency of two powerful and adjacent cities to take opposite sides in politics is well known; and Thessalonike was loyal to Antigonos and the kingdom. The subject is obscure; but it can hardly be an accident that, while Antigonid rule lasted, men of Thessalonike frequently, men of Kassandreia apparently never, called themselves Macedonians.<sup>62</sup>

Here then were two sources of difficulty in Antigonos' position; a widespread sympathy with Pyrrhos, and disaffec-

ἥλιον. His people were the stars. Dr. Head has called attention to the remarkable fact that the coins give, not Οὐρανοπολιτῶν, but Οὐρανιδῶν or Οὐρανιδῶν πόλεως.

<sup>61</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 196.

<sup>62</sup> The result of a search, not as complete as I could have wished, for the Macedonian period, i.e. before 168, is as follows. For Kassandreia: fourteen cases of *Κασσανδρεὺς* (or *Κασσανδρεῖτις* or *ἐκ Κασσανδρείας*) and four of *Κασσανδρεῖς*; none showing *Μακεδῶν*. One is instructive, *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1905, 169, a stele giving *Λυκαιονίκαι*, which gives two men with the ethnic *Μακεδῶν* and then one *ἐκ Κασσανδρείας* alone, showing that it is no accident. For Thessalonike: out of seven cases, three of *Θεσσαλονικεὺς* alone (*I. G.* vii, 320; *I. G.* xii, 8, part 2, 581; *B. C. H.* 1910, p. 367, no. 15); two of *Μακεδόνι ἐκ Θεσσαλονίκης* [*s*] (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 494 *bis*); and two, most instructive, of *Μακεδῶν* alone; one is the well-known Admetos, son of Bokros (Michel 389), who was a citizen of Thessalonike (Michel 322); the other is on a first-century epitaph from Thessalonike, *Διογένης Ἡρακλείδου Μακεδῶν* (*I. G.* ix, 2, 367). (The proxeny decree, *G. D. I.* 2767, with *Θεσσαλονικεὶ Μακεδόνι* seems to be later than 168.) — Thessalonike was a *synoikismos* of some twenty-six Greek communities; Strabo 7, frs. 21 and 24. Its loyalty: Antigonos took refuge there after his defeat by Pyrrhos, *Just.* 25, 3, 7; and, when the Antigonids were again suzerains of the Cyclades, Thessalonike seems to have been their usual channel of communication with Delos; see the decrees concerning Admetos, son of Bokros (above), and the Delian decree for Aristoboulos of Thessalonike, *σιτώνης* of Demetrios II, *B. C. H.* 1910, p. 367, no. 15.

tion, actual or potential, in his greatest city. Other local disaffection there must also have been, with so many pretenders recently in the field. And, apart from this, the kingdom had developed certain weaknesses of its own. There was a heavy decrease in the population, at any rate in that part of it capable of bearing arms; and the most serious aspect of this was the wasting of the old landed aristocracy, whose numbers had been brought down both by two generations of ceaseless war, in which they had officered the armies of two continents, and by the settlement of a certain number of them in Asia and Egypt. One consequence of this was that Antigonos and his successors had not sufficient men of their own race for the numerous offices, civil and military, which required filling, and were compelled to some extent to fall back on Greeks, who were necessarily often adventurers, and who as such were sometimes conspicuous rather for cleverness than for more necessary qualities.—Antigonos himself seems to have been well served; but at a later time treachery was not unknown.<sup>63</sup>

Another source of weakness must have been the finances.<sup>64</sup> Macedonia had been well plundered, and Antigonos had brought with him but an empty cash-box. To what extent he may have lightened the tribute formerly paid by the Greek dependencies, first to Demetrios<sup>65</sup> and then to himself, is not known; but it must have been done to some extent in such possessions as remained after the revolt of 280. Macedonia, when in working order, could provide a fair yearly revenue, though not a great one; in Perseus' time it was only something over 200 talents.<sup>66</sup> The country paid a land tax, and the kings possessed the extensive remnants of the old state domains; and the harbour and customs duties counted for something, for, (though she can hardly have required many imports), Macedonia was in a position to export timber on a considerable scale,<sup>67</sup> as well as other requisites for ship-

<sup>63</sup> Livy 27, 32, 9; 28, 6.

<sup>64</sup> See especially Beloch 3, I, 344-6, and references. There seems no information special to Gonatas' reign to be got.

<sup>65</sup> For Demetrios' taxes see ch. 5, n. 4, and ch. 3, n. 15.

<sup>66</sup> Plut. *Aem.* 28, 4.

<sup>67</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 77 and notes; *I. G.* xi, 199 A, l. 57; Theophr. *Char.* 23.



building, such as pitch. A moderate sum could also be derived from the silver workings on Mount Pangaios and the mines of iron and lead which the country possessed ; but the chief source of the income enjoyed by Philip II had failed.<sup>68</sup>

The great deposit of alluvial gold which had served Philip so well was worked out, and none other had been discovered ; no gold to speak of now came from the district about Philippi, and Antigonos never struck a gold coin. The Antigonid kings never had the possibility of amassing a treasure, like their brothers of Syria and Egypt ; even the long peace between 197 and 168 only enabled a comparatively modest saving to be made, and the 6,000 talents which Aemilius Paulus found in the treasury after Pydna were all that remained over and above the by no means large sum spent by Perseus on the war. In a reign that began under such difficulties as did that of Gonatas, the ever present problem at first must have been to balance revenue and expenditure. The country, however, was essentially sound ; it possessed good cornland and forests, and a capable population, who in time of war could turn their hands to anything.<sup>69</sup> It only required a few years of rest and good government to be again on a stable and moderately prosperous basis.

None of these sources of weakness would have mattered very greatly had Antigonos been sure of the support of the common Macedonian, the sturdy farmer who served in the phalanx and formed the backbone of the country : all that would then have been wanted was time and patience and good government. But this support was exactly what Antigonos was not sure of ; and he knew it. He excited as yet no enthusiasm in Macedonia ; to many of his subjects his philosophic training and tastes must have made him seem strange, as one who was too much of a foreigner ; he had to bear the burden of the sins of his father Demetrios, and probably of his uncle Kassandros, even if he still derived some small advantage from being the grandson of Antipatros.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>68</sup> P. Perdrizet, *Klio*, 1910, pp. 1, 25-7, throws much new light on the Pangaios mines. — Iron and lead, Polyb. 5, 89, 6 and 7. — Generally, Livy 45, 18.

<sup>69</sup> Polyb. 5, 2, 5.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Plut. *Dem.* 37. Kassandros' unpopularity, ch. 4, p. 89.

He had no reserve of popularity to draw on; and the fact was soon to be as patent to the world as it was to himself.

Any weakness in the position of the king of course reacted on the State, for in Macedonia, far more than in most countries, the king and the State were identical. There was no distinction between the king's privy purse and the State revenue. He had indeed his council, the 'Friends' whose privilege it was to be about his person both in peace and war;<sup>71</sup> but they were advisers only, and they had no independent power, or at most judicial functions. What little power existed in the country outside the king resided, not in the nobility, but in the army, that is to say, in the Macedonian people under arms. They had certain obscure rights of judging in trials for treason,<sup>72</sup> perhaps on the ground that the king, being in effect a party, could not be judge himself. And they had one moment of real power, when it fell to them to elect, or to confirm, a new king. When the throne was empty, their election was valid; they had the crown in their hands to give;<sup>73</sup> without their election no king could be. It used to be a fashion with some historians to call all the Successors usurpers.<sup>74</sup> Whatever the case as regards Syria or Egypt, the phrase as applied to the Antigonid kings of Macedonia is a mere absurdity. The old royal house of the Argeadai was extinct; and the crown was legally in the hands of the Macedonian people under arms, to confer upon whomsoever they would. Antigonos was every bit as much a legitimate national king as was Alexander.

One obscure aspect of the identity of the king and the

<sup>71</sup> Beloch 3, 1, 389; Kaerst 1, 126.

<sup>72</sup> Kaerst 1, 129. — Beloch (3, 1, 386) thinks that they had the regular criminal jurisdiction, and that the king could not put Macedonians to death without their consent. This is what Curtius says, 6, 8, 25. But Curtius is wretched authority. Of the known cases, two (those of Perdikkas' adherents, Diod. 18, 37, Plut. *Eum.* 8, and of Olympias, Diod. 19, 51) are not only treason cases but belong to a time when there was no hand which could exercise effectively the king's powers. In the third case, that of Leontios, Polyb. 5, 27, 5, the peltasts under his command claim to be consulted if it be a case of treason, but if it be a question about a bail they do not so claim, they merely say they will raise the money.

<sup>73</sup> This question is exhaustively treated in the papers by Lehmann-Haupt and Reuss mentioned ch. 5, n. 39. See also Beloch 3, 1, 385.

<sup>74</sup> e.g. Holm and Freeman.

State is provided by the land question. The nobility were great landowners, but on what terms is not known, except that all did in fact serve in the army; while the relationship between the king and the common Macedonian of Macedonia proper is lost in antiquity. The latter is always treated as a free man, and probably owned his own farm, though evidence is lacking. The national Macedonian constitution has been called feudal, on the ground that the subordinate princes in Alexander's army led their own followings;<sup>75</sup> but neither this, nor the general obligation to military service, are any proof that Macedonia proper was on a feudal basis, i. e. that each man had a superior (in an ascending chain), of whom he held, and to whom his service was due. Rather, it seems that the service of the common Macedonian was due direct to the king. That every free Macedonian did serve may be taken for granted; for the army was the people under arms, and an incident such as the calling out of old men and boys by Philip V shows that every man of military age was out already. If this be correct, the comparatively small armies which Macedonia could furnish may give some idea of the scanty population of the country which had conquered half the world. And the constant calling out of the men must have meant bad farming and a smaller food-production; this again would tend to keep down the population, a tendency perhaps counteracted in part by the opportunities offered to the Macedonian in other lands.

But outside Macedonia proper the relation of the king to the soil is more easily visible. The special method in which the Macedonian kings, like their brothers of Egypt and Asia, developed military service was by means of the κλήρος or 'lot'.<sup>76</sup> Greek civilization knew four methods of acquiring land, by inheritance, purchase, conquest, or gift from a

<sup>75</sup> Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*, 1910, p. 139.

<sup>76</sup> See, on the Macedonian system, the grants made by Kassandros, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178; the same inscription, *I. J. G.* 2, 116, 134; M. Rostowzew, *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates*, 1910, p. 251 seq.; W. H. Buckler and D. M. Robinson, *Amer. Journ. Arch.*, vol. xvi, 1912, p. 11, on a very important new inscription from Sardis for Seleukid practice, especially p. 22.—The Ptolemaic system is treated at length by Rostowzew; see also Bouché-Leclercq 3, 231 seq.—'Allotment' is too technical to serve as a translation of κλήρος.

superior;<sup>77</sup> and the lot illustrated the two latter. The land owned by the Macedonian kings had been acquired by conquest. All conquered territory passed to the king; for the king was the State. The royal domains in Macedonia proper were but the remains of a far more extensive 'spear-won territory', once possibly coterminous with Macedonia itself; but the working of the system can be seen most clearly in the lands recently conquered by Philip II, the lands of the Greek cities of Chalkidike and the coast. We seem to get no distinction here, as in Asia, between the land of the city and the land of the king; the city land, or the bulk of it, belonged to the king, and he granted it in lots to whom he would, the Crown retaining certain rights.<sup>78</sup> The tenure on which the Macedonian kings gave out these lots was a tenure of inheritance, under which the lot passed to the heir.<sup>79</sup> It is immaterial whether we call this tenure a perpetual lease or a grant, for if both are burdened with the same payments there ceases to be any distinction, save in terminology; but as 'lease' in English always imports certain elements which are absent from the lot, it is preferable to treat the lot as the grant of a limited proprietorship.<sup>80</sup> Probably it was originally inalienable;<sup>81</sup> and the king retained a valuable estate in the land, the right of escheat on failure of heirs. The king also received payment from the klerouchos or grantee of the lot, in the shape of various taxes and duties;<sup>82</sup> what they were

<sup>77</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 929, l. 133.

<sup>78</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178; the lots are city land, but are granted by the king; they had therefore become king's land by conquest (cf. Rostowzew, p. 252). They are not to become city land again after the grant, as was the case when the Seleukids made a grant of king's land out-and-out (*O. G. I.* 221 and 225); therefore they were not granted out-and-out, but the king retained some estate in them.—See Addenda.

<sup>79</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178, (δόσις) ἐμ πατρικοῖς. Presumably the same as μίσθωσις εἰς τὸ πατρικόν.

<sup>80</sup> See Bouché-Leclercq 3, 321, n. 1. The use of the word κυρίως in *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178 seems to show that the terminology of a grant of proprietorship is the more apt. Rostowzew, p. 252, treats the tenure as *Erbpacht*.

<sup>81</sup> This is only a deduction of my own. But an *express* grant of powers of sale and exchange over κληροί (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178) imports the necessity of such a grant before any sale or exchange can be made; i.e. imports some inalienable κληροί. A case of an estate inalienable for twenty years (Michel 199 = *G. D. I.* 1634) is cited, *I. J. G.* 2, 135.

<sup>82</sup> Polyb. 36, 17, 13 mentions φόροι generally. Obviously there was a φόρος, from the necessities of the case and the analogy of the lots in Egypt and



cannot be exactly stated, nor is it known if the burdens on the Macedonian lot resembled the formidable list of payments that fell on the Egyptian lot-owner ; probably they were far lighter.<sup>83</sup> One other right the king may have had ; no doubt the klerouchos, unless time-expired, held his lot on terms of rendering military service, and, on the analogy of the Egyptian practice, it would seem that the king might re-enter and declare the lot forfeit if this obligation were evaded.<sup>84</sup>

It seems that klerouchoi were also established in Macedonia proper ; Gauls and Illyrians were settled in Emathia,<sup>85</sup> and they must have received lots out of the royal domains. The object of their settlement was doubtless military service ; but as they are expressly referred to as hardworking cultivators, we are perhaps to understand that their lots were originally uncultivated land, held under that form of lease of which one of the conditions was that the lessee should bring the ground into cultivation, the form afterwards known as emphyteusis.<sup>86</sup> Large parts, however, of the royal domains remained in the king's own hand, and were cultivated by tenants.<sup>87</sup>

To secure military service, inalienability of the lot was an obvious measure ; such may have been the original idea. But at the time we are dealing with the lots known to us are alienable. In England, such inalienable estates as exist have been given by the nation as a reward for public services ; it looks in Macedonia as if alienability came in when the lot was given as a reward for past service rather than as a security

Asia (see Buckler and Robinson, *l. c.*, pp. 52-4). *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178 grants a release from import and export duties on articles for the klerouchos' own use.

<sup>83</sup> See the list for Egypt in Bouché-Leclercq 3, 233-6. If Macedonian land had been as heavily burdened, the kings must have become far wealthier than they ever were. Polyb. 36, 17, 13, the Romans freed the Macedonians from *μοναρχικῶν ἐπιταγμάτων καὶ φόρων*, is too general to be of much assistance.

<sup>84</sup> For Egypt, Bouché-Leclercq 3, 233, n. 5.

<sup>85</sup> Livy 45, 30, in the third regio ; 'incolas quoque permultos Gallos et Illyrios, impigros cultores.' To be distinguished from the settlement of a whole people or tribe, like the Vettii mentioned just before. See n. 50.

<sup>86</sup> See *Dar.-Sagl.*, s.v. ; *I. J. G.* 1, p. 201 ; for Egypt, Rostowzew, p. 80.

<sup>87</sup> I agree with Droysen, *Hellenismus*<sup>2</sup>, iii, 1, 90, that this must be the meaning of Livy 45, 18, 'locationes praediorum rusticorum.'

for service in the future.<sup>88</sup> In the case of the alienable lot the klerouchos is expressed to have absolute powers of possession, sale, and exchange.<sup>89</sup> In Asia he could also mortgage, by way of a sale subject to redemption; <sup>90</sup> this power has not yet been expressly noted in Macedonia. On the supposition that, at the same time, the lot could be left by will,<sup>91</sup> it had now come to differ in one respect only from the English fee simple (allowing for the differences in the arrangement and incidence of taxation), that is to say, in the power of the king (if it existed) to re-enter for refusal to serve; and in a country as warlike and as patriotic as Macedonia the exercise of such a power can have rarely been needed. Once the lot was freely alienable, the king's right of escheat became of as little practical value as the similar right still vested in the Crown over most of the land in England; but it served in theory to mark the fact that the lot was still king's land and not city land.<sup>92</sup> There is no evidence that the Macedonian kings ever made grants out-and-out, as did the Seleukids, grants under which the land granted ceased to be king's land at all, and had to be joined to the territory of some city.<sup>93</sup>

There was probably no national standing army at this time. The only permanent corps, besides the numerous Greek mercenaries in garrison, seem to have been the horse-guards, of unknown strength, and the foot-guards, the agema, who in later reigns had a fixed establishment of 2,000 men; <sup>94</sup>

<sup>88</sup> I do not mean that there was a time when no alienable lots existed. The development is notional rather than temporal.

<sup>89</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178, κυρίοις οὔσι κεκτηῖσθαι καὶ ἀλλάσσεσθαι καὶ ἀποδόσθαι.

<sup>90</sup> The before-cited inscription, *Amer. Journ. Arch.* 1912, p. 11, relates to a mortgage in the form *πρᾶσις ἐπὶ λύσει*.

<sup>91</sup> This is hypothetical. It has been much argued over the Egyptian κλήρος.

<sup>92</sup> Rostowzew (p. 252) believes that on a change of dynasty, or even of rulers, the king had the right to take back to himself every lot in Macedonia. One would need better evidence than *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178 for an arrangement that would have destroyed half the value of the χώρα βασιλική at once; I agree with the editors of *I. J. G.* that the klerouchoi of *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178 took grants from Kassandros 'ex maiore cautela'. What is conceivable is that it was customary for a new king to confirm titles on payment by the klerouchos of a fine.

<sup>93</sup> *O. G. I.* 221, 225.

<sup>94</sup> Polyb. 4, 67, 6; Livy 42, 51; see Deloch 3, 1, 353. I think that

Gauls were probably enlisted as required. The Macedonian army itself had come back to where it and the Roman army alike began, a levy of farmers called out when a serious campaign was expected. The professional long-service soldiers who had grown up under Philip and Alexander were either dead or settled on the land in Asia, Egypt, or elsewhere; and they were not replaced. Practically all garrison and oversea work at this time must have been performed by mercenaries, unless the forts on the northern frontier were an exception; even at the end of the century only the most important Macedonian garrisons, such as that of Corinth, had a scanty stiffening of home-bred troops. It will be seen, time and again, how loath Antigonos was to call out the Macedonians or to use them when called out; there were none to waste.

The court of an Antigoniid king presents no aspects of interest, and need not detain us. It has the regular features of any other court of the time, though perhaps less elaborate than the Egyptian. We meet with the little group of privileged officers who constituted the king's personal body-guard; the corps of youths of good family—the so-called royal pages—which formed a nursery for the higher officers of the army; the boys who were selected to be 'foster-brothers' of the young heir to the crown. The titles of two high officials are also known, the captain of the guard and the king's secretary. The former commanded the royal pages, and was responsible for the arrangements necessary to secure the king's safety. The latter conducted the king's correspondence, which involved (since the king was the State) the drafting of all decrees; since he wrote always in the king's name and not his own, he must, practically, have achieved the coveted position of power without responsibility.<sup>95</sup>

The arrangements made by Antigonos for the actual government of his empire are of more importance. The

Polybios implies that the horse-guards were more than 400 strong; Philip took 400 of them.

<sup>95</sup> See Beloch 3, I, 389-94, on Hellenistic courts generally. Add to his references for *σωματοφύλακες* those of Philip V, Livy 40, 6 and 8. — For the power of the secretary (*ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ γραμματείου*, Polyb. 4, 87), cf. that of the secretary 'ab epistulis' in the early Roman Empire.

original kingdom of Macedonia probably remained in the personal hands of the king; but all acquired territory was governed through strategoi or generals, possessing military power. We find under Gonatas a strategos of the Piraeus and the districts that were ranged with the Piraeus, Mounychia, Sounion, Salamis; in some later reign Euboea was divided between more than one strategos; under Philip V there was a strategos of Paionia. Under Gonatas, the most important strategia was that bestowed on his half-brother Krateros, who governed Corinth and Euboea, and had a general supervision of the affairs of Greece south of Attica; he was perhaps rather a viceroy than a mere strategos. He had, however, no control over the strategos of Piraeus, who was independently responsible to the king.<sup>96</sup>

The next office in importance to that of strategos was that of epistates, the governor of a town or district appointed directly by the king; he was a kind of administrator-general with very wide powers. There were epistatai in Macedonia and Thessaly; probably in Thessaly they governed the important towns. The epistates, however, in hellenistic kingdoms generally, is always connected with a subject district; and it is difficult to believe that any were ever appointed in Macedonia proper. No doubt the reference to epistatai of Macedonia means those over Greek towns of the coast. In any case, we see the system of epistatai applied in the two countries outside Macedonia proper which the king ruled as lawful ruler, the system of strategoi in the lands held merely by right of recent conquest. The two systems seem not to

<sup>96</sup> Holleaux, *R. É. G.* 10, 446, thought that the whole of Macedonia and its vassal states was divided into military districts and governed by strategoi; Beloch 3, 1, 404 contra, only 'die makedonischen Nebenländer'. There is no evidence so far for strategoi in Macedonia proper. — Strategoi. Of Piraeus καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ταπτομένων μετὰ τοῦ Πειραιῶς, *I. G.* ii, 5, 591 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 220; these at a later time include Mounychia, Sounion, and Salamis, *Diog.* L. 4, 39; *Plut. Arat.* 34. Of Euboea: *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1887, p. 81, no. 2 = 1895, p. 163. Of Paionia: *Livy* 40, 21 and 23; 42, 58. The phrase 'ex praetoribus regiis unus qui Paeoniae praeerat' points to a regular system of strategoi. Krateros: *Plut. Mor.* 486 A, στρατηγείν; his general supervision, *ib.* 219 A, 253 A; the rest of the paragraph is a deduction from the known facts about Krateros' son Alexander. — Beloch also gives a strategos of Phokis under Philip V and Perseus, and of Dolopia under Perseus; the evidence for these seems insufficient.



~~be part of a whole but to run parallel.~~ In one province, however—Chalkidike—it is possible that the two were worked together; for while we shall see reason to suppose that there was a strategos of Chalkidike, the great coast towns were certainly governed by epistatai. It may have been part of a reasoned policy, due to the enormous importance of holding the coast towns to the king's interest: its logical basis could be found in the fact that these towns had once been conquered, but were now an integral part of the Macedonia of a Macedonian king. To govern these towns as dependencies and garrison them was a strong measure, but one that was to justify itself absolutely in the near future. The system lasted to the Roman conquest.<sup>97</sup>

Details are available for one town only, Thessalonike. Thessalonike was an autonomous city of Greek blood, with the usual constitutional forms, a boule and an ekklesia; but it was governed for the king by an epistates or governor, a deputy-governor, and a board of five harmosts or subordinates of some kind; and at the head of a decree of the people of Thessalonike are found the names of the deputy-governor and the harmosts. What degree of control they exercised over the meetings of the people is not apparent. The fact that the name of the governor himself is absent may suggest that he was responsible for several cities, with a deputy in each.<sup>98</sup>

There are in existence a number of interesting inscriptions referring to a college of politarchs in several Macedonian cities, Thessalonike, Amphipolis, Herakleia in Lynkestis. It is, however, unfortunately impossible to feel any certainty that any of these are prae-Roman; most of them certainly

<sup>97</sup> On the ἐπιστάτης in Hellenistic kingdoms, Holleaux in *B. C. H.* 1893, pp. 52-60. He differed little from the ἐπιμελητής employed by Kassandros and Demetrios; both terms are applied to Demetrios of Phaleron (Diod. 19, 78, 3; 20, 45, 2), but see a good discussion of ἐπιμελητής in Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 47, n. 3. The articles under both headings in *Dar.-Sagl.* and *P. W.* hardly notice the usage as a Macedonian governor.—ἐπιστάται in Macedonia and Thessaly, Polyb. 5, 26, 5.—In the coast towns, Michel 322, with Holleaux' commentary, *R. É. G.* 1897, p. 446 seq.—At Amphipolis under Perseus, Livy 44, 44 ('qui praeerat urbi'). The 'praefecti praesidiorum' of Livy are more probably φρούραρχοι.—See Addenda.

<sup>98</sup> Michel 389 and 322, with Holleaux in *R. É. G.* 1897, p. 446; ὑπεπιστάτης and five harmosts at Thessalonike.

belong to the period after the Roman occupation, when a new system may have been established. They therefore do not call for notice here.<sup>99</sup>

None of the cities of Macedonia possessed the right of coining, not even Kassandreia or Thessalonike; and Greek towns as a rule lost the right when incorporated in the kingdom. Ouranopolis, an exception in this as in much else, had indeed struck her own coinage under Kassandros; but it may be doubted whether this was not now a thing of the past, a mere episode connected with Alexarchos' rule there. In all Antigonos' empire, it appears, the only two cities that still coined for themselves were Athens and Corinth; and, apart from historical sentiment, and from the desirability of doing everything possible to keep these two great communities contented, there was a definite reason for this in the widespread use which the well-known money of each town served in the world's commerce. The coinage of the Antigonid kings themselves issued from their royal mints in Philippi, Amphipolis, and elsewhere; Antigonos, too, coined in Demetrias, and, after the Chremonidean war, in Athens. Athens lost her own right of coining at the same time; but Corinth continued to strike her Pegasos staters till lost to Antigonos in 243.<sup>100</sup>

One very interesting question of organization is raised by Antigonos' name-cities, of which mention may be made here, though it involves considerable anticipation of events. So far as is known, he founded three; an Antigoneia on the mainland of Chalkidike near Kassandreia, another in Paionia, a third in Atintania. The first was probably founded soon

<sup>99</sup> Demitsas, *ἡ Μακεδονία*, nos. 364 to 369. These politarchs, who sometimes appear together with a *ταμίης τῆς πόλεως*, were apparently in addition to the boule and ekklesia. P. Perdrizet has maintained that this arrangement dated from after 168 (*B. C. H.* 1894, p. 416; 1897, pp. 116, 161); contra Holleaux (*R. É. G.* 1897, p. 446), who would regard politarchs as third century, on the strength of the decree of Herakleia in Lynkestis, Demitsas 368 = *B. C. H.* 1897, p. 161, and who is followed by Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft d. Griechen*, p. 141. I think clearer evidence is needed before any system of politarchs can be treated as existing prior to 168.

<sup>100</sup> Athens: ch. 10, n. 104. Corinth: Head<sup>2</sup> 403. Ouranopolis: n. 60. Mints: G. Macdonald, *Hunterian Collection*, 1, 275, 281. — Possibly some of Antigonos' tetradrachms that commemorated Kos were struck at Demetrias, from the monogram; Imhoof-Blumer, *Monnaies grecques*, p. 127.

after the capture of Kassandreia, for its purpose is obvious; it was to keep watch on the disaffected great city, and was no doubt settled with Antigonos' own partisans, time-expired mercenaries and others on whom he could rely. Though it never became a rival to Kassandreia, it did become a place of importance, and at a later time was strongly garrisoned. The other two name-cities were of course founded much later, after Antigonos had acquired the two provinces in question.<sup>101</sup>

A whole series of cities, founded in the king's own name, and never, like the Seleukid foundations, in the names of others, suggests a more famous parallel. Alexander had founded in Asia a number of name-cities, and his plan in so doing can be conjectured. As he advanced into Asia and left behind him the old traditional seats of government, he began to found an Alexandria in each province of Darius' empire; each was probably intended to be the seat of the satrap of the province. The plan was carried out so thoroughly that in Bactria, where there *was* a famous royal city, it was renamed.<sup>102</sup> Alexander, however, had a very clear conception of something which we may call his 'sphere'; he did not mean to extend his system beyond the bounds of Darius' empire; hence not only was his name-city on the Jaxartes, where Persian rule had always ended, called 'The last of the Alexandrias',<sup>103</sup> but when he did definitely overpass Darius' boundary and enter the Punjab, he founded no more name-cities or satrapies, but set up a system of protected native kings.

Now Antigonos, as will presently be seen, had just as sharp a conception of his 'sphere' as had Alexander, and outside it, i. e. in the Peloponnese, he ultimately adopted a similar system to that of Alexander, protected native 'tyrants'; and it is at least probable that in the foundation of his name-cities he was consciously imitating Alexander, and that each was meant to be the seat of the strategos of a province. The

<sup>101</sup> Antigoneia in Chalkidike; Skymnos 621 (*G. G. M.* 1, p. 221); Livy 44, 10, cf. 42, 58; it was fairly near Kassandreia. For the other two see ch. 11, notes 4 and 21.

<sup>102</sup> The Alexandria-name of Bactra is preserved in Chinese sources in the corrupted form Lan-chi; Specht, *Journ. Asiat.*, ser. 8, vol. 2, p. 321; ser. 9, vol. 10, pp. 159-61.

<sup>103</sup> Alexandreschate.

three cities known were founded in three outlying provinces that, once Macedonian, had had to be reconquered; the outlying provinces were ruled by strategoi; and it seems very difficult to avoid drawing the inference that here we have, on the analogy of the Alexandrias, the seats of the strategoi of Chalkidike, Paionia, and Atintania respectively.

A question that must have arisen early for decision was that of the capital. Aigai had been the old capital of the Argeadai. The capital of Philip and Alexander had been Pella. Both Kassandros and Demetrios had built themselves new cities; and, whether Pella remained the nominal capital or not, Kassandros seems to have treated Kassandreia, where his worship was instituted,<sup>104</sup> as his own seat. Lysimachos, and after him Arsinoe, may have done the same.<sup>105</sup> Demetrios may have meant Demetrias for his personal capital, though it is not very clear. But the actual centre of power, as was natural in the then state of the world, had steadily shifted southward.

Antigonos wisely refrained from building himself yet another capital, and made Pella again the actual seat of government. It is possible, too, that from Pella had come the family of the old Antigonos.<sup>106</sup> To have built a new great city, after the common fashion of the Successors, would have meant an expenditure of time, energy, and money, which could ill have been spared; it would have run counter to, instead of fostering, the national pride of the Macedonians; and at best it could only have produced a city of the second class. Another Kassandreia might have been possible; another Alexandria or Antioch was not, for the simple reason that Antigonos' sphere already included one of the great cities of the world. And even though Athens, in the nature of the case, could not be his official capital, the attraction which she still exercised on every form of greatness must have prevented the formation of any real rival.

Pella, indeed, on its fresh-water lake, possessed distinct

<sup>104</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178; if Kydias was priest of Kassandros.

<sup>105</sup> Lysimachos worshipped at Kassandreia, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 196. On Arsinoe's rule there for her own and Lysimachos' son see ch. 5, pp. 130, 134.

<sup>106</sup> This would depend on his rather enigmatical relationship to Marsyas of Pella; see Beloch 3, 2, 89.



disadvantages. It was notoriously unhealthy,<sup>107</sup> and it was situated too far to the north to be a convenient centre for overlooking the affairs of Greece. Antigonos is, naturally, often found at Demetrias or Athens. But Pella, where his marriage had been celebrated, and the worship of Pan officially instituted, ~~was the real and not merely the official capital, both of Antigonos and of all his dynasty; and Antigonos had emphasized his return to the national centre of the kingdom by abandoning his father's Poseidon upon his tetradrachms and substituting for the god of the lost seas the goddess of the most famous temple in Pella, Athene Alkis or Alkidemos. And if Pella lay far to the north, that had its advantages also. For Antigonos, by entrusting the affairs of Greece to Krateros, gained leisure to attend to Macedonia himself; and Pella was a convenient centre from which to carry out and maintain his measures for the defence of his northern frontier against the barbarian.~~ For the northern frontier was constantly threatened with invasion: not only by secular enemies like the southern Illyrians, or the Thracian Maedi, but also by Gaulish tribes, who perpetually tended to overflow southward from the Danube valley, and one of whose peoples, the Scordisci, was already firmly established in Servia, while others had formed the kingdom of Tylis in the interior of Thrace. But most dangerous of all were the Dardanians, an Illyrian stock who held the country about the upper Axios and part of what is now Roumania, where they had enslaved the original inhabitants. Brave, barbarous, and dirty—they washed, ran the proverb, but thrice in a lifetime, at birth, marriage, and death—they could put into the field a large force of heavy-armed men, accompanied, after the Spartan fashion, by a host of armed slaves; and the Dardanian court became the refuge of every enemy of the Macedonian crown.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>107</sup> Athen. 8, 352 a.

<sup>108</sup> Maedi: their habitual incursions, Livy 26, 25, 7 (a strong passage), 28, 5, 7. — Scordisci: C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, 1, 302; and see ch. 6, n. 69. — Dardani: customs, Strab. 7, 316; slaves, Agathark. ap. Athen. 6, 272 d (some had over 1,000); heavy-armed, Livy 31, 43. See generally Patsch in *P. W.*, s.v. The origin of the proverb *τρὶς τοῦ βίου λέλονται ὥσπερ Δαρδανεύς* is explained by Fick, *Hattiden*, p. 34.

The measures for the defence of the North must have constituted far the most important of all Antigonos' acts. Naturally, the wretched fragments of the tradition scarcely contain a hint of them; but it is known that they were successfully carried through. Macedonia was not again seriously invaded from the north for nearly fifty years, when the conquests of the Bastarnae drove the Dardanians south<sup>109</sup> to a war that ended in the death of Demetrios II, and precipitated the crisis that called Doson to the throne, a crisis not, however, for a moment comparable with that of 279. We may conjecture that among other things a system of fortified posts was introduced, exactly as Aetolia after the Gallic invasion was covered with hill-forts to prevent the repetition of any such catastrophe.<sup>110</sup> But in addition to this, Antigonos, like every one of his successors—Demetrios II, Doson, Philip V, Perseus—must have been perpetually fighting on the northern frontier, though in his case the record is lost. The barriers could only be kept up by the strong hand; and Antigonos can hardly have escaped the common lot of his dynasty, to be recalled time after time to the northern frontier, leaving other undertakings half finished;<sup>111</sup> while the necessity of keeping up a proper system of frontier defence deprived him, as it deprived every Macedonian king, of a considerable part of his effective strength in the field.

But the Antigonid kings had their reward; and many must have realized the ability with which Antigonos had handled the barbarians and secured the safety of the countries under his rule, when they looked across the sea to Asia Minor,

<sup>109</sup> Trog. *Prol.* 28. See ch. 12, p. 365.

<sup>110</sup> The Aetolian hill-forts: Soteriades, *Εφ. Ἀρχ.* 1900, p. 170. The same may be conjectured for Macedonia from the number of forts mentioned in the wars with Rome, e.g. Livy 31, 27.

<sup>111</sup> Demetrios II fell in battle with the Dardani; Doson had to leave the Peloponnese prematurely and hurry back to meet an Illyrian invasion and his death; the fuller record of Philip V shows constant wars with Illyrians, Dardanians, and Maedi, culminating in a scheme (Livy 40, 57) to destroy the Dardani altogether by means of the Bastarnae; Perseus had to spend the autumn of the first year of his war with Rome campaigning in Illyria (Livy 43, 18–20). There is perhaps an allusion to a lost campaign of Gonatas in the North in Athen. 8, 340f; for Antagoras was only with him between 276 and 274, and no other fighting at that time is known.

and saw the great towns there humbly paying tribute with both hands; blackmail to the Galatians in return for immunity from plunder, and war taxes to Antiochos to enable him to bridle those same Galatians, who all the time—so rumour whispered—were blackmailing Antiochos himself.<sup>112</sup>

From 277 to 168 Macedonia, under the Antigonids, was the shield and bulwark of Greece, preserving Greek civilization from the possibility of being swamped by northern barbarism before its work was done, before it had yet taught Rome and through Rome the whole modern world; Macedonia and her kings stood in the gap till Rome was ready and able, with greater resources, to take up the work. This is the text of the panegyric on Macedonia which Polybios of Megalopolis has put into the mouth of the Akarnanian Lykiskos; if Aetolia deserved thanks for saving Greece *once*, what do the Macedonian kings deserve, seeing that they spend nearly the whole of their lives in fighting barbarians to ensure the safety of Hellas? This is the argument with which the Roman conqueror of Philip V cut short the savagery of his Aetolian allies, when they clamoured for the abolition of the Macedonian kingdom; without Macedonia, Greece would lie under the heel of the Thracian, the Illyrian, and the Gaul. Republican Rome herself, when her time came, hardly and with many failures kept out the northerners; the Antigonids on the whole managed it with success. This is the real importance of the Antigonid dynasty in history: to this work Greek historian and Roman conqueror have alike paid their tribute.<sup>113</sup>

The attempt must now be made to ascertain what Antigonos considered his 'sphere', as a necessary preliminary to any treatment of his relations with other states, both at this time and later. He had very clear-cut ideas as to which parts of the world concerned him and which did not, ideas not of course recorded in the fragments of the tradition, but trans-

<sup>112</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 210; *O. G. I.* 223, l. 28; Livy 38, 16, 13.

<sup>113</sup> For Polybios see 9, 28–39, where he gives first a denunciation of Macedonia by the mouth of the Aetolian Chlaineas, and then (32 seq.) a defence of Macedonia as the bulwark (πρόφραγμα) of Greece by the mouth of the Akarnanian Lykiskos. I quote here freely from 35. I shall come to Chlaineas in ch. 10. — Flamininus' words; Polyb. 18, 37, 9 = Livy 33, 12, 10.

lated with unmistakable clearness into action at different periods of his life. The sweeping assertion of a modern historian, that 'the aim of the Antigonid kings was to reduce as large a portion of Greece as possible',<sup>114</sup> is, as regards Gonatas, peculiarly ill-founded even for a sweeping assertion; the facts go so very far in the opposite direction. It may be well, therefore, to state very briefly how the case does really seem to stand; the remainder of this history will either prove or disprove what is here stated.

Antigonos was, and meant to be, a Macedonian king of Macedonians; nothing more, but that fully, with all that it implied. It implied that Macedonia was to be ruled in her own interest, and made a stable state again on her own foundations; and it also implied that matters must be so ordered, if possible, as to prevent Macedonia being deprived of, or imperilled in, her place as a great Power; her standing must not be threatened. Various consequences followed from this. One was that Macedonia proper must some day be restored to her most extended boundaries. Hence districts which had once been Macedonian, such as Paionia (now independent), or Atintania (now in the hands of Pyrrhos), fell within the sphere. A second was that the days of Asiatic adventure were absolutely at an end. Antigonos was on excellent terms now with Antiochos his brother-in-law; the good understanding between the two was to take its place for many years as one of the stable factors of current politics. The two empires did not clash at any point; and Macedonian interests ended with the Thracian frontier. Save in one matter of a guardianship,<sup>115</sup> a purely personal affair, it is not recorded that Antigonos had anything to do with Asia again.

A third was, that the policy of Demetrios in Greece was reversed. Demetrios had definitely sought a preponderance of power over all the other states of the peninsula; Antigonos sought nothing of the kind. Demetrios had had ideas of world-rule; Antigonos wished to be a national king in his own country. Demetrios had thrust Macedonia into the

<sup>114</sup> Freeman, *Federal Government*, p. 179 (ed. Bury).

<sup>115</sup> Of the children of Nikomedes of Bithynia, Memnon 22.



background of his policy, and had toyed with sentimental phil-Hellenism ; now the king of Macedonia was to put the interests of Macedonia before those of Greece. It had been, no doubt, a generous aspiration on the part of Alexander and Demetrios to desire to be head of a league of Greek states, to be a Greek as well as a Macedonian king ; but, after all, this policy had been a complete failure, and Antigonos, as king of the Macedonians, can hardly be blamed for reverting, in the interests of his own people, to a policy which he had some chance of carrying through.

Save for two reasons, Antigonos might have left Greece alone altogether. The first was the danger to Macedonia. Rightly or wrongly, he thought that the security of Macedonia demanded that Greece must not unite, either of herself or under the hegemony of Egypt ; and this conditioned all Antigonos' dealings with Greece. The central point of the situation was Corinth ; that great fortress was to be held, at whatever cost. It had already proved its enormous value ; it was to do so again and again. But if it was to be held, it could not be left in the air. Antigonos ruled Thessaly, to which he probably considered his title as legal as to Macedonia ; but Aetolia and Boeotia cut land communication between Demetrias and Corinth, and Egypt ruled the sea. It was necessary, therefore, to hold Euboea as an alternative route.<sup>116</sup> He who held Chalkis held Euboea ; so Chalkis had become of necessity a great fortress, second only to Corinth : and both were in one hand, that of Krateros, so that the strategos of Corinth might also control the necessary communications northward. Antigonos was fortunate in his governor ; for Krateros' loyalty was undoubted, and indeed the good relations of the two brothers became proverbial.<sup>117</sup> So far, then, as Corinth went, this was all that was at present necessary or possible ; no more possessions in Greece were needed or desired ; but at a later period it was found necessary to secure the communications of Corinth with Attica by conquering the Megarid.

The second reason was the sentimental, or spiritual, value

<sup>116</sup> Polyb. 2, 52, 7.

<sup>117</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 486 A.

of Athens, a matter none the less real and important because intangible. Antigonos must have looked on Athens as his intellectual capital; certainly he could not allow any other power to dominate the city, or even acquire preponderating influence there. It was for this reason that he held Piraeus. Piraeus was as vital to him as Chalkis, but for quite another reason; and as it was held for the sake of Athens and not for the sake of Corinth, it was therefore (as has been seen) not put under Krateros but under a separate strategos. The strategos at this time was Hierokles of Karia, a man who had already proved his loyalty in a subordinate position.<sup>118</sup>

Outside these limits, Greece was free and independent. It is true that Antigonos in 276 still held a few small places in the Peloponnese; but these were merely a survival of his one-time Greek 'kingdom', and as they broke off one by one he made small effort to retain them. He had already lost Troizen without a struggle; in 275 he lost three of the remaining Achaean towns, Aigion, Boura, Keryneia.<sup>119</sup> The remaining three were probably lost in the war with Pyrrhos; if he continued to hold one or two small places in Arkadia or the Argolid, that is the most that he did; and there is no evidence that he did even this. Now that he had the revenues of Macedonia he no longer depended on taxes from Greek cities; while his proceedings after Pyrrhos' death seem to show that he understood that the conquest and garrisoning of this or that city state, which in the nature of things his empire could not assimilate, was a source not of strength but of weakness. Peloponnese south of Corinth formed no part of his sphere, and he had no more intention of setting up strategoi there than Alexander had of instituting satraps in India.<sup>120</sup>

It will be seen then that, Thessaly excepted, the relations of Antigonos with Greece hinge on two absolutely uncon-

<sup>118</sup> Hierokles is called τῷ τὴν Μουνυχίαν ἔχοντι καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ (Diog. L. 4, 39) and τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς (ib. 2, 127). There can be no doubt he was strategos; and the time of the latter reference is fixed by Menedemos' exile to *circ.* 273-272. — For his earlier services see ch. 4, p. 104.

<sup>119</sup> Polyb. 2, 41, 13-15. Cf. Beloch 3, 2, 306.

<sup>120</sup> This is a noteworthy point in Antigonos' policy; for Kassandros had had a strategos of the Peloponnese, Diod. 19, 64.

nected points—Corinth for the sake of safety, Athens for the sake of culture. It may be as well now to indicate briefly the position of Macedonia with regard to the several states individually.

Thessaly had for long been essentially a part of Macedonia, and it may be that (as language suggests) the Macedonian was recognized as being nearer of kin to the Thessalian than to other Greeks. It had had an ancient League of its own, grouped round the federal cult of Athene Itonia, and under the headship of a sort of military dictator, the tagos; Pelopidas had reorganized the League on the Boeotian model, under an archon, and though Philip II had cut the League into four, he had had to end, in 344, by restoring its unity.<sup>121</sup> Save for various assertions of independence—in the Lamian war, for instance, and during the Gallic invasion—the country had, since Philip, remained a Macedonian possession; but the Macedonian kings looked on it as occupying a peculiar position towards themselves, and considered that its loss would be, not as the loss of any other Greek possession, but almost as the loss of part of Macedonia.<sup>122</sup> Thessalian cities, moreover, officially dated by the regnal years of the Macedonian kings.<sup>123</sup> The best explanation of these facts, and also of the separate lists of the Macedonian kings as 'kings of Thessaly', which appear in the annalists, is that the Macedonian king *had* a legal position in Thessaly, and that he was the official head of the Thessalian League, occupying (but occupying for life) the position held by the old tagos and by the later federal archon, perhaps with the peculiar control over the troops of the state which the tagos had exercised.<sup>124</sup> It agrees with this that the Macedonian kings took into their own hands the celebration of the national Magnesian festival, the Hetairideia, traditionally founded by

<sup>121</sup> On the old League, H. Francotte, *La Polis grecque*, 175 seq.; G. Fougères, art. *κοινόν* in *Dar.-Sagl.* — The restoration of the League's unity by Philip II depends solely upon *I. G.* ii, 184 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 159, but this suffices.

<sup>122</sup> Livy 32, 10, 7.

<sup>123</sup> Decree of Krannon, *G. D. I.* 361 A.

<sup>124</sup> Monceaux in *Rev. Arch.* 1888, 1, p. 221; Fougères *l. c.*; Kaerst 1, 182. This explains why the list of the kings of Thessaly is succeeded without a break by that of the strategoi of the later league.

Jason.<sup>125</sup> In this way the effective sovereignty of Macedonia was reconciled with the continued existence of the Thessalian League: the autonomous government of the country remained in name, but was liable in practice to be overridden. Forms apart, the Thessalian differed nothing from the Macedonian: both alike did the bidding of the Macedonian king.<sup>126</sup>

The Thessalians can hardly have exercised any free choice in the appointment of Macedonian kings as presidents of their League; but no doubt all forms were observed. The country, however, was at present a source of weakness to Antigonos. He had probably been compelled to reconquer it by the sword. The Thessalian nobility had not played a very glorious part in the events of Brennus' invasion; and many of them must have been correspondingly sore, not merely because they had done a discreditable thing which had failed, but also because they found themselves under a king whose title of honour was derived from the defeat of Brennus' compatriots. We do in fact hear of irreconcilables, like that Theodoros of Larisa, a water-drinker, and therefore (in the eyes of the then world), a peculiar if not dangerous person, who remained a consistent opponent of Antigonos all his life.<sup>127</sup> It is doubtful if Larisa ever became contented with Macedonian rule;<sup>128</sup> and certainly Thessaly was to take the first opportunity of revolting against Antigonos.

With the affairs of Northern Greece Antigonos did not attempt to interfere. He sought as little to acquire influence as to conquer. Phokis, Lokris, Doris, might remain as independent as Aetolia or Epeiros for all that it concerned him. Even with Boeotia, for which his father had fought so hard

<sup>125</sup> Hegesand. ap. Athen. 13, 572 d. See Hoffmann, *op. c.*, p. 93.

<sup>126</sup> Polyb. 4, 76, 2. — Larisa under Philip V was still governed by ταγοί, whether or not a Macedonian ἐπιστάτης was added; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 239.

<sup>127</sup> Phylarch. ap. Athen. 2, 44 b. The common opinion about water-drinkers is shown by some one troubling to compile a list of them (Athen. 2, 44 b-f, and by Philemon upon Zeno (Diog. L. 7, 27) φιλοσοφίαν καινήν γὰρ οἶτος φιλοσοφεί . . . ἐπιτεῖν ὕδωρ.

<sup>128</sup> Larisa was disaffected under Philip V; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 239. It had always been markedly anti-Macedonian; see Thrasymachos ὑπὲρ τῶν Λαρισαίων (ap. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6, 624 c), who makes them say Ἀρχελῖαφ δουλεύομεν Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάρω.



and which he had once held himself, he did not seek to revise relations: it remained absolutely independent. Even had he desired to reconquer Boeotia—a thing of which no trace whatever remains—he could not at present have attempted it; there was far too much to do in Macedonia in the way of organization. Some participation in the affairs of the North could, however, hardly be avoided; for he was still bound to Pyrrhos by the secret treaty, and he was moreover in possession of a kingdom of which part had actually been in Pyrrhos' hands. If and when Pyrrhos should return, the position might become acute; but till then Antigonos had nothing to fear from Epeiros. The affairs of the North, at this time, really resolved themselves into his relationship with Aetolia.

~~The events of 279 had given Aetolia a sense of new national life and new ambitions.~~ She had stood forward as the champion of Greece; she had done deeds which poets yet unborn were to sing of to her children's children.<sup>129</sup> Henceforth she began to dream of a career of greatness. She was in fact the one state in Greece that was able throughout all her history to stand absolutely alone, in complete independence of both Egypt and Macedonia; she steered her own course. She already knew the lines on which she would work; she meant to operate by means of the control of Delphi and of the Amphiktyonic League.

Aetolia has been damned for ever in the pages of Polybios. But, in considering Aetolian policy at this time, we shall make a great mistake if we do not dissociate our minds from matters that belong to quite a later epoch. So far, Aetolia seems to have had only one recorded bad deed to her credit;<sup>130</sup> few Greek states could boast of less. She was to commit others before Gonatas died; but this was not yet. She had succeeded in 304 in mediating between Demetrios and Rhodes; and her control of Delphi, for a time at least, was to be entirely honourable to both parties. Delphi, fallen on evil days since the oracle had medised in the

<sup>129</sup> *I. G.* ix, 2, 62 = Michel 296 = *G. D. I.* 1440.

<sup>130</sup> In 314 she had received the surrender of Agrinion on terms of sparing the lives of the inhabitants, and had then slain them; *Diod.* 19, 68, 1.

fifth century, was to be quickened to new vitality and authority. She was to play a large and prominent part in that growing movement which led to so many well-known temples in Greece becoming the scene of an increasing number of manumissions of slaves.<sup>131</sup> It had always been her tradition to use her influence for the purpose of humanizing war;<sup>132</sup> but now Delphi and Aetolia between them were to bring about what was almost a new thing in the world. With the Aetolian domination over Delphi begins that most astonishing third-century achievement, the creation of numerous fresh 'asylums'<sup>133</sup> or centres of peace, under

<sup>131</sup> On the way in which the number of manumissions began to go up in the Macedonian epoch, see A. Calderini, *La manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia*, 1908, ch. 5.

<sup>132</sup> For cases in the sixth and fifth centuries see C. Philippson, *International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome*, 2, p. 219.

<sup>133</sup> They were not of course unknown before the third century; see e.g. such cases as Alalkomenai in Boeotia, Strab. 9, 413; Kalauria, whose *δουλία* was preserved by the Macedonian kings, Strab. 8, 374; and cf. the various religious truces. A fifth-century treaty (between Oiantheia and Chalaion, Michel 3) also exists which restricted the right of reprisal, *σῦλα*. — As the subject is important, I give a list of 'asyla' in whose formation Delphi or Aetolia played a leading part.

(i) First half of third century. Temple of Poseidon and Amphitrite on Tenos, erected between 278–261 (perhaps *circ.* 270/69, Graindor in *Musée Belge*, 1911, p. 254); built in response to a Delphic oracle, Tac. *Ann.* 3, 63; decree of the League of the Phokians declaring both temple and island *ἄσυλα* (*I. G.* ix, 1, 97; see *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, p. xvi, n. 1314), no doubt in response to a lead given by Delphi, as the Phokian decree was to be set up there. Possible fragment of the Aetolian decree declaring both temple and island *ἄσυλα*; P. Graindor in *Musée Belge*, 14 (1910), p. 43, no. 22, enlarging *I. G.* xii, 5, 857. See *I. G.* xii, 5, 867, 868.

(ii) *Circ.* 252. Decree of the Aetolians, that Delos is to be safe from them and the cities of their League. See ch. 12, n. 32.

(iii) *Circ.* 242–238. Temple of Aphrodite Stratonikis at Smyrna, built in response to a Delphic oracle (Tac. *Ann.* 3, 63), was declared *ἄσυλον* and Smyrna itself *ἱερὰ καὶ ἄσυλος*. Seleukos II, in getting the necessary consents, was obeying a Delphic oracle; and the Delphic decree of *ἀσυλία* remains; *O. G. I.* 228, see also *O. G. I.* 229, l. 12.

(iv) Same for Miletos and the temple of Apollo at Didyma, possibly a little earlier than (iii); R. Herzog, *Sitzungsb. d. k. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.* 1905, p. 979 (decree of Miletos).

(v) 221/20. City and territory of Magnesia on the Maeander, following on the epiphany of the goddess Artemis Leukophryene: *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 256 to 261; Michel 1495 (the Athenian response). The recognition as *ἱερὰ καὶ ἄσυλος* was in pursuance of a Delphic oracle to that effect; the Aetolian decree confirming it for their part is *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 923. Note that the response of Ithaka speaks, not of a Delphic oracle, as the Athenian response does, but *καθὼς ὁ Ἀπόλλων ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀνιέρωσεν* (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 257, l. 17).

(vi) Between 205 and 202; Alabanda (Antioch τοῦ τῶν Χρυσαστρέων ἔθνους)

the shield of the Delphian Apollo, temples or towns or territory declared inviolable and placed outside the ravages of war by the formal consent of as many civilized states as could be obtained. If the Aetolians were traditionally a nation of robbers, at least they used their power over Apollo to exempt, in Apollo's name, city after city from their depredations. Aetolia was, no doubt, on probation; to become a great power, she must be on her good behaviour. But there is no reason whatever to suppose that, at this time, her good behaviour was not entirely genuine.

The Aetolian control of Delphi did not become absolute at once. For instance, it is not known whether, as yet, she kept a governor in the town, as she certainly did later;<sup>134</sup> and it is known that at this time she was not yet using Delphi as the repository of her archives, which were still kept at Thermos.<sup>135</sup> In process of time she was to have all her decrees set up in duplicate at Thermos and at Delphi, as a matter of course;<sup>136</sup> and her authority over Delphi became so absolute that she not only kept a governor there, but could and did pass

and its territory rendered *ἄσυλος* and *ιερά*; decree of the Amphiktyons, *O. G. I.* 234.

(vii) *Circ.* 203; city and territory of Teos rendered *ιερά καὶ ἄσυλος*. Decrees of Delphi (Michel 67), of the Aetolians (ib. 68=*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 280), and of various Cretan communities, Michel 52-66. Unedited decree for two envoys from Teos, Pomtow, *P. W., Delphoi*, 2631. — This *ἄσυλία* is remarkable as having been recognized by a decree of the Roman senate; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 279, Michel 51.

(viii) End of third or beginning of second century; temple of Apollo Ptoios at Akraiphia. Amphiktyonic decree making it *ἄσυλος*, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 557; a copy of the decree was to be kept at Delphi, and the hieromnemes were to see that it was brought to the notice of all cities and peoples.

(ix) Same period; Kyzikos. Decree of Delphi making the city *ιερά*, *B. C. H.* 4, 1880, p. 473.

(x) *Circ.* 179-172. Temenos of Athene Nikephoros at Pergamon; decree of the Aetolians, at the request of Eumenes II, making it *ἄσυλον τὰ ἀπ' Αἰτωλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν Αἰτωλῶνι κατοικούντων*, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 295=*G. D. I.* 1413.

No doubt, when all the documents are published, it will appear that the *ἄσυλία* of the temple of Asklepios at Kos, *circ.* 250, falls in the same category. — Of the above, nos. (iii) and (v) to (ix) are mentioned by Hiller von Gaertringen, *Delphoi* in *P. W.*, cols. 2570, 2571.

<sup>134</sup> Aetolian governor of Delphi, *circ.* 224-200, *G. D. I.* 2672; *κατασταθεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἐπιμελητὰς τοῦ τε ἱερ[οῦ καὶ τὰς πόλ[ι]ος*.

<sup>135</sup> Treaty between Aetolia and Akarnania (Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1905, p. 55), *circ.* 276-273: the Aetolians are to set it up at Thermos, the Akarnanians at Aktion, and the two jointly at Olympia, Delphi, and Dodona.

<sup>136</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 923 (between 216 and 205); *I. G.* ix, 2, 205=*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 425=Michel 22=*G. D. I.* 1415 (shortly before 200); *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 295=*G. D. I.* 1413 (*circ.* 179-172); *G. D. I.* 1412 (date uncertain).

decrees of her own regulating the internal affairs of the city.<sup>137</sup> It does not appear that Delphi ever became a member of the Aetolian League; but it is noteworthy that, in freeing a slave, a citizen of Delphi would often date by the Aetolian strategos as well as by his own archon.<sup>138</sup> It may be worth noticing that the movement for making 'asylums' grows in force as the Aetolian control of Delphi becomes more complete.

Politically, the ambition of Aetolia was clear-cut. Delphi was the centre of the Amphiktyonic League, and Aetolia meant to control that League. Philip II had shown how the control of this religious body could be made a considerable instrument of temporal power; Aetolia meant that his mantle should fall upon herself and not upon Antigonos of Macedonia, and that she should be the League's sword. The Amphiktyonic states were to be her sphere; she looked forward to the day when she should include them all in her own polity, and make the Aetolian League coterminous with the Amphiktyonic. It was a policy that offered considerable scope; Amphiktyonic decrees could be made to assume a very different importance in the world with Aetolia as executive. In fact, very shortly after the repulse of the Gauls, the Amphiktyons were already claiming to impose their decrees upon states that were no parties to them;<sup>139</sup> and at no distant date cities that had been fined by the Amphiktyons found it to their profit to apply for remission, not to the Amphiktyons, but to the Aetolians direct.<sup>140</sup> In the end, Aetolia did get complete control of the Amphiktyonic League, though the fiction of its independence was still maintained.<sup>141</sup> But it was a policy which, when first entered on, seemed bound to bring Aetolia into collision with Antigonos.

In 285 Aetolia, as the friend of Pyrrhos, had become the friend of Antigonos also. But in 276 she can have felt little goodwill toward the king whose Celtic victory had deprived

<sup>137</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 485 = *G. D. I.* 1409.

<sup>138</sup> For references see Dittenberger, note 3 to *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 485.

<sup>139</sup> *I. G.* ii, 551 = *G. D. I.* 2506. See Niese ii, 221.

<sup>140</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 250.

<sup>141</sup> Polyb. 4, 25, 8; this was in 220, when the Aetolians controlled fourteen of the twenty-four votes; see Beloch 3, 2, 350.



her own exploits of some of their lustre ; and she must have seen that, when Pyrrhos returned, a conflict between him and Antigonos would be inevitable, and she would have to choose her side. When the time came, both her traditional friendship for Pyrrhos and her traditional policy of supporting the second state against the first were to incline her, definitely if not heartily, to the side of the Epeirot king. But in 276 the future was uncertain, and in view of eventualities she strengthened herself by that alliance with Akarnania—a country traditionally friendly to Macedonia—which has already been referred to,<sup>142</sup> and which gave her the call of the Akarnanian levies should necessity arise. But this was a matter apart from the question of the Amphiktyonic League.

Aetolia's control of Delphi already gave her a strong position in this respect ; she held the Amphiktyonic meeting-place. Either now or later, too, she so managed that the secretary of the Amphiktyonic League was always an Aetolian.<sup>143</sup> But for the time being she did not control many votes ; in this respect Antigonos had the advantage of her. Of the 24 votes, the Macedonian king controlled 7, namely those of the Thessalians (2), the Magnes (2), the Achaeans of Phthiotis (2), and the Perrhaibians (1) ; all these peoples were included in Macedonian Thessaly. Aetolia was not even an Amphiktyonic state ; she had originally no votes of her own. But neither had Philip II. At the moment Aetolia owned two votes only ; the incorporation of Western Lokris in her League had given her one of the Lokrian votes, the incorporation of Herakleia one of the Malian. But four votes had been ownerless. These were the votes originally of Phokis (2), Perrhaibia (1), and the Dolopes (1), which had been taken from them by Philip II after the Sacred War, leaving Phokis disfranchised and the Perrhaibians and Dolopes with but one vote apiece. Philip II had caused two of these votes to be given to Delphi, and two to himself as his personal possession ; Alexander in some way acquired the two Delphic votes, and thus had four of his own, which, however, he seems to have exercised through Delphic citizens.

<sup>142</sup> See ch. 5, n. 20.

<sup>143</sup> *G. D. I.*, vol. 2, p. 672.

These four votes never passed to Macedonia ; they became the personal possession of Alexander's heirs ; and with the death of Alexander's son they fell into abeyance. What happened to them in the interval is unknown. But the Amphiktyons at some time or other—it can hardly have been before Aetolia controlled Delphi—gave two of these votes back to the Delphians ; and after the events of 279 Phokis was rewarded for her bravery against the Celts by the restoration to her of the other two votes.<sup>144</sup> It is impossible not to see the hand of Aetolia in all this. Aetolia earned the gratitude of Phokis by restoring her to the position of which she had been deprived, the gratitude of Delphi by restoring her to the position in which she had been placed, by a Macedonian king ; and as Aetolia controlled Delphi, the Delphic votes would of course be cast as she directed. But as Aetolia had no power in the matter, and must have relied upon persuasion and the glamour of her victories, we see—it can be seen also in other ways—that at this time, among the small states of the North, Aetolia was popular.

Even so, however, Antigonos controlled seven votes while Aetolia actually controlled only four. But one point that comes out clearly from the Delphic inscriptions is that, between 279 and Kynoskephalai (so far as the records go), no hieromnemes from the peoples under Macedonian control ever attended or voted.<sup>145</sup> It remains to seek the reason. To

<sup>144</sup> For the reader's convenience the Amphiktyonic votes may be given here. Before the Sacred War, the following had two votes apiece : Thessalians, Magnetes, Phthiot Achaeans, Perrhaibians, Dolopes, Phokians, Boeotians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ionians, Malians, Ainianes. For the arrangements under Philip and Alexander, given in the text, see *G. D. I.* 2504, and *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 140, l. 149, with Dittenberger's notes. Of Alexander's four votes, two were, after 279, restored to Phokis (*I. G.* ii, 551, cf. Paus. 10, 8, 3) ; the other two were at some time or other given back to Delphi. (Which votes were which is not material here ; see Kaerst 1, 172, n. 3.) The list then, *circa* 277, stood as follows : Aetolia 2 (i.e. 1 Lokrian and 1 Malian), Delphi 2, Phokis 2, Boeotia 2, Dorians 2, Ionians 2, Ainianes 2, Thessalians 2, Magnetes 2, Phthiot Achaeans 2, Lokrians 1, Malians 1, Perrhaibians 1, Dolopes 1. — See generally : Hiller von Gaertringen, *Delphoi* in *P. W.* ; Beloch 3, 2, 322–52.

<sup>145</sup> H. von Gaertringen, *Delphoi* in *P. W.*, col. 2570 ; Beloch 3, 2, 325. — The festival which Antigonos' brother Krateros founded at Delphi in honour of, and in pursuance of a vow made by, his father, when he dedicated the bronze group of 'Alexander's hunting' by Lysippos and Leochares, must date from *before* the Aetolian control of Delphi. For details see P. Perdrizet, *J. H. S.* 1899, p. 273 ; for the monument, Pomtow in *B. Ph.* II. 1912, 1010.

say, as has been said, that Aetolia excluded the Macedonian kings from the Amphiktyony<sup>146</sup> is unsatisfactory; how could Aetolia do this? Her military power was not adequate, at this time, to enable her to face Macedonia; and this is what exclusion must, in the ultimate resort, have meant. Moreover, why should Aetolia exclude (say) an Athenian hieromnemon from the Amphiktyonic meeting while welcoming Athenian theoroi to the Soteria? The reason must be sought on other lines, in the action not so much of Aetolia as of Antigonos.

Aetolia was apparently popular with the states of the North. But Macedonia most certainly was not. Former kings of Macedonia had sought conquests among them; Boeotia or Phokis could not know, as yet, but that Antigonos might pursue the policy of Demetrios and his predecessors. It was therefore a moral certainty that if Antigonos sent his hieromnemones to Delphi they would be outvoted; Phokis, Boeotia, and the little peoples would vote against Macedonia on any question on which the interests of Antigonos and Aetolia conflicted. And Antigonos could not afford that his men should go to Delphi to be outvoted, that Macedonia should appear in the Amphiktyonic Assembly as on a level with the Ainiānes or Doris. The only alternatives before Antigonos were complete control or complete abstention. Control meant a policy of conquest sufficient to give him at least thirteen votes; it must have ended in a collision with Aetolia. In such a collision he might have been victorious. But none knew better than Antigonos how precarious his position in Macedonia was as yet; much was to be done, and years must elapse, before he should be secure on his throne. He did not desire aggression in Northern Greece; he did not desire war; most certainly he did not desire a war with Aetolia. He chose therefore the policy of abstention; he decided that his hieromnemones should never appear at Delphi, and that he would have nothing to do with the other Amphiktyonic states or the Amphiktyonic League. He recognized them as the sphere of Aetolia. The power of Aetolia certainly counted for something in his choice; but it

<sup>146</sup> Beloch, *l. c.* This is the basis of his arrangement of the archon dates.

is permissible to believe that the welfare of his own country counted for more. In a few years time his policy was to bear fruit; Macedonia was thenceforth, while he lived, to be on terms of peace with Aetolia, terms even of friendship. But his policy of abstention was to remain absolute; and no state whose representatives appear at an Amphiktyonic session can be a state controlled, at the time, by Antigonos.<sup>147</sup>

Such was the position in Northern Greece. In the Peloponnese Antigonos equally sought no conquests, and did not even trouble much to keep the cities which he had originally held. But here the situation differed. Here the strongest state was unalterably hostile to Macedonia; Sparta would attack him if and when she could. / But at present Sparta was quiescent; and Argos and Megalopolis, though independent,<sup>148</sup> were committed, both by traditional policy and immediate self-interest, to keeping a jealous watch on Sparta, and acted as a check on her, acted inevitably, though independent, in the interests of the northern power that was Sparta's enemy. The situation was not one calling for any immediate action; and Antigonos, with more important matters on hand, could let the Peloponnese be, so long as no new factor arose. Even had Sparta wished to attack him, she would have found considerable difficulty in doing so to any good purpose, for she had no fleet and could not pass the Isthmus. Her hostility would not become of great moment unless she had the backing of some strong sea-power; and what happened in the Peloponnese depended primarily on the policy of Egypt.

That policy, as initiated by the first Lagid, was simple and intelligible. Hold the sea, and stir up trouble for the Mace-

<sup>147</sup> I follow Beloch's conclusion here, though I have ventured to give a different reason for arriving at it. The consequence is that I follow in substance Beloch's arrangement of the Delphic archons. All systems are very provisional; but Beloch's commends itself by allowing for the steady growth of the Aetolian vote, in place of the spasmodic variations which appear in the lists of Pomtow, and of A. Mommsen in *Philol.* 60, 1901, p. 25. Moreover, the only new material known to me since Beloch wrote is said to confirm one part of his list, and in particular the important dating of Archiadas Eudokos and Straton (see ch. 9, n. 27) to 273/2-271/70; É. Bourguet, *B. C. H.* 1911, pp. 456, 481 (on a yet unpublished Amphiktyonic list).

<sup>148</sup> Ch. 5, n. 44.



donian in Greece by posing as the champion and protector of Greek independence; such was the sufficient formula. It was, it is true, a policy that was bound to end in bringing Macedonia and Egypt into collision, if and when the former should be strong enough; at the same time, scientifically carried out, it might prevent Macedonia from ever becoming strong enough.

It looked, however, for the time being, as if this policy slept with Ptolemy Soter in his grave. For his son and successor, Ptolemy II Philadelphos, was of a very different nature. Alone of the kings of his time he was no warrior; his dealings with the war-god had consisted in putting two of his brothers to death in good Oriental fashion.<sup>149</sup> The prince who presided over Egypt's age of gold was but a sickly creature, a devotee of pleasure in all its forms, ever seeking new pastimes and new sensations,<sup>150</sup> whether among his mistresses, or in the gorgeous pleasure-fleet that he kept on the Nile,<sup>151</sup> or in his menagerie of strange animals from far-off lands;<sup>152</sup> one who exhausted every form of luxury, and who, prostrated by gout, envied the simple joys of the beggars below his window, even while he dabbled in search after the elixir that should make him immortal.<sup>153</sup> Extremely able, nevertheless; a man of high culture;<sup>154</sup> the first diplomat of his time; governing Egypt well, from the point of view of the Macedonian ruling caste, and amassing from it great treasures, as from a well-managed estate; distinguished above all by the encouragement which, following his father's example, he gave to learning, art, and science, whereby he has made his name famous. His own tastes seem to have been opposed to war, and the first ten years of his reign were uniformly pacific; secure in the command of the Aegean and the friendship of Sparta, there appeared to be no reason for his interference in Greece so long as Antigonos sought no conquests there. In the years following 276 men may

<sup>149</sup> Paus. I, 7, I.

<sup>150</sup> Strab. 17, 789.

<sup>151</sup> The θαλαμηγὰ χρυσόπρυμνα καὶ χρυσέμβολα of Appian, *Prooim.* 10. (Generally on this passage see App. 10, p. 456.)

<sup>152</sup> Kallixenos ap. Athen. 5, 200 f and 201 c; 9, 387 d.

<sup>153</sup> Phylarchos ap. Athen. 12, 536 e.

<sup>154</sup> Ael. *V. H.* 4, 15, μουσικώτατον.

conceivably have begun to dream that peace, so long an exile, had returned to the world.

There was, however, one cause of difference between Macedonia and Egypt that was radical. Antigonos' policy towards Greece hinged on the possession of Corinth; without Corinth, Macedonia might be grievously injured by some combination. And Corinth (Euboea notwithstanding) was cut off from Demetrias by the sea; and the sea was Egyptian. But the sea and its islands had once been the unquestioned possession of Demetrios; wherever he had ruled or not ruled upon land, for twenty years his fleets had been all-powerful; and on his fall the command of the sea had passed into the hands of Egypt without even a struggle. Granting that Macedonia could acquiesce without loss of honour in the independence of an ancient state like Boeotia, or in the federation of the tiny towns of Achaea, could she so acquiesce in the continued dominion of another power over the League which the first Antigonos had created, and over Delos, the symbol of her lost sea-power? Antigonos must be irrevocably impelled, both by loyalty to his father and considerations of the welfare of Macedonia as he understood it, to attempt the recovery of the sea. Egypt then was the one power, beside Sparta, which was clearly marked out as his enemy. At present he had far too much to do to attend to the sea; but many at the court of Alexandria must have foreseen that some day he would try to recover this his father's dominion. Meanwhile there was peace; and the gorgeous edifice of Egyptian power, the home of such dazzling patronage of science and learning as the world had never yet beheld, seemed four-square to every wind.

There remains only the city which for Antigonos was more important even than Egypt. These years were the golden age of his relations with Athens, which he frequently visited.<sup>155</sup> The successor of Philip II was on the very best of terms with the city of Demosthenes; so cordial were they as almost to hide away the fact that Athens was under Antigonos' suzerainty.

<sup>155</sup> Diog. L. 7, 6; and see a soldier's decree from Eleusis, Ferguson, *Priests*, p. 159, n. 75.

The nationalist government of Athens, which had come into power in 280, was still in power in November 277, when the administration was in the hands of a board; Athens must have remained free and independent until some time in 276. But in 276/5 the pro-Macedonians are again at the helm.<sup>156</sup>

The change of government is obviously connected in some way with Antigonos' accession to the throne of Macedonia; but how the altered position in which Athens thenceforth stood to the king was brought about is quite obscure. What is certain is that from 276 to 273 Athens stood in some loose connexion with Antigonos, under which Antigonos was treated as 'king', and for which connexion the term 'suzerainty' may be used; and that during these years a pro-Macedonian government was in power.<sup>157</sup> In 276/5 this party put forward its political confession of faith in the guise of that decree in honour of the veteran Phaidros of Sphettos to which allusion has so often been made;<sup>158</sup> and in 275/4 sacrifices were being offered at Athens 'for the Senate and people of Athens, their wives and children, and Antigonos the king', a phrase eloquent of Antigonos' position.<sup>159</sup> In the autumn of 274 the Great Panathenaia, omitted in the year 278 on account of the troubles of the Gallic invasion, were celebrated afresh at Athens with much pomp. A devoted partisan of the king, Herakleitos, son of Asklepiades of the deme Athmonon, adorned the stadium for the occasion, and dedicated to Athene, giver of victory, a series of pictures illustrative of Antigonos' victory at Lysimacheia, or, as the Athenians put it, 'his struggle against the barbarians for the deliverance of the Hellenes'.<sup>160</sup>

<sup>156</sup> Nationalist government from 280 to Pyanepsion 277, anyhow; ch. 5, p. 137, with n. 52. — Pro-Macedonian government in Euboulos' year, 276/5; *I. G.* ii, 331 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 213, l. 57, Phaidros' son Thymochares is agonothes, and his father assists him. At the same time a single superintendent of the administration replaces the board; *ib.* l. 91 (275/4).

<sup>157</sup> It is no objection to this that Athens sent theoroi to the Soteria at Delphi; for this, unlike the sending of a hieromnemon, was entirely a religious matter, to which Antigonos would not object.

<sup>158</sup> See ch. 2, p. 45, with notes 16 and 20.

<sup>159</sup> *I. G.* ii, 5, 323 b = Michel 1484; the sacrifices referred to were in Polyektos' year, a year before the decree.

<sup>160</sup> *I. G.* ii, 5, 371 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 207 = Michel 1482. The year is not in doubt, as the omitted Panathenaia were those of 278/7 (Ferguson, *Klio*, 8, p. 338); see *I. G.* ii, 321, of that year, which points to a fear of some procession being attacked by some one.

It has been shown already how, at Athens, the old labels of oligarch and democrat gradually lost their meaning, and two new parties were formed, the pro-Macedonians and the Nationalists, each of course containing a more extreme and a more moderate wing. These two parties were to remain; but the Nationalists were already perhaps ripe for some change in their position. In the long war with Antigonos that succeeded Demetrios' downfall the Nationalists had turned for help to many quarters, but had relied chiefly on Lysimachos of Thrace. Not only was Lysimachos dead, but his kingdom had ceased to be; there were in effect now but two great powers outside the peninsula, and one of them, Asia, was on permanently good terms with Antigonos. Hence we shall now find that the Nationalists tend more and more to become simply a pro-Egyptian party. The reason was as simple as inevitable; it arose out of Athens' dependence on foreign corn.

The world contained at this time several much larger cities than Athens; but every one of them—Alexandria and Antioch, Seleukeia and Syracuse, Carthage and Rome—easily fed herself. But Athens had for many years been dependent on foreign corn.<sup>161</sup> So long as she had been a great naval power, the inconvenience of this had only occasionally been felt; but she was now no longer in a position to guarantee her own supply of food. True, there was plenty of corn in the world to feed her; but, as it happened, there was no source of supply which was not open to the control of either Antigonos or Ptolemy, unless perhaps a very little might be got from Boeotia.<sup>162</sup> Macedonia, Thessaly, and Euboea (if Euboea was still in a position to export corn, which is doubtful),<sup>163</sup> belonged to Antigonos; and he cut communication with Paionia. Eastward, the Aegean was an Egyptian lake, which the Egyptian fleet ruled as it pleased: nothing could cross but by leave of Egypt. The islands, in

<sup>161</sup> L. Gernet, 'L'approvisionnement d'Athènes en blé au V<sup>e</sup> et au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle' (*Mélanges d'histoire ancienne*, 1909), has an interesting calculation of what Athens actually required to import, vitiated, however, by acceptance of the figure of 400,000 slaves.

<sup>162</sup> But at the end of the century Oropos was importing; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 547.

<sup>163</sup> A little later Histiaia was importing; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 245 = Michel 346.



fact, were all importing corn themselves,<sup>164</sup> and so to some extent was Asia Minor, notably Ephesos;<sup>165</sup> there may still be read an Ephesian decree of thanks to a Rhodian sea-captain who landed an emergency cargo and broke the local corn-ring.<sup>166</sup> The only countries eastward that could export, putting aside Egypt herself (who could feed Athens and to spare), seem to have been the Thracian Chersonese,<sup>167</sup> and the Crimea. The former belonged to the Seleukids, who were friendly to Antigonos on the one hand, and on the other hand could not have protected their traders against Egypt if they had wished to, having merely a negligible fleet. The Crimea, Athens' old source of supply, could no doubt have fed her, though it has been thought that the amount of corn passing the Bosphoros at this time was small compared to what it had been in the days of Demosthenes;<sup>168</sup> but the Crimean supply was exposed to a double danger. Antigonos' friend Byzantion controlled the Bosphoros, and could, if desired, see that any corn ships were 'brought ashore', as the phrase went;<sup>169</sup> while, if the political position were reversed, Egypt, from her watch-tower of Samothrake,<sup>170</sup> could pick them up as they emerged from the Hellespont. From the west, too, nothing could be hoped. The corn from Syracuse came to Antigonos' port of Corinth; if Carthage exported, which is not known, the corn probably went to Egypt's dependency Phoenicia in payment for the traffic of the east; while Athens could no longer depend upon the pirate-infested Adriatic, since the loss of her fleet had rendered useless the naval station of Adria, which she had

<sup>164</sup> The following import. Very end of fourth century; Andros, *I. G.* xii, 5, 1, 714; Delos, Michel 386. Third century; Ios, *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 1010 and 1011; Samothrake, *I. G.* xii, 8, 156 = Michel 351 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 221; an unknown place connected with Delos, *B. C. H.* 1905, p. 201, no. 65, and *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 374. Beginning of second century; Arkesine, *I. G.* xii, 7, 40; the Islanders of the League generally, *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 817.

<sup>165</sup> *O. G. I.* 9 = Michel 491. The island of Nesos also imported, *O. G. I.* 4.

<sup>166</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 548 = Michel 493.

<sup>167</sup> *I. G.* xii, 8, 156 B, l. 16.

<sup>168</sup> Gernet, *op. c.*, p. 326.

<sup>169</sup> Polyb. 4, 38, 2. The technical term was *κατάγειν*.

<sup>170</sup> Samothrake was Egyptian from 281 till the second Syrian war. The main evidence is the dedication of the Ptolemaion by Ptolemy II. *I. G.* xii, 8, 228. See Beloch 3, 2, 280; C. Friedrich, Introduction to the Samothrakian inscriptions in *I. G.* xii, 8.

founded there about 326/5 in order that 'the people of Athens might at all times have a supply of corn'.<sup>171</sup> There remained the great international corn markets, Delos and Rhodes; but Egypt controlled Delos, and neither could be reached but by leave of the Egyptian fleet.

Consequently, between them, Antigonos and Ptolemy controlled practically the entire supply of corn available for feeding Athens. On one of the two Athens must depend; choice there was none. She was like an island that could not feed itself and had lost its fleet. In time of peace it was well enough; food came in naturally, for the gain of the merchant; but should she offend Antigonos, she became by that very act dependent on Egypt, who alone could keep the sea open for her; unless she had used the time of peace to store up corn, a matter requiring considerable foresight. Independence was a word with a fine ring about it; but unfortunately even heroes must eat.

It is to be hoped that it is no longer necessary to enter any defence of the Athens of this epoch against charges of degeneracy or decadence. Of course there were many unworthy elements in the city; but how many cities are free of such? To point, as has been done, to the New Comedy and say, 'behold Athens,' is frankly absurd. The New Comedy may be of great importance in the history of literature; for the history of the time it has no importance at all. It may at the start have been drawn from life; even so, it was clearly only life of a sort; and not all the wit and elegance lavished on its presentation can conceal the fact that it soon became a convention. Leave the literary qualities aside, pass over the wit and the characterization, and a picture of Athens drawn from these plays is about as true as would be a picture of England drawn from (let us say) musical comedy. The real charge against the Athens of this epoch seems merely to be, that she failed; that is to say, that she was at grips with forces physically stronger than herself. Precisely the same charge might be brought against the Athens of Thucydides.

Athens has a right to be judged, not on her stage plays, but on such things as her many struggles for liberty, or the

<sup>171</sup> *I. G.* ii, 809 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 153, taking Dittenberger's reading.

portraits left by Antigonos of Karystos, or the language of the noble resolution moved by Chremonides. Admiration for her great past need not blind us to her great present. In the two generations following Alexander's death she did some of the hardest fighting in her history; and there was not much sign of degeneracy about the men who led the national war against Antipatros, who fought against heavy odds the two days' sea-fight off Amorgos, who held their walls against Demetrios till they were glad to feed on dead mice, who stormed the Mouseion under Olympiodoros, and who at the last, when fall Athens must, fell with all honour in the great struggle which we call the Chremonidean war. There was little mark of decadence about the city that was still 'Hellas of Hellas', the home of all the great philosophies and the spiritual centre of the civilized world, the city that could draw and keep such men as Zeno and Epicurus, Arkesilaos and Kleanthes, men utterly different save in noble aims. What Athens said the world still repeated; those whom Athens honoured were honoured indeed. Wealth and power might pass to others; Athens alone had the secret of the path that raises men to the heavens.<sup>172</sup>

<sup>172</sup> Hegesand. ap. Athen. 6, 250f; τὰλλα πάντα εἶναι κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνθρώπους φέρουσιν ὁδὸν Ἀθηναίους εἰδέναι μόνους: see the fine turn given to this by Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, p. 232.

## CHAPTER VIII

### ANTIGONOS AND HIS CIRCLE

THE virtual inclusion of Athens in Antigonos' sphere effectually prevented him from attempting to set up any rival university in Macedonia, even had he desired to do so. Both politically and geographically, Athens was too close to Pella to permit of the formation there of any independent centre of intellectual activity on a great scale; no second Museum was possible, even had Antigonos had the money to endow one. In fact, there was never anything in Macedonia to compare even with such secondary seats of learning as Antioch or Pergamon. Athens was, and had to remain, the centre of gravity of the world of thought and of letters. She was still, as she had been for a century, the supreme intellectual centre, the home of all abstract thought; within her walls the great philosophic schools, not unlike colleges, had their permanent head-quarters; and even the little schools that still subsisted elsewhere, as at Megara or Eretria, were in the course of the generation then living to cease to have separate existence and merge in the Academy of Arkesilaos. Abstract thought was Athens' strength; perhaps, too, her weakness. For to modern eyes it may look as if the main stream of the world's progress had already shifted to Alexandria, where the munificent endowments of the Ptolemies were, consciously or unconsciously, all concentrating upon the great rival, science. The glory of Alexandria was to be shown forth in her mathematicians and astronomers, her geographers and physicians, her scholars and encyclopaedists; but, whatever their ultimate deserts, the immediate future did not lie with them. The immediate future lay with the philosophers, the men whose pupils were to train the Roman and whose teachings were to influence St. Paul;



and at present Athens was their home. But though she owed her chief importance to the philosophic schools, she was more than a home for philosophers. She still had almost a monopoly, as against Alexandria, of both history and comedy; if she shared tragedy with her, tragedy had become of relatively small importance. Whatever may be thought of the New Comedy, the enormous number of writers whom it attracted, their ability, and their huge output, show that it was at any rate alive and a force in the then world; and though Menander was dead, the other most prolific leaders in this branch of art were all writing for the Athenian stage. Even more notably could Athens hold her own in history. Timaios was living there, writing the large book to which, with all its faults, we owe so much of our knowledge of the Western Greeks. Timaios was a Sicilian; but Philochoros the soothsayer was an Athenian; and had some parts of his numerous writings survived, we should know a very great deal more about the festivals and mysteries, the antiquities and customs, of Athens than has been vouchsafed to us. Possibly the rhetorical Athenian history of Demochares is no great loss; for Demochares' profession was not history but words. But there was in Athens at this time, perhaps already storing up material, a young man from Euboea, who was to do a work well worth the doing, and invaluable to posterity even in the second-hand shape in which some parts of it remain: Antigonos of Karystos, who afterwards wrote the lives of the philosophers.

It was obvious, however, that Antigonos, the pupil of Menedemos and Zeno, was not likely to be satisfied with a life of which the intellectual side was represented only by details of administration; and, as there was no possibility of making Pella a second Museum or a second Athens, he set to work, immediately upon his accession, to gather round him a personal circle of notable men;<sup>1</sup> the bond that should hold them together was to be their common friendship with himself. It was, in fact, to be something like Menedemos' circle at Eretria on a much larger scale; and of the men who came to Pella, it was precisely those whom the king

<sup>1</sup> I am not aware of any work professedly dealing with Antigonos' circle.

had known at Eretria who received the earliest invitations. His marriage with Phila offered an occasion and an opportunity for collecting his literary friends about him; and though the war with Pyrrhos dispersed the circle at Pella, it formed again after Pyrrhos' death. Though two of the most prominent among Antigonos' friends should really be noticed later—for Hieronymos may not have written much by 276, and Bion had very possibly not yet found his way to Pella at all—it may be convenient to give some slight account here of Antigonos' circle as a whole, and without distinguishing the earlier and the later epoch, for the sake of the clearer view thus obtained.

The formation of something like a literary circle was not a new thing to a Macedonian king. Not to mention lesser names, Archelaos had entertained Euripides and Agathon, and Philip had secured Aristotle himself to be his son's tutor. Even Kassandros knew Homer by heart, and patronized Euhemeros.<sup>2</sup> But hardly one of the men who from time to time adorned the courts of the earlier kings really belonged there; Euripides was none the less an Athenian of Athens because he wrote the *Bacchae* at Pella. In Aristotle alone of the great names of Hellas could Macedonia claim her share, and that not only through his birthplace; Aristotle would not be quite Aristotle had he not taught Alexander.

The men who drew together to Antigonos were on a different footing. One or two, it is true, were visitors from Athens; Bion was cosmopolitan. But when we think of Aratos or Persaios, and still more of Hieronymos, we think of them as essential parts of the Macedonia of Antigonos; we do not connect them with any other place. Antigonos went very near to shaping a new thing for Macedonia, a thing that might have been of the first importance could it have lasted. The circle was obviously formed and held together by the king's own personality; it included representatives only of those aspects of the intellectual life in which he himself was interested, poetry, philosophy, history.<sup>3</sup> No man of

<sup>2</sup> Athen. 14, 620 b; Diod. 6, 1, 4.

<sup>3</sup> *History*; it ran in his family, p. 243; his especial friendship for Hieronymos, p. 246. *Poetry*; quotes Homer habitually; Diog. L. 4, 46; Stob.

science came to Macedonia; science was the handmaid of the Ptolemies, and her sole representative at Pella was Antigonos' body physician, Aristogenes of Knidos or Thasos, who wrote a medical compendium for the king's use.<sup>4</sup> Even when a considerable physicist, Straton, was active in Athens, it does not appear that Antigonos cultivated him. Antigonos stood with the Stoics; and, to a Stoic, science had no meaning at all.

This was to be exemplified clearly in the person of the most prominent of the poets at Pella. Antigonos had known Aratos of Soloi<sup>5</sup> before; and, as already related, he came to Pella for the king's marriage with Phila, and wrote the wedding hymn in praise of Pan. Its success was evidently marked, and Aratos became, and remained, Antigonos' court poet; for though he quitted Pella, like so many others, in the troubles of 273, and went to Antiochos, he returned later to Macedonia and lived there till his death. As court poet he wrote the things that were expected of him: another hymn called the Treaty-bearers,<sup>6</sup> of which the occasion is unknown; the usual Praise of Antigonos; a series of short

*Flor.* 54, 46; cf. *Plut. Mor.* 182 F, no. 17. Quotes an unnamed tragedian, see note 110. Sostratos mollifies him by quoting Homer, ch. 13, p. 387; he incites Aratos to write, p. 227. He adapts his quotations to suit himself; *Plut. Mor.* 330 E, he has altered a word (see note 110); the hexameter in *Stob. Flor.* 54, 46, ἡ δὲ ὅλη ἢ βίη ἢ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ κρυφῆδόν, is composed of halves of two lines, *Od.* 9, 406 and *Od.* 14, 330. Such a trait argues considerable familiarity with the writers so treated.

<sup>4</sup> Susemihl I, 783. The book was called ἐπιτομή φυσικῶν βοηθημάτων πρὸς Ἀντίγονον.

<sup>5</sup> See the following, since Susemihl (I, 284). E. Maass, *Aratea* (vol. xii of Kiessling and Wilamowitz, *Philologische Untersuchungen*), 1892; *Arati Phaenomena* (the text), 1893; *Commentariorum in Aratum reliquiae*, 1898. Wilamowitz, 'Aratos von Kos,' in *Nachrichten von d. königl. Gesellschaft d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, 1894, p. 182; on this, W. Christ in *Sitzungsb. d. k. Ak. Wiss. München (Philosoph., philol. u. hist. Cl.)*, 1903, p. 381, and Wilamowitz' reply, *Hermes*, 1905, p. 138. Knaack, *Aratos*, no. 6, in *P. W.* G. Kaibel in *Hermes*, 1894, p. 82, a brilliant appreciation. J. W. Mackail, *Lectures on Greek Poetry*, 1910, p. 194 seq. (chiefly on his style). —The five Lives (inc. Suidas), given in A. Westermann's *βιογράφοι*, are now given by Maass in the book of 1898. With Life 3 (Theon of Alexandria), p. 146, Maass also gives the old Latin translation, which in some points amplifies the Greek. I keep the numbers as in Westermann for convenience. It is thought that the Lives go back to an early and good common original.

<sup>6</sup> Maass, *Aratea*, p. 229, reads Suidas as follows: ὕμνος. εἰς τὸν Πᾶνα Σπονδοφόρους. This is preferable to Usener's suggestion (*Rhein. Mus.* 29, p. 41) that the plural ὕμνοι εἰς τὸν Πᾶνα would imply a contest of poets.

poems addressed to Phila.<sup>7</sup> All these are lost. But it was not by these that Aratos was to be known to posterity.

Of the little that is recorded of the poet's earlier life,<sup>8</sup> the one point that stands out is his Stoic sympathies. He may himself, like so many Stoics, have been half an Oriental; for according to one version his father's name was Mnaseas (Manasses).<sup>9</sup> His earliest teacher had been Menekrates, the grammarian of Ephesos, who wrote a poem on agriculture. He had then passed some time in Athens, where he had frequented the Porch; one account makes him a pupil of Zeno himself, another (not so trustworthy), of Zeno's pupil Dionysios of Herakleia. His outlook then was similar to that of Antigonos; and according to the tradition, which need not be disbelieved, it was Antigonos who put into his hands the work of Eudoxos, and requested him to versify that century-old star-catalogue.<sup>10</sup> The result was the much-lauded *Phainomena*.<sup>11</sup> Its literary history would fill a volume. Critics, who rightly saw in it a wider outlook than could be found in the *Works and Days* of Hesiod, were driven to compare Aratos to Homer; his friend Kallimachos praised his learning; a later epigrammatist indulged in the hyperbole that Zeus had indeed made the stars glorious, but Aratos had given them an added glory.<sup>12</sup> These praises compare strangely with the quiet, plain, and (to tell the truth) excessively dry versification of the poem, most of which has absolutely nothing in common with the five ringing lines in

<sup>7</sup> Εἰς Ἀντίγονον ἐπιγράμματα εἰς Φίλαν τὴν θυγατέρα Ἀντιπάτρου (an obvious slip) γυναῖκα δ' Ἀντιγόνου (Suidas). Many other (lost) poems are known.

<sup>8</sup> Wilamowitz, *l. c.*, definitely put an end to the belief that the Aratos of Theokritos, *Id.* 7, was the poet; unless new evidence comes to light. A. T. Murray, *Aratus and Theocritus*, 1911, has again put forward the view that the Aratos of *Id.* 7 was the poet, but has not convinced me. (See J. Sitzler, *W. Kl. Ph.* 1912, 1049.)—An Aratos of Kos was architheoros to Delos some time before 279, *I. G.* xi, 161 B, l. 55, and 203 B, l. 38; and the son of an Aratos (? the same) was theoros to Pella *circa* 252 (decree of Pella, ch. 7, n. 54).

<sup>9</sup> Fourth Life.  
<sup>10</sup> Maass, *Aratea*, says he used Eudoxos' *Phainomena*, and not his 'Mirror', as the first Life says; ch. 5, 6, 7, *passim*. Wilamowitz, *l. c.*, followed by Knaack, accepts the tradition that Antigonos commissioned Aratos to write.

<sup>11</sup> Of which the so-called Diosemeia forms the conclusion. It was subsequently fitted with a forged prologue in honour of Antigonos, beginning Ἀντίγονε, ξείνων ἱερὸν θάλος (Maass, *Aratea*, pp. 17, 222).

<sup>12</sup> Leonidas of Tarentum (*A. P.* ix, 25): καὶ Διὸς εἶναι | δεύτερον, ὅστις ἔθηκ' ἄστρα φαινώτερα.



which Homer has caught something of the magic of the stars. That Aratos adopted this style on purpose is clear;<sup>13</sup> for there was a spark of the real fire in him somewhere, and he could write poetry when he chose. One sees this in occasional passages, such as the lines which describe the star-set heavens at the time of the new moon,<sup>14</sup> or the image of the paths of the Hours as they race across the sky—a phrase, from its associations, finer perhaps to ourselves than to a Greek;<sup>15</sup> most of all in the swing of the noble prelude. But if Aratos wrote plainly and soberly on purpose, what does all the praise mean? It was not lavished upon him merely because he provided dry bread for readers surfeited with literary sugar-plums.

Aratos in fact wrote as a Stoic, and wrote with a purpose. The *Phainomena* was the first halting attempt that the world had seen at a work written

with patient plan  
To justify the ways of God to man.

His real aim was to bring out the Stoic doctrine of providence.<sup>16</sup> We may perhaps compare the *Phainomena* for a moment with the far greater work that was to be written by one whose sympathies were with the rival school of Epicurus; the poem of Lucretius 'On the nature of things'. Each of the two poets was an absolute stranger to the scientific spirit, and cared only for science in its bearing on men. Lucretius flung a mighty passion into his description of the evolution of the world, not because he cared for the evolution of the world in itself, but because it gave him a splendid lever with which to overthrow the popular gods; to free mankind

<sup>13</sup> On the style see Kaibel, *l. c.*, Mackail, *l. c.*

<sup>14</sup> Line 469 seq.

<sup>15</sup> This is not in the *Phainomena*. The inscription on a marble dial recently found in the temple of Poseidon at Tenos (*I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 891) celebrates the maker Andronikos of Kyrrhos (who built the Tower of the Winds at Athens) as a second Aratos, because he knew how to 'divide the shining circle of the heavens' and to depict αἰθεροδρόμων κελεύθους ὥρέων; and from a comparison with Kaibel, Ep. 185 (see editor's note), Crönert deduced that this fine phrase must be Aratos' own. But we can hardly avoid reading into it the associations of the Hours in Shelley's *Prometheus*.

<sup>16</sup> See Wilamowitz, *l. c.*, p. 196, and Kaibel, *l. c.*, p. 86. — Wilamowitz, however, has since taken the view (*Griech. Lit.* 1905, p. 132) that his object was 'wichtiges Wissen seinem Volke mitzuteilen'.

from fear of the gods was the real aim of his desire. Aratos plodded through his star-catalogue, not because he cared for astronomy in itself, but because the obvious utility of the stars to sailor and husbandman afforded material to illustrate his text that Zeus takes forethought for men, his children: that the gods *care*. That is why St. Paul, when speaking in a later Athens of the God who was Lord of the heavens, and who had determined appointed seasons for men, if haply they might feel after Him, naturally made appeal to the Stoics among his audience by quoting Aratos.<sup>17</sup>

With Aratos came two lesser poets. Alexander the Aetolian<sup>18</sup> was one of the so-called Pleiades, the seven writers of tragedy of the time, and had returned to Athens after arranging the tragic poets in the Alexandrian library. As a poet he tried every form, tragedy, epigram, elegiacs, narrative epics, even kinaidologiai, these last being mimes to be accompanied by music and dancing, a species of composition of which the wit largely consisted in calling a spade a spade, and which in consequence furnished an effective if dangerous vehicle for attacking those in high places. Rather better known is Antagoras of Rhodes,<sup>19</sup> epic poet and epicure, 'a terrible fellow to coin strange words.' He only stayed two years at Pella, for all his affinities were with Athens and the Academy. His masterpiece, the Thebais, may not have surpassed other third-century attempts of the sort; and his seven famous lines on the birth of Love disclose no particular claim to immortality. But there remains rather an attractive little picture of him on campaign, toasting a bit of conger eel over the camp fire and bandying chaff with Antigonos; and he left at least one poem that rings true, the beautiful epitaph written for the tomb that contained the ashes of both his

<sup>17</sup> *Acts* 17, 28: 'for we also are his offspring.' Paul quotes Aratos and Kleanthes together, but in *form* he follows Aratos. One may perhaps doubt Wilamowitz' most ingenious reasoning (*l. c.*, 1894, p. 197) designed to show that Kleanthes came first and was himself quoted by Aratos. Both were Stoics; may not the words, in some form or other, have been already Stoic property?

<sup>18</sup> Susemihl 1, 187. The evidence for his belonging to Theokritos' circle is nil. He wrote a *Daphnis*, and Tityros of *Id.* 7 wrote a *Daphnis*.

<sup>19</sup> Susemihl 1, 380. See Diog. L. 4, 26 and 27; Hegesand. ap. Athen. 8, 340 f = Plut. *Mor.* 182 F, no. 17. — The epitaph; Diog. L. 4, 21.

friends of the Academy, Polemon and Krates, telling that they were lovely and pleasant in their lives and in death were not divided.

But poetry, after all, was of small account compared with the question whether Zeno could be induced to come to Pella. Antigonos kept urging him to come; <sup>20</sup> but the old philosopher had struck root in Athens too deep to move, and he desired moreover to maintain the neutral attitude in politics which he had always practised.<sup>21</sup> The correspondence that passed on this occasion between the king and his master, had it survived, would have been invaluable for the light thrown on two notable characters; but it is hardly necessary to repeat that the letters we have,<sup>22</sup> replete with excellent sentiments, are forgeries of a later time; that of Antigonos in particular is as unlike the king's brusque utterance as can well be imagined. Antigonos of course invited Zeno as the man whom of all men he most deeply honoured; he may have wished for him as his spiritual director, but the idea that he wanted his assistance in re-organizing Macedonia need only be mentioned to be set aside.<sup>23</sup> Of all unpractical idealists Zeno was the very worst; and Antigonos, a man of middle age, trained in two hard schools, that of Antipatros and that of adversity, must have already forgotten more about the art of governing than Zeno had ever learnt. Certainly in his youth, when under Cynic influence, Zeno had written a famous treatise 'on the State'; but it was not a treatise that could be of any use to a ruler in a real earthly kingdom. His State was the ideal State of the Cynics, of which all men were citizens, in which there were neither national boundaries nor temples of the gods, in which all ordinary social and economic relationships were dissolved, and property and wives alike held in common, and which was kept together merely by the willing consent of its citizens; the State of a philosophic Anarchist. The book survived merely as a curiosity, to be a terrible thorn in the side of the later Stoics; they could only reply to their

<sup>20</sup> Diog. L. 7, 6.

<sup>21</sup> See ch. I, p. 35.

<sup>22</sup> Diog. L. 7, 7-9. See some considerations in Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos*, pp. 28, 29.

<sup>23</sup> Usener, *Rhein. Mus.* 29, p. 42; really based on the forged letters.

opponents, who were never tired of quoting it at them, that even Zeno had not always been Zeno.<sup>24</sup>

As Zeno would not come, Antigonos asked him to send one of his pupils instead, so that the Porch might be directly represented at Pella. There must have been a question who should go.<sup>25</sup> Honest drudging Kleanthes, slowest of the slow, with his oddly incongruous gift of writing great religious poetry, was out of the question; he, the only man who could 'shoulder Zeno's burden',<sup>26</sup> was already marked out as his successor in Athens. Dionysios of Herakleia, who had once been one of Menedemos' circle, was afflicted with hopeless ophthalmia, and was perhaps already meditating that transference of his allegiance to the Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure which earned him the name of Turn-coat.<sup>27</sup> Herillos of Carthage was suspect, and more than suspect, of heresy.<sup>28</sup> Ariston of Chios, called the Siren, was persuasive of speech,<sup>29</sup> and witty of pen;<sup>30</sup> even to-day he may please a stray reader here and there by his forcible reminder of the fact that flying will not make men wiser or better.<sup>31</sup> But he, too, was more or less of a heretic; he had strong leanings toward undiluted Cynicism, and was moreover rooted in Athens. The man whom Zeno finally chose was Persaios of Kition, his fellow-countryman and favourite—scandal-whispered, his

<sup>24</sup> Zeno's *περὶ πολιτείας*; Arnim 27, 41, 259 to 271; Diog. L. 7, 4; Susemihl I, 56, n. 193 and references. See especially the new fragment of Philodemos *περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν*, published by Crönert, *Kolotes*, pp. 55-67, where the Epicurean attacks Zeno's state in fine fighting style; Col. xv, 15, the apologists have to say, *Ζήνων γὰρ οὐκ ἦν αἰεὶ*, he was not always Zeno; he was once (xvi, 9) a nobody, *παντελῶς οὐδεὶς*. The sentence here seems quite complete in itself, and not to require the addition of *νέος* (A. Körte, *G. G. A.* 1907, p. 259) or the alteration of *Ζήνων* to *Ζηνώσιον* (O. Crusius, *Philol.* 66, 1907, p. 599).

<sup>25</sup> Zeno's pupils; Diog. L. bk. 7; Susemihl I, 59; Arnim, *passim*.

<sup>26</sup> Arnim 463 = Diog. L. 7, 170.

<sup>27</sup> Ὁ μεταθέμενος. Arnim 422 = Diog. L. 7, 166, 167. The second life of Aratos puts it bluntly, *εἰς ἡδονὰς μεταθεμένῳ* (how, by the way, could one in constant pain get 'pleasure'?); cf. Athen. 7, 281 d = Arnim 430.

<sup>28</sup> Arnim 411, 413.

<sup>29</sup> Ib. 333, *πειστικός*.

<sup>30</sup> That is, if the *ὁμοιώματα* were really his. Arnim (*Ariston*, no. 56, in *P. W.* ii, 1, col. 957) thought this a difficult question; Gercke in *P. W.*, *Ariston*, no. 52 (the Peripatetic), says that the *ὁμοιώματα* are either not the Stoic's or are a collection from the works of both. But more recently Arnim has printed the fragments under Ariston the Stoic.

<sup>31</sup> Arnim 353.



liberated slave.<sup>32</sup> He was accompanied by one Philonides of Thebes, a mere name.

Zeno's choice of a philosophic director for the king turned out a bad one; Persaios was not man enough for the post. In Zeno's company he may have been well enough; with that strong hand removed, he degenerated from the philosopher into the courtier, and learnt where he should have taught.<sup>33</sup> He could repeat the Stoic catchwords, but the Stoic spirit was not in him.<sup>34</sup> He found favour with Antigonos, who made him tutor of his son Halkyoneus; but the favour was extended as a matter of course to Zeno's friend, and Persaios sought to maintain it by being all things to all men, a dangerous doctrine in weak hands. He wrote indeed among other things the inevitable treatise 'On Kingship'.<sup>35</sup> But the work of his of which we hear most is one entitled *Dialogues of the Banquets*; <sup>36</sup> and these banquets had nothing in common with the famous Symposia of Plato or Menedemos; it would be as true to the Greek, and truer, apparently, to the facts, to write it *Dialogues of the Boon Companions*. Because a weak side of Antigonos, as of most of the great Macedonians, was a fondness for the feast and the wine-flask, Persaios must needs study and describe all the details of debauchery; <sup>37</sup> and if gossip was to be believed, the hero of a particularly discreditable episode related in the book was none other than the philosopher himself in his cups. It was not in this

<sup>32</sup> Third and fourth Lives of Aratos; Arnim 437 (= *Ind. Stoic. Herc.*, col. xii, 3), 435 (= *Diog. L.* 7, 36), 439 (= *ib.* 7, 6). Opinions on this story have varied; but it is not likely to be true. Susemihl's conclusion, that it originated simply in Bion's revenge on Persaios (1, 69, n. 263), is as likely to be right as anything. — The fourth Life of Aratos says that Persaios came to Macedonia at the time of Phila's marriage; this is confirmed by the mention of him by Epicurus as at Antigonos' court.

<sup>33</sup> Arnim 441 = *Ind. Stoic. Herc.*, col. xiii, αἴτιον (ν ἐγ)έμετο τούτου καὶ τὸ χωρισθῆναι Ζήνωνος ὄντος ἔτι πολλοῦ (σ)υν (᾿Α)ντιγόνου καὶ (ᾱ)μα περ(ι)πλανᾶσθαι, τὸ(ν) αἰλικόν, οὐ τὸν φιλό(σ)οφον ἡρῆμένον βίον.

<sup>34</sup> Arnim 435 = *Diog. L.* 7, 36. Elaborated by Themistios, *Or.* 32, p. 358 = Arnim 449. It may not be true, but it shows that Persaios was considered the right peg on which to hang such a story.

<sup>35</sup> Περὶ βασιλείας; *Diog. L.* 7, 36.

<sup>36</sup> Συμποτικά ἱπομνήματι (*Athen.* 13, 607 b; *Diog. L.* 7, 1), or συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι (*Athen.* 4, 162 b). Probably the former was the title, the latter merely a description of contents.

<sup>37</sup> See the description of portions of this work given by Athenaeus, in one case as a long passage quoted verbally, in the other as a summary of contents.

way that Zeno and Menedemos had won their influence over the king. Persaios indeed was the one man whom Menedemos heartily hated; he waged uncompromising war against him, and said once, over his wine, that Persaios might be a sort of philosopher, but as a man he was the worst of all that were or ever would be.<sup>38</sup> This whole-hearted verdict may be liberally discounted, for Persaios had dissuaded Antigonos from restoring to Eretria its freedom, and Menedemos took it bitterly to heart; but no doubt, too, this incident showed him what sort of effect Persaios was likely to have upon the king. Perhaps the best that can be said for Persaios is that he had plenty of wit, was doubtless good company, and was faithful to Antigonos as he understood it.

The most important figure, however, at Pella, from the point of view of philosophy, was not Persaios, but that strange creature Bion of Borysthenes.<sup>39</sup> The last word on Bion is, as yet, far from having been written; for few men in the third century are harder to judge, and few perhaps had more influence.

Bion is the lineal ancestor of that long line of wandering teachers<sup>40</sup> who were to attain to such importance in the first two centuries of the Roman empire, and who were to lead a pagan revival side by side with the growing advance of Christianity. In the third century the wandering teacher was a new thing. He called himself, and others called him,

<sup>38</sup> Diog. L. ii, 143, 144. The words are φιλόσοφος μὲν τοι τοιοῦτος, ἀνὴρ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γενησομένων κάκιστος. Menedemos perhaps had in mind Xenophon, *Symp.* 2, 10, where Antisthenes calls Xanthippe the most difficult of all women, past, present, and future, τῶν οὐσῶν οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων χαλεπωτάτη.

<sup>39</sup> Life in Diogenes 4, cap. 7; scattered fragments in Plutarch and Stobaeus; Teles, *περὶ αὐταρκείας*, is supposed substantially to represent Bion (Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, p. 296); his ideas and phrases are scattered through the other fragments of Teles. — The best thing on Bion known to me is the Prolegomena to Otto Hense's *Teletis reliquiae*, 2nd ed., 1909. See also Sussehl 1, 32; Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* (Eng. tr., vol. ii, p. 241); C. Wachsmuth, *Sillogaphorum Graecorum reliquiae*, p. 75; Arnim, *Bion* in *P. II*. — The scanty poetic fragments are given by Wachsmuth, *op. c.*, and by H. Diels, *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, 1901 (vol. iii, part 1 of Wilamowitz' *Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta*); the papyrus fragments by Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos*, p. 31.

<sup>40</sup> See Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*; *Excurs: der kynische Prediger Teles*. For the later period, Sir S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, the chapter entitled 'The Philosophic Missionary'.

a philosopher ; but his mission was, not to seek out wisdom, but to take existing wisdom and popularize it. Many, who had neither the time nor the money to attend a course of lectures at Athens, nevertheless desired to learn something of the new knowledge. The ordinary man, then as now, must have longed for something to help him in the troubles of life and console him in its sorrows, and must have felt that his subscription to the local temple did not always produce an adequate return in spiritual benefit. Many again in many places were eager merely to hear some new thing ; and, unless human nature has altered considerably, there would be a small minority almost anywhere ready to adopt the new thing as soon as they had heard it. All these men the wandering teachers professed to serve, and doubtless, according to their lights, did serve. But we must beware of making too much of them at this time, or of reading into the third century before Christ facts and tendencies which belong to the first two centuries after. Those of them whose names are known at this period generally gave up wandering about and settled down in Athens or elsewhere ;<sup>41</sup> it looks as if the demand for their services was not very insistent. But a new movement had been started, a movement fraught with large consequences, even if we can hardly listen to the paradox that the wandering teacher of philosophy was the forerunner of the Christian preacher.<sup>42</sup>

Much of the traditional life of Bion, as given by Diogenes, is hardly worth setting down here. It is encumbered with stories now universally recognized as malicious inventions ; their repetition serves no good purpose. He seems to have used his wit freely on other teachers, all and sundry ;<sup>43</sup> naturally they or their adherents retaliated. That he was of very humble birth, and that as a boy he had once been a slave, is possible enough. But he had studied philosophy at Athens under the best masters, Xenokrates and Krates

<sup>41</sup> Of the five names given by Wilamowitz, Bion and Timon settled in Athens and Diodoros Kronos in Alexandria ; Theodoros of Cyrene and Hegesias, ὁ πεισιθάνατος, attempted to settle in Athens and Alexandria respectively, but were turned out for their opinions.

<sup>42</sup> Wilamowitz, *l. c.*, pp. 313, 314.

<sup>43</sup> Diog. L. 4, 53, ὅλως καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γεωμετρίαν διέπαιζεν.

at the Academy,<sup>44</sup> Theophrastos at the Lyceum, and the Cyrenaic Theodoros; for himself he took up a Cynic view, tempered by that of the Cyrenaics. On coming to Pella<sup>45</sup> he found himself in conflict with Persaios and the Stoic interest; tradition has it that the courtly Persaios refused to associate with the smuggler's son, and appealed to Antigonos. It seems true enough that, on some occasion, Bion did tell the king that if his origin was in fact lowly, he would only deserve all the more honour for having made himself what he was, a sentiment that coincided with Antigonos' own opinion.<sup>46</sup> How long Bion stayed at Pella is not known. He taught in different places, including Rhodes, and finally settled down at Athens, and is said to have died at Chalkis in great want and misery, relieved at the end by Antigonos, who heard of his plight and sent two slaves to nurse him.

It is probable that Bion's relations with Antigonos were very much closer than written tradition gives us any idea of. Among the fragmentary notices that remain relative to the two men or to their sayings, the parallels in language are too frequent and curious to be accidental; but whether they point to the influence of the king upon Bion or Bion upon the king, or whether they merely reflect certain language current in court circles, or whether again the explanation is that the numerous notices of Antigonos and his sayings in Plutarch and elsewhere derive ultimately from some writing of Bion's and are coloured by his style, we are bound in any case to believe in a close association of the king and the

<sup>44</sup> Gomperz defends the tradition, given by Diog. L. 4, 23, that Bion's teacher Krates was the Academic, not the Cynic; *op. c.*, vol. ii, 241, and iii, 300; and so Hense, *Teles*<sup>2</sup>, p. lxvii. The difficulty is, if Bion's known teachers were two Platonists, a Peripatetic, and a Cyrenaic, how came he to be, as he certainly was, a good three-quarters Cynic?

<sup>45</sup> Date unknown; except that Persaios, who came about 276, was already established there.

<sup>46</sup> Hense, *l. c.*, p. lxxxvii, thinks Bion's letter to Antigonos (Diog. L. 4, 46) genuine, or at the worst (with Kiessling) 'ad veritatem ficta'; and that the fragment Stob. *Flor.* 86, 13, is from the same letter. This last gives Bion's claim, that a man is what he makes himself, ἐπὶ τῶν φίλων ἐξέταξε οὐ πόθεν εἶσιν ἀλλὰ τίνες. Antigonos said much the same, Plut. *Mor.* 534 C = 183 D, no. 4, ἀνδραγαθίας οὐ πατραγαθίας κτλ. Hense, p. lxxxviii, attributes both sayings to Bion; i.e. Bion said that this is what Antigonos would have said if asked. This seems a refinement; but it would of course be just as good evidence for what Antigonos himself did think.



wandering philosopher.<sup>47</sup> In one passage Bion praises some person unnamed as a good ruler, a generous giver, and one who used large resources well; it is not likely that any one but Antigonos can be the ruler referred to.<sup>48</sup>

The obvious view of Bion—too obvious perhaps—is written at large in the tradition. A professed free-thinker, like Theodoros, he had gone about the world giving his lectures, taking this or that moral point and treating it in common language, arguing it with an imaginary opponent, decking it out with a good story or a quotation from some poet, trying every means that his nimble wit could suggest of winning the assent or the applause of half-educated audiences and getting them to 'mount the steed of learning'.<sup>49</sup> But in attempting to popularize he merely vulgarized; philosophy was dragged forth from the quiet lecture-room into the crowded market-place, and the goddess of the few became the mistress of the many.<sup>50</sup>

That this is partly true is certain; as certain as it is that it is only part of the truth. The first statement can be illustrated from various sources which show things not particularly

<sup>47</sup> I have made a rough list.

(a) A man is what he makes himself; references, n. 46.

(b) Antigonos; kingship is *ἐνδοξος δουλεία* (p. 256 *post*). Bion ap. Stob. *Flor.* 46, 23, the good ruler (cf. Teles, *περὶ αὐταρκειας*, l. 8, Bion to Antigonos, σὺ μὲν ἄρχεις καλῶς) ought to become μὴ πλουσιώτερον ἀλλ' ἐνδοξότερον.

(c) Bion ap. Plut. *Mor.* 561 C, the sins of the fathers are *not* visited on the children. Ib. 562 F; Antigonos is an instance that they are not always so visited (? ultimately from Bion).

(d) Bion, *θεατρικός*, Diog. L. 4, 52; i.e. he played to the gallery, the crowd. Antigonos played to Zeno alone, Zeno was *his* θέατρον, Diog. L. 7, 15 (cf. Epicurus, fr. 208, Usener, 'satis enim magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus').

(e) Antigonos of Zeno, πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων αὐτῷ διδομένων ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὐδέποτε ἐχυνώθη οὐδὲ ταπεινὸς ὤφθη (Diog. L. 7, 15). Bion to Antigonos (in Teles, *περὶ αὐταρκειας*) σὺ . . . δίδως ἐλευθερίως, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνω εὐθαρσῶς παρὰ σοῦ, οὐχ ὑποπίπτων οὐδὲ ἀγεννίζων οὐδὲ μεμφιμοιρῶν.

(f) Antigonos calls the diadem *ράκος* (Stob. *Flor.* 49, 20). Cf. Bion on the good man, ὅστις καὶ ἐν τοῖς *ράκεσιν* οὐδὲν μείον δέιπρεπεν ἢ ἐν τῇ οὐλῃ χλαίῃ τῇ πορφυρᾷ. Also Bion himself, οἷον ἐκ *ράκων* (Eratosth. ap. Strab. 1, 15).

<sup>48</sup> Teles, *περὶ αὐταρκ.* l. 8 seq., which Hense<sup>2</sup>, p. lxxix, refers to Antigonos.

<sup>49</sup> The traditional view is Diog. L. 4, 47 and 52; he was *θεατρικός* ('playing to the gallery' is the exact translation), used *φορτικοῖς ὀνόμασι*, was *πολύτροπος* (like Odysseus), *σοφιστῆς ποικίλος* (a thing of patchwork; but the word has a good meaning too, iridescent), *πλείστας ἀφορμὰς δεδωκὼς τοῖς βουλομένοις καθιππάζεσθαι φιλοσοφίας*.

<sup>50</sup> Eratosthenes said he dressed philosophy in *ἄνθινα*, the coloured garments of the courtesan; Diog. L. 4, 52, Strabo 1, 15.

to Bion's credit. Plutarch quotes one saying of which the downright vulgarity struck him no less forcibly than it does ourselves;<sup>51</sup> a modern writer cites his wanton attack on the revered Archytas as more damaging to him than all the stories concocted by his opponents.<sup>52</sup> In fact he could not refrain from making cutting remarks about every one he came across: about Aratos the poet no less than Persaios, possibly even about Pyrrhos and Antigonos himself.<sup>53</sup> It was natural, in view of his reception by Persaios, for him to revenge himself by putting about the story that Persaios had been as much of a slave as he had; but if the sneer at Antigonos that has come down to us be really from Bion (it is, fortunately, though probable, by no means certain), we should have to condemn severely one whose tongue could not spare even his best friends. And above all, his prostitution of philosophy rests on the weighty testimony of no less a person than Eratosthenes.

But it is Eratosthenes himself who lays stress on the fact that this is but half the truth. Strip off the shreds and tatters, he says, and you will find the real Bion, like Odysseus under the beggar's rags.<sup>54</sup> And when we turn to the one poor connected piece that remains—and that at second-hand—from all Bion's writings,<sup>55</sup> we do find something quite unexpected. Here is no man in motley, squandering his wit on playing to the gallery. Instead, we see one who, in all soberness, is preaching to those who will listen a very simple and

<sup>51</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 770 B, C.

<sup>52</sup> Gomperz, *l. c.*

<sup>53</sup> Attack on Persaios, Athen. 4, 162 d. On Aratos, τοὺς ἀστρονομούντας, Stob. *Flor.* 80, 3. — Pyrrhos and Antigonos are alluded to in Teles, περὶ πενίας (Hense<sup>2</sup>, p. 43), though Hense does not mention it. The cumulative passage from the top of p. 43, οἰκέτης ἐστίν κτλ., has a strong resemblance in thought to Plut. *Pyrrh.* 14; and it is pretty obvious that, in the sequel to it, Pyrrhos is the king who σπανίζει ὥστε καὶ τυμβωρυχεῖν (Aigai) καὶ ἱεροσυλεῖν (Lokroi), Antigonos ὥστε παρὰ τὸ προσήκον φυγαδεύειν (his flight before Pyrrhos and his son). It is no doubt an up-to-date adaptation of a passage in Xenophon (Hense<sup>2</sup>, p. xxxvii), but Hense (p. xlvi) inclines to think it has come through Bion; and if the whole of Teles dates from *circ.* 240 (p. xxxvi) it is likely that this group of illustrations from the years 276–273 would be due to Bion rather than to Teles.

<sup>54</sup> Ap. Strab. I, 15, οἷον ἐκ ῥακέων ὁ Βίων (= *Od.* 18, 74).

<sup>55</sup> Teles, περὶ αὐταρκειας. See especially the opening phrase, repeated again at the beginning of περὶ περιστάσεων; (δεῖ) τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα ὃ τι ἂν περιθῇ ἢ τύχη (καλῶς ἀγωνίζεσθαι).

manly form of morality; a morality that we may call elementary if we please, but that might well help some while it could harm none. Not to seek wealth or luxury; to remember that it is as honourable to be faithful in little as in much, and that poverty never hindered the quest for wisdom; to do your duty in the station of life in which you find yourself, and to be content; to look for your happiness in yourself and in nothing outside yourself. If the wind blow fair, no harm in spreading your sails to it; but should it change, then wrap yourself in your virtue and endure what fortune may send, and see to it that, if fortune must strike you down, she strike down a man and not a worm.<sup>56</sup> Something of this sort was Bion's message to his hearers: with what power delivered we may judge, not merely from the repute he left, but from such circumstances as these, that he persuaded the sailors of Rhodes to put on the student's cloak and follow him to his lecture-room,<sup>57</sup> and that his words, two generations later, were still proverbs in Pella.<sup>58</sup> Something of his power, no doubt, was due to form; he saw that the old-fashioned set speech had had its day, and that men wanted something livelier and more realistic. Ready to his hand lay the Diatribe; and in the imaginary dialogue with an audience which the Cynics had invented he found the tool he wanted, and perfected it.<sup>59</sup> He talked, not *at*, but as it were *with* his hearers; and success followed the newer and homelier way. His

<sup>56</sup> See n. 58.

<sup>57</sup> Diog. L. 7, 53.

<sup>58</sup> Bion's words were ἀλλ' οὖν γε ἄνδρα καὶ οὐ βλάκα (Teles, *περὶ ἀπαθείας*, p. 62, Hense<sup>2</sup>). Hense (p. cxxiv) is inclined to think that much of this comes from Bion, though elsewhere (p. li) he gives a warning that it is very doubtful. But he has not noticed the Polybios passage, which goes far to prove that the closing words, at any rate, are Bion's; for a phrase which both has the place of honour in Teles and was also current at Pella cannot well, it would seem, be due to any one else. — Polyb. 16, 22, 4-5. Ptolemaios, son of Sosibios, went from Egypt to Macedonia to Philip V. Before he left Alexandria he was full of *τῦφος* (see n. 70); but when he mixed with the young men of the Macedonian court, thinking that the Macedonian manliness (*ἀνδρεία*) consisted in the fashion of their clothes, he imitated this, and persuaded himself that he had thus become a man (*ἄνδρα*), while the Alexandrians remained dolts, worms (*βλάκας*). Therefore *ἄνδρα βλάκα* was still a catch-phrase in Pella. — (It is quoted by Lucian, *Bis accus.* 21, who puts into Epicurus' mouth the words *ἀνθρώπινα καὶ οὐ βλακώδη φρονήσας*. This is given by Usener as fr. 402; but I apprehend from the context that it is not Epicurus but merely Lucian.)

<sup>59</sup> On Diatribe see Wilamowitz, *Griech. Lit.*, p. 98 seq.

words, it is true, were not new. He was apt, as Menedemos said of him, to 'slay the slain'.<sup>60</sup> He was not one from whom new thoughts were to be expected, but rather one who cast existing thoughts into a form that brought them home to men and made them remembered. His message itself was but the ultimate residue of the noble if deformed teaching of the Cynics, though shot with something of a warmer humanity. Yet, now and again, even our mangled tradition recalls some sentence which reveals Bion's own personality, the sort of flash in which Eratosthenes, who valued him highly, doubtless thought to see the genuine Odysseus. Such, for instance, is the statement that slaves if virtuous are truly free, while their masters if vicious are really slaves, a sentiment that, if Bion really uttered it, is worthy of Epictetus.<sup>61</sup> Such is his protest against the belief that heaven would visit the sins of the fathers upon the children.<sup>62</sup> But most striking of all are his few words about the dying frog; the boys stone it in sport, but the frog dies in simple earnest.<sup>63</sup> The very limpidity of the Greek phrasing serves but to reveal more clearly what lies beneath the surface, the germs of some such passion of pity as has been poured out on the same theme by a great modern poet.<sup>64</sup> The man who, in the third century before Christ, could turn aside to pity a tortured reptile was, as the world went, a very strange and notable phenomenon.<sup>65</sup>

Where Bion popularized, his younger contemporary Timon denied. Timon of Phlius, afterwards called the Sillographer,<sup>66</sup> was a one-eyed man with a taste for gardening, who began life as a dancer on the stage, but later on attached himself to Pyrrhon of Elis, the Sceptic, and eagerly adopted his teaching: nothing (so it ran) can be known; therefore never be definite about anything, but always suspend your judgement; if you do this, you will escape worry, for impertur-

<sup>60</sup> Diog. L. 2, 135.

<sup>61</sup> Stob. *Flor.* 2, 39 and 62, 42 (from Bion, *περὶ δουλείας*).

<sup>62</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 561 C.

<sup>63</sup> Ib. 965 B.

<sup>64</sup> Victor Hugo, *Le Craquaud*.

<sup>65</sup> But not quite a new one. His master Xenokrates πολλά τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἡλείει; Ael. *V. H.* 13, 31.

<sup>66</sup> Life in Diog. L. 9, cap. 12. Sussemihl 1, 109. Wachsmuth and Diels, *op. c.* (n. 39), give the fragments; Diels in numbering gives Wachsmuth's numbers in brackets.



bability will follow as automatically as the shadow follows the body ; above all, remember that nothing is good or bad, just or unjust, and nothing matters, not even whether you live or die.<sup>67</sup> It does not seem a hopeful doctrine to sow broadcast over the world. Timon, however, who was an extremely able man, made it pay ; his studied indifference to pupils attracted them ; and though it should have been immaterial to him whether he lived or died, he did in fact on his wanderings make a sufficient amount of money to enable him to live very comfortably in Athens to a good old age ; there he illustrated the 'imperturbability' which his philosophy had taught him by professing himself unable to work if the maid-servants made a noise in the house.<sup>68</sup>

He knew both Ptolemy and Antigonos, and at one period of his life spent some time at Pella, where he used to help Alexander the Aetolian with the plots of his tragedies.<sup>69</sup> Timon indeed has perhaps a better right to be classed among the poets than among the philosophers ; for he wrote poetry of every sort, both for himself and for others, and his reputation really rests on his *Silloi*. This most tantalizing poem, of which just enough remains to whet the reader's curiosity, was an elaborate skit on the philosophers, living and dead, the two that received the worst handling being Zeno and Arkesilaos. Zeno, taking his cue from the Cynics, had preached against *τῦφος* or Illusion ; and Timon retorted upon Zeno with interest. In his hands Illusion tends to become a catch-word, a phrase in which you sum up all that you dislike in those with whom you disagree. His master Pyrrhon alone escapes scot-free.<sup>70</sup> The poem falls into three books : the

<sup>67</sup> This last from Epictetus ap. Stob. *Flor.* 121, 28, as a maxim of Pyrrhon.

<sup>68</sup> Diog. L. 9, 113.

<sup>69</sup> Ib. 110 and 113.

<sup>70</sup> As the meaning of *τῦφος* bears on the character of Antigonos (n. 103), it is worth considering. — Illusion can be in two spheres : (a) on the intellectual side, resulting in a perversion of knowledge, *καπνὸς φιλοσοφίας*, false dogmatism ; (b) on the ethical side, resulting in a perversion of character, false pride. After the Cynic Antisthenes launched the word on its interesting career (in a technical sense), by saying that *ἀτυφία* was the *τέλος*, his school do not appear to have kept to one meaning ; but, speaking roughly, they classed as *τῦφος* the ideals of the common man. Thus, though Krates, in frs. 1 and 8 (Diels), clearly means the illusion of *knowledge*, he as clearly in fr. 4, by his 'wine-dark sea of Illusion' that surrounds the plain living of the Cynic, means false pride ; and the latter is the meaning in the well-known

first opens with the Battle of the Philosophers, and passes on to the Fishing of the Philosophers,<sup>71</sup> where Zeno, in the person of a greedy old Phoenician woman, sitting in a dark mist of the inevitable Illusion, angles in vain (for her weel is small and her stupidity great) for the shoal of swimming dialecticians, Menedemos, Diodoros, and Arkesilaos, led by the great Plato-fish himself.<sup>72</sup> In Book II Timon descends to the Shades under the guidance of Xenophanes, the man of partial illumination (as Dante under the guidance of Vergil), and interviews the dead philosophers; Book III deals with those yet living. The *Silloi* must, however, belong to a much later stage of Timon's life than his sojourn in Pella.

But the Muse who found the best entertainment in Macedonia was Klio. History in the fourth century had paid the penalty of her rapid rise in the fifth. At Athens she had suddenly burst full-grown from her chrysalis of myth and logos, like the city goddess herself from the head of Zeus; but the changing conditions of the world forbade another Herodotos, the limitations of human nature a second Thucydides. Unable to move forward, she had naturally moved back. The first glamour of youth was over, and men in the fourth century had become intoxicated with a new art, the art of putting words together. The teaching of Isokrates invaded the province of the writer no less than that of the speaker; the thing

story of Diogenes trampling upon Plato's *τῦφος* (Diog. L. 6, 26). This latter was the aspect in which Zeno handled the word; he said πάντων ἀπρεπέστερον εἶναι τὸν τῦφον (Arnim 317=Diog. L. 7, 22); intellectual error cannot be unbecoming, and the context is plain. Timon, unable to retort on Zeno by accusing him of false pride, assails him with the other meaning; the 'mist' in which Zeno sits is the intellectual error of dogmatism. Both meanings continue to run on side by side; to Timon, his master Pyrrhon alone is quite free of false *dogmatism*, ἀτυφος, fr. 9 (32), his guide Xenophanes partially free only, ὑπάτυφος, fr. 60 (40); all others must have been condemned. To Bion, a small livelihood may be happy and profitable if false *pride* be absent (Teles, περὶ αὐταρκ., μετὰ . . . ἀτυφίας); and the Cynic teachers, Krates and Diogenes, are ἀτυφοί. In a certain sense, ἀτυφία is tending to become the virtue of one's friends, τῦφος the vice of one's enemies; and nothing is a surer sign of the presence of the objectionable quality in oneself than to claim that one is free of it, as did Pyrrhon (Diels, p. 180, from Aristokles). In later literature we continue to get both senses; ethical in e.g. Polyb. 16, 22, 4, Strabo, 15, 686, Plut. *Mor.* 43 B; intellectual in e.g. Polyb. 3, 81, 1, Plut. *Mor.* 580 C; ambiguous e.g. Polyb. 3, 81, 9.

<sup>71</sup> I merely follow Diels here.

<sup>72</sup> Fr. 30 (7) τῶν πάντων δ' ἡγήτο πλατίστακος (= 'mullus praegrandis', Diels, p. 183, and also 'Plato-fish').

became obscured by the symbol ; and if Ephoros was, in his way—let us grant this much to Polybios' appreciation—a considerable writer, he left behind him a bitter legacy, a school that cared to set down, not what had actually happened, but what sounded well. History, in the hands of the literary men, threatened to strangle herself in her own presentation and to degenerate into mere rhetoric.

It was comparatively easy, and it gave pleasure ; and many literary men of the fourth and third centuries carried on the process with eagerness. Many of these historians had great merits ; they were often learned, they were often industrious, they often had definite theories of how history should be written ; but whether we turn to the purely Isokratean writers like Ephoros and Theopompos,<sup>73</sup> or to the men of the new semi-poetical or Asianic style like Timaios, or to the school which, represented by Douris of Samos,<sup>74</sup> set out to vivify history by dramatizing it, we find, or think we find (for we are dealing with writers who are largely known to us only at second-hand), one common failing running through all their work ; the ultimate aim is not truth, but effect. And if this was the case with the great writers, it was natural enough that their followers should reproduce their faults without their virtues ; the result was to be seen in men like the much-read Kleitarchos, whose work was no better than a second-rate historical novel.

Polybios, in a well-known passage, laid it down that history would be well written when men of action were historians, or historians men of action. He desired, he said, that men of action should write history as of necessity, and not by the way. But in fact the men of action had already saved history. One of the many by-results of Alexander's career was that a

<sup>73</sup> Douris, fr. 1 ; Ephoros and Theopompos αὐτοῦ τοῦ γράφειν μόνον ἐπέμε-  
λήθησαν. See a very different estimate of Theopompos, however, by Wilamo-  
witz, *Greek Historical Writing* (trans. Gilbert Murray, 1908), which,  
however, seems partly to depend on the view that the Oxyrhynchos historian  
is Theopompos.

<sup>74</sup> For a very high estimate of Douris, see Beloch 3, 1, 492, who ranks him  
as more important than Hieronymos, and thinks that a large part of the  
material portions of Diodoros and Plutarch come from him. See contra  
E. Schwarz, 'Douris' in *P. W.* ; apart from Diodoros' Agathokles, we cannot  
say much about Douris' influence on the historical tradition.

new sort of historical writing appeared in the world, and the credit of it is due to Macedonia, and not to Greece ; for the Greeks who helped the Macedonians to start it either belonged to Macedonian cities or were in Macedonian service. What chiefly distinguishes it from the rhetorical schools is that it was, almost exclusively, written by men who had first lived through or played a part in the thing they wrote, and who afterwards wrote down the thing they knew. Probably their work was not popular, or much read ; the literary men, the rhetoricians, held the field. But it was an honest attempt toward the truth.

The place of honour is due to the three men of Macedonia who, with the aid of the official documents, put down the true facts of Alexander's expedition as they had themselves seen it ; Ptolemy son of Lagos, afterwards king of Egypt, from the military side ; Aristoboulos of Kassandreia from the point of view of the geographer and ethnologist ; Nearchos, a Cretan by birth but settled in Amphipolis, who told the story of the fleet which he had himself commanded. Alexander's career was quickly enough obscured by the usual clouds of rhetoric and miracle-mongering ; and but for these three men, and the practical Roman soldier from Bithynia who had the good sense to use their writings, we should know little enough of Alexander.

Antigonos himself, on each side, came of a family that had numbered historians amongst its members. Marsyas of Pella, half-brother or nephew of the elder Antigonos, had commanded Demetrios' centre at Salamis and written a history of Macedonia.<sup>75</sup> Antipatros the Regent had written a history of the Illyrian wars of the Macedonian king Perdikkas, and had also published two volumes of his own correspondence,<sup>76</sup> which must have formed a valuable quarry for Hieronymos. Above all, Krateros, Antigonos' half-brother, produced a work both of great value in itself and astoundingly modern in conception ; he collected from the Athenian archives, and published, the Athenian decrees from the earliest times to his own day, illustrating them with the necessary commentary.

<sup>75</sup> Susemihl 1, 533. On the relationship, Beloch 3, 2, 89.

<sup>76</sup> Suidas, 'Αντίπατρος.



It formed, in fact, a history of Athens based on epigraphic material. Naturally, his judgement was not always correct; he is said to have occasionally inserted spurious matter, such as the draft of a treaty which had never been completed. But it was regarded as noteworthy if he ever gave a fact without citing either a decree of the Assembly or a judgement of the Court in support of it; and the loss of such a work may be heartily deplored.<sup>77</sup> Whether the actual priority in the study of inscriptions belongs to him or to Philochoros cannot be decided; both the Macedonian prince and the Athenian antiquary were precursors of that most learned epigraphist of the next century, Polemon of Ilion.

It was only fitting, then, that at Antigonos' court the outstanding literary figure should be a historian: and though Hieronymos, in all probability, only wrote at the end of his active career, that career may be briefly referred to here; for it not only illustrates the possibilities, alike of adventure and of power, which lay open to the Greek in the new world, but it also brings before us the best type of the new school of historian who had himself played his part in that world.

Hieronymos of Kardias<sup>78</sup> was a Greek of the Thracian Chersonese, a fellow-countryman of Eumenes, whose fortunes he followed. He shared in the siege of Nora, and went as envoy for Eumenes to Antipatros, on which occasion the old Antigonos attempted to win him over. At Gabiene, where Eumenes was taken, Hieronymos was found among the wounded, and kindly treated by Antigonos, whose service he afterwards entered, remaining thenceforth a loyal adherent of the Antigonid house. In 312 Antigonos gave him a special

<sup>77</sup> *F. H. G.* ii, 617; Susemihl 1, 599; Beloch 3, 1, 495; W. Larfeld, *Handbuch d. griech. Epigraphik*, vol. i, 1907, p. 21, who concludes that the writer was the Macedonian prince. — On his care to cite either a ψήφισμα or a δίκη, *Plut. Arist.* 26. — On his admission of ἀντίγραφα συνθηκῶν ὡς γενομένων (where ἀντίγραφα clearly means, not copies, which would give no sense, but drafts that were never completed), *Plut. Kim.* 13, 5.

<sup>78</sup> F. Reuss, *Hieronymos von Kardias*; Susemihl 1, 560; Beloch 3, 1, 491, cf. 3, 2, 3 seq.; Wilamowitz, *Griech. Lit.*, p. 105 (with special appreciation of his truthfulness); H. Nietzold, *Die Überlieferung der Diadochen-Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Ipsos*, 1905 (not seen); F. Reuss in *Woch. Kl. Phil.* 1905, 1389, reviewing Nietzold, and in *Jahresbericht*, 1909; J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, 1909.

commission as governor of the Dead Sea,<sup>79</sup> as part of a very peculiar scheme for putting pressure on Ptolemy. From the Dead Sea came all the bitumen used in Egypt in embalming the dead ; this substance rose to the surface and floated there in great blocks, and was collected by the local Arabs, whose tribes fought violently with each other for the lucrative fishery. They had no boats, but put out on rafts made of reeds, each carrying three men ; two were to row and collect the bitumen, while the third carried a bow to repel enemies. Antigonos, or Demetrios, conceived the idea of cornering the supply of bitumen, a proceeding which, if successfully carried out, must have caused great religious excitement in Egypt and reacted unfavourably on Ptolemy ; and Hieronymos' commission was to build boats and collect all the available bitumen into one place.<sup>80</sup> The Arabs, however, were in no mind to lose their gainful trade ; they put out in thousands on their reed rafts and assailed the boats with arrows. This weird struggle on the malodorous lake ended in a complete victory for the Arabs, and the project of cornering bitumen fell through.

Whether Hieronymos was really satrap of Syria also may be doubted.<sup>81</sup> But it is probable that he fought by Demetrios' side at Salamis, and that it is to him that we owe our understanding account of that great victory ; perhaps, too, the picture of Demetrios himself in action, an inspiring figure on the poop of his great galley, bestriding his three fallen armour-bearers and taking his joy, like any hero of Homer, in the spear-play and the crash of the bronze-shod beaks.<sup>82</sup> He certainly fought in the battle of the kings at Ipsos, and remained true to Demetrios after that catastrophe ; in 293 Demetrios made him governor of Boeotia. He continued to live at Gonatas' court, and perhaps accompanied the king in the war against Pyrrhos, though he must have been nearly eighty at the time. Like Aristoboulos and Polybios and many another,

<sup>79</sup> Diod. 19, 98-100.

<sup>80</sup> Ib. 19, 100, 2.—There was of course bitumen in Babylonia ; also near Apollonia, Ael. *V.H.* 13, 16 ; but Egypt was supplied from the Dead Sea, Diod. 19, 99, 3.

<sup>81</sup> The only authority is Josephus, *c. Apion.* 1050 E.

<sup>82</sup> That the excellent naval items of this part of Diodoros are probably from Hieronymos, see ch. 3, n. 37. But it may be doubtful if this applies to the picture of Demetrios.

he lived first and only wrote when his active career was over ; it is said that in spite of the great exertions of his life, and his many wounds, he lived to be 104, and kept all his faculties to the end.

He wrote the history of the two generations that followed Alexander, the Successors and their sons, the Diadochoi and the Epigonoï ; he himself lived through both. His history forms a large part of the foundation of everything that we now know about the period which it covers.<sup>83</sup> His outlook was a wide one ; he was the first to give to the Greek world a sketch (introduced into the chapters on Pyrrhos) of the early history of Rome.<sup>84</sup> Though a partisan of the Antigonids, it is supposed that he dealt faithfully with both the elder Antigonos and Demetrios, concealing neither their harshness nor their greed of power.<sup>85</sup> There were some who reproached him with representing Gonatas in too favourable a light ; but the writer who relates this carries little weight as a historical critic, and had evidently not read Hieronymos himself, for he gives the statement merely as common report.<sup>86</sup> As such it is of little value ; and the possibility always remains that Hieronymos spoke well of Gonatas because that was in accord with facts. In reality it is not known at all what he thought or wrote of the king ; all evidence is lost. But what the king thought of Hieronymos can be guessed ; for his only recorded writing was a series of letters addressed to the historian, in which (among other things) he gave some account of the literary circle of which both had been members.<sup>87</sup> Clearly

<sup>83</sup> He may be the basis at first hand of Arrian's Diadochoi, and is in large part (not of course at first hand) that of Plutarch's Lives of Eumenes, Demetrios, and Pyrrhos. As to Diodoros, there is much discussion as to how Hieronymos was used and with what intermediaries. Certainty may never be attained ; but it is admitted anyhow that he counts for much in Diodoros' books 18 to 20, the excellence of which is unquestioned ; see E. Schwartz, 'Diodoros' in *P. W.*, col. 684.

<sup>84</sup> Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1, 6.

<sup>85</sup> Reuss, *Hieronimos*, p. 108.

<sup>86</sup> Paus. 1, 9, 8, cf. 1, 13, 9. Note Pausanias' *ἔχει δόξαν* : it is merely a case of 'they say', and of little value. The definite statement that Hieronymos hated Lysimachos may well be true ; he was an officer of Demetrios, and also Lysimachos had destroyed his native city, Kardias. But the story of Lysimachos (i.e. his Thracians) rifling the tombs of Pyrrhos' ancestors is not the absurdity that Pausanias supposes ; Pyrrhos afterwards allowed his Gauls to do just the same thing at Aigai.

<sup>87</sup> Third Life of Aratos ; *ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ Ἀντίγονος ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Ἱερώνυμον.*

Hieronymos was one whom he delighted to honour. That the historian, too, was interested in those philosophic questions which appealed to the king is shown by the comparative frequency with which Hieronymos appears as a source in later philosophic literature.<sup>88</sup>

Hieronymos' primary aim was truth, the recording of what really did happen. This aim he achieved in full measure; the trustworthiness of his narrative was unquestioned. But though his matter was good, he had no gift of style; he was said to be dry, and he did not attract readers. When read at all he was read at second or third hand; thus scarcely the most trifling fragment of his actual words can be identified as having survived, though something of the substance of what he wrote can be gathered from three of the best of Plutarch's Lives and the material portions of three very excellent books of Diodoros. He differs somewhat from most third-century writers, such as Ptolemy I or Aratos of Sikyon; their careers were more important than their writings; with Hieronymos the historian overshadows the man. And the pity of it is that, to himself, he was a soldier and a statesman, and only turned historian in old age; consequently he taught no pupils, and left no successor; true understanding of the history of Macedonia ends with his death. That he was a great historian we can dimly see. It is difficult to speak with much confidence of the place of one whose work is only known to us through the use made of it by others; but it has been suggested, not unreasonably, that had that work survived we might to-day be including Hieronymos as third in a triumvirate of Greek historians with Polybios and Thucydides.<sup>89</sup>

At the centre of the society here sketched stood the king himself.<sup>90</sup> He was about forty-three years old at the time of his marriage to Phila;<sup>91</sup> he had one natural son, Halkyoneus,<sup>92</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos*, p. 28.

<sup>89</sup> Bury, *op. c.*, p. 177.

<sup>90</sup> Droysen's famous portrait, *Hellenismus*<sup>2</sup>, iii. 1, 206, remains perhaps the best and truest appreciation of Antigonos. See also Kaerst, 'Antigonos,' no. 4 in *P. W.*; Niese, ii, 223; Beloch 3, 1, 590; and especially Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, pp. 211, 212.

<sup>91</sup> Phila was, at least, something over twenty years younger than himself. She was alive in 246/5; see ch. 13, n. 60.

<sup>92</sup> Halkyoneus was grown up and holding high command in 273. His



born many years since, and brought up as a prince of the blood, who three years later was old enough to be holding high command in the army. As king of Macedonia Antigonos married one wife and no more, a natural reaction against the excesses of Demetrios. But the scanty details of his private life are really immaterial to history. That he took pleasure in the feast and the wine-cup<sup>93</sup> is merely to say that he was a Macedonian king; it was a matter of course that it should be so. The Macedonian of the third century was fond of huge banquets,<sup>94</sup> and expected that his king should get drunk on the proper occasions, as Philip and Alexander had done. The record still remains of how Philip literally drank himself into the good graces of the hard-riding Thessalian landowners.<sup>95</sup> Even in Greece a 'water-drinker' was as great an oddity as he would have been among English squires in the eighteenth century.<sup>96</sup> But these things were merely for the time of relaxation; the first Antigonos, and even Demetrios,

mother was an Athenian hetaira, Demo (Ptolemaios of Megalopolis ap. Athen. 13, 578 a); but all the stories show him being treated precisely as crown prince. Now the third-century evidence was that Demo was Antigonos' *ἐρωμένη*, and that Demetrios I had an *ἐρωμένη* called Mania (Ptolemaios, *l. c.*), a *πύρνη* whose real name was Melissa (Machon ap. Athen. 578 b, with details); and it seems clear to me that Plutarch's source here (not Hieronymos) in the life of Demetrios has wrongly identified Mania with Demo, who in the third-century evidence are two different people, and that Plutarch's stories really relate to Mania, and not to Demo, who was never Demetrios' *ἐρωμένη*; the identification of the two probably rests on some such worthless rubbish as that given by Herakleides Lembos ap. Athen. 578 a (second century), which is self-contradictory and does not even merit refutation.

<sup>93</sup> Persaios' account of a state banquet of Antigonos, Athen. 13, 607 c seq., and see next note. Zeno rebukes Antigonos for getting drunk, Arnim 289=Ael. *V. H.* 9, 26. — It does not appear after which Antigonos the wine-cup called *ἀντιγονίς* (Ath. 11, 783 e, 497 f) was named.

<sup>94</sup> Description of the wedding feast of the Macedonian Karanos, given by the Macedonian Hippōlochos (Athen. 4, 128 a–130 d). Hippolochos had a taste for this sort of thing, and described Karanos' orgy to his friend Lynkeus (brother of Douris the historian), who lived in Athens, in return for a letter from the latter describing a banquet called Aphrodisia which Antigonos had given there (Sussehl 1, 487 and 881). Both banquets probably belong to the time when Antigonos was crown prince, and a section of Athenian society was flattering Demetrios by references to Phila Aphrodite. — When, however, Dion Chrysostom (*Or.* 33, § 26) says that Macedonia, like Sybaris, &c., perished of luxury, I take his moralizing to refer to the Macedonian race generally, in Asia and Egypt. Macedonia itself seems never to have been wealthy.

<sup>95</sup> Theopompus Fr. 178 (*F. H. G.* 1, p. 308).

<sup>96</sup> See ch. 7, n. 127. At least two philosophers of this century, Theophrastos and Hieronymos of Rhodes, wrote on drunkenness.

kept business and pleasure separate, and never drank on campaign.<sup>97</sup>

The portrait of Antigonos' features that is most likely to resemble him must have been taken at a somewhat later time, probably after the fall of Athens.<sup>98</sup> It shows a plain, straightforward sort of face, thoughtful, but far from good-looking; save for a somewhat similar projection of the rounded chin, it bears no resemblance to the handsome features of Demetrios. Antigonos in fact scarcely inherited anything from his father at all, save family loyalty; he possessed neither his genius nor his failings. What he did possess was a dogged tenacity, surpassing that of either the first Antigonos or Antipatros, a tenacity which rose above both good fortune and evil, which had brought him to the throne, and was to take him much further; he was to be a signal illustration of the superiority of character to talent.

Among the moralists of a later time, Antigonos used to be quoted as a proof of the thesis that the sins of the fathers are not always visited upon the children: the worthy son of a worthless father, they concluded, *can* escape the punishment of the race, even as Antigonos, good offspring of a bad root, escaped the penalty due to the sins of Demetrios.<sup>99</sup> If one is to appeal to heredity, it might be equally true to put it that he reaped the reward due to the virtues of his mother Phila. But Antigonos himself was Stoic enough to believe that a man stood on his own feet, and was what he made himself.<sup>100</sup> Without illusions and without enthusiasms, with little gift of attracting men, knowing quite well that he was not a heaven-sent general or statesman, he nevertheless won through at the end with almost everything that he meant to do, partly because of his inflexible determination to do it, partly because he possessed the old Greek virtue of moderation,<sup>101</sup> the only quality (so Aristotle had said) which could hold a kingdom together;<sup>102</sup> he could distinguish the things that were possi-

<sup>97</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 19.

<sup>98</sup> See ch. 7, n. 20, and frontispiece.

<sup>99</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 562 F. See n. 47 (c).

<sup>101</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 545 B, μέτριος.

<sup>102</sup> Aristot. *Pol.* 1313 a. Probably he had the Macedonian kingdom in view (Newman).

<sup>100</sup> See notes 46 and 47 (a).

ble from the things that were chimaeras. Moderation was not a virtue that he could have learnt from his Stoic teachers, or anywhere but in the school of life itself; but Zeno had taught him one of his highest lessons, to be free from the great Illusion, false pride.<sup>103</sup> Whether he also acquired from his Stoic friends his capacity to bear misfortune with dignity and calmness<sup>104</sup> may be doubted: more probably his mind here ran on parallel lines with theirs. His kindness and generosity are frequently noticed.<sup>105</sup>

He appears to have hated shams. This was one element of his enmity to Pyrrhos, and of his obvious knowledge that in the long run it must be Pyrrhos and not himself that must go under. It was not always possible for a king to prevent the worst sham of all, his worship as a god. His own realm, indeed, he could control; and Antigonos had no occasion to consider the question of a State worship of himself, in which so many of the kings from Alexander downward had found a wonderful instrument of statecraft. But if an independent community desired to render to a king divine honours, it was not easy to stop them from doing so; and few kings in fact desired to stop them. But it may be recorded of Antigonos, to his honour—and of him almost alone among kings of the time of Macedonian blood—that, so far as is known, he was never worshipped by anybody.<sup>106</sup>

This side of his character can be illustrated from some of

<sup>103</sup> Antigonos is twice called *ἄτυφος*, each time in a passage that relates to character and not to intellect; Plut. *Mor.* 545 B, *ἄτυφος καὶ μέτριος*; Ael. *V. H.* 2, 20 (see n. 122), *πρᾶον καὶ ἄτυφον*; and see the context in each case. Referring to n. 70 on the double meaning of *τύφος*, it is clear that the *τύφος* from which Antigonos was free was false pride.

<sup>104</sup> *Μεγαλοφρόνως*; Plut. *Mor.* 119 C.

<sup>105</sup> e. g. toward Kleantes, whose poverty he relieved (Diog. L. 7, 169); toward Bion, p. 235; toward Pyrrhos' son Helenos, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34; Just. 25, 5, 2. He is *πρᾶος*, Ael. *V. H.* 2, 20. Cf. Bion on Antigonos, Teles, *περὶ αὐταρκείας*, l. 8.

<sup>106</sup> On the supposed evidence to the contrary see App. 5, p. 435. — The fact that he used his own features for Pan on his coins does not mean that he thought himself Pan; if so, Demetrios in like case (see C. T. Seltman, *Num. Chron.* 1909, p. 267, n. 3) must have thought he was Pallas Athene. — I believe, in spite of all that has been said to the contrary, that the plain man of the time was perfectly clear as to the distinction, in this connexion, of *θεός* and *ἄνθρωπος*. Else why did Antipatros take the risk involved in refusing to worship Alexander, *ἀσεβὲς τοῦτο κρίνας*?

the anecdotes told about him;<sup>107</sup> it will suffice to select two that are undoubtedly true.<sup>108</sup> One is the snub, half brutal half humorous, which he bestowed on the wretched poet who had addressed him as 'god',—'the slave of the bed-chamber doesn't think so'.<sup>109</sup> The other is not quite so obvious. While he was besieging a town a certain philosopher insisted on reading him a treatise on justice. It is, fortunately, possible to reconstruct the text on which the learned man was preaching; it was the old saying, scorned in its time, but again taken up and rehabilitated by Aristotle, that 'justice is the good of my neighbour'; and the king turned on him with 'How can you prate to me of justice and my neighbour's good when you find me assaulting my neighbour's city?' Did then Antigonos not believe in justice, and hold with Epicurus' comment (hardly made in earnest), that one set to administer justice was a fool not to take his neighbour's goods when he had the power? Antigonos in reality knew far more about justice than that philosopher probably did; he once, in reply to one who said everything was just for kings, had answered that nothing was just for kings but what was just in itself: but he could not restrain the savage impatience of the man of action, the man who has got to *do* something in a position

<sup>107</sup> On the lengths of the reigns of the three kings called Antigonos (that of Gonatas being far the longest), and the law of chances, a number of the anecdotes merely labelled 'Antigonos' must refer to Gonatas, as well as those expressly assigned to him; and any which relate to philosophical questions are sure to do so. Of Plutarch's *Apophthegmata*, under 'Αντιγόνου', Nos. 7 (= Plut. *Mor.* 360 C, see *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 268), 8 (which involves discussion of the point referred to in note 110), and 17 (from the appearance of Antagoras), certainly belong to Gonatas. Of the stories in Polyæn. 4, 6, Nos. 1, 3, 17, 18 are Gonatas without question. The only uncertain one here is No. 2. It comes between two Gonatas stories, and for this reason Melber gave it to Gonatas with a query; on internal evidence it might also, perhaps, suit Antigonos I. Of those in Stobæus' *Florilegium*, 7, 20 and 49, 20 seem certainly to be Gonatas, from the contents (see note 117), while 49, 20 has two definite parallels in language; ῥάκος recalls Bion (note 47 f), ἐπὶ κοπρίας Gonatas himself (λασανοφόρος of Plut. *Mor.* 360 C).

<sup>108</sup> Whether any particular story or saying is true or not can never be decided subjectively; our business is to look for the allusion, the quotation, the parallel in philosophic literature. I may illustrate this by referring to notes 47 and 110, ch. 10, n. 107, and *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 268. The Antigonos sayings have never, to my knowledge, been investigated, except the single case in Hense, *Teles*<sup>2</sup>, p. lxxxviii.

<sup>109</sup> Οὐ τοιαῦτά μοι ὁ λασανοφόρος σύννοιδεν. See *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 268. The point evaporates in polite translation.



perhaps every way impossible, at the easy periods of the man of books, the man who had not got to grips with reality. There is no truer bit of human nature in Plutarch.<sup>110</sup>

In politics, his steady determination was the dominant factor. Through good fortune and evil he had held firmly to the belief that he was to be king of Macedonia; and he was king. We shall see the same quality in his wars with Egypt; we see it again, perhaps even more clearly, in the history of his successors. It took him many years to win the allegiance of the Macedonians; once won, it was won for ever. Not the worst excesses of his grandson ever shook their loyalty to the dynasty; and even after their two great and unequal struggles with Rome, that power never felt safe from pretenders claiming kinship with the beloved house until she had carved up and dismembered the land in a fashion practised upon no other nation.

Beside determination stood a truly Stoic sense of duty, a quality inherited in part, no doubt, through his mother from Antipatros. It showed itself of course clearly in the general measures taken for the good of the country, and in the resolve to be a Macedonian and not a Greek king: it showed itself in a number of smaller ways. He took the work of a king seriously: unlike Demetrios, he made himself readily accessible to his people;<sup>111</sup> it is probably to him that the story relates of a king who had complete records compiled of

<sup>110</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 330 E. Certainly Gonatas, as he is called ὁ γέρον (J. H. S. 1909, p. 268). He said ἀβέλτερος εἶ ὃς ὁρῶν με τὰς ἀλλοτρίας πόλεις τύπτοντα λέγεις περὶ δικαιοσύνης. Τύπτοντα in this sense is unique, according to Steph. Byz.; this, and the scansion, show that Antigonos is quoting bits of two iambic lines. The strange ἀλλοτρίας, therefore, whether it be the original adjective or whether, as I imagine, Antigonos has substituted it, must refer to what the 'sophist' was saying, as it is the point of the sentence. His text, then, was ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν ἢ δικαιοσύνη, a saying attacked by Thrasymachos (Plato, *Rep.* 343 C), and set up again by Aristotle, *Eth. Eudem.* 5, 1, 17 and 6, 6. — We know that discussion of this was in the air. Bion parodied it with τὸ κάλλος ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν (Diog. L. 4, 48); Epicurus' comment is given by Arrian, *Epicetet. Diss.* iii, 7, 11 (p. 322 of Usener's *Epicurus*). — Antigonos on δίκαια, Plut. *Mor.* 182 C, no. 8. — Aristotle's dictum involved this, that justice was the good of *all* the citizens (A. C. Bradley in *Hellenica*, p. 230). If we compare this with Antigonos' own theory of kingship (see p. 256), we see that he would probably have agreed. — To suppose (as has been done) that in Plut. *Mor.* 330 E Antigonos was talking mere cynicism, in the modern sense, is superficial.

<sup>111</sup> Ael. *V. H.* 2, 20, δημοτικός.

all who came to him on embassies or other State affairs, and astonished them upon their introduction by his knowledge both of themselves and of their business.<sup>112</sup> But Antigonos indeed went far beyond details of administration ; for it was he who laid down the highest view of kingship that the ancient world ever saw.<sup>113</sup>

Most of Alexander's successors were frankly usurpers. Their justification was their ability ; they were the right men in the right places. But however well the Lagid or the Seleukid might govern, he governed his country for himself, as his domain ; and when he sought some theoretic base for his power—a power that had in fact no theoretic base at all—he could only find it on the religious side, in the worship accorded to him by his subjects.<sup>114</sup>

Strictly speaking, Antigonos needed no theoretic base for his power at all. It was sufficient that he had become the legitimate national king of an ancient monarchical country. This enabled him to put away, once and for all, all question of a state worship of himself. But though he was now a legitimate national king, he had become such entirely through his own effort and abilities. He answered exactly to the description of a Successor ; he had found no hereditary realm or lawful succession waiting for him ; he had won his kingdom on the field of Lysimacheia, by his own right hand, and held it at present by administering its affairs with intelligence.<sup>115</sup> It was largely an accident that the ancient customs of the country he ruled had enabled the Macedonians

<sup>112</sup> Polyaen. 4, 6, 2, if it be Gonatas ; see n. 107.

<sup>113</sup> In what follows, to the end of the chapter, I have drawn freely on Kaerst's brilliant work, *Studien zur Entwicklung und theoretischen Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum* (ch. 3 and 4). But I have rearranged the ideas ; and when I come to Antigonos' own contribution I have reluctantly to part company with Kaerst altogether. There is also much that is valuable in R. Pöhlmann, 'Die Entstehung des Cäsarismus' (*Aus Altertum und Gegenwart*, 1895 ; omitted from the 2nd ed., 1911, as being substantially incorporated in the 4th ed. of his *Grundriss d. griech. Geschichte*).

<sup>114</sup> The position of the Diadochoi is given by Suidas, βασιλεία (2). Kaerst attributes this passage to historic rather than philosophic literature.

<sup>115</sup> This sentence corresponds to four points of the ordinary διάδοχος as given by Suidas, *l. c.*, οὔτε φύσις (hereditary realm) οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον (lawful succession) ἀποδιδούσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις ἡγεῖσθαι στρατοπέδων (Lysimacheia) καὶ χειρίζειν πράγματα νουνεχῶς (intelligent administration).

to confer on him a kingship valid in law. It might have been otherwise; it was somewhat of an accident that he had become a national king, rather than a king of the type of Ptolemy. Antigonos fully recognized his own share in the matter by the foundation of his games Basileia in honour of his own kingship, and perhaps by the change he made in the method of dating State documents.<sup>116</sup> But though he meant to be a national king in every sense, and recognized that he had a sure basis of rule in his election by the Macedonians, the part he had played in bringing about his own kingship reinforced the desire he already felt, a desire inevitable from his philosophic training and surroundings, that that kingship should justify itself in the sight of philosophy, and should have some theoretic basis not at variance with the highest thought of the time.

Many trains of thought contributed to form this basis, and can be partially traced. There was first the Cynic view. The common herd must have a master; but that master must take as his ideal the Cynic hero Herakles, the superman toiling and suffering incessantly to drive evil out of the world. Kingship then was a hard thing to its possessor, bringing him pain and not pleasure, evil things rather than good. Antigonos, like many other kings, felt this to the full; you cannot, he said, get any great good without great hardship: and if men knew all the troubles that clung to the rag called a diadem, none would stoop to pick it up if it lay on the dunghill at their feet.<sup>117</sup> But this was one side only.

Then there was a Stoic view. Kings need render no account and submit to no restraint; to get a good king, then, you must have the best man possible, for the decision in things good and bad rests with him, and an inferior man will not understand what to do, or act conformably to the Law that orders the universe.<sup>118</sup> The best man possible is the wise man, the philosopher; but as a practical matter you do not find philosophers at the head of States. The next best

<sup>116</sup> The games; ch. 7, n. 18. — Kassandros had dated by some priesthood; under Antigonos the king's regnal year was used; ch. 7, n. 56.

<sup>117</sup> Stob. *Flor.* 7, 20 and 49, 20. See note 107. It is of course a common sentiment; see Doston's reputed words, Just. 28, 3, 13.

<sup>118</sup> Suid. βασιλεία (1); Chrysippos ap. Diog. L. 7, 122.

thing, then, is that the philosopher, if he does not actually rule, shall stand behind the chair of the ruler and advise.<sup>119</sup> This, too, Antigonos fully met; Persaios had come to him as his philosophic director, and wrote for him, as Euphantos had done before, a treatise on kingship.

But there was still something wanting. The toil of the king, and the direction of the philosopher, were insufficient unless applied to the right end. Again the Stoic philosophy intervened. There were in the world enlightened monarchs who worked hard, but who had gone astray by treating their states as their private domains. Their exactions in the way of taxes were, said the Stoic, little better than those of a tyrant; men were forced to pay. Taxation should be by consent; for the true king must remember that the goods of his people were not his; the true view must rather be that kingship is the possession of the State.<sup>120</sup>

We cannot tell when the Stoics voiced this rather startling phrase, or in what temporal relation it stands to Antigonos' own view. But, even if the unnamed Stoic preceded Antigonos, he did not go the whole way. He was thinking chiefly of *property*. One thing, however, followed from his utterance: Stoicism condemned the ordinary Hellenistic kingdom, and declared with no uncertain sound that the king of her choice must think, not of his rights, but of his duties.<sup>121</sup> And it was from the point of view of duty that Antigonos started, when he went as far as it is possible to go on the path so marked

<sup>119</sup> Chrysippos ap. Plut. *Mor.* 1043 C, συμβιώνεται βασιλεῖ. For other passages see Kaerst, *l. c.*, p. 71, n. 2.

<sup>120</sup> Suidas, βασιλεία (3), a most valuable bit of Stoic or Stoic-Cynic teaching; Kaerst, *l. c.*, p. 59 seq.—Τὰς σὺν λόγῳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ τῶν εἰσφορῶν ἀπαιτήσεις, as opposed to exactions, is uncommonly near taxation with consent of the taxed.—"Ὅτι ἡ βασιλεία κτῆμα τῶν κοινῶν' ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ δημόσια τῆς βασιλείας κτήματα (as the Diadochoi treated them). Whether the first phrase comes earlier in time than Antigonos' saying or not, it does not go nearly as far. It *might*, for instance, be satisfied by (e. g.) the rights claimed by the people of Epeiros to depose a king who misbehaved.

<sup>121</sup> See Pöhlman, *l. c.*, p. 287.—'The French Revolution proclaimed the Rights of Man, but this is not enough. . . . One day we shall begin to proclaim the Duties of Man. In Article 48 of the Convention for the peaceful settlement of international disputes the word "duty" has, at the suggestion of France, been inserted for the first time in an international agreement.' Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, in a paper communicated to the first Universal Races Congress, London, 1911 (*Interracial Problems*, ed. G. Spiller, p. 384).



out for a king, and put the coping-stone on that which the philosophers were building. The occasion was that his son had misused some of his subjects, and Antigonos, gently enough, rebuked him and said, 'Do you not understand, boy, that *our* kingship is a noble servitude?' Of the meaning of the words no doubt is possible, for the context is eloquent. That which the Stoic had partially, but only partially, envisaged in theory, Antigonos translated into personal fact; the king must be the servant of his people.<sup>122</sup> The theoretic basis of kingship was found in the duty of service. We are familiar now with kings who have made this their highest aim; perhaps only those who have some slight acquaintance with the ancient world can realize to what extent it was a new conception in the third century before Christ. Kings no doubt had sought the good of their people before Antigonos, just as men had done their duty before the Stoics taught; but Antigonos is the first known to us who laid down, as a rule of practice, that principle which was thenceforth held to mark a kingly soul, and which we still consider an ideal.

<sup>122</sup> Ael. *V. H.* 2, 20, ὁρῶν τὸν υἱὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις χρώμενον βιαιότερόν τε καὶ θρασύτερον "οὐκ οἶσθα" εἶπεν, "ὦ παῖ, τὴν βασιλείαν ἡμῶν ἐνδοξον εἶναι δουλείαν;" It goes on, that whoever does not recognize that this was spoken in love of the people (φιλανθρώπως) does not know a kingly man from a tyrant. — Φιλανθρώπως, cf. φιланθρωπία of the true (Stoic) king in Suidas, βασιλεία 3, i. e. love of that section of humanity committed to the monarch's care, κηδεμονία in Suidas, *l. c.* (on which Kaerst, *l. c.*, p. 60, n. 1). — Aelian seems to have a bit of philosophic literature here; cf. the parallels with Suidas, βασιλεία 3. — That the Antigonos is Gonatas is unquestioned; Doson had no son, and πρᾶος and ἄτυφος could not be applied to Antigonos I, who, moreover, does not figure in Stoic literature. And the son's act suits Halkyoneus, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34. — As to the meaning, I cannot follow Kaerst. He takes δουλεία to mean that kingship is a *burden*, and says we must *not* take the view that it means *service*; so again in his *Gesch. d. hell. Zeitalters*, ii, 1, p. 317, it is a *burden*, to be taken up out of a sense of duty toward those entrusted to the king's care. Antigonos *did* think kingship a burden, as I have shown. But in this passage the natural meaning is the right one, as the context shows beyond any possibility of doubt. Antigonos could not rebuke his son for violence by saying 'kingship is a heavy *burden*'; it would have no meaning. The sense imperatively demanded is 'kingship is *service*'.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE RECKONING WITH PYRRHOS

THE peace of the world was not destined to last. In the year 275/4 two events happened, of crucial importance for the time that followed; Ptolemy II married his sister Arsinoe, Keraunos' widow, and Pyrrhos<sup>1</sup> returned from Italy.

Pyrrhos, because of his well-known war with Rome, has often been treated as a typical Hellenistic monarch. In fact, no one could have been less representative of his time than the king of Epeiros. All his Macedonian contemporaries, without exception, were men who cared strongly for learning or letters in some form or other; great fighters and great administrators, they all agreed in this, that it was no small part of the business of a king to encourage intellectual activity and research. Probably the world has never seen a period in which the rulers of the civilized states, taken as a whole, were so unanimous in their efforts to advance knowledge and culture. But Pyrrhos, king of a very backward country, cared as little for knowledge or culture or any other immaterial thing as did any baron of the dark ages. He said openly (with a side-hit at Antigonos' philosophical tastes), that there was only one philosophy worthy of a king, and that was war;<sup>2</sup> on war he wrote, and for war, as an end in itself, he lived. We may indeed suspect that one of the reasons which made him the darling of the common soldier was just this, that he, while born a king, was not altogether too far above the common soldier's level.

<sup>1</sup> Pyrrhos' features may be preserved in a marble bust at Naples; see J. Six, *Röm. Mitt.* 1891, Pl. VIII. He identified it as Pyrrhos, and A. J. B. Wace (*J. H. S.* 1905, p. 94) thinks it fairly safe to accept this. The head is diademed, and wears a Macedonian helmet crowned with oak-leaves. The face is not attractive; the set of the mouth, the large base to the nostrils, and the vertical wrinkles between the brows, give it an unpleasant, almost a peevish, look. It is quite unlike the traditional face of Alexander.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 8.

In one way he was a spoilt child of fortune ; no folly or mismanagement ever appeared to impair his prestige or weaken his attraction ; his legend even survived sheer defeat. He came back from Italy something worse than a failure—he came back without his honour, having by a trick<sup>3</sup> evaded the allies who had trusted him, and whom he left helpless before the vengeance of Rome ; yet he came back as formidable as ever. That he had been unable to make the least impression on the solid power of Rome is no matter for reproach ; where a Hannibal was to fail, a Pyrrhos was not likely to succeed ; but it is clear that he completely miscalculated the nature of his undertaking. He had been confident, and rightly so, of his ability to beat the Romans in a pitched battle ; but he had never considered what was to happen if Rome refused to come to terms in spite of defeat ; and he was driven into an *impasse* by his inability either to conquer Rome or to make peace with her.

Not a common soldier in his army would have managed things as badly as the brilliant Pyrrhos had done. To fight Rome alone was enough for any man ; to drive Rome and Carthage into each other's arms and fight the two at once was madness. Most of all do the events in Sicily prove Pyrrhos' utter absence of statesmanship. It may have been too late to revive the policy of Dionysios I, and found an empire of all the Western Greeks ; it was not too late to form a strong buffer state in Sicily, a state that could have relied upon Epeiroi support. The enthusiasm excited in Sicily by the advent of Pyrrhos was enormous ; tyrant after tyrant laid down his power and handed over to Pyrrhos his troops ; the whole island, save Messene and Lilybaeum, was in his hands. Carthage was so shaken that she offered Pyrrhos a war indemnity and a fleet if she might only keep Lilybaeum, which Pyrrhos might have known was in any case impregnable to an enemy who did not command the sea. Here surely was an opportunity of some sort for a statesman. But Pyrrhos, already unequal to the task of facing Rome, flung back the Carthaginian overtures, and

<sup>3</sup> Polyæn. 6, 6, 1. — He may perhaps have had some idea of returning after conquering Macedonia ; if so, he soon forgot about it.

compelled the two great Powers to unite ; attacked, and was of course repulsed from, Lilybaeum ; alienated the Sicilians by all sorts of harshness, apart from the naval conscription (which they recognized as necessary if he was going to fight Carthage), and then aroused a terrible outburst of hatred in the island by hanging his most prominent adherents on suspicion and without trial ; lost Sicily as fast as he had won it ; fought a great battle against Carthage with his Syracusan-Epeirot fleet, manned with pressed rowers and troops who had never seen the sea, and naturally suffered a disastrous defeat,<sup>4</sup> which finally decided the secular duel of Carthage and Syracuse in favour of Carthage ; and then with shattered forces went out to be defeated again by Rome. The one result of his six years in the west, during which he had drained Epeiros of her best blood and weakened her permanently, was to give to Roman legionary and Carthaginian sailor that confidence in themselves, each on his own element, with which they entered on their war for Sicily. Well may Antigonos have said of Pyrrhos that he was a gambler who threw good numbers but had no idea how to make use of them.<sup>5</sup> Pyrrhos was no second Alexander ; he was, at best, a second-rate Demetrios.

It was in the autumn of 275 that Pyrrhos suffered his defeat at the hands of Manius Curius. He was at the end of his resources ; his allies had lost heart, he had no money to enrol mercenaries, and he could not raise another man from Epeiros. He had already applied to Antigonos and Antiochos for help ;<sup>6</sup> both had very naturally refused. Either that autumn

<sup>4</sup> Pyrrhos got 140 ships at Syracuse, the remains of Agathokles' fleet (Diod. 22, 8, 5), including the royal enneres. He left Syracuse with 110 ships, and lost 70 in the action, only 12 remaining seaworthy (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 24 ; App. *Samm.* 12 ; Paus. 1, 12, 5 ; 'Ined. Vat.' in *Hermes*, 27, 121, published by H. von Arnim). The Carthaginians even captured his own royal ship, an hepteres, and used it afterwards as a flagship of their own (Polyb. 1, 23, 4). Niese (ii, 50) very rightly considered that this battle did Pyrrhos more harm even than Beneventum ; and it evidently ruined the Syracusan sea-power. I do not understand how de Sanctis (*Storia dei Romani*, 2, 418) makes out that Pyrrhos saved Sicily from becoming definitely Carthaginian. The *Ined. Vat.* shows how enormously this defeat of Pyrrhos enhanced Carthaginian prestige at sea.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26. We should use the metaphor from cards rather than dice.

<sup>6</sup> Paus. 1, 13, 1 ; Just. 25, 3, 1.



or in the spring of 274<sup>7</sup> he gave out for the benefit of his allies and of the Romans that Antigonos was coming to his assistance; and under cover of the impression made by the news he succeeded in slipping away unmolested by Rome. He brought home with him 8,000 foot and 500 horse, all that remained, save the garrison left at Tarentum, of the large armies he had raised during these last years; money to pay them with he had none.

But he had one great quality drawn from his very defects. A born fighter, he could never sit down under adversity; and if he did spend his life in dropping the substance to grasp the shadow, he never lost hope that the very next shadow would turn substantially into the thing that he wanted. He now thought that Macedonia might prove an easier conquest than Rome or Carthage; and at once set about enforcing his old pretensions to the crown. His grievance against Antigonos is said to have been, partly, that Antigonos had refused him assistance in Italy, and partly 'other things';<sup>8</sup> speculation on the subject is useless, for the terms of the secret treaty of 285 between Antigonos and Pyrrhos are unknown. A reason was not really necessary; it was enough that Macedonia had once in part belonged to Pyrrhos. In the autumn of 274 Pyrrhos started enlisting Gauls, and refreshed his wearied

<sup>7</sup> The chronological data are as follows. Manius Curius triumphed in Feb. 274; therefore Beneventum was fought in the autumn of 275. The change of government at Athens cannot have taken place before Antigonos' defeat by Pyrrhos, and the pro-Macedonians were still in power in December-January of Hieron's year 274/3, *I.G.* ii, 5, 323 b = Michel 1484; consequently the *earliest* possible date for Antigonos' defeat is spring 273. As a whole campaigning season must be allowed for Pyrrhos' Peloponnesian expedition, and as prior to this Antigonos was again defeated by Ptolemaios and then had to regain Macedonia, it is clear that Beloch was right in putting Pyrrhos' death in late autumn 272, and Ptolemaios' victory in 273. Now Pyrrhos sent messengers to Asia for help after his defeat at sea by Carthage, and they did not return till after Beneventum, Paus. i, 13, 1; consequently his defeat at sea was at latest spring 275, and the messengers got back, at earliest, very late in the autumn of 275. He *might* then have crossed to Epeiros autumn 275, but spring or summer 274 is more likely. But Beloch's supposition, that he defeated Antigonos in 274 and crossed to Peloponnese in 272, not only runs counter to *I.G.* ii, 5, 323 b, but makes him spend 273 doing nothing, which I cannot believe; I therefore put Antigonos' defeat in spring 273, and Ptolemaios' victory the same autumn. The date of Beneventum being otherwise fixed, there will be no need to alter this even if Pomtow succeeds in dating Hieron in 276/5 (see *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1910, 1096).

<sup>8</sup> Paus. i, 13, 2.

and unpaid troops by attacking and looting the nearest Macedonian towns before going into winter quarters.

It is necessary to turn now for a moment to events in the south. So long as Egypt held Phoenicia, so long had Antiochos a standing grievance against her; and it appears that in the winter of 275/4 an arrangement was come to between Antiochos and Magas, the half-brother of Ptolemy II, who governed Cyrene for him, for a joint attack upon Egypt. Magas married Antiochos' daughter, Apame, probably in the winter of 275/4, and rose in the spring of 274,<sup>9</sup> but Antiochos was not yet ready. It may, however, have been this danger which prompted Ptolemy to his marriage with his sister Arsinoe, which took place some time in 274, prior to November of that year.<sup>10</sup>

We last saw Arsinoe in Samothrake, where she had taken refuge after the murder of her younger sons by Keraunos. At what time she returned to Egypt is not known, except that she must have been there some little while before 274. She was not as young as she had been, and the result of her two experiments in marriage had hardly been of a nature to make her desire a third husband; but her ambition, and probably her powers, had merely ripened with advancing years, and she seems to have had something of the confi-

<sup>9</sup> Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 3, 523. — Apame; *O. G. I.* 745.

<sup>10</sup> The Pithom stele shows Arsinoe was queen by 2 Nov. 274, and Lehmann-Haupt (*l. c.*, 524), following Koehler, put her marriage in the summer or autumn of that year. Beloch (3, 2, 130) thought it might be much earlier, even 278. — Now the *πομπή* described by Kallixenos was compounded of several festivals; those of Alexander and of Ptolemy I (Athen. 5, 201 d), those in honour of the deified parents of Ptolemy II (ib. 197 d and 203 a), and another in honour of Ptolemy II himself (ib. 203 b); and the balance was delicately adjusted between the last two, Ptolemy I and Berenike receiving twenty-three golden wreaths and Ptolemy II twenty-two. If Arsinoe had been queen (and co-ruler, see her head on the coins) she must surely have appeared with Ptolemy II; and her absence seems to me proof that she was not married at the date of this *πομπή*. If, then, this *πομπή* be the second celebration, in the winter of 275/4, of the penteteris of which the first celebration (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 = *I. G.* xii, 7, 506) was in 279/8 (H. von Prott, *Rhein. Mus.* 53, p. 460)—and I share the common opinion that this is most probable—then Arsinoe was married between spring and November 274. But recently Bouché-Leclercq, after a long discussion, preferred 279/8 for Kallixenos' *πομπή* (vol. iv, 1907, p. 307), and Delamarre (notes to *I. G.* xii, 7, 506) seemed inclined to agree. If this be well founded, the marriage could, so far as the *πομπή* goes, be 278; but in any case I adhere to 274, as I cannot dissociate it from Magas' revolt and Pyrrhos' return. — See Addenda.

dence afterwards felt by her kinswoman Cleopatra that kings and kingdoms existed to be her puppets. But she did not aim as high as Cleopatra was to aim. Her desire was not the empire of the world, but the empire of Macedonia; a quite feasible ambition. She had twice been queen of that country; she desired again to be queen, if not of Macedonia then of some other state, but in any case she desired the kingdom of Macedonia for her eldest and sole surviving son Ptolemaios.<sup>11</sup> Twice he had ruled some part of it;<sup>12</sup> and he had a workable claim as the sole surviving legitimate descendant of Lysimachos.

But the most powerful lever cannot be worked without a standpoint. Looking about her for firm ground from which to start, Arsinoe can have found but one place, Egypt; her first step, therefore, had to be to establish herself in her brother's kingdom. But though she sought the crown of Egypt for herself, it was but as a step toward the crown of Macedonia, perhaps for herself, anyhow for her son. For her policy as queen of Egypt is known;<sup>13</sup> it was a strenuous revival of the policy of her father; stir up trouble for the Antigonid in Greece by posing as the champion of Grecian liberty. Her point of view was undoubtedly hostile to Antigonos; for her policy was the policy that produced the Chremonidean war. The crown, then, which she had in view was the crown of Macedonia rather than that of Egypt; but first she must control the resources of Egypt. Of her ability to control them to good purpose she can have had no doubt; and very properly so.

Doubtless the idea of marriage with her easy-going brother came from her, and not from him. She was the master will of the combination; perhaps also the master mind, though he was able enough. Her difficulty must have been the hostility of the Macedonian element in Egypt to such a marriage, a hostility that would weigh heavily with such a nature as her brother's. It was an extremely tolerant age; but

<sup>11</sup> See generally App. 7. This view of Lehmann-Haupt's is also adopted by Ferguson, *Athens*, 170, 175.

<sup>12</sup> Once (nominally) while Arsinoe held Kassandreia; and again actually during the *ἀναρχία* (Euseb. I, 235 (Schoene)).

<sup>13</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214.

there were one or two things to which even that generation objected, and the marriage of a full brother and sister was one of them. It may be that the revolt of Magas gave her the necessary lever, by showing the advantage to the State of her virile counsels; but it may also be that the revolt was the result of her accession to power. Anyhow, Ptolemy repudiated his wife, another Arsinoe, a daughter of Lysimachos, who had borne him three children, and married his sister. The Greek-speaking element in Alexandria disapproved, and the poet Sotades expressed the popular feeling in a verse of unexampled coarseness, for which he afterwards paid with his life; but we hear of no serious difficulty; and the queen's wonderful ability must soon have tended to reconcile the ruling caste to the accomplished fact. To the native Egyptians such a marriage was of course right and proper for the king, consecrated by a tradition coeval with the Pyramids.

Arsinoe had now the power she wanted for herself. She became, and was treated as, not merely queen in name, but co-ruler in fact, with her head on the coinage; and pending the provision of the crown of Macedonia for her son, she seems to have persuaded Ptolemy to adopt him. She made life easy for her pleasure-loving husband, and tolerated his numerous love affairs, while she herself at once set to work to infuse some energy into the foreign policy of the Egyptian government.

In the summer of 274 Magas had invaded Egypt; Ptolemy's Gallic mercenaries had revolted; Antiochos was making extensive preparations for war. It must have been obvious to Arsinoe, that if Antigonos, who was on very good terms with his brother-in-law Antiochos, chose this moment to put forward his pretensions to the Cyclades, Egypt would have more on hand than she could well manage. Antigonos at any rate must be held off; and Egypt adopted the simple and obvious course of subsidizing her old friend Pyrrhos,<sup>14</sup> who was proclaiming his intention of attacking Antigonos. An alliance, too, either already existed or was now made between Egypt and another traditional friend, Sparta. This seemed

<sup>14</sup> See App. 7.



to safeguard matters as against Macedonia ; and with Magas recalled home by a native revolt, Arsinoe felt free at the beginning of 273 to turn the whole force of the kingdom against Antiochos ; prompt success in Asia followed.

The Egyptian gold completely altered Pyrrhos' position. By the spring of 273 he had collected a formidable army, and invaded Macedonia in force by way of the Aoos pass ; he had many partisans in the western districts, of which he had once been king. Antigonos reluctantly found himself compelled to break with the very necessary policy which he had desired to carry through, and to call out the Macedonian troops. He must have known that to do this was to court possible disaster ; but to meet Pyrrhos with the Gauls alone was to make disaster certain. Pyrrhos entered Macedonia, either out-generalled or defeated Antigonos, and compelled him to a retreat ; on the march he attacked him again ; the Gauls, who had the post of danger in the rear, stood by their salt and were cut down to a man ; the Macedonians went over to Pyrrhos in a body, and Antigonos fled to Thessalonike.<sup>15</sup> Some parts of upper Macedonia and of Thessaly fell at once into the conqueror's hands, though Aigai resisted and had to be taken by assault.<sup>16</sup> Lower Macedonia was saved for the time by Antigonos' system of garrisons of mercenaries, and of governors specially appointed by himself ; here the king again began to collect an army.

Pyrrhos had won the usual victory ; and the plaudits of the Macedonian phalanx had hardly died away when he began to incur the usual unpopularity. On the capture of Aigai his

<sup>15</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26. The reference to the rear-guard shows that Antigonos was already in retreat. As he only had Macedonians and Gauls, he had either disbanded his Greek troops during the peace for financial reasons, or (more probably) was using them to garrison his coast towns and fortresses. — The battle was fought *περὶ τὰ στενά*, which can only mean the Aoos pass, near Antigoneia, where Philip V made his first stand against Flamininus (Beloch placed the battle in Thessaly) ; see Plut. *Tit.* 3 τὰ στενά ; Livy 32, 5, 9, 'quae ad Antigoneam fauces sunt (stena vocant Graeci)' (therefore Polybios had τὰ στενά) ; Philip calls the place 'insessas fauces Epiri', Livy 33, 4, 2, and one day away was a place called Pyrrhos' camp, Livy 32, 13, 2. To-day Klisura (Hirschfeld, 'Aoos' in *P. W.*). — Pyrrhos landed near Akroeraunia, Paus. 1, 13, 1, and so would raid the north-west of Macedonia ; Antigonos, under this provocation, had come to seek Pyrrhos and defend the limit of his territory.

<sup>16</sup> Polyæn. 2, 29, 2.

Gallic mercenaries broke open and plundered the old tombs of the kings, stealing the gold and scattering the bones;<sup>17</sup> Pyrrhos neither hindered nor punished, and opinion in Macedonia condemned him severely. He himself made no attempt to consolidate his conquest; he turned south into Thessaly, and after dedicating the shields of the conquered Gauls in the temple of Athene Itonia—an act which probably meant that he claimed the leadership of the Thessalian League and treated Antigonos as deposed—he went home, taking with him the Macedonian shields to dedicate to the Dodonaean Zeus,<sup>18</sup> and leaving his son Ptolemaios as governor in Macedonia. By the autumn Antigonos, having collected troops from his garrisons and presumably engaged more Gauls, attacked Ptolemaios, but was again so completely defeated that he escaped (it is said) with only seven companions.<sup>19</sup> This time it must have looked as if all were over; and Pyrrhos called Antigonos a shameless person for continuing to wear the purple after losing the power which it symbolized.

But Antigonos knew better than his rival. He understood Pyrrhos, and he understood the kind of conquest which he made. In this case it seems to have been more than usually superficial,<sup>20</sup> a temporary phase due to the magic of Pyrrhos' name, and his relationship to Alexander; and probably it only extended at all to that part of the country which Pyrrhos had ruled before. Though he must have

<sup>17</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26; Diod. 22, 12. — These tombs have not been found; and as the Gauls were said *ὀρύττειν*, to dig them up, it is probable that they were not vaulted chambers of the so-called 'Macedonian' type, known to the Greeks as *καμάραι*, in which the dead reposed, not in sarcophagi, but on open beds of stone. The earliest known examples do not appear to be earlier than the end of the fourth century (P. Perdrizet, *B. C. H.* 22, p. 335); but a very beautiful tomb, Greek work, of the beginning of that century, but not quite Kamara type, has recently been discovered (Th. Macridy, *Jahrb.* 1911, p. 193). The word *καμάραι*, however, is said to be 'Carian', and might therefore be old Macedonian, like 'sarisa'. See further on this word Wilamowitz, *Jahrb.* 1905, p. 104; E. Petersen, *Neue Jahrbücher* 15 (1905), p. 698; F. Solmsen, *B. Ph. W.* 1906, 853; F. Reuss, *Rhein. Mus.* 61, p. 409.

<sup>18</sup> Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26; Paus. 1, 13, 2-3; Diod. 22, 11.

<sup>19</sup> This second defeat is probably much exaggerated, if true at all. It rests only on Just. 25, 3, 8, and produced no effect.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch's words are *ὕπω δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα καὶ σίστασιν ἐχόντων μόνιμον*. It is quite useless quoting Euseb. 1, 243 (Schoene); no one can say if Pyrrhos or his son Alexander be meant.

held one or more of the Macedonian mints, he made no arrangements for issuing his own money; he contented himself with surcharging some of Antigonos' pieces with an Epeiros monogram.<sup>21</sup> Even while Antigonos was in flight, Pyrrhos was longing to be off on a new adventure which had presented itself. The instigator of this fresh undertaking—the fourth within seven years—was Kleonymos of Sparta.

Kleonymos was the younger son of the late king Kleomenes, and a violent and tyrannical character; he had desired the kingship, but had been passed over in favour of his energetic and capable nephew Areus, the son of his elder brother Akrotatos.<sup>22</sup> Kleonymos left the city, seeking an opportunity of vengeance; and Pyrrhos, with his known love of adventure, offered a likely instrument. To him Kleonymos went, received a command in his army, and was instrumental in taking Aigai for him; after this he prevailed upon Pyrrhos to reinstate him in Sparta. Ptolemaios must have been recalled from Macedonia some time in the autumn or winter of 273/2, leaving Macedonia to look after itself; and in the spring of 272<sup>23</sup> Pyrrhos and two of his sons, Ptolemaios and Helenos, marched a very large force—it is said to have been 25,000 foot, 2,000 horse, and 24 elephants, and included Macedonian troops—through Aetolia to the sea and shipped them, obviously with Aetolian aid, across to Achaea.<sup>24</sup> Aetolia had made her choice between Pyrrhos and Antigonos, and her choice was Pyrrhos.

Antigonos must have remained in arms all the winter of 273/2. The inevitable reaction against Pyrrhos seems to have set in after the violation of the tombs at Aigai; Ptolemaios may even have left Macedonia because he needs

<sup>21</sup> Svoronos, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 126; A. J. Reinach, *ib.*, pp. 201, 202. The surcharge is ΑΠΕΙΡΩΤΑΝ in monogram.

<sup>22</sup> Paus. 3, 6, 2.

<sup>23</sup> See note 7.

<sup>24</sup> The statue erected to Pyrrhos at Kallion (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 919, see Beloch 3, 1, 595, n. 1) might date from after Pyrrhos' Italian expedition, from the name [Καλλιπολ]ιτᾶν, see ch. 6, n. 54. In any case, the first Aetolian gold staters were, like those of Pyrrhos, designed, engraved, and struck at Syracuse; Head<sup>2</sup> 334; some Aetolian pieces bear the Epeiros monogram, A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 236; and this, together with Pyrrhos' passage through Aetolia, is good evidence.

must. Antigonos had never lost the coast cities, strongly garrisoned and governed and supported by his fleet; he must during the winter and spring have recovered the country, or most of it, almost as fast as he had lost it.<sup>25</sup>

But his sudden overthrow had produced its natural result in Greece. The pro-Macedonian government in Athens fell in the autumn of 273 or the following winter,<sup>25</sup> and was replaced by another. It is impossible to make out if the new government consisted of a coalition of Moderates or of the less advanced wing of the Egypto-nationalist party; but it is clear that the pro-Macedonians were no longer in office. It is not likely that the change took place without at least the friendly observation—perhaps co-operation is too strong a word—of Egypt: there seems to have been an understanding—*entente* is the term used—between Egypt and Athens at the time, and it may perhaps have been now that the Athenians erected statues of Ptolemy and Arsinoe before the Odeion. Egypt was feeling her way, so far as she could do so. But so long as her hands were tied and her energies absorbed by the war with Antiochos, she was not ready for any breach with Antigonos. The relations of Egypt and Macedonia in 273 were still, officially, good relations, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say no relations at all; Antigonos could hardly know as yet that Arsinoe, apparently absorbed in the war in Asia, was already at work against him behind the scenes. At Athens the new government took a moderate line. An embassy was sent to Pyrrhos on his landing in Peloponnese, probably to ask him to respect the neutrality of Egypt's friend; and communications were opened up with Aetolia. In or about the year 272 Athens is found, for the first time since the Aetolians gained control of Delphi, in possession of one of the two Ionic votes: a fact that shows that she was acting independently of Antigonos. As Antigonos, while he controlled Athens, allowed no hieromnemon to go from her to Delphi,

<sup>25</sup> He had recovered all or most of it by the time Pyrrhos attacked Sparta, Paus. 1, 13, 7; Plutarch implies the same.

<sup>26</sup> Not later, because of the embassy to Pyrrhos in the spring of 272 (Just 25, 4, 4), and the relations with Aetolia that same year.



the sending by Athens of an hieromnemon was practically equivalent to the repudiation of Antigonos' suzerainty; at the same time, being an act essentially religious rather than political, it was not necessarily of a nature to provoke war. The same attitude of caution—willing to wound and yet afraid to strike—comes out strongly in the decree passed a year later on Laches' motion in honour of Demochares, with its eloquent omissions.<sup>27</sup>

Elsewhere in Greece movements were more pronounced. It was probably at this time that those of the Achaean towns which had not yet declared themselves independent of Antigonos did so,<sup>28</sup> completing what had been begun in 280; the ten towns now formed a small federation, with a promising constitution rather like the Aetolian, but otherwise of no special importance. It may have been now, too, that Sikyon got rid of her tyrant Kleon and established for a little while a democracy, under the lead of two prominent citizens, Kleinias and Timokleidas; but there is nothing to show that Kleon had been a partisan of Antigonos.<sup>29</sup> More important to Antigonos was the loss of Euboea, including

<sup>27</sup> Beloch's dating of the Delphic archons Archiadas, Eudokos, and Straton, now seems a fixed point; see ch. 7, n. 147. Pomtow has recently accepted his date (273/2) for Archiadas; *B. Ph. W.* 1912, 606. It follows that there was a change of government at Athens *circa* 273, or she could not have sent a representative to the Amphiktyonic council. With this agree two other items of evidence; Laches' decree for Demochares of 271/70, which could never have been passed under a pro-Macedonian government (see ch. 10, p. 289; Antigonos might have smiled at it, but not the pro-Macedonian Athenians); and a fragment of Alexis' Hypobolimaïos (Kock ii, p. 386, no. 244), which refers to an *entente* (ἑμὸνία) with Ptolemy II, and belongs about this time, as it falls while Arsinoë was queen. Ferguson (*Athens*, pp. 169-73) does not recognize any change of government at this time, and attempts to explain away Laches' decree, not, I think, with success. He does not notice Athens' Amphiktyonic vote. I do not make out whether Lehmann-Haupt (*Klio*, 5, 381) thinks there was a change of government or not. — The statues; Paus. 1, 8, 6. — The date of the appearance of the Sarapiastai in the Piraeus (*I. G.* ii, 617; Paus. 1, 18, 4) is quite uncertain; Beloch 3, 1, 449; Ferguson, *Athens*, 171.

<sup>28</sup> Polyb. 2, 41, 13-15. The movement may not have been completed till the Chremonidean war.

<sup>29</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 2. It is quite uncertain, for it is not known how long this republic lasted, though Plutarch implies for some little time. Decree of Delos for Timokleidas, Dürrbach in *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 135, no. 31. A Timokleidas is also mentioned on a broken base from Delphi, possibly a dedication of statues of Alexander son of Polyperchon and Kratesipolis (Pomtow, *B. Ph. W.* 1909, 286); but as Alexander was murdered in 315 the dates are a difficulty, and it might be this Timokleidas' grandfather.

Eretria and Chalkis, a grievous blow to the communications between Demetrias and Corinth.<sup>30</sup> The vital importance of Corinth to Antigonos was never better demonstrated than now; so long as he held Corinth, everything could be re-established. But the use of Corinth depended on the sea, and it was just as well for him in 272 that Egypt had her hands full elsewhere.

In the spring of 272 Pyrrhos landed in the Peloponnese. Events were moving much too quickly for the Egyptian government, and before the war with Antiochos should be ended<sup>31</sup> they were to pass entirely out of Egyptian control. But as yet Arsinoë believed that Pyrrhos was still working in the interests of Egypt; and his first proceedings were calculated to reassure her. He gave out on landing that he had come to free the Peloponnesian cities that were still in Antigonos' hands. These were few and unimportant,<sup>32</sup> save Corinth; but it sounded well, and Pyrrhos was not there to attack Corinth. Of the independent states, Achaea and Messene sent envoys;<sup>33</sup> Elis and perhaps others joined him; when he reached Megalopolis, the 'Great City' opened her gates to him. Up to that time Sparta seems to have had no misgivings. Pyrrhos was the friend of Egypt, and Sparta her ally, in fact if not in name; and King Areus, with the best

<sup>30</sup> Euboea exercises one of the Ionian votes in the Amphiktyonic council in 272 and 271, being represented by an Eretrian and a man of Chalkis respectively; Beloch 3, 2, 328, 350. For Eretria see also Diog. L. 2, 142 and 127.

<sup>31</sup> Antiochos entered the war in the spring of 273. Its events seem to demand more than one campaign, which again is required to explain why Egypt played no part at all in the events in Greece in 272. All that the dates require is that the war should be over a sufficient time before Arsinoë's death, July 270, to allow of Theokritos writing his 'Praise of Ptolemy' in the interval.

<sup>32</sup> There can have been nothing outside Achaea, except perhaps one or two towns in the Argolid.

<sup>33</sup> Just. 25, 4, 4. This does not prove that Achaea and Messene joined him (Beloch supposes that Achaea did, 3, 1, 595), any more than Athens did. Messene is said to have aided Sparta afterwards against Pyrrhos' attack, Paus. 4, 29, 6; the two actions are not necessarily inconsistent. But the statue of Pyrrhos erected by the Elean Thrasyboulos in the Altis at Olympia (Paus. 6, 14, 9) does seem to prove that the Eleans joined him; for Thrasyboulos appears later as one of the murderers of Aristotimos, whom Antigonos supported (Plut. *Mor.* 253 B), and therefore as a member of the democratic party which had the support of Actolia, at present Pyrrhos' friend. See Niese 2, 56, n. 5.

of the Spartan levies, was in Crete, where one of the never-ending wars between the Cretan cities was in progress, fighting there in the interests of Egypt, who either now or soon after acquired a firm footing in the island by the possession of Itanos.<sup>34</sup> At Megalopolis Spartan envoys met Pyrrhos, who protested that nothing was further from his thoughts than an attack on Sparta; but the envoys must have doubted, for a messenger seems to have been sent off in haste to recall Areus, if indeed this had not already been done. After some stay at Megalopolis Pyrrhos moved leisurely forward, plundering the Lakonian territory as he marched through it, and came in sight of the wealthy<sup>35</sup> and ill-defended city. Not wishing, it is said, to enter Sparta by night, he camped and waited for the morning. He had thrown to the winds his word given to the Spartan envoys; he cared nothing that Sparta was the friend of his friends; he meant to take the city, just because it had never been taken.<sup>36</sup>

Sparta did many fine things in her time, but few finer than that night. The Senate first decided to send the women away to Crete; but a noble woman named Archidamia, mother of a noble race,<sup>37</sup> came down to the council chamber with a drawn sword in her hand, and demanded of the elders, in the name of her sex, if they thought that Spartan women would care to live after the city was taken. Meanwhile the men had started on the entrenchments, digging a broad ditch opposite to Pyrrhos' camp and lagging wagons at either end of it, bedded up to their axles in the earth. But they had hardly begun when the women and girls turned out in a body and took the work from the hands of the men who had to fight next day, telling them to sleep while they with the old men finished it. At dawn they handed over the completed

<sup>34</sup> *O. G. J.* 45. See also the inscription of Itanos in honour of Ptolemy III and Berenike (published by A. J. Reinach, *R. É. G.* 1911, p. 392) which describes Ptolemy III as παραλαβὼν τὰν τῶν Ἰτανίων πόλιν καὶ πολίτας παρὰ τῷ πατρὶς βασιλείῳ Πτολεμαίῳ καὶ τῶν προγόνων.

<sup>35</sup> G. Kazarow, *Klio*, 7, 47, on the gold which Sparta collected.

<sup>36</sup> What follows, to the end of the chapter, unless otherwise noted, is merely a brief paraphrase of Plutarch's *Pyrrhos*, ch. 27-34. This splendidly picturesque narrative carries the reader away; whether we can believe it all is another matter. The story and its sources are considered in App. 8.

<sup>37</sup> Her grandson was the reformer Agis.

fortification to the fighters, with the old Spartan bidding, either to conquer or to die worthy of Sparta.

For two days the unequal battle raged along the trench and the lagged wagons. On the first day Ptolemaios, at the head of a picked body of Chaonians and 2,000 Gauls, nearly broke through the wagons, but was repulsed by Areus' son Akrotatos, who left his post on the other side of the city, hurried to the point of danger with 300 men, and took Ptolemaios in rear, almost driving him into the trench; then, streaming with blood, he marched back in triumph through the city, while the old men followed him cheering. But the second day was even more critical, for the defenders were wearying, and many were wounded or dead. All through the hours of fighting the women stood by the men, handing up missiles, supplying them with food and drink, and carrying away the wounded. The Macedonian troops in Pyrrhos' service had in the night cut great piles of wood, and these they now hurled into the trench, together with shields and corpses and anything that might serve to fill it. While they thus engaged the attention of the defenders, Pyrrhos in person turned the end of the line of wagons and led an attack at the head of his guards. Almost he was through; already shrieks for the captured city rose from the women; then a Cretan javelin pierced his horse, which plunged, fell, and flung its rider; the Spartans charged, and swept his Companions back in disorder. But the defenders had lost heavily, and the survivors were worn out; one more assault would have carried the day. But before it could be delivered, Antigonos' general Ameinias, marching in all haste from Corinth, had flung himself into the city with his men; soon after came Areus the king with 2,000 Cretans and mercenaries; and Sparta was saved. Thereupon the women went quietly to their homes; it no longer became them to be heroes.

Antigonos, with plain common sense, had gone direct to the central point of the position. He had seen that nothing now mattered compared to the man Pyrrhos; Pyrrhos must be followed at any cost. Therefore he, too, having recovered Macedonia before Pyrrhos reached Lakonia, had left it, loyal



or disloyal, to shift for itself, and was shipping all his available troops to Corinth. Sparta, it is true, was his consistent opponent; but at present his only thought was Pyrrhos; Pyrrhos' enemy was for the moment his friend. He had therefore sent forward in all haste his best general, Ameinias, the ex-pirate;<sup>38</sup> and he had been just in time. For the second time in his history, Pyrrhos had accomplished the feat of driving two great rivals into each other's arms.

Pyrrhos was loath to leave the city; he made one more attack, and was beaten off. He then withdrew his troops, and thought of taking up winter quarters in Lakonia; but a message from his partisans in Argos caused him to alter his mind, and to snatch at a new hope; whether victorious or defeated, he must needs trouble the world till he died. Two parties in Argos were at feud, the stronger one, led by Aristippos, being favourable to Antigonos; and Aristestas, who led the other, sought to be beforehand with his rival by calling in Pyrrhos. Pyrrhos broke camp and set out northward. In a pass in the hills he was ambushed by Areus and the Spartans and his rear-guard cut up; he sent Ptolemaios to their assistance, and Ptolemaios was slain by a Cretan, a famous runner named Oryssos. Pyrrhos and the main body struggled on through the pass; the Spartans pursued with little caution; once out of the hills Pyrrhos turned on them, and at the head of the Molossian horse took ample vengeance for his dead son. But he had lost valuable time; and he arrived at Argos to find that Antigonos, hurrying from Corinth, had already crowned the heights above the town with all his forces, and held an impregnable position. Pyrrhos camped in the plain near Nauplia, and (it is said) sent a herald to Antigonos, calling him a robber and challenging him to come down and fight it out; Antigonos, with all the cards in his hand at last, naturally replied that he would fight as and when he chose. Mean-

<sup>38</sup> Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, p. 213, n. 35, calls Ameinias commander in Corinth; and it is possible that he commanded the garrison under Krateros. But Krateros could not have risked denuding Corinth, of all places, of troops; and I think Ameinias, with his fighting record, was more probably in command of Antigonos' advance-guard. Plut. *Pyrrh.* 29 only says τῶν Ἀντιγόνου στρατηγῶν.

while Argos, caught between the hammer and the anvil, sent envoys to both kings, begging them to retire and leave the city free, on terms that it should be the friend of both. Antigonos agreed, and proposed to send his son as a hostage.<sup>39</sup> Pyrrhos, too, agreed, but offered no hostage.

That night Pyrrhos' partisans in Argos opened the gates, and the king, well accustomed by now to break his word, poured troops into the city from both sides. All went well until he attempted to bring in the elephants; the gateway was too low to admit the towers which they carried, and the noise made in removing and then replacing them roused the sleeping city. The Argives flew to arms, and dispatched a messenger to Antigonos for help; he came down to the plain and sent forward his son Halkyoneus with a strong force, and he and Areus, who with his mixed army of Spartans and Cretans had followed Pyrrhos up, attacked the Gauls from behind as they were entering. Pyrrhos himself, from the other side, reached the market-place; there he was caught in the inextricable confusion of a soldier's battle in the narrow streets; he could neither advance nor retreat. Daylight revealed the whole city choked with men, fighting each other just as it chanced, in utter disorder; a message which Pyrrhos managed to send to his son Helenos outside, bidding him break down the wall and free him a way out, only made matters worse, for the message was wrongly given, and Helenos attempted to enter the city with all the troops left. An elephant became jammed across one of the gates; another elephant, seeking its wounded mahout, ran amuck through the turmoil; and in the press and the confusion, Pyrrhos, trying to cut a way out himself, was struck on the back of the neck and stunned by a tile thrown from a house-top by an old woman who saw her son in danger. Before he could properly recover his senses, one Zopyros, a mercenary in Antigonos' service, had recognized him, and with an Illyrian sword clumsily hacked off his head. Halkyoneus came up on the news, galloped off with the head, and flung it at his father's feet as he sat in his tent with his Council. When Antigonos recognized it, he struck Halkyoneus with his staff,

<sup>39</sup> Ἐδίδου. The context shows that Halkyoneus was not actually sent.

calling him accursed and barbarian, and then covered his face with his cloak and wept, for he remembered the fate of his grandfather Antigonos and his father Demetrios, and he knew not what Fortune might yet have in store for his house.

Pyrrhos' army was leaderless and aimless. Helenos surrendered to Halkyoneus, who received him gently and led him to Antigonos, this time gaining his father's approbation, tempered by a rebuke for having allowed Helenos to retain the garb of a suppliant. The king treated Helenos with every kindness, and sent him back to Epeiros; he himself received the surrender of all Pyrrhos' army. The long duel of the statesman and the soldier was over; and it was Antigonos who gave his rival the due funeral rites. On the spot where Pyrrhos fell, the Argives raised a temple to the goddess Demeter, who, so their legend said, had slain him in the form of a woman; there the ashes of the war-worn Epeirotes found their rest.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Paus. 1, 13, 8; 2, 21, 4. This is what Pausanias was told in Argos, and I see no reason to doubt it. There was, however, a monument at Ambrakia called Pyrrheion (Polyb. 21, 27, 2 = 22, 10, 2; Livy 38, 5, 2); and Justin (25, 5, 2) says that Antigonos gave Helenos 'sepulti patris ossa in patriam referenda' (cf. Val. Max. 5, 1, 4). But if Helenos was to take home the remains they would not have been buried at all; and this whole story of *burial* and re-exhumed bones is suspect, for Hieronymos says that Antigonos *burnt* the body (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34, see App. 8). The story might well have been invented because of the Pyrrheion; at the same time it may be doubtful whether the ashes were not at some time removed to Ambrakia. — There was a story that Pyrrhos' great toe, the touch of which would cure splenetics, refused to burn, like Shelley's heart, and was sent to Dodona in a gold casket; Val. Max., Nepot. Epit., 9, 24.

## CHAPTER X

### THE FIRST WAR WITH EGYPT

THE death of Pyrrhos left the Peloponnese in a very disturbed state. Nearly every city was divided against itself; if one party had declared for Pyrrhos, the other had naturally stood by Antigonos. This can be seen most clearly in the case of Argos and Elis; but it must also be true of many other towns, notably of Megalopolis, to which Pyrrhos had been admitted by his partisans. According to the tradition, those towns which had not actually joined Antigonos were in a state of civil war; and there is no need to disbelieve this. The state of parties in nearly every city was a reflection of that which obtained at Athens; that is to say, the old labels of oligarch and democrat had been replaced by two new parties, the friends of Macedonia and the friends of Egypt; and the latter had welcomed Pyrrhos. Now Pyrrhos was dead and Egypt had no help to give them; and the triumphant partisans of Macedonia were not likely to deal any too gently with their rivals. Greek faction-fights were not as a rule waged in kid gloves.<sup>1</sup>

There was no question as to who was master of the situation. Antigonos was on the spot, without a rival, and with a victorious army. Egypt had not helped her friends in the hour of trial—indeed it would have been difficult for Egypt to know what to do, with Pyrrhos and Sparta fighting each other—and Egypt had no claim to any voice in a settlement, save as the ally of Sparta. And Sparta, though her deep-seated hostility to Macedonia was not of course diminished one whit by the fortuitous occurrence of their recent co-operation, could not for the moment do otherwise than assent to such measures as Antigonos in reason might take; she could not

<sup>1</sup> Just. 26, 1, 1-3. If his words, 'Peloponnensii *per proditionem* Antigono traditi,' have any meaning, they must refer to Egypt. — The state of parties at Argos, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30 seq.; in Elis, ch. 9, n. 33, and p. 287 *post*.



in decency quarrel at once with the man who had just rescued her from Pyrrhos.

It has been well said that, putting Aetolia aside, the one weighty question of politics in the Greece of this epoch was the question, where the influence of Egypt ended and that of Macedonia began.<sup>2</sup> This question, on Pyrrhos' death, had suddenly become clear-cut. Antigonos had hitherto had to reckon with the ever-present threat of Pyrrhos; now that Pyrrhos was dead and Epeiros no longer dangerous, he could see what had lain behind, the far more dangerous threat of Egypt. Egypt had emerged stronger than before from her war with Antiochos, though for the moment she had suffered a severe check through the defection of Pyrrhos from her interest, a defection that had left Antigonos arbiter of the Peloponnese. Sparta indeed was bound to Egypt's interest hand and foot, if only by her hostility to Macedonia, and Egypt could strike at Antigonos through Sparta as and when she would; but at present this was out of the question. Sparta could not at once make war on her preserver; Egypt could not touch Antigonos' victorious land-army directly; the sea-power could do nothing for the moment, in face of the overthrow of her friends in the different cities, but watch, wait, and work. The difference, however, between the two great Powers had now definitely come out into the open; Egypt claimed the crown of Macedonia, Macedonia was soon to be brusquely reminded that she had once had, and lost, the rule of the sea. Everything that was to happen in Greece, Aetolia apart, for the next twenty-six years was to be affected by this rivalry.

Antigonos was now face to face with the question of his policy towards Greece. In the circumstances he could probably have recovered parts of it without any great difficulty; for in many of the towns he possessed a strong, even a dominant, party devoted to his interests, as the event was to show. Large parts of it had once belonged, first to his father Demetrios, and then to himself; would he attempt to recover them? How would he deal with those who had helped Pyrrhos? Would he take and garrison what he could and rule by the

<sup>2</sup> Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft*, p. 168.

strong hand, as he had done before he became king of Macedonia, or would he revive Demetrios' discredited policy of a union of hearts?

Antigonos' first aim was a prosaic one; he wished to be free to return to Macedonia, where everything that he had already done was waiting to be done over again. The unstable base of his power there made any schemes of new conquest absolutely impossible, even had he desired such. He did not desire to be king of Greece; he was first and foremost king of Macedonia. Had he desired acquisitions in Greece, he could have made them now; and the fact that he held his hand shows that he held it deliberately. His problem was a different one; how to keep Greece neutralized, keep it from actual interference with his own kingdom and policy, without imposing a strain on the finances and forces of Macedonia which Macedonia at present could not bear.

The first thing was to consider what was the minimum that was vital to Macedonia. Antigonos' conception of his sphere has already been noticed.<sup>3</sup> Peloponnese, except Corinth, was outside the sphere: but the war had shown once more that the importance of Corinth could not be overestimated. Consequently Corinth and its communications northward must be safeguarded in every way: apart from this, the Peloponnesian question resolved itself merely into keeping a sufficient check on Sparta, and through Sparta upon Egypt. The natural checks on Sparta to the northward were Argos and Megalopolis. Both these large cities were divided; each contained a strong Macedonian party, but each had opened her gates to Pyrrhos. To take and garrison them was not at all what Antigonos desired; he was not yet strong enough to spare too many garrisons, even if he had wished to. It is probable, too, that he had long since mastered the fact that a city garrisoned against its will was no source of strength to him, though it might be a source of weakness to the enemy. An alternative was to establish his own party in office in each town; but such a government might be overthrown, and would almost certainly be overthrown at any moment of crisis just when he wanted it.

<sup>3</sup> See ch. 7, pp. 198, 202.

What applied to these two cities applied also to the smaller ones that had once been under Macedonian rule.

Antigonos' solution as regards the Peloponnese was, not merely to establish his own party in power in such of the cities as were necessary to him, but to aid the leading man of that party to rule the city as a 'tyrant', that is to say, an unconstitutional ruler, who maintained his power by means of mercenaries, acted in Antigonos' interest, and was assured of Antigonos' support. Such a scheme would in effect enable Antigonos to garrison the cities without having to bear the cost, and would ensure stability and continuity. The tyrant would have the support of the pro-Macedonian faction; he could hold in check the patriotic or democratic opposition, which would naturally look to Egypt for help, and the very fact of this opposition would keep him, from motives of self-preservation, faithful to Antigonos' interest. It may be that Antigonos had in his mind Alexander's system of governing the lands outside his sphere—that is to say, to the east of the Indus—by means of protected native rulers; but there was a good deal of difference between hereditary kings of Indian races, like Taxiles and Poros, and tyrants in Greek cities.

That Antigonos supported a certain number of tyrants, and found them useful allies, is undoubted. That he himself actually installed them, or was responsible for their seizure of power, is not always clear. We must bear steadily in mind that it is just at this point of Antigonos' history that we lose the guidance of Hieronymos, who, even at third hand, has kept tradition in a sound path; and that henceforth we depend on sources of information avowedly hostile, often bitterly hostile, to the Macedonian king.<sup>4</sup> The one contemporary document, the decree moved by Chremonides,<sup>5</sup> a document whose business it is to represent Antigonos in the worst possible light, says in general terms that he wronged and broke treaty with the cities and tried to subvert their laws and their ancestral constitutions; but it does not mention the establishment of tyrants. A reference to 'ancestral constitutions', however, very often imports something to do with a tyranny,<sup>6</sup> but the phrase need not mean more than a

<sup>4</sup> See App. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214.

<sup>6</sup> See App. 5, pp. 437, 438.



general support of tyrants. In Polybios' dramatized view of Antigonid policy, the Aetolian Chlaineas, who plays the devil's advocate, is allowed to lay great stress on Antigonos' policy of 'planting' tyrants, but is also allowed to exaggerate in grotesque fashion.<sup>7</sup> Polybios' own verdict is given elsewhere, more soberly, but almost in the Aetolian's words; it is, however, qualified by 'it is said that'; Polybios was clearly not satisfied with the evidence on the matter.<sup>8</sup> Lastly, Trogus is plain and emphatic, but cannot carry things further than Polybios does.<sup>9</sup>

The actual number of tyrants known is not great, and only one can be dated with certainty to the years following the death of Pyrrhos, though it is clearly implied that it was at this time that Antigonos originated the system. Aristotimos of Elis was leader of the party in Elis which was opposed to the friends of Pyrrhos, and, though he looked to Krateros for aid when once in power, accounts differ as to whether he was installed by Antigonos or whether he himself seized the tyranny in the ordinary way.<sup>10</sup> The tyrant Abantidas in Sikyon did not establish himself there till about 264, eight years after Pyrrhos' death, and there is no evidence whatever that he was a partisan of Antigonos. In any case the fact that Antigonos acquiesced in the continued independence of the little Sikyonian democracy, which had been established in 274 or thereabouts, is eloquent of the fact that he sought no conquests in the Peloponnese, and was not establishing tyrants for amusement; Sikyon was not dangerous to him and was not engaged in civil war, and he left the town alone.<sup>11</sup> One or two tyrants of smaller cities, mentioned at a later time, may

<sup>7</sup> Polyb. 9, 28 seq. Chlaineas' words (9, 29, 6) are οἱ δὲ τυράννους ἐμφυτεύοντες οὐδεμίαν πόλιν ἄμοιρον ἐποίησαν τοῦ τῆς δουλείας ὀνόματος.

<sup>8</sup> Polyb. 2, 41, 10, πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος (Gonatas) ἐμφυτεύσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησι. I do not find that ἐμφυτεύειν occurs in this sense except in these two passages; one would like to know their relationship. Is Polybios quoting some popular phrase, perhaps manufactured in Aetolia?

<sup>9</sup> Trog. *Prol.* 26, 'quibus in urbibus Graeciae dominationem Antigonus Gonatas constituerit.'

<sup>10</sup> Contrast Paus. 5, 5, 1 with Just. 26, 1, 4. Plut. *Mor.* 250 F and 253 A merely show that Antigonos supported him, which is certain from the state of parties.

<sup>11</sup> Abantidas: Plut. *Arat.* 2 and 3; Paus. 2, 8, 2, a curious jumble. On the dates, which depend on Aratos' age in 245, and generally, see ch. 12, p. 361.



conceivably be the successors of tyrants set up by Antigonos, but this is quite uncertain.<sup>12</sup> The two towns that really matter are Megalopolis and Argos. How and when Aristodemos of Megalopolis and Aristomachos of Argos came by their power is unknown; there are difficulties alike in the way of supposing that they did, or that they did not, establish themselves in the years immediately following Pyrrhos' death.<sup>13</sup> Certainly Aristodemos, if not already in power by the time of the battle of Corinth, was ruling at Megalopolis shortly after that event.<sup>14</sup> Aristotimos of Elis turned out to be abominably cruel, and was assassinated after five months of power; even so, it is clear that his misdeeds have lost nothing in the telling.<sup>15</sup> But Aristomachos and Aristodemos were capable rulers. The latter was called 'the Good'<sup>16</sup>; while Aristomachos founded a secure dynasty, which had a history almost unique among the houses of tyrants; for after the Argives had twice refused to aid the Achaean League to expel his elder son Aristippos, when success would have been certain, his younger son, another Aristomachos, who succeeded his brother, voluntarily laid down his power and became elected general of the League instead. In what light the dynasty was regarded at Argos can be deduced from the interesting fact that inscriptions relating to it have survived;

<sup>12</sup> Those of Hermione and Phlius in 229 and of Orchomenos in 235; see Beloch 3, 2, 310. There is no evidence that a tyrant Aristokleides or Aristomelides at Orchomenos, whom Niese (2, 226) makes one of Gonatas' men, belongs to this time at all.

<sup>13</sup> If they did not, then Trogus can hardly be right in attributing the institution of Antigonos' system to this time, as these are the two important men. If they did, how came Areus in 265 and 264 to be able to move about the Peloponnese unhindered, when Aristodemos alone was strong enough to intercept, defeat, and kill Areus' son? — Beloch (3, 1, 600, n. 1) argues that Aristomachos may have been son of the Aristippos of Plut. *Pyrrh.* 30, and that this Aristippos became tyrant on Pyrrhos' death. It is possible, but evidence is wanting.

<sup>14</sup> On the date of Aristodemos' accession to power see note 84.

<sup>15</sup> Justin and Plutarch go back here to the same source, almost certainly Phylarchos. It is instructive therefore to see how that which in Plutarch is a scheme of *plunder*, cruelly enough carried out, and ending in the imprisonment of the women (*Mor.* 251 C-E), becomes in Justin 'occisus prius in gremio matrum parvulis liberis virginibusque ad stuprum dereptis'. It is a good object-lesson in the worthlessness both of Justin's moral embellishments and of these sort of stories. — It is very doubtful if the silver coins of Elis with API, formerly attributed to Aristotimos, are his; Head<sup>2</sup> 424.

<sup>16</sup> 'Ο χρηστός, Paus. 8, 27, 11.

it was indeed a rare event for a tyrant's monuments to outlast his rule.<sup>17</sup>

It is evident then that later writers indulged in a good deal of general exaggeration, and are not to be too credulously followed; such things, for instance, are found as the commander<sup>18</sup> of a Macedonian garrison, or even the stalwart champion of a democracy,<sup>19</sup> being spoken of as 'tyrants'. The only cities in which, as far as is known, Antigonos supported his system were those which were absolutely necessary to him, if he was to safeguard the position of Macedonia as a great power; Argos and Megalopolis as checks on Sparta, Elis, which had aided Pyrrhos, as some check on a disaffected Aetolia. Further than this he made no attempt to go. He himself was certainly not actuated by any tyrannical feelings. He acquiesced in the revolt and federation of the little towns of Achaea, as he had already acquiesced in the revolt and independence of Boeotia; Messene and Sikyon he left alone as strictly as he left the communities of Northern Greece. Mere conquest in Greece was not a thing which he ever contemplated or desired; this is written plain on every page of his history.

At the same time, though greatly exaggerated, the accusation that he installed tyrants may, the accusation that he supported tyrants does, correspond to a fact. That fact excited much feeling throughout Greece;<sup>20</sup> and it will be as well to consider for a moment what it means. There are a good many ways of looking at it. First, there is the Macedonian view, which was probably that of Antigonos. From this standpoint, the sole question was the benefit of Macedonia. For the good of the Greek cities, Antigonos was (he

<sup>17</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 25, 27, 35. Though Aratos, after his wont, calls Aristippos an even more pernicious tyrant than his father, he has not been able to hide away the crucial fact that the Argives twice refused to fight against him. Surely no one will ever again, with Freeman, treat Aratos as evidence on such matters; having failed to assassinate both father and son with the dagger, he tried again with the pen.— See the inscription relating to Aristippos and the younger Aristomachos; Wilhelm, *Beiträge*, p. 110, no. 95, with his commentary.

<sup>18</sup> Pythemos ap. Athen. 2, 44 c; cf. Beloch 3, 2, 383.

<sup>19</sup> Timokleidas at Sikyon (Plut. *Arat.* 2) is called a tyrant by Pausanias, 2, 8, 2.

<sup>20</sup> It is the one single fact about Antigonos that our anti-Macedonian tradition has invariably managed to remember. See e.g. Euseb. 1, 237 (Schoene): οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐγκρατὺς χειρωσάμενος.

might have said) not responsible ; they were not his ; if they all cared to combine, they could drive him out of Greece at any moment ; if they did not, it was their affair. Moreover, they had objected to his garrisons, and to his tribute ; they were now free from both garrisons and tribute.

Secondly, there is the Greek view. It was no gain to exchange a responsible garrison-commander and a fixed tribute for an irresponsible and perhaps cruel tyrant, who could plunder as he wished : it was an unjustifiable and wicked interference with the rights and liberties of a free city-state and its members. To this we shall return.

Lastly, there is our own view, the point of view of modern morality. Let it be assumed that private morality *does* apply in the sphere of government : and let it further be assumed that we may, if we please, apply our own moral standards to the men of 2,000 years ago—a large assumption. Then the truth is, that Antigonos was doing at (say) Argos on a large scale exactly what every citizen of Argos did all his life on a small scale, and that both were very reprehensible people. A democratic Argive would have put it, that the king had enslaved the Argives ; but the democratic Argive himself owned slaves, and was a member of a community and a civilization whose brilliance was entirely based on, and due to, slave labour. That, so far as is known, he generally treated his slaves well is beside the point ; so far as is known, Aristomachos the tyrant treated Argos well. The point is, that the moment we introduce our own moral standard, the whole of Greek 'freedom' becomes a myth. There was no such thing as a free Greek city ; liberty was the prerogative of certain people only ; a large part of the population of the peninsula were slaves. If it is to be granted to Polybios' Chlaineas that Antigonos was bound to take thought for independent Greek cities, that he was in fact his brother's keeper, then the same unfulfilled obligation would clearly lie on every slave-owning democrat in Greece.

This being so, it may look at first sight as if, both parties being tarred with the same brush, there was nothing to do but to consider the question of expediency ; that is to say, that the Macedonian view is the right one, and that the only ques-

tion is, Did the policy pay from the point of view of Antigonos' kingdom of Macedonia? But this will hardly do. It was, it is true, quite illogical that a slave-owner should object to a tyrant. It was, it is true, quite abominable that a free democracy should, as often happened, sell the population of another free city for slaves, or that a people rejoicing at its delivery from the cruelty of a tyrant should, as happened, proceed to treat the tyrant's harmless women-folk with equal cruelty. The stern Hebrew law-giver, who declared that the sins of the fathers should be visited on the children, at least assigned the visitation to his God; the Greek democrat often enough took it into his own hand.

But for all this, we are bound to take into consideration the Greek view. We are bound, it would seem, to take Greek 'freedom' as we find it, according to the standard of the time, and not apply to the men of the time a standard which they had no means of knowing or reaching. And the men of the time did not yet see clearly that domestic slavery and political slavery, which they called tyranny, were alike parts of one evil. Hence the paradox, that while no Greek ever raised his voice against slavery in the abstract,<sup>21</sup> hardly any Greek ever doubted that it was a meritorious act to assassinate a tyrant. But in spite of this, the feeling of the ordinary Greek citizen toward tyrants in the third century was no doubt being gradually strengthened by the fact that, though no one protested against slavery, there was a better feeling growing up with regard to the treatment of the slave; his loss of freedom, it was said, should render him a subject for compassion rather than blows: and the number of manumissions was steadily growing.<sup>22</sup> All this must, it seems, have reacted on

<sup>21</sup> From time to time some one refused to sell *Greek citizens* for slaves, like Kallikratidas; but this was not a protest against slavery in itself. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1, 3) records that there were some in his time who argued that slavery was against nature, and, being based on force, was unjust; but probably this was an academic argument rather than a practical view of life. See the question discussed in Newman's *Politics*, 1, 139 seq. The Stoics never took up the question of abolition, as one would have expected them to do, owing to a peculiarity of view; they considered that the slave was already free (if he chose to be) *in his own mind*, and what happened to the body was a matter of indifference. (See R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, 1910, p. 144.)

<sup>22</sup> Epicurus (*Diog. L.* 10, 118 = fr. 594, Usener) had said οὐδὲ κολάσειν



the sentiment of the ordinary citizen toward a tyrant, a man who, he would say, had enslaved himself and his friends. There is no need to multiply well-known instances of that sentiment; but it may be useful to quote some almost contemporary cases in Greek law. At Eresos an old statute provided that a tyrant if taken was to be tried on the capital charge, and his descendants banished for ever; it is known that under this law two tyrants at least were condemned to death, and that both Alexander and Antigonos I on appeal allowed the city to enforce its law against the banished descendants of former tyrants who desired to return.<sup>23</sup> Again, at Ilion, a law passed about the beginning of the third century provided *beforehand* what honours were to be paid to any one who should thereafter assassinate any tyrant of the city.<sup>24</sup> In the case of a tyrant, killing was indeed no murder. Whatever then his attitude toward others' freedom, the ordinary Greek citizen had got to the length of a passionate desire for his own. The feeling was far indeed from the modern one; it sometimes embraced only the circle of the subject's fellow-citizens; at best, it extended only to the citizens of other Greek cities, men of equal standing with himself. But everything must have a beginning; and, such as it was, this was one of the beginnings of the idea of liberty, and, as such, is to be recognized as one of the highest expressions of the moral standard of the times, even though it worked, as it often did work, by the most unworthy means.

Consequently Antigonos' policy deliberately fell short of the highest standard of the time. Doubtless he knew this perfectly; very likely he held a view which, whether it be right or whether it be wrong, has always commanded

τοὺς οἰκέτας, ἐλεήσειν μέντοι: and the aphorism 'Be pitiful to slaves' was becoming a commonplace early in the century (Inscription from Kyzikos, *J. H. S.* 27, 62 (3) = 6, 53 in F. W. Hasluck's *Cyzicus*; a collection of 'copy-book' maxims). The Stoic theory of the brotherhood of man was helping to bring about a change of attitude toward the treatment of slaves; and Zeno when ill refused to be treated better than his slave; Arnim 287. The New Comedy has an honourable record in this respect. — For the manumissions see A. Calderini, *La manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia*, 1908, ch. 5.

<sup>23</sup> *O. G. I.* 8; *I. J. G.* 2, p. 161 seq.; E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 157 [125], p. 294.

<sup>24</sup> *O. G. I.* 218; *I. J. G.* 2, p. 24. Time of Seleukos I. — See Addenda.

a large following, the view that the business of a statesman is not morality, but the good of his country. It is fair to suppose that he saw no practical alternative, and, in adopting the policy of expediency, was content to take the usual risks of such a policy. Sentiment had been tried by Demetrios, and failed; to garrison the cities he was not strong enough; a third course, to retire altogether from the Peloponnese, would have been absolutely inconsistent with his duty to Macedonia as he understood it; it would only have given Egypt a free hand, and produced a worse war than the Chremonidean. He therefore allowed the end to justify the means; that is to say, he did evil that good might come of it. What came of it the sequel will show.

Emphasis has been laid here upon the fact that Antigonos' policy was one of expediency only, because a different view has found large acceptance. According to this view, Antigonos was prompted to set up a system of tyrants by his Stoic sympathies and training; he thought he was setting up in this or that city the rule of the One Wise Man.<sup>25</sup> This view seems to be peculiarly wide of the truth; a Stoic would never for an instant have confused the rule of king and tyrant, the legitimate monarch of willing, and the unconstitutional monarch of unwilling, subjects. Plato and Aristotle indeed, though outwardly emphasizing the distinction between king and tyrant, had gone near to saying that the true monarch, when he came, would (save for his willing subjects) be merely a glorious tyrant; he would transcend all laws, which would merely be hindrances and shackles upon him.<sup>26</sup> But since then the world had seen Aristotle's dream of the 'god among men' realized in the universal divine kingship of Alexander; and the Stoics, however much their speculations owed to Alexander's career, were no longer inclined to put the true monarch above all law; he was rather to be the interpreter of law, not indeed of this or that code, but of the

<sup>25</sup> Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, p. 217; Ferguson, *Athens*, 163, 176; Kaerst, *Antigonos*, no. 4 in *P.W.* I (ii), col. 2417 (in part only; in part due to political necessity).

<sup>26</sup> Plato, *Polit.* 293 seq.; Aristot. *Pol.* 3, 1284<sup>a</sup>, cf. A. C. Bradley, *Hellenica*, p. 238.

divine law immanent in the universe and binding on all men alike. And when the Stoic brought his speculations down to earth, nowhere do we find the distinction between the true king and the tyrant drawn more sharply, or with more just understanding of realities, than in one of the surviving fragments of Stoic literature.<sup>27</sup> Throughout history, Stoics fought against the 'tyrant' whenever they found one. And even in the case of that other third-century monarch whom they trained, Kleomenes III of Sparta, though he brought about a revolution and was called a tyrant by his enemies, a Stoic if questioned would undoubtedly have said that, on the contrary, he had overthrown a tyranny, a condition of things in conflict with the 'common law'; and can it be said that he would be wrong?

The next question for Antigonos' consideration was the communications of Corinth. Apparently this was not taken in hand till 270, a proof that Antigonos' first care had to be Macedonia, where he must have spent the year 271. But in 270 he recovered Euboea,<sup>28</sup> and again placed it under Krateros. It was perhaps at this time that he occupied Megara, though this is uncertain.<sup>29</sup> He had now all of Greece that he wanted; a chain of territory, or rather of fortresses, binding Corinth to Demetrias.

The brief independence of Eretria was marred by a sad incident. Menedemos was suspected (we hardly need to be told, falsely) of a desire to betray the city to his friend the king, and was sent into banishment. He went first to Oropos, and in the temple of Amphiaraos awaited events;

<sup>27</sup> Suidas, βασιλεία 3. See ch. 8, n. 120.

<sup>28</sup> Athens and Euboea do not vanish from the Amphiktyonic lists till 270; Beloch 3, 2, 250. The decree of Laches for Demochares shows that at some time in 271/70 the pro-Macedonians had not yet returned to power.

<sup>29</sup> Polyæn. 4, 6, 3. Antigonos had elephants with him. This fact excludes the years before 277, when Antigonos had no elephants; any Demetrios had were lost in 288 to Lysimachos and Pyrrhos. Antigonos in 277 recovered those of Lysimachos, which had passed to Keraunos, less any which Keraunos may have lent to Pyrrhos; but he lost all his elephants to Pyrrhos (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26), and did not recover them till Pyrrhos' death; therefore the war with Pyrrhos is also excluded. It must then fall here, where I have placed it, or in the Chremonidean war. The fact that Megara does not appear among Sparta's allies in *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214 is by no means conclusive against the latter date; Megara may have joined later, or been trying to preserve neutrality.

there he was seen by Hierokles, Antigonos' general in Piraeus, who thought to please the exile by an account of how Antigonos had taken the town. Menedemos' savage rebuke to him showed that the old man's heart was still with the city that he had done so much to render illustrious; and it is said that he now returned secretly, took his wife and daughters, and went to Antigonos to plead for his country's freedom. Antigonos himself would have given it, even with the knowledge that it must probably mean another war; Persaios dissuaded him. Menedemos died soon after at Antigonos' court; it is said that he fell into deep dejection, and no longer cared to live.<sup>30</sup>

In Northern Greece the only question that needed attention was Aetolia. Antigonos had sought no compensation, territorial or otherwise, from Epeiros for Pyrrhos' attack on him; he had sent home Helenos and his Epeiots, and left the country intact<sup>31</sup> to Pyrrhos' son and successor Alexander; presumably he made peace with him on the basis of each country keeping what it had prior to 274. This generous treatment meant that he desired a friendly Epeiros as neighbour. Alexander had a war on his hands forthwith with the Illyrian king Mitylus, who doubtless aimed at recovering the territory taken from Illyria by Pyrrhos; but Mitylus was presently defeated,<sup>32</sup> and Alexander succeeded in keeping together his much shaken kingdom.

Aetolia, however, had definitely favoured Pyrrhos, and she had also given shelter to the Eleans exiled by Aristotimos, whose rule was marked by great cruelty. With Aetolian help the exiles returned, and fortified a post in the country; a conspiracy was formed against Aristotimos; he was struck down by one Kylon, after a rule of five months; Krateros came up from Corinth too late to aid him. The Aetolians erected a statue at Olympia to Kylon, and the Delphians

<sup>30</sup> Diog. L. 2, 127, 142, 143. Πολλὰ λέγοντος περὶ τῆς ἀλώσεως τῆς Ἑρετρίας can hardly, I think, mean 'tried to secure the co-operation of Menedemos in an attempt on Eretria', as Ferguson puts it, *Athens*, 165.

<sup>31</sup> Epeiros still marched on the north with Illyria, as is shown by Alexander's war with Mitylus; Trog. *Procl.* 25.

<sup>32</sup> App. *Illyr.* 7 is very vague, but seems to show that Alexander held as much of Illyria as Pyrrhos had done.



afterwards passed a decree in his honour. But the populace of Elis gave a signal illustration of how a democracy can vie even with the worst of tyrants ; as a great favour, and at the request of a woman, they allowed the tyrant's two young daughters to hang themselves, in lieu of worse. The pathetic narrative of the girls' death is told by the same writer who relates the cruelties of their father ; both stories must stand or fall together.<sup>33</sup>

Antigonos saw that, if he would have peace in the north, as he desired, he must come to an arrangement with Aetolia, the one Power strong enough to stand in complete independence even of Egypt. The subject is excessively obscure, in the absence of any inscriptions that might throw light on the details ; but it can be stated with confidence, from subsequent events, that Antigonos thought that peace was worth some concessions, and that an arrangement *was* come to. The main lines of it can be tentatively gathered. What was past was to be past. Pyrrhos was dead and Antigonos alive, and there was room enough in the North for both Aetolia and Macedonia without either troubling the other. Antigonos sought nothing from the states of Northern Greece, which he regarded as outside his sphere ; and probably he gave Aetolia a free hand, so far as he was concerned, to bring them into her League at her pleasure, while he treated Aetolia's control of the Amphiktyonic body as a religious rather than a political matter, and not one for interference. Aetolia in fact obtained from Macedonia the recognition she wanted ; henceforward (leaving Epeiros aside) there are *two* leading and rival powers north of the Isthmus of Corinth. In return, Aetolia promised neutrality. It sounds little, but it sufficed. Antigonos formally abandoned that which he had never had any intention of trying to possess, in return for an undertaking by Aetolia never to act against him ; let her do what she wished to emphasize her neutrality before the world, but she must not join with Macedonia's enemies, that is to

<sup>33</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 250 F, Μίκα καὶ Μεγιστώ (almost certainly from Phylarchos). — Statue at Olympia to Kylon, Paus. 6, 14, 11 ; decree of the Delphians for Κύλλων Κύλλωνος Ἡλείος, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 920. He killed Aristotimos, Paus. 5, 5, 1.

say, with Sparta or Egypt. And so long as Antigonos lived, Aetolia's undertaking was observed.<sup>34</sup>

It will be seen from this brief review that Antigonos' interests in Greece (Athens apart) now fell into two groups; first, those states of the Peloponnese that were friendly to him; and secondly, a group of fortresses with territory stretching northward from Corinth towards Demetrias, the most important being Corinth, Piraeus, Chalkis. These fortresses held Athens in their arms, so to speak, as a glance at a map shows; and the connecting knot of both groups was Corinth. Outside these two groups, Greece was free and was not interfered with. Mainland communication between Corinth and Demetrias there was none; Boeotia, Lokris, part of Aetolia all intervened; the only route was by sea, or through Euboea. Right along the sea route, from Cape Sounion to the mouth of the Gulf of Pagasai, on which stood Demetrias, stretched the long island of Euboea, protecting and landlocking it. The interdependence of the whole system is clearly shown on the map; how Corinth knots up both groups, how Chalkis commands the route to Corinth, and how the two together dominate Athens, now that she has lost Piraeus.

~~A subject that is unfortunately very obscure is Antigonos' dealings with Athens after the war. The nationalist government was still in power in 271; Athens still kept her place in the Amphiktyonic council, and in the year 271/70 the Athenians, on the motion of Demochares' son Laches, passed a decree in honour of Demochares, who had recently died.<sup>35</sup> Though the decree was carefully worded, so as not to allude either to Demetrios or to Antigonos, or even to Macedonia, its import is obvious: honours for the good democrat, who had disdained to serve under any oligarchic (i. e. pro-Macedonian) government, who had borne exile for his opinions, and who had obtained money from all Demetrios' enemies, Lysimachos, Ptolemy, Lysimachos' son-in-law Antipatros, every hearer~~

<sup>34</sup> This arrangement can only be deduced from subsequent events, which it is required to explain. The fiction that the Amphiktyons were independent of Aetolia was consistently maintained; Polyb. 4, 25, 8.

<sup>35</sup> Plut. *X Orat. Vit.* 851 D seq.; Pytharatos' year.

knowing well what that money had been used for: all this shows that the party in power, while anxious to preserve neutrality and avoid hostility to Antigonos, was not pro-Macedonian. But in 270 Athens vanishes from the Amphiktyonic lists; and as this is the year in which Antigonos was campaigning in the neighbourhood and recovering Euboea, we must suppose that it was in this year that the government was overthrown once more, the pro-Macedonians returned to power, and Antigonos' vague suzerainty was again recognized. Doubtless the change came about peaceably; the overthrown government had merely sought neutrality and had not acted against Antigonos; with the restoration of the pro-Macedonians to power Athens merely returned to the position of the favoured city which she had held from 277 to 274.<sup>36</sup>

One event of the first importance marks the year 270; in July died Arsinoe.<sup>37</sup> She had enjoyed her power for four years only; but the impress which she gave to Egyptian policy lasted long after her death. Had she lived, no doubt the Chremonidean war would have been fought sooner, and fought with more energy by Egypt, even as the first war with Syria had been fought; but the events of 272 had for the time tied the hands of Sparta, and of Egypt through Sparta; and before it was again possible to force events Arsinoe was dead. She was deified as the goddess Philadelphos, she who loves her brother; by a strange chance the name, which that brother never bore either in life or after death, became attached to him, and he is universally known as Ptolemy Philadelphos. He carried out one of Arsinoe's wishes shortly after her death; she had been more than titular

<sup>36</sup> See ch. 9, n. 27. A pro-Macedonian government must have been in power again at Athens from about 270 to 266, for (apart from the fact that after 270 Athens vanishes for a time from the Amphiktyonic lists) Antigonos' relations with Athens seem to have been again the same as in 277-274; it was at this period that Demetrios the Fair, who cannot have been born before 286 (perhaps in 285), must have been studying in Athens under Arkesilaos (Diog. L. 4, 41); before 274 he was too young.

<sup>37</sup> Beloch 3, 2, 130; Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 5, 384. Bouché-Leclercq, vol. iv, p. 310, refers to a papyrus (*Hibeh Paph.*, no. 99) dated 20 Daisios (about June) in the fifteenth year of Ptolemy II = 270, with the formula ἐφ' ἱερέως Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Θεῶν Ἀδελφῶν. But this need not show that she was dead by June; it may only show that she had become a goddess before her death. I need not go into the controversy on this point.

queen, she had been co-ruler, and Ptolemy replaced her, so far as possible, by promoting her son by Lysimachos, Ptolemaios, whom he had adopted, to be co-ruler of the empire with himself in her place.<sup>38</sup>

One of the things on which Arsinoe had left the distinct mark of her strenuous personality was Egypt's rule of the sea. Philokles and his contemporary nesiarch, Bacchon of Boeotia, were apparently dead; and both Philokles' successor, Kallikrates, son of Boiskos, and Bacchon's successor, Hermias, displayed much devotion to the queen. It is possible that their appointments were due to her, more especially as Kallikrates came from Samos and Hermias (probably) from Halikarnassos, both formerly possessions of Lysimachos; but, as regards Kallikrates anyhow, this is far from certain. It is certain, however, that if he had once been an adherent of the other Arsinoe, the first wife of Ptolemy II, he had known how to transfer his worship to the rising sun. He dedicated statues of Ptolemy II and Arsinoe at Olympia; and he built for her worship, as Aphrodite Zephyritis, a temple at Zephyrion, which he only completed after her death.<sup>39</sup> Arsinoe herself took an interest in Delos; there was erected on the island, either by her or in her honour, a building called the Philadelphieion, which contained her picture;<sup>40</sup> and it was no doubt at her request that Kallimachos wrote his Hymn to Delos, to be sung at the federal Ptolemaieia, with its allusion to the events of 274 and its curious attempt to show that Ptolemy had borne his part in the contest against the Gauls no less bravely than Antigonos or any one else.<sup>41</sup> The meaning of the stones, of

<sup>38</sup> See App. 7, pp. 444, 446.

<sup>39</sup> Hermias, *J. H. S.* 1911, 251; Kallikrates, *ib.* 254 seq.; where all the references are collected.

<sup>40</sup> *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 75, no. 47, l. 38, τὸ Φιλαδέλφειον, and see Dürrbach's notes, especially the reference to the οἶκος οὗ ἡ γραφὴ ἢ Ἀρσινόης; *Archives*, lxxvii A, l. 164 (Sosistratos).

<sup>41</sup> See line 171 and the scholion; the drowning by Ptolemy of his Gallic mercenaries who revolted in 274 is Ptolemy's share of the ξυνὸς ἄεθλος of himself and Apollo against the Gauls! It was written as soon after 279 as it can be placed, i.e. soon after 274, and no doubt, like Theokritos' 'Praise of Ptolemy', before 270. The suggestion that it was written for the Ptolemaieia of Delos was made by A. J. Reinach, *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1911, p. 46. For other suggestions, Susemihl I, 360.



which so many have been found in the Islands, bearing simply the words 'Of Arsinoe Philadelphos', is not known;<sup>42</sup> neither is it known if Arsinoe had any part in what was to be the one lasting monument of Egypt's sea-power, the book of the chief steersman Timosthenes of Rhodes 'On Harbours', which filled, for the sailors of the third century, the place taken to-day by the *Mediterranean Pilot* and the charts issued by the British Admiralty.<sup>43</sup> But it is significant that one of the best harbours in the Aegean, which the Egyptian fleet was to use as its base in the Chremonidean war, was re-christened by her name,<sup>44</sup> as was the naval post which Egypt was to seize later in the Argolid.<sup>45</sup> What she would have done had she lived can only be guessed; but what the men who served her thought, we know. After her death the nesiarch Hermias made a vase foundation on Delos, of the usual type, which came to be known as the Philadelphieia. But the vases did not bear the customary inscription. Along with the usual dedication to the gods of Delos, Apollo, Artemis, and Leto, appears a dedication to two other deities, Ptolemy the king and Arsinoe Philadelphos; and while Ptolemy's name comes last in the inscription, Arsinoe's comes first of all, taking precedence even of Apollo himself.<sup>46</sup>

Here, with the year 270, the curtain falls, not to rise again

<sup>42</sup> For conjectures see notes to *O. G. I.* 34.

<sup>43</sup> Susemihl 1, 660; Wilamowitz, *Griech. Lit.* 89. Of course if he was ναύαρχος and not ἀρχικυβερνήτης he must come late in Ptolemy II's reign.

<sup>44</sup> It is uncertain if Arsinoe in Keos (*I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 1061, cf. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 261, l. 78) was Poiessa (Wilamowitz, *ad loc.*) or Koressos (Graindor, *B. C. H.* 1906, p. 97).

<sup>45</sup> Arsinoe-Methana, *I. G.* xii, 3, 466; cf. *O. G. I.* 115; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 261, n. 11; Beloch 3, 2, 283. On the inscriptions, the identification, though probable, is not proved; but J. N. Svoronos in *Journ. Intern.* 7, p. 397, gives a coin of Methana which, in his opinion, renders the identity certain.

<sup>46</sup> On the identity of the Philadelphieia and the festival founded by Hermias see E. Schulhof, *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 114; it is absolutely certain, as shown by Menethales (*I. G.* xi, 320) B, l. 25, which gives both Hermias' name and the title Philadelphieia. The first vase appears under Melichides ii, 267; Menethales, l. 28; Boulon (*I. G.* xi, 313), l. 64; Akridion (*I. G.* xi, 298), A, l. 80; it was therefore probably not founded till 268. Akridion, l. 80, gives the ἐπιγραφή on the vases: [Δ]ηλιάδες χορεία [ἐπιδ]όντος Ἑρμίου Ἀρσινόῃ Φιλαδέλ[φ]οι Ἀ[πόλλωνι Ἀρτέμει Διὶ καὶ βασιλεῖ Πτο]λ[ε]μαίῳ, the gap after Ἑρμί being fully given in Menethales B, l. 25. — Other dedications made jointly to an old and a new deity are known, e.g. a stoa at Halikarnassos dedicated to Apollo and King Ptolemy, *O. G. I.* 46; and a dedication Σαράπιδι Ἰσίδι [Β]ασιλεῖ Φιλίππῳ, P. Perdrizet in *B. C. H.* 18 (1894), p. 417, no. 1.

till the year 266. The events of the three intervening years are in our tradition almost a blank. Antigonos was hard at work consolidating his power in Macedonia, and trying to get the country on to a sound footing, work that was this time to end in success; he also came periodically to Athens, where his half-brother, Demetrios the Fair, son of Demetrios the Besieger and Ptolemais, was studying philosophy under Arkesilaos,<sup>47</sup> just as his son Halkyoneus was doing at Pella under Persaios. Ptolemy in the meantime was quietly preparing to carry out Arsinoe's policy. He had now a formal alliance with Sparta;<sup>48</sup> and Sparta was re-forming the old Peloponnesian League; she had already by 266 found a number of allies, Elis, the Achaean League, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Phigaleia and Kaphyai—that is to say, practically the whole of Arkadia except Megalopolis—and some of the Cretan cities.<sup>49</sup> Megalopolis and the Argolid held to Antigonos; Messene was able, as so often, to maintain complete neutrality, and possibly Sikyon also; but the League embraced the larger part of the Peloponnese, and, so far as the Peloponnese alone was concerned, a great superiority in force. Discontent with Antigonos' system, and the natural Greek hatred of a tyrant, probably had a good deal to do with bringing Sparta recruits.

That the initiative in the ensuing war came from Egypt is fairly plainly shown in Chremonides' decree.<sup>50</sup> But though Egypt had for long been desirous of attacking Antigonos, she favoured the plan of attacking him by deputy; she proposed that others should do the actual fighting. She had secured as much of the Peloponnese for her purpose as she could hope to do; she now attempted to induce some of the other states of Greece to join. It is possible that she had some success; Histiaia in Euboea, for instance, is found about

<sup>47</sup> See note 36, and Diog. L. 7, 6.

<sup>48</sup> Note the number of Ptolemaic coins in a third-century hoard found in Lakonia; A. J. B. Wace, *B. S. A.* 14 (1907-8), p. 149.

<sup>49</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214.

<sup>50</sup> See Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 5, 384. It seems to follow from the war being fought in pursuance of the policy of Arsinoe; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214. The composite motives that led to the war are well given in Ferguson, *Athens*, pp. 175-7.

266/5 exercising an Amphiktyonic vote, which can best be explained by a revolution from Antigonos;<sup>51</sup> and it does not follow that no other cities joined in the war beyond those which Chremonides in 266 enumerated as already in the Spartan League. But the great triumph was the winning over of Athens. At some time prior to 266 a Ptolemaic embassy visited the city. All that is known about it is that some one collected a number of philosophers to meet the envoys at dinner, and that Zeno, who was among them, refused to talk: and when the envoys asked him what they were to say about him to their king, he bade them tell him that there was one man in Athens who knew how to hold his tongue.<sup>52</sup> It needs no guessing to see what Egyptian envoys were there for, or what sort of talk passed round at that dinner. Zeno adhered inflexibly to his rule of political neutrality; but the envoys must have received the promise of the Athenian nationalists to join the coalition.

In the autumn of 266 we emerge again for a moment—the last for years—into the full blaze of historical daylight. The pro-Macedonian government in Athens has fallen, and the revolution has brought to the helm not merely the nationalist party, but the extreme wing of it. The more moderate men who had been responsible for the policy of neutrality of 273–271 were either not in office or overborne by more impetuous colleagues. Athens has formally entered

<sup>51</sup> Histiaia about this time was exercising one of the Ionian votes in the Delphic Amphiktyony. The first hieromnemon appears in the autumn of Pleiston's year, 266/5 Beloch; if so, Histiaia revolted from Antigonos with Athens. The last appears in the autumn of Emmenidas' year, 260/59 Beloch; if so, Histiaia retained independence for two years after Athens' fall. This is difficult; one must suppose that Egypt stipulated for this in the peace of 261 (see generally ch. 11). Allowing that Beloch (3, 2, 333) is right in his date for Nikodamos, the date of Emmenidas depends on his view that the Soteria was a trieteris. If, as some think, it had become an annual festival, Emmenidas would be 259/8, lengthening Histiaia's independence. But Pomtow has recently stated that some unpublished texts support the trieteris theory, *B. Ph. W.* 1910, 1092. — With this independence of Histiaia must be connected the long list of proxenies granted by the town, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 494, the date of which is *circa* 264/3; see Beloch, *l.c.*; Wilhelm, *Beiträge*, p. 143.

<sup>52</sup> Arnim 284. Diog. L. 7, 24 says the envoys were from Ptolemy; Stob. *Flor.* 33, 10, from Antigonos; Plut. *Mor.* 504 A gives no name. Diogenes is obviously right; no agent of Antigonos would want to find out what he was to say about Zeno to the king.

into an alliance with Egypt ; and the ekklesia, perhaps on the motion of Chremonides, has passed a decree to invite the rest of Greece to follow the same policy.<sup>53</sup>

The guiding men of the new movement at Athens were Chremonides, son of Eteokles, of the deme Aithalidai, and his brother Glaukon.<sup>54</sup> Glaukon had been one of the men of the nationalist government of 288-281, and had fought against Antigonos; he was apparently older than his brother, and had held a number of offices, as already mentioned. More recently Delphi had decreed him the usual honours; his services to her must have been connected, either with the events following the retreat of the Gauls, or with the time of Pyrrhos' invasion, when Athens had for a while cultivated the goodwill of Delphi and Aetolia.<sup>55</sup> But, of the two, Chremonides was the leader. He seems to have been noted for his personal beauty; he was perhaps a pupil of Zeno; he was at any rate, like his opponent Antigonos, a friend of both Zeno and Kleanthes.<sup>56</sup> In him appears, for the first time, the phenomenon afterwards so common at Rome; how the Stoic teaching, with its insistence alike on true kingship and on the importance of the individual, impelled men to resist whomsoever they considered a tyrant.

On the ninth day of Metageitnion 266—about the beginning of September—Chremonides moved the declaration of war against Antigonos.<sup>57</sup> The preamble of the resolution recited that in olden times Athens and Sparta had fought many a noble fight together against the invader who attempted to enslave the cities of Hellas, winning glory for themselves and freedom for the rest of Greece; that the same evil days had again come upon Greece by the hands of men who were attempting to destroy the laws and the ancestral constitution of each city; that King Ptolemy, following the policy of his father and of his sister, was openly showing an earnest

<sup>53</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214.

<sup>54</sup> The names of two sisters, "Αγω or "Αγνη, and Pheidistrate, are also known; *I. G.* ii, 1369; *Wilhelm, Beiträge*, p. 75.

<sup>55</sup> Glaukon, ch. 4, p. 95. Decree of Delphi; *Homolle in B. C. H.* 1899, p. 547, no. 35. The archon is Erasippos, whom Pomtow placed provisionally in 277.

<sup>56</sup> *Arnim* 286 = *Diog. L.* 7, 17.

<sup>57</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214.



resolve to free Greece ; that the Athenians, having allied themselves with him, had passed a decree to call upon the rest of Greece to join in the same policy ; and that the Spartans, the friends and allies of King Ptolemy, had passed a decree that they and their Peloponnesian allies (whose names are set forth) should be the allies of Athens, and had sent envoys to Athens to ratify the treaty of alliance. It was then formally decreed that there should be an alliance between Athens on the one hand and Sparta with her allies on the other, in order that all Greeks might be of one mind together, and might with a good courage fight shoulder to shoulder with King Ptolemy and with each other against those who had wronged and broken faith with their cities, and so save Hellas.

It is a noble document, a fitting prelude to the last great struggle entered on by Athens for the liberties of herself and of Greece. If Athens were to fall, the gods gave it to her to fall with all honour. But the very words of the decree itself show the hopelessness of the struggle, apart from the Egyptian alliance ; the curse of the Greek race was on this war, as on every Greek struggle against Macedonia ; only the merest fraction of them could ever unite. The reference to Xerxes, who had been beaten by Athens and Sparta and their friends, in despite of the medizing states of Northern and Central Greece, shows how clearly this was present to the mind of Chremonides. There had been four chief military Powers in Greece. Athens and Boeotia had fought alone at Chaironeia, while Sparta and Aetolia had held aloof ; the presence of either might have altered the world's history. Sparta had then fought Antipatros by herself. Sparta and Boeotia had taken no part in the Lamian war, of which Athens and Aetolia bore the brunt. In the rising of 280 Sparta and Boeotia had fought against Antigonos ; Aetolia had held aloof, and Athens was too exhausted to join. Now Sparta and Athens were again allies ; Aetolia and Boeotia were strictly neutral. There was probably no time at which the four Powers together would not have been more than a match for Macedonia ; to bring more than two into line at once seems to have been impossible. This time it was thought

that the Egyptian alliance would supply the deficiency; but casting out Satan by means of Satan has never been a hopeful policy.

With the passing of this decree the coalition against Antigonos was fairly launched. He had no option but to take up the challenge; right or wrong, great Powers cannot abdicate. But sympathy with Athens must not blind us to the fact that the war was forced upon Antigonos against his will, and at the bidding of Egypt; Egypt, and not Athens, was the real protagonist. Chremonides was of course quite justified in bringing up against Antigonos his policy of 'tyrants'. But Antigonos' policy toward a large part of Greece had been one of great moderation; time after time he had held his hand; much of the Greek world, including many cities that had revolted from him, was as independent as if Macedonia did not exist. His relations with Athens had been of the best; with Sparta he in no way interfered. ~~What he desired was peace for Macedonia.~~ But there was the direct threat of the Egyptian pretender over his head; he could not do anything to weaken his position as against Egypt. Consequently, as regards Antigonos and Athens, the war was a conflict of two rights; each was right, Athens to struggle (as she believed) for complete independence, Antigonos to fight for his country's place in the world. That Athens, if successful, would not have gained complete independence, but would merely have changed suzerains, does not alter the case. We may leave it so, subscribing neither to the opinion of those extremists to whom nothing in Greek history is of much value save the independent city-state, nor to that of those other extremists to whom the small city-state has little right to exist over against the stable rule of a great monarchy: opinions often conditioned by the political upbringing and environment of the writers.

It was too late to begin operations<sup>53</sup> in what remained of

<sup>53</sup> General authorities for the war: Paus. 1, 1, 1: 1, 7, 3: 3, 6, 4-6; Trog. *Prol.* 26; Just. 26, 2. The labours of many scholars have now produced agreement on the main outlines. On the dating see especially Lehmann-Haupt, *B. Ph. W.* 1906, 1265 (superseding *Klio*, 3, 171); Kolbe, *Archonten*, p. 40 (1908); Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 178 seq. Beloch, who places the campaign against Alexander later, ends the war a good year too soon.

the autumn of 266. Athens, however, signalized her change of government by again sending a representative to the Amphiktyonic Council at the autumn meeting of 266;<sup>59</sup> and it is probable that something was done in the way of provisioning the city, a cumbersome task with the Piraeus in Antigonos' hands. But in the spring of 265 Antigonos invaded Attica with a large force, while Areus moved northwards from Sparta with the troops of Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. Neither Megalopolis nor Argos appears to have been able to delay his march, which may render it doubtful if they were yet in the hands of tyrants;<sup>60</sup> and he easily reached Corinth. Here he was brought up short; for Krateros' lines, based on the great fortress of Akrokorinthos, stretched from sea to sea; the position could neither be attacked nor turned. Meanwhile the Egyptian fleet, under its new admiral Patroklos, son of Patron, a Macedonian,<sup>61</sup> Kallikrates' successor, had reached the Attic coast. But Patroklos found the booms down across the harbour of Piraeus,<sup>62</sup> and the town strongly held by Antigonos' garrison; he took up his position at a little island off Cape Sounion, afterwards known as Patroklos' camp,<sup>63</sup> so as to co-operate with Areus. His base was one of the harbours in the island

Lehmann-Haupt, Beloch, Kolbe, Ferguson, Kirchner, all agree that *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214 was passed in 266 and the war began spring 265; this may now be regarded as certain. — The name 'Chremonidean war' is from Hegesandros (ap. Athen. 6, 250 f); probably a nickname, but convenient.

<sup>59</sup> Athenian hieronemones; one under the archon Pleiston, autumn 266/5 (Beloch 3, 2, 330); one under Athambos, who, if he preceded Pleiston as Beloch thought, should probably fall in 270, before the fall of the nationalist government of 273-270; and one under Damosthenes, *G. D. I.* 2519, the last probably during the course of the war.

<sup>60</sup> It is just possible that Megalopolis resisted in vain, and that it is to this war that the notice in Livy 32, 22, 10 belongs: 'Megalopolitanos avorum memoria pulsos ab Lacedaemoniis restituerat in patriam Antigonus.' If so, the restoration must be connected with Aristodemos' accession to power, after the battle of Corinth; see note 84.

<sup>61</sup> Patroklos succeeded Kallikrates at some date between 270 and 265, *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 255. In 270 (269) he was priest of Alexander and the *Θεοὶ Ἀδελφοί*; *Hib. Pap.* i, no. 99. Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 175, n. 2, thinks he was 'Arsinoë's man'. But his appointment as admiral certainly dates after her death.

<sup>62</sup> For the booms or chains of Piraeus see a decree from Piraeus, *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1900, p. 91, l. 39; ib. 1884, p. 170, ll. 43, 46; Plut. *Dem.* 8; Athen. 12, 535 d; Schol. to Aristoph. *Pax*, 144.

<sup>63</sup> Πατρόκλου χάραξ, Strab. 8, 398.

of Keos, either Koressos or Poiessa, which had been, as already noticed, renamed Arsinoe.<sup>64</sup>

National qualities seem to have a habit of adhering to the soil of a land, even if the race changes. Centuries before, Assyrian captains and Hebrew prophets had declared that Pharaoh king of Egypt was the staff of a broken reed, whereon if a man leant it would go into his hand and pierce it;<sup>65</sup> and the words might have been spoken of Ptolemy II. The Egyptian fleet seems to have been equipped with native marines only;<sup>66</sup> it did not even carry, (as would have been indispensable for serious fighting), a force of Greek mercenaries, which the wealthiest power in the world could have had in abundance. Patroklos was therefore unable, or professed himself unable, to make any serious attack on Antigonos; his Egyptians, he said, could not face Macedonians; but he told Areus that if he would do the fighting, the fleet might land its marines and take Antigonos in the rear. But Areus could not pass Krateros' lines. It was a good example of the limitations of sea-power.

One of the astonishing things in the story, at first sight, is that Patroklos, with the unquestioned command of the sea, did not ship Areus' army either across the Saronic Gulf or the Gulf of Corinth, and turn Krateros' position. Kassandros had long since shown that Corinth could be thus turned.<sup>67</sup> But here Antigonos' foresight showed itself. There was nowhere to land. The Megarid was his, and he presumably, like Demetrios, held Aigosthena in strength.<sup>68</sup> Piraeus was his, and with the interior lines he could probably have prevented a landing at one of the open roadsteads of Attica, such as Marathon or Eleusis. To land in Boeotia would probably have forced Boeotia into Antigonos' arms; or it may

<sup>64</sup> See note 44; and cf. *O. G. I.* 44, ἐξ Ἰουλίδος.

<sup>65</sup> 2 Kings 18, 21 = Isaiah 36, 6; adopted by Ezekiel, 29, 6 and 7.

<sup>66</sup> Paus. 3, 6, 5 makes Patroklos say that his men, being sailors and Egyptians, could not be expected to fight Macedonians. — Native epibatai in the Egyptian fleet in 480, *J. H. S.* 1908, p. 208. On a landing, a large part of the force would be the rowers, who would have their arms. These, a little later, were raised in Egypt by a naval conscription, *vavréia*; *O. G. I.* 90 (the Rosetta stone), l. 17; the interpretation depends on the hieroglyphic and demotic versions.

<sup>67</sup> Diod. 19, 54.

<sup>68</sup> *I. G.* vii, 1.



be that his arrangement with Aetolia included some provision for Aetolian help in the event of a Boeotian rising. To land in Aetolia was of course out of the question; no one lightly put a hand into that hornet's nest. It was a stalemate.

As against the allies, who could neither help Athens nor each other, Antigonos had the tremendous advantage both of the interior lines and of knowing his own mind. He had not mobilized his own inferior fleet,<sup>69</sup> requiring all his force for the land; so he cared little for Patroklos. But the coalition had forced a war on him against his will; if they wanted a fight, they should have one. Leaving enough men behind to mask Athens, he moved with his main body through the Megarid<sup>70</sup> to meet Areus. But he had enlisted a new tribe of Gauls for the war, in order to spare his Macedonians as much as possible; and these Gauls, who did not know him, for once played him false. Outside Megara they mutinied in a body, and Antigonos had after all to bring up the Macedonians; he attacked the mutineers, and in what is described as a great battle cut them to pieces.<sup>71</sup> But his operations for that year were paralysed; he returned and sat down outside Athens, while he recruited fresh men.

Somewhere about this time occurred an incident which illustrates Antigonos' weakness at sea. Krateros was bringing a wife for his son Alexander from somewhere in the north-west; a quadrireme was sent to the Aetolian port of Naupaktos to convey the lady, Nikaia, to Corinth; and the ship was captured by the Achaeans, whose naval strength was very small. They seem to have released Nikaia, but they kept the ship.<sup>72</sup>

So came the winter. Areus and his army went home; he could not keep his citizen troops together for a winter

<sup>69</sup> Paus. 3, 6, 4 says that Antigonos moved on Athens *πεζῶ τε καὶ ναυσίν*; this means transports, for of course he could not reach Attica altogether by land. But when he adds (1, 1, 1) that Antigonos' fleet kept the Athenians from the sea, he is talking nonsense; Antigonos held Piraeus and every Athenian vessel that had not rotted away. It is certain that Antigonos required every man he had for the land operations.

<sup>70</sup> See note 29.

<sup>71</sup> Justin's details are worthless. But Gauls did often enlist as a tribe, bringing their families with them.

<sup>72</sup> Livy 35, 26, 5; Beloch 3, 2, 437.

campaign. Patroklos, too, must have gone home; his galleys could not keep the sea through the winter. Whether he returned the next year is not known. But at some period of the war, being unable to do much damage to Antigonos, he insulted him; he sent him a present of fish and figs, which perplexed Antigonos' Council, till the king with a laugh interpreted it to mean that the Macedonians must get command of the sea, or starve.<sup>73</sup> Possibly Patroklos, with his strong fleet, had done something in the way of cutting off Antigonos' supplies; but to emphasize the fact was folly. Antigonos put the insult away in his mind with other matters; in due time it was to bear fruit. This was about all that came of the high-sounding phrases of Egyptian diplomacy.

But the Spartan was made of better stuff. In the spring of 264 Areus again came northward, and Antigonos came southward to meet him. The battle took place outside the fortifications of Corinth; Sparta and her allies were completely defeated, and Areus left dead on the field.<sup>74</sup> It was probably here that Halkyoneus fell; his name does not meet us further, and he was killed in some battle. Antigonos bore the loss of his favourite son with Stoic fortitude; but the utterance attributed to him on the occasion is undoubtedly apocryphal.<sup>75</sup>

The battle of Corinth was the decisive action of the war. It left Sparta weakened, and it broke up the Peloponnesian League.<sup>76</sup> But it did more than this. It gave new strength

<sup>73</sup> Phylarchos ap. Athen. 8, 334 a = *F. H. G.* 1, 334. Fish were a luxury, while figs at this time typified the very poorest food; see Teles, *περὶ αὐταρκειας*, p. 13, l. 8 (Hense<sup>2</sup>); Krates fr. 4 (Wachsmuth, Diels), l. 5; Diog. L. 2, 139; especially Philemon in Diog. L. 7, 27, εἰς ἄπρος, ὄψον ἰσχύς, ἐπιπτεῖν ὕδωρ.

<sup>74</sup> There is a drachm of Antigonos showing obv. the head of Poseidon crowned with a plant like ivy, and with bays; rev. Athene Alkis, which as regards types comes, therefore, half-way between the two tetradrachms, and may represent the transition from one to the other (Imhoof-Blumer, *Monnaies grecques*, p. 124, no. 68, and p. 127). If so, the Poseidon should refer in some way to Corinth, and it may have been struck to commemorate the victory over Areus.

<sup>75</sup> Ael. *V. H.* 3, 5; Plut. *Mor.* 119 C. Plutarch makes Antigonos say, at greater length, 'You have lived longer than one would have expected from your recklessness'; and similar words are put by Justin, 25, 4, 10, into the mouth of Pyrrhos on the death of his son Ptolemaios. One cannot therefore credit either. — Had Halkyoneus been alive in 262, he and not Demetrios would have commanded the army that invaded Epeiros; see note 83.

<sup>76</sup> This is obvious from the fact (among other things) that, shortly after,

to the partisans of Antigonos at Argos and Megalopolis. Whether Aristodemos was already ruling in Megalopolis may be doubtful; in any case his effective power dates from the battle of Corinth.<sup>77</sup> The same is very likely true of Aristomachos at Argos, though he is not actually mentioned till after the end of the war. Areus was succeeded in his kingship at Sparta by his son Akrotatos, the hero of the defence against Pyrrhos; however much Sparta might have suffered from her defeat, it might be predicted with certainty that the fiery young man would make some effort to avenge his father's death.

The appearance on the scene of a new opponent to Antigonos seemed to hold out to Akrotatos some prospect of a successful campaign. Egypt, though not willing to fight herself, was ready enough to persuade any one else to join the coalition who seemed anxious to do so; and it seems to have been shortly after the battle of Corinth that Alexander of Epeiros took the field;<sup>78</sup> his intervention a year earlier might have caused Antigonos considerable embarrassment. Alexander had come well out of his Illyrian war, and had recently made a friendly arrangement with Aetolia for the partition of Akarnania;<sup>79</sup> that is to say, Aetolia was to help him to recover Akarnania, and was to receive the eastern part of it for her assistance. There might be some excuse for Alexander, for Akarnania had once belonged to Pyrrhos; but the action of Aetolia was peculiarly shameless, seeing that quite recently she had entered into a treaty with Akarnania

Akrotatos (see note 84) was not a match for Aristodemos alone. — Beloch 3, 1, 610 notes that the League broke up; but he can hardly be right in making Achaea become Antigonos' ally, as will appear when the affairs of Sikyon in 251 are reached.

<sup>77</sup> This follows from his defeat of Akrotatos, on which see note 84.

<sup>78</sup> Beloch 3, 2, 426 puts Alexander's attack after the end of the Chremonidean war, chiefly on the ground of Demetrios' age, but also influenced by his own theory of the date of the death of Demetrios the Fair, on which see App. 9. But Justin 26, 2, 9 ('in quo cum occupatus esset', 'reversus a Graecia') is quite clear. — See note 83, and Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 181, n. 1.

<sup>79</sup> Polyb. 2, 45, 1; 9, 34, 7; Just. 26, 3, 1; 28, 1, 1. — A. J. Reinach, *Journ. Intern.* 1911, p. 236, would put the partition not later than 265, on prosopographic grounds. The monument which the Aetolians set up at Delphi to celebrate the conquest of Akarnania (Paus. 10, 16, 6) has recently been identified; Pomtow in *B. Ph. W.* 1912, 540.

which bound either state to aid the other if attacked.<sup>80</sup> Aetolia was waxing fat, with the natural consequences; and this partition was one of the results of the free hand which Antigonos had given her. For Aetolia was presently to interpret her sphere as meaning, not merely the Amphiktyonic States, but as much of the west coast of Greece as she could control; and the partition of Akarnania was the first of a number of acts of brigandage which were to make her by and by the best-hated state in the peninsula. The partition was duly carried out; and Alexander, having re-established his father's kingdom, turned his thoughts to revenge for his father's death, a matter which fell most opportunely for Egypt.

Alexander invaded Macedonia by the usual route through the Aoos pass; he overran part of the north, where there were still doubtless partisans of Epeiros who joined him, and captured a few places.<sup>81</sup> But he had neither the glamour nor perhaps the military talent of Pyrrhos; and it was not difficult to plunder a land whose defenders were absent. Antigonos had to leave a small force before Athens and hurry back to meet him.<sup>82</sup> What happened is entirely obscure, except that Antigonos in a short time was sufficiently master of the situation to return to Athens, leaving the conduct of the war against Alexander to his generals, with an army placed under

<sup>80</sup> 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1905, p. 55.

<sup>81</sup> The story in Just. 26, 2, 10, that Antigonos' troops went over and he lost Macedonia, is (as the sequel shows) mere Justin, a duplicate of Pyrrhos' invasion inserted for the sake of the moral, which is duly drawn, 26, 2, 12. If it were true, how could Antigonos have left the conduct of the war to his lieutenants?

<sup>82</sup> Almost every historian, on the faith of Polyæn. 4, 6, 20 = Frontin. *Strat.* 3, 4, 2, repeats the story that at some time in the war Antigonos made a truce with Athens. If it were true, the Egyptian fleet would have reprovvisioned the city. I think the truce belongs to 282; see ch. 5, n. 32. Of the two inscriptions which Ferguson, *Athens*, 181, n. 2, assigns to this truce, *I. G.* ii, 5, 616 b is entirely local to Piræus, and requires no truce to explain it; Piræus was in Antigonos' hands, and cannot have been much affected by the war, especially in July 262, when certainly Patroklos' fleet was away. *I. G.* ii, 310 is most uncertain; see *Priests*, 151. Ferguson now follows Koehler; but it is a strong measure to place it twenty-eight years after the other decree for Aischron, *I. G.* ii, 309, especially as in 290 Aischron was a man of weight, and therefore not young. Even if 'Αντιπατρ]ρον be inevitable in the other inscription on the same stone, it does not follow that both decrees belong to the same time merely because they are on one stone. And anyhow *I. G.* ii, 310 refers to a peace, not a truce. Possibly 282/1.



the nominal command of the crown prince Demetrios, his son by Phila, a lad of not more than twelve or thirteen years old. This army met Alexander at a place called Derdia in Eleimiotis, beat him decisively, and invaded Epeiros; Alexander was driven from his kingdom, and all danger from that quarter was at an end for the time being.<sup>83</sup>

It was in all probability while Antigonos was engaged in the North that Sparta made one more hopeless effort to aid Athens; it is quite probable that Akrotatos and Alexander were definitely co-operating. Akrotatos, however, could command only a weak force, for he no longer had the Peloponnesian League behind him; and he never reached the Isthmus, if that was his objective. He was met by Aristodemos of Megalopolis, completely defeated, and killed in the battle.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Just. 26, 2, 11-3, 1. — Certainly Demetrios the crown prince, and not Demetrios the Fair. I have shown elsewhere (*J. H. S.* 1909, p. 265) the pains which Trogus took to distinguish people of the same name; and here we have in two consecutive paragraphs of Justin (26, 2, 11, and 3, 3), 'huius filius Demetrius' and 'Demetrium, fratrem regis Antigoni'; and I cannot undertake to say that this is not a correct copy of Trogus. — Demetrios II could have been born in 276 at the earliest. He is, it is true, called *μενράκιον*, a lad, in 247 (Plut. *Arat.* 17, probably from Phylarchos); but this must be set aside, for he was married in 253 (see ch. 12). He was therefore about thirteen, probably, in 263, and his presence with the army quite possible. Perseus held a similar 'command' at thirteen, Livy 31, 28. — Antigonos' campaign against Alexander must fall in 263; that of Demetrios may be either 263 or 262; there is no certainty. On Derdia (Euseb. 1, 243, Schoene) see Droysen<sup>2</sup> 3, 1, 238, n. 2.

<sup>84</sup> Plut. *Agis*, 3. — The date is settled by an important inscription from Delphi, published by É. Bourguet, *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 488; *Δελφοὶ ἔδωκαν Ἀρεῖ βασιλεῖ βασ[ι]λέως Ἀκροτάτου καὶ Χιλωνί(δ)ο[ς] | ἀσιλίσσης αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκγόνοι[ς] | προξενίαν προμαντείαν προ[ε]δρίαν προδικίαν ἀσυλίαν ἐ[ν] ῥγείαν, ἀρχοντος Ἐμμενίδου, βουλευόντων* (breaks off). This is Areus II; and as Emменidas' year is in all probability 260/59 (Beloch's date; see ch. 7, n. 147, and ch. 10, n. 51), Akrotatos fell in the Chremonidean war, and not somewhat later (Beloch 3, ii, 114 places his death on other grounds about 260), and Aristodemos consequently came into power at Megalopolis after the battle of Corinth, at the latest. [Pomtow in *Ath. Mitt.* 1906, p. 482, calls Emменidas 266/5, but gives no reasons; this inscription makes that date impossible, for the death of Areus I and consequent accession of Akrotatos in 264 are now well settled.] — É. Bourguet, in publishing the inscription, decides it must belong to Areus I, solely on the ground that descendants of Areus are mentioned, and Areus II died in childhood. But a grant to a man and his heirs does not import that he has any heirs, either in English or Greek; I need not labour the point. To make out his case, Bourguet has to suppose (1) a second and unknown Delphic archon Emменidas; (2) that Akrotatos, father of Areus I, who was never king, was nevertheless *called* king; (3) that, like his grandson, he married an (unknown) Chilonis (a very rare name; Pape gives two instances only); (4) that this Chilonis, though not queen, was nevertheless

It was some years before Sparta could move again, and for a time she ceased altogether to be a force in the world's politics. On the other hand, his victory gave Aristodemos a considerable increase of both prestige and power. That he was popular in Megalopolis is obvious, or he could not have fought the battle at all.<sup>85</sup> He was now able to include in his dominions a large part of Arkadia;<sup>86</sup> he adorned his city with temples;<sup>87</sup> and out of the spoils of Sparta he built a pillared hall in the market-place of Megalopolis.<sup>88</sup>

Meanwhile Antigonos had returned to Athens, and taken charge of the operations there. Whatever had been the case during the campaigning season of 263, from the winter of 263/2 the siege was vigorously pressed. No further help was to be expected. Both Sparta and Epeiros had been thoroughly beaten, and Egypt was already in 262 turning her attention elsewhere.<sup>89</sup> Athens was thrown back on herself. She must have been provisioned for such a contingency; otherwise she could never have resisted as she did. Legends clustered about the doomed city; the aged poet Philemon, who died at Piraeus during the siege, saw in a vision, the night before his death, nine maidens leaving his house, and when he asked them whither they went, the Muses replied that they must not stay to witness the fall of Athens.<sup>90</sup> Men saw in the war the end of an epoch; and it was by the mouth of one who remembered the glorious days of Demosthenes that the

*called queen.* — It is clearly Areus II, son of the Akrotatos and the Chilonis well known from Plutarch's *Pyrrhos*. — While one cannot say in which of the two years, 263 or 262, Akrotatos fell, the former is much more probable. — Paus. 8, 27, 11, and 30, 7 has a version of the defeat and death of Akrotatos at the hands of Aristodemos, in which the Akrotatos is the father of Areus I, and the Aristodemos two generations before Lydiades. If it be a mere blunder, it is a very circumstantial one. I have no idea what it means.

<sup>85</sup> He could never have withdrawn all his mercenaries from the town. It would seem, too, that to defeat Sparta he must have had the co-operation of the citizen troops.

<sup>86</sup> If the Arkadian League, formed after his death, included the same territory.

<sup>87</sup> Paus. 8, 32, 4, and 35, 5.

<sup>88</sup> Paus. 8, 30, 7.

<sup>89</sup> For the actions of Egypt see ch. 11, p. 313.

<sup>90</sup> Suidas, *Philemon*. (His death was probably in 263/2, but 264/3 is possible. The reckoning is intricate, and nothing now turns on it.) — Connected with this legend about the Muses may be the story, which rests on poor authority (Paus. 1, 30, 4), that Antigonos burnt the grove at Kolonos, which they loved (*Oed. Col.* 691).

Immortals foretold her fate to their beloved home.<sup>91</sup> The city held out to the uttermost,<sup>92</sup> but her spirit was greater than her strength; hunger did its work at the end; and some time in the winter of 262/1, four years from the commencement of the war, Athens surrendered.<sup>93</sup>

With the surrender ended, once and for all, the period during which Athens had been a political force in the world: for thirty-two years the once imperial city was to be, in fact if not always in name, a dependency of Macedonia. The war had been forced upon Antigonos against his will; and he determined, very properly from the point of view of his own kingdom, that he would see to it that, so far as possible, he should never have to fight another of the sort. Leniency he had formerly shown in plenty; but the day for leniency was past. There were no reprisals; Chremonides and Glaukon were merely sent, or allowed to escape, into exile; they found refuge in Egypt, and no doubt with them went other leaders of the national resistance.<sup>94</sup> But the city Antigonos took into his own hands. He refortified the Mouseion, and placed

<sup>91</sup> Niebuhr, *Kl. Schriften*, p. 463.

<sup>92</sup> Paus. 3, 6, 6, ἐπὶ μακρότατον.

<sup>93</sup> The material passages of Apollodoros' chronicle, with Crönert's readings, are printed Beloch 3, 2, 39 and 424; Ferguson, *Priests*, 153. — Kolbe's idea (*Archonten*, p. 40 seq.) that the year 262/1 was divided between the archons Antipatros and Arrheneides would present an arrangement without parallel, for in all the changes of government known the eponymous archon was, for obvious reasons, re-elected. In view of Ferguson's note, *Athens*, p. 182, n. 1, I need only say that it was always perfectly clear that Ferguson was right in maintaining, against Kolbe, that the year 262/1 was *not* the only possible one for Arrheneides. On Apollodoros' figures for Zeno's scholar-chate, it is a question of simple arithmetic. A. Mayer, 'Die Chronologie des Zenon und Kleantes,' *Philol.* 71, p. 211, follows Kolbe, dividing the year 262/1, but has no new reason. — The surrender. Kolbe, pp. 39-45, dates it July-Sept. 262. Ferguson formerly (*Priests*, 154), 'late fall of 262 at the earliest,' Lehmann-Haupt (*B. Ph. W.* 1906, 1265), spring or early summer 261. Ferguson now (*Athens*, 181) agrees with Lehmann-Haupt, putting it about March 261 on the strength of Polyæn. 4, 6, 10, which I think belongs elsewhere (see n. 82). All that can, I think, be said for certain is, some time in 262/1 and probably in the winter, because of 'the division of dedications to Asclepius in *I. G.* ii, 836, 36 ff., between Phileas and Calliades, the priests of Asclepius before and after the fall of Athens in 262/1 B.C.' (Ferguson, *Athens*, 181, n. 3). On this division, which I think Ferguson proved in *Priests*, see Kirchner in *B. Ph. W.* 1909, 844, 847, against Kolbe's criticism, *op. c.*, p. 6 seq.

<sup>94</sup> Teles, *περὶ φυγῆς*, p. 23 (Hense<sup>2</sup>). For other possible Athenian exiles see Ferguson, *Athens*, 188, n. 1.

a strong garrison there ;<sup>95</sup> he garrisoned all the Attic forts ;<sup>96</sup> he removed all the existing magistrates from office,<sup>97</sup> and himself, following a precedent set by his father Demetrios, nominated the new ones :<sup>98</sup> nothing remained to the people but to confirm the men of his choice. That they should belong to the pro-Macedonian party was a matter of course : and as a descendant of Demetrios of Phaleron—a man honest at any rate in his speech—was one of the new magistrates,<sup>99</sup> we see how completely the pro-Macedonian party had absorbed the extreme oligarchs. Even offices which were religious and not political, such as the priesthood of Asklepios, changed hands ;<sup>100</sup> the sole exception was the eponymous archon, Antipatros, who, in pursuance of an unbroken precedent, was retained in office, the inconvenience of any other course being glaring.<sup>101</sup> So far as form went, however, the system of administration was altered, if at all, in one respect only : it was perhaps now that the generalship for home defence was divided into two separate commands, a recognition of the fact that the Piraeus, which separated the two halves of it, had become permanently Macedonian.<sup>102</sup>

So far as form went ; for in fact the administration was reduced to insignificance. Not only were all the Antigonid

<sup>95</sup> Apollodoros, *l. c.* ; Paus. 3, 6, 6 ; cf. Euseb. 2, 120, Schoene.

<sup>96</sup> Piraeus, Mounychia, and Salamis were, and remained, in Antigonos' own hands ; *I. G.* ii, 5, 591 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 220 ; Plut. *Arat.* 34. So did Sounion, Plut. *l. c.* ; and if Sounion, probably Rhamnous also, i.e. the whole of the *χώρα ἡ παραλία* ; *I. G.* ii, 1194 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 498 and Kirchner in *Ath. Mitt.* 1907, p. 470 ; A. Wilhelm in *Εφ. Ἀρχ.* 1892, p. 147, no. 35, and *Beiträge*, no. 42. On the other hand, under Demetrios II Eleusis, Phyle, and Panakton were garrisoned by Athens with citizens and mercenaries (*I. G.* ii, 5, 614 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 192) and the strategos of Piraeus had nothing to do with them (silence of Plut. *Arat.* 34). Antigonos must have garrisoned them to start with and handed them back to Athens together with the Mouseion. — This differs somewhat from Ferguson ; see *Klio*, 9, p. 318 ; *Athens*, p. 183, n. 1.

<sup>97</sup> Apollodoros, *l. c.*

<sup>98</sup> This really follows from the fact that he governed the city through an epistates (n. 103) ; but there is express evidence for one magistracy in Hegesand. ap. Athen. 4, 167 f. Demetrios must have been nominating magistrates for some time prior to his fall in 288, for Plut. *Dem.* 46 says that on that event the Athenians voted *ἀρχοντας αἰρεῖσθαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἦν πάτριον* (read *πάτριον* with *αἰρεῖσθαι*, i.e. restoration of choice by lot ; the statement about *ἐπώνυμοι* rests on a mistake).

<sup>99</sup> Hegesandros, *l. c.*

<sup>100</sup> Ferguson, *Priests*, 139 seq.

<sup>101</sup> So Ferguson and Kirchner as against Kolbe ; see n. 93.

<sup>102</sup> Ferguson, *Klio*, 9, p. 318 ; *Athens*, 183.



forces in Attica placed in the hands of one strategos, who represented the former strategos of the Piraeus with enlarged powers, but Antigonos also appointed an epistates or governor of Athens itself, and apparently governed the city very much as he governed Thessalonike.<sup>103</sup> Whether the two offices were in one man's hand, or whether they were held by two different persons, cannot be ascertained; neither is it known who held either, though the strategos in command may well have been Hierokles, the former strategos of the Piraeus. This method of governing Athens worked one very important change. It would seem, from the cessation of the Athenian decrees, that the *ekklesia* can have had no initiative apart from the epistates, unless in the most purely local concerns; he may have even introduced the resolutions which they were to pass, as was done, for instance, by the epistates at Thessalonike. The only decree known to have been passed at this time at Athens was passed at Antigonos' express request. Very damaging, too, to Athens was the abolition of the right of coinage. Antigonos' silver tetradrachms—the type with Pan's head on a Macedonian shield—replaced at Athens the well-known coins which for so long had carried the city goddess and her owl far and wide over the world. Coins were still struck at Athens, but not her own; she was henceforth a Macedonian mint, and struck Antigonos' tetradrachms. Athens' commercial supremacy had long been a vanishing tradition; the loss of her coinage may have given it the final blow.<sup>104</sup>

It was indeed the end of an epoch; and it was marked in

<sup>103</sup> I apprehend that Apollodoros' words, τὰς ἀρχὰς [ἀντιγνήσθ]αι καὶ πᾶν ἐν[ί] βουλευ[ε]ιν ? ἐφ[ε]ίσθαι, import that Antigonos down to 256/5 governed Athens directly through an epistates, very much as he governed, e. g. Thessalonike (ch. 7, n. 98). Ferguson suggested that Hierokles became the strategos of Antigonos in Attica; unless he was also epistates of Athens, a possible candidate for the latter post would be Thrason of Anakai.

<sup>104</sup> Koehler's view (*Sitzungsb. d. Berl. Akad.* 1896, p. 1089; cf. Ferguson, *Athens*, 184) that Athens did continue to coin after 322, seems now admitted. But Head in his second edition, p. 378, thinks that the number of autonomous coins struck at Athens at this time was small. Note, however, that out of a hoard of eighty-six coins in Lakonia, formed about the end of the third century, no less than forty-two are Athenian tetradrachms (A. J. B. Wace, *B. S. A.* 14, 1907-8, p. 149 seq.). Antigonos' tetradrachms first appear at Athens in 261/60; it is thought that those with the calathus were struck at Athens; see ch. 7, n. 20.

dramatic fashion by the death of Zeno. He was the last among ~~the~~ heads of the great schools who, during the past forty years, had made Athens famous; with his death, all had passed into new hands. Epicurus had died in 271; Straton, the successor of Theophrastos as head of the Peripatetics, a year or two later; Polemon of the Academy in 268/7, at a great age, and his friend and successor Krates very shortly after. Zeno alone of that brilliant company had survived to witness the struggle between his two pupils and the overthrow of his home by his friend, with what feelings who can say. He was not a very old man, being only seventy-two when he died; but the story goes that he took a slight accident which happened to him to be a sign that his time was come, and ended his life by voluntary starvation. His death can be dated to some time between July and October 261,<sup>105</sup> a few months after the surrender.

For thirty-nine years he had taught at Athens; and the Athenians had recognized the worth of this stranger within their gates, and had come to hold in high honour one whom they knew to be the friend of their enemy, because they likewise knew him to be a noble man. The story that they entrusted the city keys to him for safe custody is not likely to be true. But a crown of gold and a decree of honour had been voted him during his life;<sup>106</sup> and now that he was dead the Athenians erected a bronze statue to his memory, and at Antigonos' request, conveyed through an Athenian, Thrason of Anakai, gave him a public funeral in the Kerameikos. Antigonos himself honoured and lamented his friend by quoting over him a phrase made current by Zeno's great

<sup>105</sup> Zeno died in Arrheneides' year (Apollod. *l.c.*) 261/60 (see n. 93). The Athenian decree voting him a tomb in the Kerameikos (cf. Paus. 1, 29, 15) was passed the twenty-first day of the fifth month of that year (Diog. L. 7, 10); he therefore died some time in July-October 261. He was seventy-two years old (Persaios ap. Diog. L. 7, 28; other versions can be neglected).

<sup>106</sup> That is, if the decree which we have, Diog. L. 7, 10-12, be really composed of two decrees (Beloch 3, 1, 466, n. 3; see Susemihl 1, 54, n. 186); it does not appear how a gold crown could have been voted to him after death. But the bulk of the document we have certainly represents the genuine decree passed after his death. It is rated highly, but not too highly, by Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, p. 232. It is extraordinary that any one ever thought it a forgery; only a man touched by strong feeling could have written the preamble.

rival ; with Zeno, he said, he had 'lost his audience'.<sup>107</sup> The things he had had to do were not always of a nature to be popular with the gallery ; but Zeno had understood, and if his approval were won, what mattered the others ? But none but Athens could have paid to the dead Phoenician the tribute of the beautiful words that have come down to us. Antigonos' friend, Thrason of Anakai, who drafted the decree whereby Athens honoured the dead, after recalling the many years which Zeno had spent in the service of philosophy and the insistency with which he had always urged the young to strive after virtue and temperance, said simply, 'He made his life a pattern to all ; for he followed his own teaching.'<sup>108</sup>

<sup>107</sup> Diog. L. 7, 15, λέγεται . . . εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀντίγονον, οἶον εἶη θέατρον ἀπολωλεκώς. *A priori*, one distrusts the genuineness of such remarks. But of this one there can be no doubt ; not merely because it is from Antigonos of Karystos (Wilamowitz, *l. c.*, 232, who accepts it on this ground), but because it is virtually a quotation from Epicurus, who said (the Greek equivalent of) 'satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus' (fr. 208, Usener) ; a philosopher need not play to the gallery or seek the applause of the mob (πρὸς ὄχλον καὶ θέατρον, Ps. Plat. *Axiocl.*, p. 370 D ; see Hense, *Teles*<sup>2</sup>, p. lxx) ; it is enough if another philosopher approve him ; such a one is audience enough. Antigonos may also have had in mind Plat. *Polit.* 260 C, the king himself is not a θεατής, one of the audience, the implication being that he must have an audience. — It is a pity that one has to change the metaphor in English.

<sup>108</sup> Παράδειγμα τὸν ἴδιον βίον ἐκθεῖς ἅπασιν, ἀκόλουθον ὄντα τοῖς λόγοις οἷς διελέγετο.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE LOST YEARS

To write any real history of the eight years from 261 to 253 is frankly impossible. All connected tradition is lost; even the Athenian inscriptions fail utterly until after 256/5; the meaning, and often the date, of each isolated event is a subject of controversy. All that can be done is to note certain points, and indicate what seems, on present materials, to be the likeliest method of joining them together. But the attempt has to be made; and no one will take the result, however expressed, to be other than largely hypothetical.

The preceding narrative has carried the story down to the surrender of Athens. So far as Antigonos was concerned, this ended the war; it demonstrated that, on land, he had completely mastered the formidable coalition formed against him. The principal members of that coalition had been Athens, Sparta, Epeiros, and Egypt; and his measures for dealing with Athens have already been described. With Sparta he had no measures to take; the Peloponnesian League had broken up, and peace would be Sparta's most urgent need for some years. But he had to settle with Epeiros; and Demetrios' victory and Alexander's flight from his kingdom had put him in a position to exact what terms he pleased. After Pyrrhos' death he had been scrupulously considerate; he had taken no compensation either in men, money, or territory. But it was clear now that he could not risk another attack of the sort from behind; and he knew that so long as the gorge of the Aoos, the famous 'Narrows' which formed the portal of Macedonia on the north-west and were compared to Tempe,<sup>1</sup> was in Epeiot hands, there could be no certainty of lasting peace. It is possible that he actually

<sup>1</sup> See ch. 9, n. 15.



now governed Epeiros for a little while; at any rate it must have been at this time that he restored the ancient boundaries of Macedonia, and gave back to her, not only Parauaia and Tymphaia,<sup>2</sup> but also Atintania,<sup>3</sup> which had belonged to Kassandros though not to Demetrios. The possession of this latter province drove a wedge between Epeiros and Illyria and gave Antigonos access to the Adriatic; and it also gave him the Aeos pass, the key to his own kingdom. To secure the pass, he founded his second name-city, Antigoneia on the Aeos,<sup>4</sup> doubtless as the seat of the strategos of the new province. Epeiros never troubled Macedonia again.

The settlement with Epeiros no doubt took place in 262/1, or at latest in the year after. There remains to be considered

<sup>2</sup> Beloch places the recovery of these two provinces of Macedonia after Pyrrhos' death (3, 2, 315, a full discussion). But I cannot reconcile a dismemberment of Epeiros with Antigonos' other actions at that time; I therefore place the recovery here, for I think Beloch has shown it cannot be later.

<sup>3</sup> So Niese 2, 238; and see ch. 13, p. 368, where Antigonos has a garrison at a point on the Adriatic coast. — Beloch (3, 2, 316-17) believed that Atintania was still Epeirot in 229, and that consequently Antigoneia on the Aeos was founded by Pyrrhos. This is important. The question turns on the meaning of Polyb. 2, 5. That the beaten Epeirots fly *ὡς ἐπ' Ἀτιντάνων* shows, not that Atintania was theirs, but that it might provide a refuge of some sort. That the Epeirots had previously detached a corps *παραφυλάξοντας τὴν Ἀντιγόνοιαν* does not prove that Antigoneia belonged to them; for *παραφυλάττειν* or *παραφυλάττεσθαι* in Polybios does not as a rule mean, as Beloch says, 'zum Schutz gegen Feinde besetzt halten' (I only know one possible instance, 4, 73, 1), but means simply 'to keep an eye on'. As this is the real point, I must prove it. Polyb. 4, 3, 7, Dorimachos is sent by the Aetolians *παραφυλάξων τὴν τε χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Φιγαλέων*. The sequel shows that he was only a Resident, without any troops. 5, 92, 8, Aratos raises 1,100 men *παραφυλάττεσθαι* Messenia, the Argolid, and the territory of Megalopolis and Tegea, while with the picked troops of Achaea and their mercenaries he intends *τηρεῖν* those parts of Achaea exposed to Aetolia; i. e. with a large force he guards a small territory, with a tiny force he 'keeps an eye on' half the Peloponnese. 18, 3, 11, and 4, 6, Alexander Isios asks Philip *διὰ τί . . . κατὰσχοι φρουρὰ τὴν πόλιν* (Lysimacheia)—why he garrisoned it. Philip replies, 'My men were not garrisoning it, as you allege; they were keeping an eye on it,' *παραφυλάττοντας*. 7, 3, 9, *παραφυλάττον (τινα) ὡς πολέμιον*, 'kept watch on'; 1, 36, 9, *παραφυλάττον τὸν ἐπιπλοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων*, 'watched for'; 7, 16, 7, to be on one's guard against reinforcements; 16, 14, 10, to be on one's guard against certain writers; 2, 58, 2, to watch over the freedom of a town. — I hope this is enough to show that there is no reason for believing that Antigoneia on the Aeos was anything but an Antigonid foundation.

<sup>4</sup> Antigoneia, no. 1 in Steph. Byz.; cf. Pliny, *N. H.* 4, 1 (1) Antigonenses. Whether its territory technically belonged to Chaonia (Steph.) or Atintania (Polyb. 2, 5) is not material; it is part of what Antigonos took.

the last and most important member of the coalition, Egypt ; and here it will be necessary to go back a little and explain the cause of Egypt's inaction toward the end of the siege of Athens, an inaction which may seem to have been no less contrary to her self-interest than derogatory to her honour. For Egypt, unlike Sparta and Epeiros, had not been defeated by Antigonos. She had not suffered in the war ; on her had fallen none of the fighting. She had made war by deputy ; when the process failed, she simply withdrew. The cause of her withdrawal seems merely to have been that a more promising opening had presented itself elsewhere.

It must be borne in mind that the Chremonidean war was Arsinoë's war ;<sup>5</sup> she had intended to employ the forces of Egypt for the purpose of forwarding her son's claim to the throne of Macedonia. Had she lived, her extraordinary energy might have given the struggle another aspect. But Arsinoë was dead and comfortably deified ; and though the train which she had commenced to lay was laid and exploded, so much cold water had been thrown on it in the interval that the explosion, so far as Egypt went, was rather a damp affair. It was not in human nature that Philadelphos, with sons of his own, should continue to be so greatly concerned for the son of Arsinoë ; and no doubt there was a strong party at court engaged in urging on him the claims of the rightful heir, and suggesting that the venerable goddess, lately deceased, had not said the last word on Egyptian policy. Egypt, it was argued, need not greatly concern herself with Macedonia ; Antigonos' navy was a negligible quantity, and he was likely to remain too fully occupied on land to think of challenging Egypt's possession of the sea. But the military power of half Asia was not a negligible quantity, and Antiochos was only too likely to use the first opportunity of challenging Egypt's possession of Hollow Syria, a province which Antiochos claimed as his of right, and which was vital to the wealth and prosperity of Egypt ; was it not the gateway of much of the trade of inner Asia ? Egypt's true policy was to keep her eyes firmly fixed on this danger-point, and to take every opportunity of weakening

<sup>5</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214, l. 17.

Antiochos, whose resources, unwieldy and scattered as they were, were nevertheless very great.

Ptolemy himself must, as will appear, have inclined to this view; and some time in 263/2 the opportunity offered itself. Philetairos of Pergamon, who after Lysimachos' death had established his independence, but had always remained on excellent terms with Antiochos I, died, either in 263 or 262; and his nephew and successor, Eumenes I, made a prompt change in his relationship with the king of Syria. How the war between these two started, we do not know; but it must have broken out almost at once. Eumenes was wealthy, and no doubt followed the usual course of hiring Gauls; but Gauls were equally at Antiochos' service, and the great disparity in the strength of the two shows that Eumenes must have had some further foundation for his confidence. As Antiochos was on very good terms with Antigonos, Eumenes naturally turned to Egypt;<sup>6</sup> no doubt he had arranged matters with Egypt beforehand, possibly even before Philetairos was dead; for the war must have followed very promptly on his accession. Athens was left to endure her death agony unaided; there was something better now for Patroklos to do than to levy toll on fishing-boats in order to send Antigonos presents. The allies won prompt success, for a Seleukid mobilization was a slow matter; these kings were rarely able to bring their strength to bear till a war had been some little while in progress. Eumenes on land penetrated as far as Sardis, and there defeated Antiochos in open field under the walls of the great fortress.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile the Egyptian fleet, waging a war of limited liability (for Antiochos had no fleet to speak of), swept the coast northward from its base at Samos; and several of the Ionian towns, including not only Miletos but the great city and seaport of Ephesos,

<sup>6</sup> Important in this respect is the foundation of Philetairos or Eumenes I of the Philetaireia at Delos, the first vase of which appears under Elpines, 262 (Schulhof in *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 106). It can only have been founded by a friend of Egypt; and the same applies to the other associations of Eumenes I and Delos, e.g. his statue there (Homolle, *Archives*, 61) and the setting up at Delos of *O. G. I.* 266. He went there under Egypt's shield.

<sup>7</sup> Strab. 13, 624.

fell into Egyptian hands.<sup>8</sup> All these cities had once belonged to Lysimachos, and had passed to Seleukos after Kouroupedion; and it is likely that they all contained elements hostile to the rule of the Seleukid, men who were prepared to welcome, as successor to Lysimachos' rights, the country of which Lysimachos' son was now co-regent.<sup>9</sup>

When the good understanding between Antiochos and Antigonos is considered, it is natural to ask whether Egypt, in withdrawing from Europe in order to support Eumenes in Asia, was not really acting both in her own defence and in loyalty to her allies; that is to say, whether in 263 Antiochos was not preparing to intervene on Antigonos' behalf, making the struggle world wide. But it seems impossible to support this view; for Eumenes was clearly the aggressor. Had Antiochos been preparing to intervene on behalf of his brother-in-law, he would not have been caught so entirely unprepared.

Antiochos did not long survive his defeat; he died at some time in 262/1, and was succeeded by his son Antiochos II. This king's accession was followed by a general peace.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Ionia was not acquired by Egypt in the first Syrian war, as its omission in Theoc. 17, 86-90 shows; and Ephesos was Seleukid near the end of the reign of Antiochos I, Michel 486. At the same time Ephesos and Miletos were Egyptian at some time prior to the revolt of Ptolemaios son of Lysimachos in 258; and I agree with Beloch that they can only have been taken in Eumenes' war (3, I, 614, n. 1). See generally, on Egypt and Ionia, Beloch 3, 2, 271 to 276.

<sup>9</sup> See App. 7, pp. 445, 446, on this identification.

<sup>10</sup> The Delian choragic inscriptions open as a rule with the formula ἐπὶ τοῦ δέϊνα ἄρχοντος ὑγίεια καὶ εὐετηρία ἐγένετο. Of the fifteen known prior to 1908, eight show this formula (six in *B. C. H.* 1883, p. 103 seq., one in *B. C. H.* 9, p. 146, and one in *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 142, no. 42); five are broken away, or mere fragments (three in *B. C. H.* 1883, p. 103 seq., and two in *B. C. H.* 1905, p. 515, no. 170, and p. 520, no. 174; see E. Schulhof in *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 58); and two have no formulae at all (in *B. C. H.* 1883, p. 103). But recently two exceptions have been published: one by Schulhof in *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 57, no. 10, a fragment of the year of the archon Paches (255 Homolle), in which the formula reads [ὑγίεια εὐε]τηρία εἰρήνη ἐγένετο; the other by Dürrbach in *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 36, no. 17, of Tharsynon's year (261 Homolle), with the formula ὑγίεια εἰρήνη πλοῦτος ἐγένετο. Dürrbach thinks that these two formulae do not represent real historic events. This will be settled if other similar inscriptions are found showing εἰρήνη in the formula; but on the material before us to-day I cannot treat it as a mere coincidence that out of ten such inscriptions with formulae preserved two mention 'peace', and that these two coincide in date, one with the surrender of Athens, the other with the withdrawal by Antigonos of his garrison from the Mouseion. (On the adoption in this book of Homolle's dates for the Delian archons of Antigonos' reign,



Athens had just fallen, and Antigonos was quite ready for a peace that should secure to him both what he had won and the opportunity of quietly carrying out the necessary reorganization at Athens and elsewhere. Egypt had nothing more to fight for in Europe, and had compensated herself for her loss of prestige in Greece by her territorial acquisitions in Asia. Antiochos II was not ready for war; he had losses to repair, but he needed time. A general cessation of hostilities between the three Powers followed.<sup>11</sup> Antigonos, as was natural in view of his success, was the one to benefit most; for one term of the peace between himself and Egypt seems to have been that Ptolemy should cease to support the claim of Lysimachos' son to the throne of Macedonia.<sup>12</sup> As Antigonos, who could not reach Ptolemy, could never have enforced such a stipulation, it must be supposed that it was a condition pleasing to Ptolemy himself; it gave him a good excuse for ridding himself of Arsinoe's son and restoring his own son to the second place in the empire. And Ptolemy

see App. 11.) There is no *a priori* difficulty in a reference to a real peace in such an inscription; see *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 140, a long inscription from Delphi containing accounts of the *ναοποιοί*, divided into archon years, where one section, the archon year of Damoxenos, is distinguished by the added words (l. 71), *ἐπεὶ ἀ εἰρήνη ἐγένετο* (346, Dittenberger). And a very striking parallel to the Delian inscriptions has recently come to light. In *Musée Belge*, vol. xv, 1911, pp. 256, 257, P. Graindor published a new inscription from Tenos, an archon list divided into columns. Col. 1 he assigns to the beginning of the second century B. C. This column runs in two-line paragraphs, the first line giving the archon's name and patronymic, the second his tribe. But *one* name has an accompanying statement. After the name in ll. 7 and 8, . . . *ἄμος Σίμων* [φυλ]ῆς *Θρυησίδος*, we read (ll. 9 to 11) [Ἐπὶ] *τούτου ἦν [ὕγι]εια, εἰρήνη, εὐε[τηρ]ία, εὐνομία*. The addition of these words to *one* name in a mere list of names must surely represent a real fact. — I conclude therefore that we have to reckon with two 'peaces' at this time, one in 261 and one in 255 (262 and 256 being also possible), each of which affected Delos in some way (precisely as the end of the Sacred War affected Delphi); that is to say, Ptolemy II, the master of Delos, must in each case have been one of the parties to the peace. If this be well founded, the fragmentary events of 261 to 256 must be marshalled afresh accordingly. — See Addenda.

<sup>11</sup> If Ptolemy had remained at war with *one* great Power, Delos could hardly have emphasized 'peace'.

<sup>12</sup> A deduction from the virtual banishment of Lysimachos' son which followed. Ferguson, *Athens*, 189, supposes that Antigonos stipulated that he should be removed from the *co-regency*. This is on his supposition that the peace fell *circa* 259. If it is 261, this cannot be; for according to the Revenue papyrus the co-regency lasted two years longer, till 259/8, which I take to be the date of Ptolemaios' revolt at Ephesos. — For another possible term of this peace, see p. 320 and ch. 10, n. 51.

did in fact rid himself most effectually of Ptolemaios by appointing him to the governorship of Ephesos and the other Egyptian acquisitions in Ionia, which had once belonged to his father Lysimachos.

The peace lasted but a little while. It seems to have been in 259 that the wars between the three great Powers blazed out again, though it is quite possible that hostilities had even commenced the year before. The ashes of the Chremonidean war may have never ceased to smoulder ; while it cannot be a coincidence that Ptolemaios at Ephesos revolted and was deprived of the co-regency in the same year (259/8) which saw the activity of Demetrios the Fair at Cyrene. As Ptolemaios can only have revolted with Antiochos' support, as Antiochos was friendly to Antigonos, and as Athens was simmering with discontent, the most probable view to take is that by 259 Antiochos II had completed his preparations and was ready to attempt the recovery of what his father had lost, and that coincidently with the outbreak of his war with Egypt, which is sometimes called the second Syrian, came fresh hostilities, of a sort, between Egypt and Antigonos, or rather between their respective friends, probably started by the intrigues or supposed intrigues of Egypt at Athens. The two wars lasted down to about 256 ; but the central problem, whether Antiochos and Antigonos were definitely co-operating, is one at present incapable of solution. They could only have aided each other indirectly, in any case, as the Egyptian fleet would have absolutely hindered communication ; but, though evidence is wanting, we may suspect that they had at least a good understanding.<sup>13</sup> A connected narrative of the two wars is not possible ; all that can be done is to mention a number of events which belong to this period, 259-256, but which cannot be properly ordered in chronological sequence.

Antiochos II appears in the tradition as a drunken sot, and his ministers figure as something worse ; but in fact what can be made out of his actions at this time shows that his government was capable and energetic ; and once the war began he waged it with vigour and success, bringing up large forces

<sup>13</sup> The sort of *entente*, falling short of *συνμαχία*, which was known as *ἁμόνοια*.

from the eastern provinces of his huge empire. He found an unexpectedly in Lysimachos' son. Ptolemaios saw that, as the result of the Chremonidean war, all chance of the throne of Macedonia was lost to him for ever. He also understood that he had virtually been banished from Alexandria to the government of a by no means extensive set of possessions, while Philadelphos' own son, afterwards Ptolemy III, was back in favour at court.<sup>14</sup> He determined to do what he could for himself, and with Antiochos' aid he declared himself independent of Egypt. His counsellor was an Aetolian soldier of fortune named Timarchos, who was probably an officer in the Ptolemaic service governing for him in Miletos. The garrisons of the towns under Ptolemaios' control naturally consisted of mercenaries who had either taken the oath to him personally or were won over; and Antiochos sent him some Thracians to stiffen his men. Timarchos, too, was a man of energy; he crossed from Asia to some populous island, probably Samos, and compelled his men to victory by adopting Agathokles' stratagem of burning his boats.<sup>15</sup>

But Lysimachos' son did not long enjoy his new power. ~~His tenure of it may indeed have been very brief, for it does not appear that Egypt moved against him; but of course the record is too broken to speak with certainty. The Thracians plotted his overthrow; he fled to the temple of Artemis with his mistress Irene, where both were cut down; the city was handed over to Antiochos. Timarchos seized the reins in Miletos and made himself tyrant; the Milesians were well plundered to pay his mercenaries; and when Antiochos succeeded in overthrowing him, the grateful citizens deified the king of Asia, who was thenceforth known as Antiochos the god.~~<sup>16</sup> The rest of the Ptolemaic possessions in Ionia fell to

<sup>14</sup> This really follows from his betrothal to Magas' daughter Berenike just before Magas' death. On the date see App. 9.

<sup>15</sup> Ptolemaios' revolt, Trog. *Prol.* 26. Timarchos aids the revolt, *ib.*; rules at Miletos, App. *Syr.* 65; crosses to (?) Samos, Frontin. 3, 2, 11; burns his boats, Polyæn. 5, 25. The Thracians, Athen. 13, 593 b, would naturally be recruited by the power that controlled the Thracian coast.

<sup>16</sup> Ptolemaios' death, Athen. *l. c.* Timarchos' overthrow; App. *Syr.* 65; *O. G. I.* 226. The Timarchos who appears in an inscription of Miletos as minister of Antiochos Epiphanes might be his grandson.

Antiochos with the two great cities. The Egyptian fleet apparently did nothing; it was probably engaged in trying to retake Samos, but at any rate the Egyptian admiral was in a dilemma; he could neither aid the rebel Timarchos to resist Antiochos, nor the enemy Antiochos to put down Timarchos; and he certainly could not storm a city like Miletos in defiance of both. The whole affair was probably over at latest by about 256;<sup>17</sup> Egypt had sustained a shrewd blow, and with the death of Ptolemaios there vanished the last of the pretenders to the crown of Macedonia.

Meanwhile Ptolemy had not been altogether idle in Europe. Probably one of his first acts in the war was the restoration of Alexander to the throne of Epeiros.<sup>18</sup> Alexander, driven out of his kingdom by Antigonos' son Demetrios, had taken refuge in Akarnania; the motive of this step is obscure, for he had apparently just treated the country very badly. It is not known, however, on what terms he held it. If by garrisons and the strong hand, his action is explicable. If, on the other hand, he were titular head of the Akarnanian League, somewhat as Antigonos was of the Thessalian League, his action must perhaps be referred to the strong national feeling of the Akarnanians against Aetolia; the Macedonian king, Aetolia's friend, was perhaps actually ruling in Epeiros, and that part of Akarnania which was not Aetolian may have considered that Alexander's rule was preferable to any of the apparent alternatives. His restoration to the throne of Epeiros was no doubt a gain to Ptolemy; but both his prestige and his country's power were much impaired, and he was in no condition to attack Antigonos again.

At Athens, even under the rule of a powerful Macedonian

<sup>17</sup> It cannot be said how long Ptolemaios, and Timarchos after him, maintained themselves; the 'terminus post quem non' is the peace of 255.

<sup>18</sup> Justin 26, 3, 1. It is of course quite uncertain how long Alexander's 'exile'—i.e. his rule in Akarnania alone—lasted. Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 181, n. 1, thought that he was restored to Epeiros before the peace which concluded the Chremonidean war. This is quite possible; what has decided me to place the event later is, that Alexander's defeat by Demetrios most probably fell in 262, and from then till after peace was made Egypt was fully occupied elsewhere. She abandoned Athens; would she have interfered in Epeiros?



governor, things were not altogether quiet. The war party, the nationalists, may still have been strong in the city; and at some date that cannot be very long after 261, and should therefore belong to this war of 259, some of the extreme members were again intriguing—or were accused of intriguing—with Egypt. Let Egypt act as she would, nothing could alter the fact that she alone held in her hand the two things needful, corn and gold. This time Antigonos took strong measures; Philochoros, seer and historian, was executed for treason,<sup>19</sup> and it is not likely that he was the only person implicated. The history of the city for the next thirty years would appear to show that it had been very thoroughly purged; and no doubt any strong members of the war party who yet remained were banished. As the war party would include some of the best and most capable citizens, Athens must have been weakened in the process; and her later history shows that she never really recovered from the crushing blows she had received. Material prosperity, a kind of freedom, a continued supremacy in philosophy—these were yet to be hers; but never again, save perhaps in Sulla's siege, were men at Athens to know the glory of having struggled to the uttermost, even though in vain.

Histiaia in Euboea seems to have managed to retain its independence for a year or two after the fall of Athens; its hieromnemes appear at Delphi down to 259 or 258. Possibly its independence had been one of the conditions of the peace of 261; but during the present war, whether conquered or otherwise, it seems to have fallen into line with the rest of Euboea and again become subject to Antigonos.<sup>20</sup>

Antigonos had in the late war restored the old bounds of Macedonia in almost every direction. But Paionia was still independent, and thrust a great block of alien territory down the course of the chief river of Macedonia, the Axios. How and when Antigonos acquired Paionia is quite obscure; it may have been either at this time, or perhaps after the war with Alexander of Corinth; probably the country joined one

<sup>19</sup> Suidas, *Philochoros*.—<sup>1</sup>This shows it was not long after 261.

<sup>20</sup> The town appears with an Amphiktyonic vote till 260/59 (259/8 is also possible); see ch. 10, n. 51.

of the coalitions formed against Antigonos, just as Audoleon had joined the coalition of 288 against Demetrios. It is almost certain, however, that its re-absorption by Macedonia belongs to some period in the reign of Gonatas; for the coins show that Dropion left no successor, and he cannot well have reigned till the time of Antigonos Doson. It may therefore be mentioned here for completeness. The country had more than once belonged to Macedonia, and rounded that kingdom off with a very important acquisition of territory along its northern frontier. For the seat of the strategos of the new province Antigonos founded his third name-city, Antigoneia on the Axios; it was somewhat south of Stoboi, and no doubt commanded the entrance to the 'Iron Gates', the pass through which the Axios flowed, and which gave access from Paionia to Macedonia.<sup>21</sup> Whether Antigonos pushed still farther to the north-east, and brought the country of the Agrianes under his rule, is quite unknown. They had once, for a time, been incorporated in Macedonia; but all that can be said for certain is that they were independent in the time of Antigonos Doson.<sup>22</sup>

Very early in the war—probably in 259—an opportunity presented itself to Antigonos of inflicting considerable, if indirect, damage upon Ptolemy. An actual attack on him without a strong fleet was not possible; but the occasion that now offered itself was one of promise. Cyrene had never taken kindly to Egyptian rule; and it has already been related how Magas, who governed Cyrene for Egypt down to 274, rebelled in that year and, in concert with Antiochos I, brought on the struggle known as the first Syrian war. Magas must

<sup>21</sup> Pliny, *N. H.* 4, 10 (17); Peutinger table; not in Steph. Byz. The town is not in Droysen's well-known list, though given by Beloch 3, 1, 372; but Pliny is quite clear, 'oppidum Stobi, mox Antigonea, Europus ad Axium amnem'; he follows the river down. — This foundation and the cessation of the Paionian kings are the evidence for Paionia again becoming Macedonian. It must have happened in Gonatas' reign; if in Doson's, Dropion must have reigned at least fifty years; this is almost impossible, for he began by reorganizing a country shattered by the Gauls, and cannot well have been a very young man at the time. — On the pass see Strabo 7, 329, fr. 4; Oberhummer, 'Axios' in *P. W.*

<sup>22</sup> They appear as a separate force in Doson's army at Sellasia. But it is possible that their country became subject to Gonatas and lost again on the death of Demetrios II.

have had the support of the strong party in Cyrene that was hostile to the Egyptian connexion ; and the result of the war, so far as the Cyrenaica was concerned, was that the country practically won its independence ; Magas was recognized as king, subject to some sort of vague Egyptian overlordship. He was a half-brother of Ptolemy II, being a son of Berenike by her first marriage ; and his wife Apame, a daughter of Antiochos I and Stratonike, was not only sister of Antiochos II but niece of Antigonos.<sup>23</sup> Magas died at some time shortly after the taking of Athens by Antigonos, probably in 259,<sup>24</sup> leaving no son to succeed him, but an only daughter Berenike, who cannot well have been more than fourteen years old at the time. It seems that, when he knew his end was at hand, he felt a desire to terminate all cause of quarrel between the two kingdoms, and betrothed Berenike to the eldest son of Ptolemy II, afterwards Ptolemy III : <sup>25</sup> a circumstance that shows that this Ptolemy was at the time considered certain to be the successor to the throne of Egypt, and that Arsinoë's son, if not yet actually in revolt, was looked upon as discarded by his appointment as governor of the Ionian towns, as he seems himself to have recognized.

The betrothal of Berenike to the heir of the throne of Egypt did not suit either the nationalist party in Cyrene or the queen-mother Apame. It is evident that there were two parties in the country ; and as the projected marriage was pleasing to the party that favoured Egypt, Apame naturally turned to her own people. Doubtless with the approval of the anti-Egyptian or nationalist party, she sent to Antigonos, offering Berenike's hand and kingdom to his half-brother Demetrios the Fair ; as he was a grandson of Ptolemy I through his mother Ptolemais, it was doubtless thought that this might weigh with the philo-Egyptian opposition. Demetrios started at once ; a fair wind and a swift ship enabled him to evade any Egyptian cruisers ; he reached Cyrene in safety. The traditional version of what happened is somewhat as follows. Though a capable soldier, Demetrios lost no time, once Antigonos' hand was removed, in showing that

<sup>23</sup> Paus. 1, 7, 3.<sup>24</sup> See App. 9.<sup>25</sup> Just. 26, 3, 2.

he was a son of the Besieger in other things beside military ability. He began with a successful campaign against Egypt in Libya; <sup>26</sup> but after this he treated the court of Cyrene with contempt and the troops with despotic harshness; he also slighted the little Berenike, and made love to her mother Apame, who was not much older than himself and was attracted by his good looks. The result was that the Egyptian party in Cyrene, under the lead of Berenike, rose against him and slew him in Apame's bedchamber; Berenike secured that her mother's life should be spared.<sup>27</sup>

But all the details of this story are absolutely untrustworthy, as Justin's moral embellishments usually are. Demetrios was already the father of a son who was to be the greatest statesman of his age; and it is not at all likely that the father of Antigonos Doson was politically incapable. The only facts for which good evidence exists are, that Demetrios became king of Cyrene and died,<sup>28</sup> and that Berenike, when a small girl, did *something* which a court poet could call extraordinary and speak of as removing some obstacle to her future marriage with Ptolemy III.<sup>29</sup> As it is quite certain from contemporary evidence that Demetrios never married Berenike,<sup>30</sup> who was the legitimate heiress to the throne, and as it is equally certain that he was for a time king of Cyrene, it is clear that what he really did do was to execute a *coup d'État*,<sup>31</sup> with the support of the nationalist party and no

<sup>26</sup> Demetrios' Libyan war, Euseb. Schoene I, 237 *ὅς καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν Λιβύην ἐλαβε*, of course with the inevitable confusion with Demetrios II.

<sup>27</sup> Just. 26, 3, 3-8.

<sup>28</sup> Doson's inscriptions, in which he calls himself son of *King* Demetrios, show that he was king somewhere; *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 94 (the Sellasia Inscription from Delos); *B. C. H.* 1896, p. 135, from Mantinea. (That this last is correctly filled up by Fougères is shown, not only by Polyb. 5, 9, 10, but by another Doson inscription published by H. J. W. Tillyard and A. J. B. Wace, *B. S. A.* No. xi, p. 111, no. 11, from Geraki; *Βασιλέως Ἀντιγόγου Σωτήρος*.) The place of which he was king was Cyrene; Plut. *Dem.* 53, *Trog. Prol.* 26, Euseb. Schoene I, 237.

<sup>29</sup> Catull. 66 (= Kallimachos), ll. 26-8. Berenike's independence of character is also shown by the story in Ael. *V. H.* 14, 43. If the statue at Athens, figured by Svoronos, *Journ. Intern.* 1, 228 and *πίναξ 1'*, be really Berenike in middle age, as he suggests, she had a masculine and determined face.

<sup>30</sup> Catull. 66, l. 14, 'virginis exuviis.'

<sup>31</sup> One could have guessed this from Trogus 26, 'occupato regno.' One of the many difficulties into which Beloch has fallen by displacing the date



doubt of Apame, who saw her way to being again queen; thereupon the Egyptian party removed him by assassination, with Berenike's privity. It is not the only case in history where an event whose mainspring was political has been turned into a story of passion; it may be added that it is by no means certain that Demetrios was ever even betrothed to Berenike. It is certain, however, that with his death a considerable opportunity was lost to Antigonos.

Demetrios' death probably occurred in 258, not long after the revolt of Lysimachos' son at Ephesos. It formed a set-off to the death of the Egyptian claimant to the Macedonian throne, and it brought to Egypt a very real gain of power. For Cyrene, for a little while, now came (it seems) substantially under Ptolemy's rule. The friends of Egypt, who had killed Demetrios, threw themselves and their country into Ptolemy's arms, perhaps from fear of the nationalists and Antigonos; and though Berenike was queen in name, she was betrothed to Ptolemy's son, and Ptolemy made him in the meantime the real ruler of the country, with the name of king, working of course in Egypt's interest.<sup>32</sup> This advantage undoubtedly made it more easy for Egypt to negotiate. For things had not been going any too well with Egypt in Asia. Not merely had Antiochos recovered Ionia, but he had succeeded in occupying Pamphylia and that part of Kilikia which had previously belonged to Egypt,<sup>33</sup> and had managed to slip transports across the narrow sea and capture Samothrake,<sup>34</sup> important as a religious centre. Egypt seems to have retaken Samos,<sup>35</sup> but that was all. In Asia she had been

of Demetrios' death is that he has to make *Demetrios* summon Ekdemos and Demophanes and give Cyrene freedom (3, 1, 640). See App. 9.

<sup>32</sup> See App. 9 for all this.

<sup>33</sup> This seems to follow from this, that Pamphylia and (part of) Kilikia were Ptolemaic *circ.* 270 (Theoc. 17, 88), while Ptolemy III *conquered* them (*O. G. I.* 54, l. 15). The only alternative would be, that Ptolemy II gave them as part of Berenike's dower, which is not likely. See generally Beloch 3, 2, 263 seq., who, however, discredits alike *O. G. I.* 54 and the Seleukid conquest.

<sup>34</sup> This follows from Antiochos II setting up *O. G. I.* 225 there in 253; see *I. G.* xii, 8, p. 38. Of course the possessions of Samothrake on the mainland were at his mercy.

<sup>35</sup> *B. M. Inscr.* iii, 403 does not, I think, show that Samos was for a time Seleukid, as Niese 2, 135, n. 8, and Beloch 3, 2, 276, thought. The mention

definitely weakened, and must have realized that she had undertaken more than she could carry through, and that a genuine peace would be desirable. Antiochos may have been willing enough to make peace, provided that it secured to him his considerable conquests. The result was the peace of 255 (or perhaps 256),<sup>36</sup> which must, so far as concerns Ptolemy and Antiochos, have been a peace between them on the basis of the *status quo*. How far the peace reached is not known; but undoubtedly it included Antigonos. For though the new war between Egypt and Macedonia had only been waged by the friends of each, still the execution of Philochoros shows clearly enough that the two principals were on terms of hostility, even though they could not reach each other; and subsequent events, notably the actions of Antigonos at Athens and in regard to Bithynia, prove that he must have been a party to the treaty, quite apart from the fact that a Delian inscription could hardly emphasize 'peace' if Ptolemy still remained at war with Macedonia.

Antigonos had now a very different position from any that he had ever heretofore occupied. He had gained heavily by these ten years of war. He had restored, or was in the way to restore, to Macedonia the most extended boundaries that she had ever known; but, more important than that, he had at last secured the loyalty of the Macedonian people. The steady work of years had borne fruit; save in a few cases near the Epeiros frontier, his people had supported him loyally, and he had even been able to entrust the end of the struggle with Alexander to an army with which he himself was not present. He might at last consider himself firm on the throne. Long, too, as his two wars had lasted, they had probably exhausted Macedonia less than would have been the case with many other countries, seeing how self-contained and self-supporting it was; and though the Macedonian

of Antiochos II in ll. 132 and 151 is a mere method of dating, and a natural one, since Priene was also concerned. See Bevan, *House of Seleucus*, I, 175, n. 4.

<sup>36</sup> See n. 10. Without a peace Antiochos could never have retained Samothrake. Those who make its loss to Egypt a result of the battle of Kos have never explained why it should have fallen to Antiochos and not to Antigonos.

troops had been compelled to fight three considerable battles, each had been a decisive victory, and their losses may not have been great. Sparta and Epeiros had both been conclusively beaten; neither was likely to be dangerous again for years. All the pretenders to his throne were dead, unless Alexander of Epeiros can be reckoned as such, and Alexander was in no position to attack him again. Antigonos' arrangement with Aetolia had been tested by events, and had held good. Athens, and everything that Athens implied, belonged to him; and it had been demonstrated to completeness that Egypt could not herself conduct an offensive war against Macedonia. Above all, Egypt had no further claims on the Macedonian crown. In Peloponnese, Antigonos was popular in the Argolid;<sup>37</sup> and it appeared as if his friends in the peninsula were now powerful enough to hold his enemies in check. Even his system of tyrants, the weak spot in his armour, appeared to be justifying itself in the hands of Aristodemus of Megalopolis. On land, Antigonos had reached his zenith. He had laboured hard; it began to look as if he were about to enter into the fruits of his labours.

Peace then was made, and in due course the world saw the extraordinary spectacle of Antigonos and Ptolemy working hand in hand. Nikomedes of Bithynia died somewhere about this time, leaving children by two marriages and his kingdom to the younger family: anticipating that the son of his first marriage, Ziaelas, would make trouble, he named Antigonos and Ptolemy joint guardians of the infants, together with the cities of Byzantion, Herakleia, and Kios. Ziaelas of course raised an army of Gauls and invaded Bithynia; the Bithynians obtained troops from the children's guardians, and after a good deal of fighting an arrangement was come to through the mediation of Herakleia, which, however, gave Ziaelas the kingdom. The sole importance of the episode, in a history of Antigonos, is that it is the only occasion known on which Antigonos, since he became king of Macedonia, interfered in any way in Asia, and the only occasion in history, so far as

<sup>37</sup> A decree of Epidauros in his honour, *I. G.* iv, 1419. Perhaps now, perhaps after Pyrrhos' death. Gonatas and not Doson, *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 270, n. 39.



is known, on which troops of the Antigonid and the Lagid, even if only mercenaries, fought on the same side.<sup>38</sup>

The greatest gainer by the peace was, however, Athens. Antigonos, from the strong position he had achieved, felt that he could now afford to treat the beaten and weakened city with a little less severity. It has been suggested that among others who petitioned him on the subject was Aristomachos of Argos. All danger seemed over, and as soon as peace was concluded, he restored full self-government to the city; the Macedonian epistates was removed, and the garrison withdrawn from Athens herself, that is to say, from the Mouseion.<sup>39</sup> This was the garrison which pressed most severely on the city; it was constantly before all men's eyes. With the withdrawal of the Macedonian governor there was some rearrangement of commands; or, rather, a return was made to the system that had existed before the Chremonidean war. Hierokles no longer meets us; whether he was dead or superannuated cannot be said. But Piraeus, with the fort of Mounychia, was again placed in the hands of a separate strategos, who held, in addition, 'the fortresses that go with Piraeus,' Salamis and Sounion. The new strategos of Piraeus was that Herakleitos of Athmonon whom we have already met as agonothetes of the Great Panathenaia in 274 and as a zealous adherent of Antigonos. He had held some post under Antigonos in the interval; possibly he had been governor of Salamis in the years 261-255; he was popular in Salamis and perhaps in Athens, and no doubt it was considered that the Athenians would find his appointment less galling than that of a stranger.<sup>40</sup> As Hierokles before him,

<sup>38</sup> Memnon 22. — This enables a narrowing of the limits for the death of Nikomedes from some time between 264 and shortly before 247 (on the various theories, R. Herzog, *Ath. Mitt.* 30, 1905, 173 seq.), to some time in the period when Antigonos and Ptolemy were really at peace, *circ.* 255-253.

<sup>39</sup> Paus. 3, 6, 6 for the fact. The date is from Eusebios, and is confirmed by the date of the first gift made by the people of Athens to Asklepios after the war; see Ferguson, *Priests*, p. 147, n. 29; *Athens*, p. 191; Kirchner, *B. Ph. W.* 1909, 847. I do not know any ground for Ferguson's statement that the Athenians tried to get Arkesilaos to intercede for them with the king; but he may well be right that Aristomachos helped them; he did something for Athenian freedom, *I. G.* ii, 5, 371 c.

<sup>40</sup> See ch. 7, n. 160. — Decree of the Salaminians for him, *I. G.* ii, 5, 591 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 220. Beside Piraeus, he was strategos τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ταπτομένων μετὰ



he was entirely independent of Krateros at Corinth, and responsible directly to the king. In his hand were the keys of Athens from the side of the sea; Antigonos knew well enough that he had not yet finished with Egypt. What was done with the forts of Eleusis, Panakton, and Phyle is not known; it is very likely that Antigonos handed them back to Athens with the Mouseion.<sup>41</sup>

It was an altered Athens that received back the right of self-government. A great generation had passed away, and their successors were hardly the equals of the men who were gone. The fitful freedom of the forty years preceding the Chremonidean war, interspersed though it was with periods of foreign rule, had at least been life; and Athens had been the home of a large number of men who, if not always great men in the proper sense, were at least notable personalities, men of mark in their time, bearing the impress of an age kept at stretch by the continued clash of arms and interests which had centred round the city. Now Athens had peace; such fighting as she was to do in the next twenty-five years was done for, and under the aegis of her master; but she had a master, and the peace was like the peace of death. She was not again to be an independent force in the world's politics; and the beginnings can perhaps be detected of the process by which she would ultimately cease to be a force in the world's thought. Zeno's death had indeed come at the parting of two epochs. It was not merely that many of the strongest statesmen had gone into exile; for the alteration was equally marked in the spheres of literature and philosophy. There was no great historian now in Athens; Philochoros was dead, and Timaios dead or gone to Sicily; Phylarchos did not write, apparently, till after Athens re-

τοῦ Πειραιέως; see Plut. *Arat.* 34 and ch. 10, n. 96. He had previously been *παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Ἀντιγ[ό]νῳ τεταγμένος*; as he had repaired the forts on Salamis, which were in ruins, I imagine he was governor of Salamis from 261 to 256. Ferguson (*Athens*, 192) says that his new position approximated to that of Demetrios of Phaleron. But as I understand it, the office of epistates of Athens (see ch. 10, n. 103) lasted only from 261 to 256; Herakleitos in 256 became Antigonos' *general*, but he was not (so far as I can see) epistates of Athens, nor did he hold any post in the Athenian government; Athens was (*in form*) again 'free'.

<sup>41</sup> See ch. 10, n. 96.

covered a kind of freedom in 229; Klio loved free air. There was no one to replace Menander, Philemon, and the other prominent comedians who were dead or dropping out one by one; the New Comedy had seen its best days; poor as it was in some respects, it retained enough of the old tradition of Comedy to love free air also. Philosophy was different; no externals could make a slave of the philosopher who knew in his own soul that he was free. Yet in philosophy also, as in literature and politics, there was a change. It has happened before now that, in this or that country, conquest has called out, by way of reaction, a more intense intellectual fervour in the conquered, leading to manifestations which have restored their country's place in the world; but nothing of the sort happened, nor could it well have happened, at Athens. Athens was growing old; she seems no longer to have had the strength to bring any great new thing to the birth. It is true that one of the most notable of the philosophic movements of antiquity was yet to come, and to come from Athens; but it was to be no longer positive and creative, but critical and destructive. Spring and summer were over; and the autumn sunshine already gave presage of the frosts to come.

But autumn has its own charm; and the philosophers of the new generation at Athens, if not the equals of those who were gone, merit more than a passing glance. The balance of the schools had entirely changed; two of the four had broken in half, and the dominant personality in Athens no longer belonged to the Stoa. Epicurus' school was unchanged; his successor, Hermarchos, was a man of no note in himself, but a faithful friend of the master to whose teaching the school clung and was to cling without alteration or growth. Aristotle's school was shattered: and Hieronimos of Rhodes,<sup>42</sup> represented to us as a poor ill-natured creature, but not without wits, who had hankerings after Epicureanism, was leading the secession from Straton's official successor Lykon.<sup>43</sup> That there should have been a secession is perhaps not surprising; for Lykon's chief title to fame is that he succeeded, during

<sup>42</sup> Susemihl I, 148.

<sup>43</sup> Lykon; Life in Diog. L., bk. 5; Antigonos of Karystos ap. Athen. 12, 547 d; Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, p. 78 seq.; Susemihl I, 146.

his long tenure of the scholarchate, in reducing Aristotle's once great school to an insignificance which lasted, with brief intermission, for a couple of centuries. If tradition be true, he was indeed a curious kind of philosopher. He had been an athlete, well known as a wrestler, a boxer, and a tennis-player; and he became a devotee of the luxury of the table. His extravagant banquets, to which his pupils had to contribute, made membership of the school a prohibitive luxury to any but the wealthy; and the banquets themselves were symposia, not of wit or learning, but of eating and drinking. But he had his good points. He took much interest in the early education of boys; he often gave advice on affairs to his fellow-citizens, and his advice was always sound. His lengthy will reveals a character both business-like and generous; by it he liberated his numerous slaves, and charged his heir with the education of one of them who was a minor.

The other school which had broken in two was Zeno's. The official headship rested with Kleanthes.<sup>44</sup> He was a man of sterling personal worth, who in youth had shrunk from no hardship or privation that he might earn enough during the night just to live while attending Zeno's lectures by day; even his rivals esteemed him highly. But he was slow-witted, and never became a force in philosophy; his importance to Stoicism consisted in the fact that he received the torch from Zeno and handed it on to Chrysippos. One gift, however, was his. If not a great philosopher, he was a true poet; and his Hymn to the World-Power whom the Stoics called by the popular name of Zeus, with the wonderful lines which not only recall one of the best-known images in Isaiah but into which we can read, if we wish, a very modern and un-Hellenic feeling for those who appear to be failures,<sup>45</sup> marks the highest point which Greek religious poetry ever reached.

Ariston of Chios<sup>46</sup> led the secession from Kleanthes. Though inferior to the latter in character, he was far superior in commonplace ability, and succeeded in making himself a

<sup>44</sup> See ch. 8, p. 231.

<sup>45</sup> Line 14, ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θείνει, καὶ κοσμεῖν τ᾽ ἄκοσμα καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν. — 'The crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain.'

<sup>46</sup> Ch. 8, p. 231.

position in Athens second only to that of Arkesilaos. But he failed to found an independent school, which may seem to argue that he had no particular originality; and his greatest merit was to have taught Eratosthenes.<sup>47</sup>

Politically, the Stoa and the Colonnade had almost changed places at Athens. The former, to Antigonos, was represented by Persaios at Pella; and there is no record that Kleanthes was ever a personal friend of the king, though Antigonos was said to have once given him a large sum of money, no doubt (if the story be true) that he might no longer have to work for his living.<sup>48</sup> But Kleanthes had been a friend of Chremonides; <sup>49</sup> and with Athens taken, Chremonides banished, and Zeno dead, the Stoa turned away from Macedonia. Ptolemy invited Kleanthes to come to Alexandria, or, if he could not come, to send a pupil; and as Chrysippos would not leave Athens, Kleanthes sent Sphairos of Bosporos, a man who afterwards had the distinction of being the teacher and friend of another great enemy of Macedonia, Kleomenes III of Sparta.<sup>50</sup> Eratosthenes too, Ariston's pupil, was to become one of the greatest ornaments of the Museum at Alexandria. On the other hand, Lykon abandoned the traditional attitude of Aristotle's school. That school had always been Macedonian in feeling, but their Macedonia was that of Kassandros; they had never been friends of the Antigonid, but on the fall of Demetrios of Phaleron had turned to Egypt. This attitude had lasted throughout Straton's life; he had been the tutor of Ptolemy II, and had corresponded with Arsinoe.<sup>51</sup> But the Macedonia of Kassandros was a vanished tradition; what remained of the extreme oligarchic faction that in the old days had supported him had long since amalgamated with the modern pro-Macedonian party that supported Antigonos; a

<sup>47</sup> The account of Ariston's high place in Athens comes only from his own pupil Eratosthenes (Strab. I, 15; Athen. 7, 281 c). But Eratosthenes could be emphatic on his failings, Athen. *l.c.* His alleged flattery of Persaios, because he stood near Antigonos (Athen. 6, 251 c), is merely from Timon's *Silloi*, and may be disregarded.

<sup>48</sup> Diog. L. 7, 169; possibly untrue. Antigonos may have made the offer, and been refused.

<sup>49</sup> Diog. L. 7, 17.

<sup>50</sup> *Ib.* 7, 185, 177; Athen. 8, 354 e; Plut. *Kleom.* 2. For the various dates involved see Susemihl I, 73, n. 296.

<sup>51</sup> Diog. L. 5, 60.



descendant of Demetrios of Phaleron had been one of Antigonos' nominees for a magistracy. Above all, Antigonos' star was in the ascendant. Both sections of Aristotle's school made their peace with him. It is intimated that Antigonos, who had had nothing to do with Straton, knew Lykon well, and found a charm, which would not bear transplanting on to paper, in the fragrance and grace of his conversation;<sup>52</sup> while the philosopher contributed 200 drachmai to the war fund raised by Athens when she fought for Demetrios II against Aratos.<sup>53</sup>

But the most notable figure in Athens for twenty years after her fall was Arkesilaos,<sup>54</sup> Krates' successor as head of the Academy. Like Kleanthes of Assos and Lykon of the Troad, he too was a Greek of Asia; his native place was Pitane. He was obviously of considerable parts and really witty, and he made the Academy again the leading school in Athens. As a personality he deserved his prominence. He was a man of real worth; his kindly nature and actions, and his freedom from pride, were notorious; though well off and living in more than comfort, he cared little for money, and his generosity was as lavish as unostentatious: 'Most ready to do good and most loath to have it known' is his biographer's verdict. There appears to have been much personal liking and mutual respect between him and Kleanthes, and each defended the other warmly on occasion,<sup>55</sup> though intellectually they were at daggers drawn.

But if Arkesilaos raised Plato's school once more to the leading position in Athens, it was largely because, under him, it was no longer the school of Plato. Though Pyrrhon does not appear to have been one of his numerous teachers, his contemporaries treated him as a Pyrrhonist;<sup>56</sup> and the

<sup>52</sup> Diog. L. 5, 65.

<sup>53</sup> *I. G.* ii, 334 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 232.

<sup>54</sup> Arkesilaos: Life in Diog. L., bk. 4, and two stories Athen. 10, 420 c; Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, p. 70 seq.; Susemihl 1, 122; von Arnim, *Arkesilaos* in *P. W.*; Zeller, *Stoics*, &c. (Eng. tr.), p. 529. — There is an obvious element of slander in Diogenes' Life, which Hense (*Teles*<sup>2</sup>, p. lxxv) has ascribed to the same source as the same element in the life of Bion.

<sup>55</sup> Diog. L. 7, 171, Kleanthes; Plut. *Mor.* 55 c, Arkesilaos (see Kaibel, 'Baton' in *P. W.*).

<sup>56</sup> So Ariston (see n. 63) and Timon (*Silloi*, frs. 31 and 32, Diels = 16 and 17, Wachsmuth).

burden of his teaching was purely sceptical. He may have thought that he was going back to Socrates;<sup>57</sup> he can hardly have thought that he was going back to Plato. The question has been warmly argued both in ancient and in modern times; and while some in antiquity defended him as a Platonist on the absurd ground that his scepticism was merely a touchstone for pupils, and that to those chosen he then taught esoteric Platonism,<sup>58</sup> a modern writer has taken up an exactly opposite standpoint; his aim was the search for truth, and he sought it as Plato did.<sup>59</sup> But it must be remembered that whereas Plato came to certain positive conclusions, Arkesilaos came to none; he desired, as did every philosopher, to find truth, but he decided that truth could not be found, and that one must suspend one's judgement. The comparative ease with which the sceptical position could be maintained, the assimilation of the little non-Athenian schools, and the fact that Arkesilaos was a persuasive lecturer and the ablest mind in Athens, inevitably raised him and his school to the highest position; not, however, without strong opposition, notably from Timon and Ariston and Antagoras the poet. These men were equally bitter against him, but on different grounds; Timon as the legitimate successor of Pyrrhon, on whose preserves Arkesilaos (he thought) was poaching; Antagoras as the friend of the true Platonists Polemon and Krates, from whose teaching Arkesilaos had departed; Ariston as the champion of the Stoic theory of knowledge, which Arkesilaos was especially attacking; in fact Arkesilaos and his greater successor, Karneades, were to damage that theory past any mending, a matter which of course did not in the least impair the vital part of Stoicism, the philosophy of conduct. So Antagoras abused Arkesilaos in the market-place;<sup>60</sup> Ariston's friends brought up against him the

<sup>57</sup> See Susemihl 1, 123, n. 585; cf. Cic. *Acad.* 1, 44.

<sup>58</sup> Sext. *Pyrrh.* 1, 234, 'some say.'

<sup>59</sup> Von Arnim in *P. W.* s.v. *Arkesilaos*; he says that his aim was the knowledge of truth (Cic. *Acad.* 2, 60), and that the sources which attribute to him the impossibility of knowledge are wrong. Unfortunately one of these sources is precisely Cic. *Acad.* 1, 44; and if Cicero's *Academics* are evidence in the one case they would seem to be so in the other. The Plato to whom von Arnim thinks Arkesilaos went back is the early Plato; *Hellenistische Philosophie*, p. 250 (in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, 1, 5).

<sup>60</sup> Ael. *V. H.* 14, 26.

time-honoured charge that he 'corrupted the young';<sup>61</sup> Timon lampooned him as an owl courting the popularity of a mob of chaffinches, whose admiration stamped him as a trifler, and inquired of him, not without point, why he opened his mouth so wide as to call himself a Platonist;<sup>62</sup> while Ariston himself, with insult still more pointed, turned him into a kind of chimaera, whose face might be the face of Plato, but whose body and tail were Diodoros the dialectician and Pyrrhon the sceptic.<sup>63</sup> The actual result was probably to strengthen Arkesilaos' position.

Politically, Arkesilaos in public maintained a strict neutrality. He had been an intimate friend of Hierokles, Antigonos' general in the Piraeus, a circumstance which led to some feeling against him, for Hierokles, naturally, cannot have been popular; but he never courted the friendship of Antigonos, and indeed went out of his way to avoid it. It was not very easy for the friend of Hierokles never to meet Antigonos; but Arkesilaos kept his independence manfully, and the only favour he ever sought from Antigonos was something for his native city of Pitane, which seems not to have been in Antigonos' power to grant. His most direct connexion with the Macedonian house was not with Antigonos at all, but with Demetrios the Fair, who before the Chremonidean war had been in Athens for a time as Arkesilaos' pupil.<sup>64</sup> But in this matter at least Arkesilaos was a true follower of Plato. The Academy had always been the home of quiet but well-understood patriotism: Arkesilaos went further. For among his pupils were those two men from Megalopolis,<sup>65</sup> who were to achieve an almost legendary renown as liberators, not only of their own city, but of any city which called on them and whose

<sup>61</sup> Diog. L. 4, 40.

<sup>62</sup> Timon, fr. 34 (19) = Diog. L. 4, 42, *τὶ πλατύνει* (why do you 'spread yourself' so, open your mouth so wide?) was ingeniously conjectured by Wilamowitz (*Antigonos*, p. 76) to mean 'weshalb bleibst du Platoniker?' Neither Wachsmuth nor Diels has adopted this; but in view of Timon's other play on Plato's name (*πλατίστακος*, Plato-fish; see ch. 8, n. 72), and the traditional derivation of Plato from *πλατὺς* (Neanthes, fr. 13, in *F. H. G.* iii, p. 5), it seems to me very probable.

<sup>63</sup> Diog. L. 4, 33, *πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὅπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσος Διδώρος.*

<sup>64</sup> All this from Diogenes. On the request for Pitane see Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 234, n. 3.

<sup>65</sup> For Ekdemos and Demophanes see Polyb. 10, 22, 2; Plut. *Philop.* 1; Paus. 8, 49, 2; ch. 12, p. 357.

freedom required championing. In the darkest hours of Macedonian rule, Arkesilaos' class-room was one of the places in which still glowed the spark of liberty, waiting to burst into flame. Well may the Athenians have set him above all his contemporaries.<sup>66</sup>

The new position of things must have made a sensible difference in Antigonos' relations with the world of philosophy. In truth, they were hardly what they had been. The leading philosopher in Athens was now one who was quite detached from Antigonos, and belonged to a school that had never had any welcome for Macedonian kings; and, over and above this, Arkesilaos, as was not unnatural in a native of Pitane, stood in the friendliest relationship to Eumenes of Pergamon, with whom he perhaps corresponded;<sup>67</sup> and Eumenes was a friend of Egypt. The Stoa had deserted Macedonia for Egypt and Sparta. The newly-acquired friendship of the Colonnade was perhaps hardly a set-off to this. So much of our knowledge rests on a tradition which is vividly anti-Macedonian that it is always possible that Lykon and Hieronymos of Rhodes have had hard measure dealt out to them precisely because they were Antigonos' friends; but, even so, they cannot be made out to be very notable personalities. And Lykon, though he had changed the traditional attitude of his school, was anything but a partisan of Antigonos. His real sympathies, natural in a Greek of the Troad, were, like those of Arkesilaos, with Pergamon; both Eumenes and Attalos I honoured him above all his contemporaries, an indication that there may have been more in Lykon than our tradition allows;<sup>68</sup> and he refused an invitation to go to Antiochos II, the friend of Antigonos and enemy of Eumenes.

Antigonos then, when he instituted and endowed a yearly festival at Athens in honour of his dead son Halkyoneus, could find no one better to have the conduct of it than Hieronymos of Rhodes: though it is always possible, as has been suggested, that Hieronymos was chosen because of some special friendship for the deceased. But although so many of the philosophers now looked away from Antigonos and toward Egypt

<sup>66</sup> Diog. L. 4, 44, ἀποδεχθεῖς παρ' Ἀθηναίων ὡς οὐδεὶς.

<sup>67</sup> Ib. 4, 38.

<sup>68</sup> Ib. 5, 67.



and her friends, it is perhaps characteristic of the Athens of this time that none of them went very far in the matter; all, save Lykon, were ready to attend, and did attend, the yearly festival given by Hieronymos with Antigonos' money: even Arkesilaos was found there, and Lykon's absence was due solely to personal dislike of Hieronymos; one of the things, no doubt, which prevented him, the only scholarch at all so disposed, from drawing closer to the king of Macedonia.<sup>69</sup>

Over and above this, we cannot but come to the conclusion that what was taking place in the schools was also taking place in the world, and that Antigonos' conquest of Athens, unavoidable as it was on Antigonos' part, had brought about an equally unavoidable change in his relationship with the city. The government, of course, after the withdrawal of the Mouseion garrison, was carried on by the pro-Macedonian party, and entirely in Antigonos' interest; it could not be otherwise. But though Athens again offers her official sacrifices for the king's welfare, and even engages in a war on his behalf, we feel that the times are changed, and that it is now the goodwill, no longer of a friend, but of a dependant.<sup>70</sup>

There is one other event which falls at this time, as to which we would gladly know something. From the point of view of world-history, it can hardly be denied that one distinguishing peculiarity of the third century before Christ was this, that so many of its greatest men were Asiatics. In the earlier part of the century it had been Zeno, the Phoenician of Kition; at its end it was to be Hannibal, the Phoenician of Carthage. In the time between the two falls the reign of Asoka of Pataliputra, king of all India north of the Deccan. Any estimate of Asoka must of course always be based on what he himself says about himself; but there is no more reason to suppose it untrue, seeing the frankness with which he relates the horrors of war once inflicted by himself on the Kalingas, than there is reason to doubt the main fact of his life, that he

<sup>69</sup> Diog. L. 4, 41 and 42; 5, 68.—The suggestion that Hieronymos may have been a friend of Halkyoneus' is Ferguson's (*Athens*, 233).

<sup>70</sup> *I. G.* ii, 1, *add. nov.* 373 b; archon Lysiades (247/6, Ferguson; ? 242/1, Kolbe). *I. G.* ii, 307 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 635; Kallimedes (246/5, Ferguson and Kolbe). *I. G.* ii, 374; year unknown, but the priestess mentioned is a daughter of Polyeuktos the archon of 275/4, and καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου fits the gap.

found India Brahmin and left it largely Buddhist. It was after the conquest of the Kalingas in the ninth year of his reign (261), and in consequence, by his own account, of his remorse for the bloodshed and suffering so caused, that Asoka became a Buddhist lay disciple.<sup>71</sup> Two years later, in 259, he formally entered the Order, and dispatched missionaries all over the world to effect a truer conquest, conquest (as he puts it) by the Law of Piety: these were sent, not only throughout India, but to five of the Hellenistic courts, those of Antiochos II, Ptolemy II, Magas of Cyrene, Alexander of Epeiros, and Antigonos.<sup>72</sup> Whether they ever arrived we do not know. A later Ceylonese work, which affects to know the names and destinations of all Asoka's missionaries, conducts them all to places in India and Ceylon, except one, Mahārakkita, who was sent to the country of the Yonas, the north-west frontier tribes of that name;<sup>73</sup> but the particulars given in the Mahāvamsa often deserve little enough credit, and it omits other missions attested by the inscriptions.<sup>74</sup> There does not perhaps exist more than one actual indication of the presence of a Buddhist in the Hellenistic world.<sup>75</sup> But an embassy would not necessarily leave archaeological traces of itself; and of how many other events of this time has all record perished? Several Greek envoys had already gone to the court of Pātaliputra;<sup>76</sup> Asoka's father had petitioned Antiochos I for the visit of a Greek philosopher;<sup>77</sup> in Augustus' time, when overland communication was less easy than before the Parthian revolt, an Indian embassy came overland to Augustus, among their

<sup>71</sup> The dates, and the translations of the inscriptions used, are those given in the second edition of V. A. Smith's *Asoka* (1909).

<sup>72</sup> *Rock Edict* 13.

<sup>73</sup> V. A. Smith, *op. c.*, p. 44. — I discussed these Yonas, *J. H. S.* xxii, 286. — Bactria had not yet revolted from Antiochos II.

<sup>74</sup> The Mahāvamsa omits the missions to the Tamil kingdoms of South India, which are attested by the inscriptions, and includes a mission to Pegu, which is not. V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*, p. 166; *Asoka*<sup>2</sup>, p. 44.

<sup>75</sup> A Ptolemaic gravestone, with the Buddhist wheel and trisula, found by Prof. Flinders Petrie; *J. R. A. S.* 1898, p. 875.

<sup>76</sup> Megasthenes from Seleukos I to Chandra-gupta. Daimachos from Seleukos or Antiochos I to his son Bindusāra, Asoka's father; Strab. 2, 70. Dionysios from Ptolemy II to one of the dynasty, Plin. *N. H.* 6, 17.

<sup>77</sup> Bindusāra to Antiochos I; Hegesand. ap. Athen. 14, 652 f.

number being that famous ascetic, whether a follower of Buddha or Brahma, who burnt himself alive in the market-place at Athens as a demonstration of his creed.<sup>78</sup> With these things before us, nothing hinders us from taking Asoka's statement to be literally true.

We may picture for ourselves, if we please, the visit of that missionary to the court of Pella, dressed in the yellow robe of his Order, with shaven head and begging-bowl, undistinguished save for the king's envoys that escorted him, undistinguished perhaps even by any escort at all, but representative of a faith that was to embrace one-third of the human race, and of a belief, as yet uncorrupted, in one who had found for his suffering fellow-mortals the path of peace. Much of what he had to say would go home to his audience. Antigonos must have had some fellow-feeling for a king who took his kingship seriously, whose time and work were his people's.<sup>79</sup> The statesmen of the court would listen, perhaps with interest, to the account of a monarch who planted trees and dug wells along his roadways, built rest-houses and founded hospitals; who said that slaves must be treated properly and every living creature with respect, and who professed to know a better way of conquest than that of the sword.<sup>80</sup> The philosophers of the court might compare their own ideals with the Indian's law of piety,<sup>81</sup> while they listened to the story of an alien philosophy which had actually put into practice that which some of themselves had attempted, a philosophy whose followers, by abjuring the world and the things of the world, had thrown off with all their possessions the troubles that even the smallest possessions bring, and had by contemplation attained, not only to that present tranquillity of spirit at

<sup>78</sup> Nicholas Damasc. ap. Strab. 15, 719, 720.

<sup>79</sup> *Rock Edict 6.*

<sup>80</sup> *Rock Edicts 2, 11, 13; Minor Rock Edict 2; Pillar Edict 7.*

<sup>81</sup> Asoka's 'Law of Piety' enjoins: (*R. E.* 3) obedience to father and mother; liberality to friends, acquaintances, relatives, Brahmins, and ascetics; respect for the sacredness of life, small expense and small accumulation; (*R. E.* 11) proper treatment of slaves and servants; (*Minor R. E.* 3) reverence for teachers and speaking the truth; and generally (*Pillar Edict 7; cf. P. E.* 2), compassion, liberality, truth, purity, gentleness, and saintliness. On the Buddhist colouring of this see *Asoka*<sup>2</sup>, 30-2. It is interesting, therefore, to compare it with bed-rock Greek morality of about the same period, for instance [Plutarch] *de Lib. Educ.* 7 E, a passage perhaps strongly influenced by Bion (Susemihl 1, 41, n. 117 b).

which some of the Greeks were aiming, but (as they believed) to a path of enlightenment which would at last lead them forth free of the confused turmoil of living and being, in a freedom with which the Stoic's assumed liberty to usher himself forth from this life could not for a moment compare. It may even be that among the philosophers some one, in the spirit of Epictetus, would not have averted his head at the saying that wrongs must be borne patiently if it be possible;<sup>82</sup> though all alike, king, statesmen, philosophers, would have been equally at a loss to understand how the master of India could think that nothing bore much fruit save only that which concerned the other world.<sup>83</sup> It is perhaps but a fancy; but it may please us to think that for a moment there was in truth some sort of communication between the king who declared himself the servant of his people and the king whose ideal of kingship was expressed in his master's words, 'All men are my children.'<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> *R. E.* 13, and the *Kalinga Borderers' Edict*.

<sup>83</sup> *R. E.* 13.

<sup>84</sup> Twice repeated, in the *Borderers'* and the *Provincials' Edicts*. It is a slight variant of a phrase attributed to Gautama Buddha.



## CHAPTER XII

### THE SECOND STRUGGLE WITH EGYPT

WITH the conclusion of the peace of 255 it looked as though all danger of any further Egyptian aggression had passed away with the passing of the reason for that aggression. But this is not to say that all questions at issue between Egypt and Macedonia had been removed. Rather, with the elimination of Athens and Epeiros and the temporary eclipse of Sparta, the two great Powers were left face to face without any buffer state intervening, and the radical cause of difference between them came more plainly into sight. Egypt had suffered loss on the coasts of Asia at Antiochos' hands; but her naval supremacy had not yet been questioned. She still controlled the sea, and was still master of the League of the Islanders; the Aegean was still an Egyptian lake. But the League had been founded by Antigonos' grandfather, and Antigonos' father had for twenty years borne rule at sea as absolute and unquestioned as that of Ptolemy; and with all matters settled on the mainland, it was inevitable that Antigonos' thoughts should at last turn to the re-conquest, as a practical matter, of what any son of Demetrios must have regarded as not the least part of his legitimate heritage.

Many reasons combined to urge this on his attention. It is not necessary to suppose that vengeance for the death of his half-brother in Cyrene was one of them; for, strictly speaking, Ptolemy had no responsibility for that death at all. Doubtless a desire to repay Ptolemy for the endless wars which the latter had inflicted on Macedonia counted for something. But two other reasons can be seen which, in the nature of things, must have played a part in reinforcing what, after all, was the sufficient compelling motive, the desire to recover what had belonged to Demetrios.

Macedonia had, throughout Antigonos' reign, been at a disadvantage in one respect compared with the other two chief Powers in the north of the peninsula. While Epeiros comprised Dodona and Aetolia controlled Delphi, Macedonia possessed no great religious centre recognized as such by the Greek race. For a Power that desired definitely to be well within the circle of Greek culture, a certain disadvantage may have been felt here. The control of Delos would do more for Macedonia than symbolize the rule of the sea; it would definitely bring within her sphere one of the very greatest of the religious centres of the Greek race, precisely as the control of Athens supplied her with her intellectual capital. But while the spiritual life of the Athenian schools, whatever it might mean to the court circle, can have meant nothing to the plain Emathian farmer, even the plainest could understand Delos and the worship of the Delian Apollo.

But the other reason was weightier and more practical than this. Egypt controlled the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean, absolutely and without question, so far as galleys could do it. It is not possible but that Macedonia had a sense of being hedged in. The Egyptian sea-power may of course have counted for something in the sphere of trading; undoubtedly the sea-command was of use in diverting the wealth and commerce of the world into the channels that led to Alexandria.<sup>1</sup> But more important than any question of trade must have been the land-power's feeling that she was ringed in, gripped on all sides by the sea-power's tentacles. Like the wrestler who has drawn a bye, and stands watching ready to encounter the wearied victor in the contest, so the sea-power watched her rival, ready and able to take advantage of each and every embarrassment.<sup>2</sup> Even Corinth itself was under observation; from the all but island of Methana, the naval base in the Argolid which Egypt had seized some time in the late wars and aptly re-named Arsinoe,<sup>3</sup> a fleet

<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, 221-2. I know of no evidence for Holm's statement (vol. iv, Eng. tr., pp. 197, 209) that Egypt protected freedom of trade in the North Aegean.

<sup>2</sup> Polyb. 5, 34, 8, ἐφῆδρενον.

<sup>3</sup> See ch. 10, n. 45.

could watch Corinth and the Piraeus, and flank any Antigonid fleet based on Corinth.

The political position, then, being what it was, it is no wonder that Antigonos used the opportunity of the peace to create a new navy. In one way it was a fair enough venture. More than twenty years had passed since the Celtic invasion, and a new generation of young men in Macedonia had come to military age. If Patroklos' challenge still rankled in Antigonos' mind, Patroklos had also exposed the essential weakness of an Egyptian fleet; it was manned by Egyptians. And meanwhile the world had seen a new thing. A great land-power, by the adoption of a few simple expedients, had taken to the water with instantaneous and overwhelming success; and to Antigonos the victories which Rome was winning over Carthage must have been full of promise. He was better off than Rome for the necessary *trained* men, masters and steersmen; and, given a boarding fight, it was extremely doubtful whether any marines that Egypt could raise would stand against Macedonian troops. Egypt's actual effective force of men of Greek or Macedonian blood settled in Egypt was none too great, and was her ultimate sheet-anchor; she could hardly risk such on shipboard, where few states employed their best troops. And Rome had done more than show how a boarding fight could be secured. Whatever form of grappling is implied by the *corvus*, Rome had learnt the system from Sicily;<sup>4</sup> and the connexion between Corinth and Syracuse, in shipbuilding as in other matters, was still close.<sup>5</sup> Whether the actual Roman device may not have been really Syracusan or Corinthian in origin is immaterial; for both Corinth and her daughter city had always possessed a traditional method of sea-fighting which depended on ships rather more heavily built than the light triremes of Athens and Phoenicia. It is certain that what Rome was doing would be well known in Corinth, and that the lesson of her victories lay at Antigonos' service.

—Still, whatever the shortcomings of an Egyptian fleet, as

<sup>4</sup> Polyb. I, 21 and 22.

<sup>5</sup> The builder of Hieron's ship, Archias, came from Corinth; Athen. 5, 206 f.



regards manning, the sea-power of Egypt was, to all appearance, very great; and the fact that tradition has exaggerated it out of all reason must not blind us to its real greatness. De

At some time or other in the reign of Philadelphos—doubtless toward its very end—the official Egyptian navy list seems to have recorded a grand total of at least 300 warships.<sup>6</sup> Athens indeed had possessed as many or more in her time, perhaps Syracuse also; but, even so, Egypt was, in numbers, as strong on paper as Demetrios had ever been, a little stronger than contemporary Rome, half as strong again as contemporary Carthage.<sup>7</sup> But these comparisons are merely keel for keel; and mere comparison of numbers is here misleading. For the size of warships had steadily tended to grow; and in the Egyptian navy even the quinquereme had given place to larger vessels. Two-thirds of the fleet, it is true, consisted of quadriremes and smaller vessels, doubtless principally of smaller vessels; but the strength of the navy was thought to consist in the great number of huge galleys of seven, nine, and even more men to the oar, of the type brought into favour, with such startling success, by Demetrios at Salamis. It is even possible that we may have to reckon with the Egyptian ships of the end of Philadelphos' reign *averaging* the power of a quinquereme, a higher average than ever obtained at Rome or Carthage, a much higher average than that of the fleets which met at Salamis in 306, and an average, of course, out of all proportion to that of the Athenian navy of the time of Demosthenes. Moreover, the fleet enjoyed the very real, nay vital, advantage of operating in a sea studded with Egyptian bases and military posts, enabling easy movement in any desired direction. De

Still, there were other weak spots beside the manning. The number of Egyptian interests would almost certainly, in the event of a great war, entail the dividing, perhaps the subdividing, of the fleet; it could hardly operate as a whole. It is quite possible, even, that the fleet could not be manned as a whole, in spite of Egypt's large population and her naval De

<sup>6</sup> See App. 10, p. 456.

<sup>7</sup> For Demetrios see ch. 3. Rome and Carthage, refs. ch. 3, n. 47.



conscription;<sup>8</sup> for the number of rowers required must have been enormous, even allowing for the fact that some of the best contingents came from, and were manned by, men of Phoenicia and Cyprus.<sup>9</sup> And, above all, it was a naval service that had never won a great victory. What it held, had come to it by default; and its record, when it had met the Antigonid, was a record of defeat.

Antigonos had no chance of creating a fleet that should, on paper, be anywhere near a match for that of Ptolemy. The better part of it would have to be manned from Corinth and Chalkis, though both Piraeus and the large coast towns of Chalkidike possessed ample facilities for building, and he had plenty of timber. But it was useless to build a fleet that could not be manned; and Gauls were no use on shipboard. He must of course have intended to use his Macedonians as marines; he was fortunate if he did not have to use them at the oar also, as was done by his grandson.<sup>10</sup> His chance lay in this, that, unlike Egypt, he would be able to employ his fleet as a single unit, and would be able so to man it that, if he could secure the indispensable boarding fight, his victory would be as certain as that of the Roman fleet in similar circumstances.<sup>11</sup> But in one way he was much less happily situated than Rome. Rome understood how to use her enormous resources; and in the third century Rome never fought at sea against odds. Antigonos had to use what resources he had, and to prepare deliberately for a contest in which he would be heavily outnumbered. For all analogy, both of territorial resources and of tradition, leads to the conclusion that if Antigonos could get to sea a fleet equivalent in power to about 100-120 quinqueremes he was doing very well indeed; if he ever succeeded in putting in line the equivalent of 150 quinqueremes, or say one-half of the paper strength of Egypt, he was doing wonders, the possibility of which is not easily to be credited.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The conscription is not mentioned till the reign of Ptolemy V, but it may date from earlier. *O. G. I.* 90, l. 17; Bouché-Leclercq, vol. iv, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> For ship-building in Cyprus, *O. G. I.* 39.

<sup>10</sup> Polyb. 5, 2, 4.

<sup>11</sup> The genuine Macedonian still inspired terror in battle; Polyb. 4, 69.

<sup>12</sup> See App. 10, pp. 457, 458.

Of the particulars of his fleet nothing is known. Of his flagship alone, a most famous vessel, it has been possible to recover, though dimly, a number of details.<sup>13</sup> It is practically certain that she was built at Corinth, and more than probable that she was named after that city, Antigonos' chief naval base. She was a tall heavy ship, with two decks over the heads of the rowers, so that with the deck on which stood the rower's thwarts she could be, and was, called a three-decker;<sup>14</sup> her motive power was that of an enneres, nine men to an oar; she was probably suggested by, and in some sort a development of the principle of, Lysimachos' extraordinary okteres, which had been so instrumental in the defeat of Antigonos in his naval battle with Ptolemy Keraunos in 280. That she was fitted for a very heavy catapult, carried grapnels, and was perhaps equipped with the towers on deck so familiar in the Roman battles of the civil wars, is tolerably certain; if the sources can be trusted, her relative weight may be guessed at from the fact that timber enough for something like fifteen quadriremes was built into her. That she must have been somewhat slow, and intended to lead a fleet which meant to fight at close quarters and board, if possible, and not trust to manœuvring for the ram, is obvious. Too little is known of third-century shipbuilding to enable any guess at what other developments may have taken place on these lines; but some of Antony's ships at Actium may have been in a similar category, and the type (substituting catapults for guns) may have already begun to approximate to that of the mediaeval galleasse. One question of great interest must be answered in the negative. When it is remembered that the quinquereme and her sisters could mount one catapult only, as the mediaeval quinquereme mounted one gun; and when it is remembered how, at Lepanto, the power of the clumsy sailing galleon to throw a broadside ended at once and for ever the day of the handy oared galley as the ship of the line; it is natural to ask, whether in Antigonos' ship, or in any

<sup>13</sup> For everything connected with this vessel I refer to my paper in *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 209, 'The Dedicated Ship of Antigonos Gonatas.'

<sup>14</sup> Τριπύμενος.

successor, any trace is found of the idea of a broadside. All that can be said is, that no such trace appears;<sup>15</sup> we must conclude, as is probable from other indications, that the catapult in naval warfare was comparatively ineffective.

It was obvious that to challenge at sea a Power whose effective naval strength was from two to three times as great as your own was no light matter; and Antigonos sought first to lessen the risk. He looked about for alliances; and drew both the two obvious bonds a good deal closer than they had been before. Both Antiochos and Aetolia were already his friends; with Antiochos he now formed a definite alliance, and it would seem that his relations with Aetolia became closer, though the subject is obscure.

Aetolia, during the years that had elapsed since Pyrrhos' death, had made good use of the free hand which Antigonos permitted her. She had been expanding her League as opportunity offered, in part no doubt peacefully, in part aggressively; and she had steadily grown in power. Of the little Amphiktyonic peoples, the Ainianes, the Dorians of the mother-city, the Dolopes, and the Malians, had joined the Aetolian League;<sup>16</sup> their votes helped to swell the Aetolian vote on the Amphiktyonic council. More important was the acquisition of part of Phokis, and of Eastern Lokris. For a short time after Pyrrhos' death Phokis appears to have three votes on the council; somewhere about the epoch of the Chremonidean war her votes seem to vanish altogether, and from about the time of the peace of 255 she reappears with one vote.<sup>17</sup> It is known that at a date somewhere before 261, and perhaps not very long before, Phokis was engaged in war with some state and very doubtful of the issue;<sup>18</sup> and the natural reading of the above facts is, that Phokis com-

<sup>15</sup> Had it ever been thought of, it must have appeared in Hieron's ship (Athen. 5, 206 e) or in the τεσσαερακοιτήρης (ib. 5, 203 e); but the former only carried the usual one catapult, extra large, and the armament of the latter is not given.

<sup>16</sup> Beloch 3, 2, 344.

<sup>17</sup> See the table, ib. p. 350.

<sup>18</sup> *J. G.* ix, 1, 97. It is dated approximately by this, that it is a response to an invitation of the Tenians to declare the island and temple of Poseidon ἅσπυλα, and the temple was built between 278 and 261; it is mentioned by Philochoros. (Graindor, in *Musée Belge*, 1911, p. 254, thinks he will be able to date the building *circ.* 270/69.)

menced to extend her territory, perhaps at the expense of the Eastern Lokrians, and had thus taken their vote ; that the Lokrians had appealed to the Amphiktyones, that is in effect to Aetolia ; and that war had followed, ending in the absorption by Aetolia of part of Phokis with one of the Phokian votes, while Eastern Lokris or part of it, with its vote (which does not appear again), had joined the Aetolian League.

Aetolia had thus gained a large increase of territory, and now controlled nine Amphiktyonic votes. Should Antigonos ever alter his mind about his relationship to the Amphiktyony, Aetolia could now outvote him by herself. But with the new consciousness of power came the beginnings of its abuse. Luxury began to grow upon the Aetolians in a manner that was to become a byword;<sup>19</sup> and with luxury came greed. It has already been told how Aetolia now began to put into practice that well-known instrument of her policy, partition, with its cynical interpretation of Hesiod's maxim that the half is greater than the whole: she had already joined Alexander of Epeiros in partitioning Akarnania.

So far, Aetolia had kept her pledge of neutrality to Antigonos, but no more. Indeed, she had rather gone out of her way to show the world that it was neutrality and not friendship; for directly the Chremonidean war was over, she had caused Delphi to pay Egypt the compliment of granting to the whole of the citizens of Alexandria in a body prior rights of consulting the oracle, while a little later, in 260/59, Delphi had passed a decree in honour of Areus II of Sparta.<sup>20</sup> How and on what terms Antigonos succeeded in converting neutrality into friendship is not known, nor is it known whether, as yet, he had any definite alliance with the Aetolian League; but the fact from henceforth of a closer relationship, or entente, cannot well be doubted, in view of the course of events.

Antiochos had recently concluded a favourable peace with Egypt; but neither the late war, nor the peace, had touched

<sup>19</sup> Polyb. 13, 1; Agatharch. ap. Athen. 12, 527 b = fr. 2 in *F. H. G.* 3, p. 192.

<sup>20</sup> Decree for the citizens of Alexandria, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 488 = *G. D. I.* 2592. The archon is Aristagoras, 262/1, Beloch. Decree for Areus II, *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 488 (see ch. 10, n. 84); the archon is Emmenidas, 260/59, Beloch. The fact that Keian victories at the Soteria begin in Aristagoras' year can hardly have a political meaning.



the real question at issue between the two empires, the question of Hollow Syria. No doubt Arados, though now autonomous, was friendly to Antiochos;<sup>21</sup> but the bulk of Phoenicia proper was still held by Ptolemy. Egypt had something which Antiochos regarded as his, just as she had something which Antigonos regarded as his. A definite alliance was an obvious course; it was cemented by the marriage of Antigonos' son Demetrios to a younger Stratonike,<sup>22</sup> who was a daughter of Antiochos I and the elder Stratonike, and full sister of Antiochos II. To represent the involved relationships of the two houses is becoming impossible: the younger Stratonike was her husband's first cousin and also his aunt, her mother-in-law's half-sister and also her niece, her father-in-law's niece, her own mother's granddaughter-in-law, and perhaps other things which the curious may work out. The date of the marriage can be fixed with tolerable certainty to 253. It cannot have preceded the peace of 255, not only because of Demetrios' age, but because the Egyptian fleet would have made the successful transfer of the bride from Antioch to Pella a precarious if not impossible matter; and any date later than 253 is of course quite out of the question, owing to the rupture in the relations of the two kings. The year 253 coincides so well with other events that it may be definitely accepted.

That year saw Antiochos busy preparing for the new war in support of Antigonos. At some time in the course of the year he sold a piece of territory to his wife Laodike for cash; and the purchase money, of which the first of the three instalments fell due in December 253, was to be paid into the war chest.<sup>23</sup> This instructive occurrence, which we need not suppose to have been an isolated one, shows that Antiochos was making ready for war; but it also shows that his resources were at a low ebb.

<sup>21</sup> Strab. 16, 754; Beloch 3, 1, 695. The era of Arados, i.e. its autonomy, begins in 259/8.

<sup>22</sup> Euseb. 1, 249, Schoene; Just. 28, 1, 2. See Beloch 3, 2, 93.

<sup>23</sup> *O. G. I.* 225. The money is to be paid *εἰς τὸ κατὰ στρατείαν γαζοφυλάκιον*. The sale includes the revenues for 254/3; and as the dates for payment of the instalments of the purchase money are Dec. 253 and March and June 252, the sale is dated to 253.

By the summer of 253 Antigonos' new fleet, too, was ready:— and at its head he sailed to Asia to fetch home his son's bride.<sup>24</sup> He received her from the hands of her mother, his sister Stratonike, whom he had probably not seen for twenty-four years.

Stratonike had had a career almost without parallel even in the third century; for her husband Seleukos had, after five years of marriage and the birth of a daughter, handed her over to his son Antiochos as his wife, and Antiochos' wife she had remained till his death, bearing him several children. The reasons are lost, hidden away behind the well-known folk-tale with which later writers adorned the strange event: and naturally no one troubled to record Stratonike's own opinions. Practically all that is known of her character, beside the usual Macedonian interest in literature, is that she was devoted to religion and to the memory of her father Demetrios. Her numerous offerings on Delos are well known; and a little temple containing her statue stood in the sacred precinct there. But she was not only a devotee of the orthodox worship of Apollo. She had been a friend of Arsinoe Philadelphos, and this may have led her into association with the more intimate creeds of Egypt; and at Smyrna, where she lived, she belonged to a religious body or club which worshipped Anubis. She herself was worshipped at Smyrna after her death, and the local cult of Aphrodite afterwards bore her name.<sup>25</sup>

We need then never be astonished to find Stratonike associated with any religious act, especially as regards Delos. Her offerings there can be traced from the year 279 at least, the earlier records having almost entirely perished; and she

<sup>24</sup> I find it difficult to dissociate Antigonos' appearance in the Aegean from the marriage, though there is no evidence.

<sup>25</sup> On the οἶκος οὗ Στρατονίκης of Hypsokles, *I. G.* xi, 161, A, l. 91, see Homolle, *B. C. H.* 1890, p. 509, n. 3. Delian decree in praise of Teletimos who made a statue of Stratonike (*quaere*, the same statue), *B. C. H.* 1888, p. 419.— Her friendship with Arsinoe, *O. G. I.* 14. — Συναγούβιασται at Smyrna, including 'queen Stratonike', Michel 1223; see, however, Kaerst ii, 1, 275, n. 3.— Stratonike worshipped at Smyrna, *O. G. I.* 229, l. 9 seq.: Aphrodite Stratonikis, *O. G. I.* 228 and 229, and *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 575. She was alive at the very end of the reign of Antiochos I, *O. G. I.* 222.— Interest in literature, Beloch 3, 1, 441, sufficiently explaining Lucian, *περὶ εἰκ.* 5. Gossip of the usual kind in Pliny, *N. H.* 35, 40.

had marked the occasion of the marriage of her daughter Phila to Antigonos in 277 or 276 by the dedication to Apollo of Demetrios' necklace, which she had preserved, and her daughter's ankle-rings. She now celebrated the marriage of her daughter Stratonike with Demetrios II by supplementing the gold crown of bay-leaves which adorned the head of the temple image of Apollo at Delos by a far more magnificent crown, containing four times the weight of gold of the old one; and she also provided new crowns for the little Graces who stood on Apollo's hand. At the same time she dedicated another necklace to Leto.<sup>26</sup>

Stratonike had done much for Apollo; it remained to do something for the memory of Demetrios. She possessed her full share of Antigonid devotion to her father. She had preserved his necklace after his death; she always referred to herself as 'daughter of Demetrios' in her dedications; on one occasion she had made use of the style of her father and brother and called herself 'the Macedonian'. On the base of the statue which she dedicated to Arsinoe, while she was Antiochos' wife, she does not even call herself 'queen', but merely 'daughter of King Demetrios', as usual. Taken in conjunction with the fact that not one of all her numerous offerings and dedications makes the least reference to Antio-

<sup>26</sup> I need not consider those of Stratonike's offerings which throw no light on the foundation of 252. But Demetrios' necklace is important. *I. G.* xi, 199, B, l. 51 (inventory of Antigonos I, 274); *περιδέραια τὰ Δημητρίου καὶ φιάλια καὶ περισκελίδας ἀνέθηκε Στρατονίκη, ἄστατα*. From this the same is restored in Sosimachos, 276 (*I. G.* xi, 164, A, 74); and the same *περιδέραια*, with the omission of Stratonike's name, occur in Sosisthenes, 250 (*B. C. H.* 1903, p. 64 = *I. G.* xi, 287, B, l. 21), with the variant *περισκελίδες δύο*. — Her dedications on the occasion of the marriage of her daughter Stratonike, which appear first in Sosisthenes, are: B. 66, a gold crown for the *ἄγαλμα* (B. 66 gives side by side the *τέτα* crowns for the *ἄγαλμα*, first the old one weighing this year 144 drachmai, ΗΔΔΔΔ ~~ΗΗΗ~~, which is the one of Hypsokles B, l. 95, where it weighs 146 drachmai—twenty-nine years' attrition in the interval,—and then the new one, given by Stratonike, weighing over 600 drachmai; thus conclusively preventing the identification of the two, which was made by Homolle, *B. C. H.* 1891, p. 146); three gold crowns for the Graces, *ib.* B, 67; *ib.*, a golden *καθετήρ*, necklace, of forty-eight links, dedicated to Leto. This necklace, which is not, I think, found earlier, occurs again in Akridion, 240 (*I. G.* xi, 298, A, l. 145), and in Demares, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 588, l. 4, and cannot be identical with Demetrios' necklace, as *both* come in Sosisthenes. — The items in this and the next note from inventories at the time unpublished I owe to the kindness of Prof. Dürrbach.

chos, and remembering that Antiochos had put her eldest son to death, it is difficult to avoid the supposition that Stratonike considered herself rather as the daughter of her father than as the wife of her husband.<sup>27</sup> It has an important bearing on what follows.

For Antigonos had not put to sea merely to celebrate a wedding. On his way back he sailed to Delos, and there, in the centre of Ptolemy's sea-power, he founded two festivals in honour of the Delian Apollo and the gods of Delos, vase foundations of the usual type. One series of vases bore his own name (Antigoneia); the other the name of his sister

<sup>27</sup> In Sosisthenes, B, 66 (see n. 26), and Demares, ll. 33, 185, 198, we have six ἐπιγραφαί on Stratonike's dedications quoted verbatim; all are in the form βασιλίσσα Στρατονίκη βασιλέως Δημητρίου, with or without the addition of καὶ βυσιλίσσης Φίλας. Those in Sosisthenes probably belong to 253. The three offerings in Demares above mentioned do not occur elsewhere, and might belong to Antiochos' lifetime as well as later. Earlier inventories than Sosisthenes seem to give no ἐπιγραφαί of Stratonike, and there is no need to emphasize the fact that we cannot rely on the wording of these lists when they are not quoting verbatim. The consequence is that we cannot say for certain what Stratonike called herself in her dedications during her husband's lifetime. — The strange Στρατονίκης Μακέτας of 274 B. C. (*I. G.* xi, 199, B, l. 71, Antigonos I) may be correctly preserved; and as this offering is in the πῶρινος οἶκος, which replaced the χαλκοθήκη after 279 (Homolle, *B. C. H.* 1882, p. 87), it is dated to a time when she was Antiochos' wife. — Elsewhere we have Στρατονίκης τῆς Δ[ημ]ητρίου (*Amer. J. Arch.* 1910, p. 415) on a marble ball at Sardis; and Σ. βασιλέως Δημητρίου (*O. G. I.* 14) on the base of Arsinoe's statue erected by Stratonike. This last is striking. At its date, Berenike was βασιλίσσα. But at some unknown date after the recovery of Cyprus by Ptolemy in 294 Berenike was not yet βασιλίσσα, *O. G. I.* 20. Therefore the earliest date for *O. G. I.* 14 is 293 (Dittenberger puts it too early), and the latest, Arsinoe's death in 270; and the point is that Stratonike does not call herself βασιλίσσα or mention Antiochos, though she was at the time his wife. — Dittenberger already noticed it as strange, that Stratonike never refers to Antiochos (note 2 to *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 588); and with so many inscriptions known, it cannot be chance. For a queen's normal reference to her husband in the earlier part of the third century see e.g. *O. G. I.* 15 (Arsinoe); Hypsokles, B, l. 52, Berenike's offering ἐπὶ Πτολεμαίου. — There is, however, a later case to the contrary; see A. Wilhelm, *B. Ph. W.* 1912, 314, who fills up the fragment of a third-century Delian inventory (*B. C. H.* 1911, p. 259, no. 51, l. 10) as ἄλλη (i.e. φίλη) βασιλίσσης [Φί]λας τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου; and it is fair to state that Wilhelm thinks the omission of the husband normal, quoting Stratonike and the (later) Φίλα βασιλέως Θεοδώρου of Demares (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 588, l. 184, cf. ll. 13 and 213). But nothing shows that this Phila was married, and her dedication to Artemis may be against it; nor can we really say that Phthia was married either at the time. In Egypt the unmarried princesses bore the title βασιλίσσα, *O. G. I.* 35; probably also in Syria, *O. G. I.* 745; the same may have been the case in the Epeiriot royal house, closely allied to the Egyptian through Berenike. And as to offerings later than the middle of the third century, Stratonike's very numerous dedications may have set a fashion.



Stratonike (Stratonikeia). It is stated, as we should expect, that the latter foundation was made in fact by Antigonos on Stratonike's behalf. The first vases of each foundation appear under the archon Phanos in 252, rendering the year 253 the most probable year for the actual foundation.<sup>23</sup>

If any political event, any otherwise unknown victory, had led Antigonos to make this foundation, the inclusion of Stratonike would be incomprehensible. She no longer played a part in the world's politics; she was merely queen-mother in Syria; any joint action of Antigonos and Antiochos, anything bearing on Syrian policy, would have been expressed very differently. At the same time, had Stratonike's foundation been, as so many of her dedications were, of religious import only, a mere offering to Apollo, the association of Antigonos in it would be equally incomprehensible. Peace or no peace, it was well understood that Ptolemy was his enemy; and to make a merely religious foundation in the very centre of Ptolemy's empire of the sea was an impossibility; no graver insult to Egypt could be imagined. No Macedonian had appeared at Delos for many a long year; and though there was nothing to prevent any private person making his offering during the religious truce, the fact that a Macedonian king, at the head of his fleet, should appear at Delos and make there a foundation to endure for all time meant one of two things only, a triumph or a challenge.

It was in fact a challenge. Antigonos was weary of being attacked; this time he meant to be the aggressor, and end it. The only bond between himself and Stratonike and Delos

<sup>23</sup> These two foundations have long been known. See Homolle, *Archives*, 53, 59, 60; and the very clear list of all the known foundations given by Schulhof, *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 97 seq. The two series of vases come out quite clearly in the inventories of Sosisthenes (250), B, ll. 124, 125; Akridion (240), A, ll. 83, 88 (for refs. see n. 26); Boulon (234), *I. G.* xi, 313, ll. 66, 69; and Menethales (229), *I. G.* xi, 320, B, ll. 30, 34. Akridion combined with Sosisthenes and Boulon shows that the actual ἐπιγραφαί were as follows: on the vases of the Antigoneia, Δηλιάδες χορεία Ἀπόλλωνι Ἀρτέμιδι Λητοῖ ἐπιδόντος βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου ἐπ' ἄρχοντος (τοῦ δέινα), and on those of the Stratonikeia, Δηλιάδες χορεία Ἀπόλλωνι Ἀρτέμιδι Λητοῖ ὑπὲρ βασιλίσσης Στρατονίκης ἐπ' ἄρχοντος (τοῦ δέινα); that is to say, the latter foundation was not made by Stratonike, but by Antigonos on her behalf. It is clear that the Stratonike in question was Antigonos' sister; he could not possibly have made an offering on behalf of the young Stratonike while entirely omitting her husband, his son the crown prince Demetrios.

(religion and Seleukid politics being alike put out of the question) was simply this, that both he and Stratonike were children of Demetrios, sometime lord of Delos and the Aegean; and this is the explanation of his action. There were still many alive who remembered the last occasion on which Macedonian keels had furrowed the waters of the Egyptian lake; thirty years had passed since Antigonos and his warships had brought home Demetrios' ashes. Now, at the head of a new fleet, Antigonos once more recalled his father's memory; he announced plainly, to Ptolemy and the world, that the son of Demetrios claimed, and was ready to fight for, his father's heritage. Delos had been the centre of Demetrios' rule of the sea, as it was now the centre of that of Ptolemy; and from Delos Antigonos dictated what was virtually his declaration of war. Whether for the time being he took actual possession of Delos or not is a question entirely immaterial. Antigonos knew perfectly, as every one must have known, that he could not assume to act as lord of Delos till he had defeated Ptolemy's fleet. It was enough that he had issued a challenge which no great Power could overlook; Ptolemy's fleet must meet him in due time.<sup>29</sup>

But the appearance of Antigonos in the Aegean, when the reason was understood, created something like a panic there. It was known that he was now good friends with Aetolia; where he went, the dreaded Aetolian corsair might follow. Perhaps Egypt was not as strong as her dependants hoped, or feared; she had come badly out of the last war; did the new turn of events mean that Egypt might no longer be able to defend them? Kos, Ptolemy's own birth-place, began to send messengers over half the world to get her great temple of Asklepios recognized as inviolable;<sup>30</sup> and her invitation

<sup>29</sup> Antigonos also dedicated a gold crown at Delos about this time, Sosthenes, B, l. 63. It is conceivable that he fought a battle of some kind with the Egyptian cruisers, and took temporary possession of Delos; but, if so, this was *not* the battle of Kos, i.e. the decisive battle after which he dedicated his flagship; and there was no question of an attempted transfer to him of the suzerainty of the League of the Islanders (as suggested by Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 190).

<sup>30</sup> A number of responses to the Koan invitation were found by R. Herzog, and will be published in the Kos volume of *J. G.* See meanwhile *Ath. Mitt.* 1905, p. 173; *Arch. Anz.* 1903, pp. 9, 10. Herzog dates it 'about 250'; *Arch. Anz.* 1905, p. 11.

to Pella laid the greatest stress (as was only natural in the circumstances) on the goodwill she felt toward King Antigonos and the Macedonians.<sup>31</sup> Apollo of Delos went straighter to the point; he prayed assistance from Apollo of Delphi; Aetolia could not decently support one sanctuary and sack the other. The Aetolians acted with correctness; they passed a decree guaranteeing to Delos safety from all corsairs of Aetolia or her League; a prominent citizen of Aetolia, Nikolaos son of Hagias, an elderly man already known at Delos, bore the decree to the island, and offered there to Apollo a valuable ring and a sum of money for a perpetual foundation of the usual type, known as the Nikolaeia. The grateful Delians voted a statue to Nikolaos; and in the Delian accounts for the year 250 can be seen an entry showing the sum paid to one Neogenes, a stone-cutter, for engraving on a stele the Aetolian guarantee.<sup>32</sup> The larger world outside the Aegean must have watched with great interest to see what Ptolemy would do. To most men living, the Egyptian rule of the sea must have seemed one of the root facts of civilization; it had been undisturbed for thirty-four years.

The old voluptuary of Alexandria took up Antigonos' challenge after his own fashion. He began, it is true, to build more great ships;<sup>33</sup> but this was a precautionary measure only, in view of absolute eventualities. He did not

<sup>31</sup> This appears from the unpublished response of the men of Pella; see ch. 7, n. 54. Obviously such phraseology could only be used in a time of peace between Egypt and Macedonia.

<sup>32</sup> Sosisthenes A, l. 80, payment to Neogenes for engraving τὸ δόγμα τὸ Αἰτωλῶν. A fragment of this δόγμα is extant, running Δαλί[οι]ς εἴμεν ἀσφύλειαν τὰ [ἀ]π' Αἰτωλῶν καὶ τῶν πό[λεων]; P. Roussel and J. Hatzfeld in *B. C. H.* 1909, p. 482, no. 8, note 4.—Nikolaos; an offering of his at Delos before 279; Hypsokles B, l. 83.—The first vase of the Nikolaeia appears in 251, archon Artysileos; Sosisthenes B, l. 126; see Schulhof, *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 106 seq. Probably therefore founded in 252. The very complete inventories of Akridion, Boulon, and Menethales (see n. 26), all list the Nikolaeia next after the Stratonikeia.—His ring, with a precious stone; Sosisthenes B, l. 46. His statue at Delos; *B. C. H.* 1909, 481, no. 8.—The ἐπιγραφὴ on the vases of the Nikolaeia seems to be in the usual form (Akridion, l. 90); Δηλιάδες χοίρεία Ἀπόλλωνι Ἀρτέμιδι Δητοὶ ἐπιδόντος Νικολάου Αἰτωλοῦ.

<sup>33</sup> It appears that at some time contemporary with, or not long before, the building of Antigonos' ship, the largest of Ptolemy's vessels was a πεντεκαίδεκτήρης; i.e. he had stopped just short of where Demetrios got to before his death. Afterwards he built up to τριακοντήρης, whether they were used or not. See *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 209 seq.



intend to mobilize his fleet and put to sea; he had never yet looked on a drawn sword. But in the art of spinning diplomatic webs he was a past master; and there were plenty of others who would draw the sword in exchange for his gold. Antigonos might be well enough among the clumsy rustics of Macedonia;<sup>34</sup> it was time to show the world that he was but as a clumsy rustic himself in the hands of the subtle king of Egypt.

The workings of Egyptian diplomacy are hidden from us; we only see the result. But the result stands out with startling clearness. Egypt neither moved a man nor launched a ship; but Antigonos found himself brought up short, his friends gone, his fleet paralysed, another set of dreary wars on hand. Of all the checks which he had suffered in his time, this must have seemed the worst; the world may very well have thought it checkmate. Ptolemy had read men a lesson in the power of gold; could Antigonos recover himself yet again, as he had done so often?

The first blow fell in a quarter where Antigonos may have thought himself more than secure. His trusted half-brother Krateros was dead, and his power and honours had been allowed to devolve on his son Alexander. But Alexander had other thoughts than loyalty; and his desire to be himself a king made him an instrument ready to Ptolemy's hand. In the winter of 253/2 he threw off his allegiance to Antigonos, and proclaimed himself king in his viceroyalty, Corinth and Euboea.<sup>35</sup> It was not a great kingdom; but it was a

<sup>34</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 178 B; Philip II said the Macedonians were *σκαίους φύσει καὶ ἀγροίκους καὶ τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγοντας*.

<sup>35</sup> The revolt; Trog. *Prol.* 26. Alexander as an independent king; *I. G.* ii, 5, 371 c and 591 b. His kingdom included Corinth, Plut. *Arat.* 17 and 18; and Euboea; Suidas, *Euphorion*; A. Wilhelm in *Εφ. Ἀρχ.* 1892, p. 127 (decree of Eretria). On a possible coin of his, a didrachm of Karystos, J. Six in *Num. Chron.* 1894, p. 299; but Head<sup>2</sup> 357, n. 1 does not think it can be so early. — The chronology is now certain within narrow limits. He had not revolted in summer 253, since Antigonos must then have had all his fleet; and he was, as Beloch has shown, in revolt when Aratos took Sikyon, for Nikokles (against whom Antigonos had promised Aratos help) was Alexander's friend, so that the help which nearly came to him from Corinth must have been help from Alexander. I may add that the independence of Alexander at this time, and his friendship with Nikokles, are alike required to explain why Antigonos could not reach Nikokles, and why Aratos, who sought help against Nikokles from Antigonos and Ptolemy, did not apply to



vastly important one. It contained Antigonos' two principal naval bases, Corinth and Chalkis; and it deprived Antigonos of the best part of his fleet, for the revolt was timed of course to take place when the squadrons of Chalkis and Corinth were laid up for the winter. There was no longer any question of the Egyptian sea-command being challenged. The fortresses, too, gripped Athens in their arms, and Alexander forthwith attacked that town. It was now seen how wisely Antigonos had acted in keeping Piraeus and the Attic forts separate from Krateros' viceroyalty; for Herakleitos, their commander, remained loyal.<sup>36</sup> Alexander secured the aid of certain pirates, probably from Crete,<sup>37</sup> who may have been subsidized by Egypt: but Herakleitos received the hearty co-operation, not only of Athens herself, but also of Argos and its tyrant Aristomachos; and the two cities together maintained the war against Alexander.<sup>38</sup> Once more, and for the last time, Antigonos' system of tyrants appeared to be justifying its existence.

But Ptolemy succeeded in a greater achievement even than this. It had become almost a basic fact in politics that the Seleukid should be friendly to Antigonos and hostile to Egypt: and Antigonos in fact had a definite alliance with Antiochos.<sup>39</sup> But Antiochos, though preparing for war, was in desperate need of money; and he may have been somewhat tired of his wife Laodike's imperious nature. Ptolemy bought him outright for a younger wife and a huge sum in cash down. That was the essence of the transaction; it was

Alexander, though he was so near at hand. — (De Sanctis in *Klio*, 1909, p. 1, has again argued that Nikokles was Antigonos' friend, but has no good reasons.) — If then Aratos took Sikyon in May 251 (see n. 50), Alexander's revolt, which must have occurred when the fleet was laid up, must be winter 253/2 or winter 252/1. As I believe that the revolution in Megalopolis was in 252 (n. 43), and that it is unlikely that Antigonos had his fleet all 252 and did nothing, I conclude that Alexander revolted in the winter or early spring of 253/2.

<sup>36</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 220 = *I. G.* ii, 5, 591 b.

<sup>37</sup> *Ib.* The pirates came from Epilimnios, which seems unknown.

<sup>38</sup> *I. G.* ii, 5, 371 c. The Athenians, while praising Aristomachos, speak of the co-operation of the Argives; perhaps one of many signs that Aristomachos' rule was popular. (See ch. 10, p. 280.)

<sup>39</sup> Antiochos I even reckoned Antigonos I among his *πρόγονοι*, perhaps as having ruled in part of his kingdom; *O. G. I.* 222, n. 10. (Unless it be a bit of royal 'common form'.)

of course decently veiled. Antiochos repudiated Laodike on some unknown charge and wedded Berenike, Ptolemy's daughter; as her dowry she brought with her such a great sum in money that she became known to history as *φερνοφόρος*, the well-dowered.<sup>40</sup> Laodike and her sons retired to Ephesos; the relationship of Syria to Egypt became a close one; and when Berenike bore Antiochos a son, the friendship of the two courts, and the consequent hostility of Antiochos to Antigonos, seemed to be permanently assured.

Even lesser powers did not escape Ptolemy's far-reaching combinations. Bithynia, for instance, had been a consistent friend to Antigonos: but the new king, Ziaelas, had come to the throne in despite of his half-brothers, who were wards of Antigonos and Ptolemy jointly, and had therefore (whatever the exact nature of the compromise arranged by the Herakleots) entered on his career in a spirit of opposition to both the great Powers. Such an attitude, of course, could not last; Ziaelas had to favour one or the other; and Ptolemy, possibly by playing upon the natural dread of Antiochos which the Bithynian felt, possibly by helping the young king to pay his Gallic mercenaries, had known how to win him to his side. Ziaelas, in an official letter written about this time, refers to Ptolemy as his 'friend and ally'.<sup>41</sup>

Ptolemy had indeed accomplished much. But fortune was doing even more for him than he had planned.

It has been seen that in the dark days that followed the surrender of Athens, the philosopher Arkesilaos, true in this to the spirit of Plato's school, had, in his political detachment, kept alive the flame of patriotism, and something more. Some of those who surrounded him became passionate devotees of the freedom, not of this or that city only, but of Hellas—of any Greek community that needed help. Among these were two exiles from Megalopolis, named Ekdemos and Demophanes. Their very names are uncertain, and variously given in the tradition;<sup>42</sup> their exploits became

<sup>40</sup> Jerome on *Dan.* 11, 6.

<sup>41</sup> Letter of Ziaelas to the Koans, in reply to their request for *ἀσυλία* for the Asklepion; R. Herzog, *Ath. Mitt.* 1905, p. 173; *ὅντα ἡμέτερον φίλον καὶ σύμμαχον*.

<sup>42</sup> See ch. 11, n. 65. — On the variants (Ekdemos, Ekdelos; Demophanes,

almost a legend. Born at Megalopolis, a city whose best days were yet before her, and whose sons were to add to the Greek roll of honour the names of Lydiades, Philopoimen, and Polybios, they belonged to a community which was the traditional friend of Macedonia; possibly they had been banished because they had thought otherwise. Whether at Athens they made the acquaintance, as is generally supposed, of another pupil of Arkesilaos, Demetrios the Fair, and whether they may have accompanied him to Cyrene or not is entirely uncertain; it is not likely that Demetrios was in Athens after 266, and it is very possible that Ekdemos and Demophanes were not there so soon. What is certain is that somewhere about this time, most probably in 252, they slew Aristodemos the tyrant and 'freed' Megalopolis.<sup>43</sup> Aristodemos was called 'the Good'; but it was always immaterial, to a philosophic Greek republican, whether an unconstitutional monarch was good or bad; he was to be slain for being unconstitutional. It was an axiom with a Greek democrat, no less than with certain modern historians, that the very worst democracy was infinitely better than the very best 'tyranny'—a conventional view which neglects the uncomfortable fact that the tyranny of a democracy can be the worst in the world. This reflection, however, does not affect Megalopolis, whose new democratic government

Damophanes, Megalophanes), see Beloch 3, 1, 635, n. 2. I have kept Polybios' forms in the text, with von Arnim in *P. W.* 1905, s.v. *Ekdemos*, though both Niese and Beloch prefer Ekdelos. — Is it an accident that both names are compounded of -demos?

<sup>43</sup> Plutarch, *Philop.* 1 and Polyb. 10, 22, 2 both give their exploits in order thus: (1) Megalopolis, (2) Sikyon, (3) Cyrene. Neither passage *alone*, I admit, could settle the chronology, and Beloch transposes (2) and (1). But if the two passages be compared, it appears that they must have a common source, and that common source some way back, for the facts agree while the language differs; and I am not prepared to say that this common and early source was wrong. Consequently Megalopolis comes first. And as the revolution there involved the overthrow of a friend of Antigonos', I take it that it was stimulated by Alexander's example. It has to fall, then, between Alexander's revolt in winter 253/2 (see n. 35) and the liberation of Sikyon in May 251 (see n. 50); i.e. in 252. We cannot suppose that it fell *before* Alexander's revolt, i.e. in 253, when Antigonos at the height of his power was issuing his challenge to Egypt. — The date 252 for the revolution at Megalopolis explains, both why Aristodemos does not appear in the war against Alexander, and why Antigonos took no steps against Megalopolis; he could no longer reach it.

justified its existence. It appears that the Arkadian League was revived for a few years, with Megalopolis at its head;<sup>44</sup> for the fall of Aristodemos had freed the other towns which he ruled. It was a blow to Antigonos, with whom Megalopolis now ceased to be in direct relations; and it prevented him from securing the assistance of Arkadia in conjunction with that of Argos for the war against Alexander. But to the actual balance of power in the Peloponnese it made little difference; for the new league of necessity took up an attitude of opposition to Sparta.<sup>45</sup>

But, for Antigonos, worse was yet to come. It is almost a commonplace that a great idea is apt to strike more than one person at the same time; and the spirit of liberty was stirring in other places beside the classroom of Arkesilaos. To speak of it as the ghost of Grecian liberty rising from its tomb is absurd. The Greek love for freedom had never died, had never even slept, as the ceaseless struggles here recorded sufficiently show. What differentiated the new movement from its various predecessors was simply this, that, up to a certain point, it was successful. It owed its success to a number of reasons; an improved form of political organization was only one of them. But the principal cause was a man.

Of all the opponents whom Antigonos encountered in his time, Aratos of Sikyon<sup>46</sup> was far and away the most dangerous; and Antigonos met him very late in life. Aratos was not a great man; he was not even a good man. No one has ever made of him more than half a hero; his faults

<sup>44</sup> For this revived Arkadian League see Niese, *Hermes*, 34, 542; Beloch 3, 2, 441 seq. It seems to me that there is enough to establish it even independently of the question of the date of *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 106, which has recently been again dated to the fourth century by H. von Gaertringen, *Ath. Mitt.* 36, 349, on fresh evidence.—How the synoikismos of Orchomenos and Euaimon, which may fall somewhere about the middle of the century (F. Solmsen in *Rhein. Mus.* 1910, p. 321), fits in, is quite obscure.

<sup>45</sup> See Beloch, *l.c.*, on the defeat by this league of a Spartan army at Mantinea.

<sup>46</sup> For Aratos; Plutarch's *Life*, and Polyb. 2, 43 seq.; both based on Aratos' memoirs, both also using Phylarchos. For the character of these sources see generally App. 1. In Aratos' memoirs we have to allow, not only for vehement anti-Macedonian bias, but also for strong personal colouring; they were in fact Aratos' apology for his life (cf. Wilamowitz, *Gr. Lit.* 117).—The fullest modern account is still that of Freeman, *History of*



were too glaring. As statesman, politician, intriguer, he was no doubt supremely able; the influence which he came to wield over the Achaean League was amazing; his successes were great, and he was absolutely incorruptible. He planned in his time a number of night attacks and surprises that were capably and courageously carried through. There, from the material point of view, Aratos ends. It is not necessary to reproach him with his failures in the field; it was the fault of the polity under which he lived that he could not hold the office of president of the League, for which he was the obvious person, without being at the same time commander-in-chief, for which post he had every possible disqualification. We are bound to believe that he was a personal coward in battle; for the only alternative is that he was a traitor, and that seems out of the question. If Antigonos had once allowed the end to justify the means, Aratos did it whenever he chose. To hire assassins against a 'tyrant' was no doubt considered fair play by his contemporaries; but none were found to justify such acts as his attack on Athens in a time of profound peace, or to believe his excuse, that a subordinate had acted without orders. He was too jealous to allow any other prominent man at his side; no means were too low to undermine or counter the influence of a rival.<sup>47</sup> His relations with Lydiades, who was able and honest, form one of the most pitifully mean chapters of history; and there is no need here to relate how at the end he stultified his whole life's work from jealousy and terror of Kleomenes of Sparta, an infinitely greater and nobler man than himself.

It may then well be asked, what it was that made Aratos so dangerous, and why he was such a force in his world. The answer is not far to seek. At the outset of his career, Aratos was a man utterly possessed by one great passion; and a man so possessed is perhaps the most formidable force known. Hannibal himself did not hate Rome more thoroughly than Aratos hated a 'tyrant'. His whole being

*Federal Government*, 1861 (ed. J. B. Bury, 1893). It should not be necessary to-day to emphasize the partisan character of this great work; in parts it is a political pamphlet.

<sup>47</sup> See the story of how Argos became included in the League; Plut. *Arat.* 35, Freeman, *Federal Government*, 331-4.

was filled with a single thought; that the Peloponnese must be freed, and that he must free it.<sup>48</sup> It was with the stupendous driving power of this idea behind him that he went forward; and against an idea the swords of Gallic mercenaries are drawn in vain.<sup>49</sup>

It is in the year 252/1, soon after the revolt of Alexander and the liberation of Megalopolis, that Aratos first appears on the scene.<sup>50</sup> Sikyon had for many years been ruled by tyrants, but (as already narrated) a change had come about the time of the war with Pyrrhos, when for a short interval the city had been a democracy under the guidance of two leading citizens, Timokleidas and Aratos' father Kleinias. Aratos was born in 271, the year after Pyrrhos' death. Timokleidas died, and in the course of the year 264, perhaps as a consequence of the defeat and death of Areus of Sparta, one Abantidas slew Kleinias and made himself tyrant of the city. The little Aratos, however, then seven years old, escaped through the kindness of Abantidas' sister, and was sent to Argos; Abantidas could not reach him there under the strong rule of Antigonos' friend Aristomachos, and there he grew to manhood, to reward Aristomachos in after years by trying to assassinate him.<sup>51</sup> Abantidas remained in power till the general ferment of the year 252, when two men, Deinias, probably the historian,<sup>52</sup> and one Aristoteles, a philo-

<sup>48</sup> Polyb. 2, 43, 7-8; and Aratos' whole career.

<sup>49</sup> Wilamowitz, *Antigonos*, 218, 'Geister bannt man nicht mit keltischen Garnisonen.'

<sup>50</sup> Chronology. — Polybios 2, 43 makes Sikyon join the League in 251/50; its liberation is therefore generally put in May 251. Ferguson argues for May 252 (*J. H. S.* 1910, p. 197, n. 38), but I do not find his argument convincing. Plutarch shows that Sikyon joined the League *before* Aratos got his twenty-five talents (*Arat.* 11), and Aratos' voyage to Egypt is much later; he was only recently home when Antigonos was back in Corinth in 247 (*Arat.* 15). There seems no reason to depart from the accepted belief, which accords with Plutarch, that Aratos joined Sikyon to the League almost immediately after its liberation. — Polybios also fixes Aratos' first generalship to 245, and makes him twenty-six at the time (born in 271). Beloch (3, 2, 179) says Polybios must be mistaken, as no one could be strategos under thirty. But Beloch's instances of a thirty-year limit (for lesser offices) belong to a much later period; and I cannot believe that Polybios, with Aratos' memoirs before him, made a mistake as to his age.

<sup>51</sup> As Aristomachos was Antigonos' friend, Abantidas was therefore probably not. — See Plut. *Arat.* 25.

<sup>52</sup> Susemihl 1, 633, and Beloch 3, 1, 634, identify this Deinias with the historian. In *P. W.*, 'Deinias,' 7 (Schwartz) and 8 (Natorp), they are separated.

sopher—perhaps another of Arkesilaos' friends, for he is called a dialectician—rose against him and slew him. They could not, however, free the city, for Paseas, Abantidas' father, succeeded in grasping the tyranny for himself, which means that he secured the allegiance of Abantidas' mercenaries. One Nikokles, however, managed to slay Paseas by guile, and ruled in his stead. He ruled badly, and was nearly turned out by Antigonos' friends the Aetolians;<sup>53</sup> but he survived the attack, whatever it was, having strengthened himself by securing the friendship or alliance of Alexander of Corinth.<sup>54</sup>

Meanwhile Aratos had grown up in Argos into a capable and athletic youth, and his own sense and his father's reputation caused the Sikyonian exiles, who had gathered at Argos, to look to him as their leader. The bloodshed at Sikyon turned their thoughts toward action, and Aratos applied for help both to Antigonos and Ptolemy. Ptolemy, of course, was not going to act against a friend of Alexander's. Aratos says that Antigonos promised help and did not send it; but it is obvious, both that Antigonos had no means of reaching Sikyon himself, and also that he would have been glad enough, if he could, to have put down Nikokles, the friend of Alexander. As, however, Nikokles only ruled for a short time,<sup>55</sup> it is more than likely that the Aetolian assault upon him, whatever it was, was Antigonos' method of redeeming his promise, the only way in which he could do so.

Aratos thereon resolved to put down Nikokles himself; his confidants were another Aristomachos,<sup>56</sup> a Sikyonian exile, and the famous friends Ekdemos and Demophanes, who came from Megalopolis to aid the new undertaking.<sup>57</sup> The picturesque narrative of the night surprise of Sikyon in May 251 may be read in the pages of Plutarch; how Aratos threw Nikokles' spies off their guard by an ostenta-

<sup>53</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 4. I do not know how far ἐπιβουλευομένην is meant to go.

<sup>54</sup> See n. 35.

<sup>55</sup> It is not clear to me that Plut. *Arat.* 4 means that Nikokles only ruled four months *altogether*, as is generally supposed.

<sup>56</sup> A statue base bearing his name, Ἀριστόμαχος Σωσάνδρου Σικυνώνιος, has been found at Delphi (Pomtow, *B. Ph. W.* 1909, 286).

<sup>57</sup> Plut. *Philop.* 1; Polyb. 10, 22, 2. Plut. *Arat.* 5 mentions Ekdemos only.

tious devotion to eating and drinking; how the friends got the fortifications of Sikyon measured, and had scaling-ladders openly prepared by one of the exiles, a professed ladder-maker; how they hired some brigands, the 'arch-klepht' Xenophilos and his band; how on the appointed night they came up to the walls through a market garden, having locked the gardener in his house but failed to catch his dogs, which were small and quarrelsome and would not make friends; how the little dogs nearly wrecked the whole undertaking, which was saved by Aratos' spirit; how Mnasiatheos and Ekdemos were first over the wall, and Aratos secured the whole of the tyrant's mercenaries as they slept; and how at dawn, as the citizens were clustering together, ignorant and in wonder of what had happened, on their ears fell the startling cry of the herald, 'Aratos, son of Kleinias, calls his countrymen to their freedom.' The tyrant's house was fired and plundered, the sight of the flames nearly bringing Alexander's men from Corinth down upon them; but no blood was spilt, even Nikokles himself escaping. Aratos recalled all the Sikyonian exiles, whether banished by Nikokles or by earlier tyrants; and, seeing the difficulties of the time, he took the all-important step of finding support for Sikyon by uniting it, a Dorian city, to the league of the ten towns of Achaea, a league whose constitution he is said to have admired greatly.<sup>58</sup>

Aratos had shown his quality; nor was he likely to stop here. His proceedings at this time were of course in no sense aimed at Antigonos; they were directed merely to the freeing of the Peloponnese. So far as he had a particular opponent, that opponent was Alexander of Corinth, who had been a friend of Nikokles, and was Antigonos' enemy. Any opponent of Alexander was of use to Antigonos; and it was probably at this time that Antigonos sent Aratos a present of twenty-five talents, of which the Sikyonian made honour-

<sup>58</sup> Polyb. 2, 43, 3.—The worthless story that he joined Sikyon to the Achaean League because it was *φθονομένην ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου* (Plut. *Arat.* 9) is a mere afterthought of Aratos' own, and is refuted by his subsequent acceptance of twenty-five talents from Antigonos (see next note); it was quite uncertain at this time, to Antigonos, whether Aratos, who had just overthrown an enemy of his, was not going to be his friend.



able use in freeing prisoners and aiding destitute citizens.<sup>59</sup> Whether as a consequence of this, or merely in pursuit of his own ideas, Aratos' next move was an attempt on Corinth, which failed; but Alexander was alarmed, and managed to secure an alliance with the Achaeans.<sup>60</sup> This must have taken place shortly after the accession of Sikyon to the Achaean League; and, to be just to Aratos, the alliance, at this time, can have been none of his doing; he had not yet the conduct of the affairs of the League, unofficially or otherwise. So far it had looked to be an open question, to any one not well acquainted with Aratos, whether Antigonos might not turn his exploits to his own advantage; but the alliance between Alexander and the League definitely ranged the League, and Aratos as a member of it, on the side of Antigonos' avowed enemy, Ptolemy.

Meanwhile the war between Antigonos and Alexander continued its dreary progress. An Athenian decree in honour of Aristomachos of Argos tells that Alexander offered the latter favourable terms to detach him from the alliance, but the 'tyrant' loyally refused to make peace apart from his allies, and even advanced the latter money;<sup>61</sup> another decree shows that Herakleitos successfully defended Salamis from attack.<sup>62</sup> Alexander, however, seems to have been too strong for the allies, and at some time which cannot be exactly ascertained compelled Argos and Athens to make peace and recognize him in his kingship.<sup>63</sup> He still, of course, remained in a state of war with Antigonos.

It is difficult to make out what Antigonos was doing in this war.<sup>64</sup> He was not doing nothing; and indeed Polybios

<sup>59</sup> See Holleaux, *Hermes*, 1906, p. 475. It is not possible to say whether Aratos' attack on Alexander, referred to out of place in Plut. *Arat.* 18, preceded or followed Antigonos' gift. But the two things must be connected; Antigonos' aim was Alexander, and not, as Holleaux thinks, Sikyon.

<sup>60</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 18.

<sup>61</sup> *I. G.* ii. 5, 371 c.

<sup>62</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 220.

<sup>63</sup> This follows from *I. G.* ii. 5, 371 c. Ferguson (*Priests*, 166) dated this decree 250/49 or 249/8; but Kolbe (*Archonten*, 61) seems right in saying that nothing in the decree shows that Alexander was yet alive. The decree then cannot help us as to when the war ended; but it can hardly have lasted longer than 249, because of Alexander's death, on which see ch. 13, n. 5.

<sup>64</sup> Ferguson (*Athens*, p. 193) conjectures that Antigonos was occupied in resisting Egypt's reconquest of the Cyclades. But he had lost all the best of his fleet.

expressly refers to the manifold activities of these later years of his life.<sup>65</sup> There was no question of Aristomachos and Athens being left unsupported; for Herakleitos was Antigonos' general in command, and no doubt properly furnished with troops. But Antigonos himself was engaged elsewhere; and it is never very hard to guess what a king of Macedonia is doing when he vanishes from view. Every one of Antigonos' successors was perpetually being interrupted, even in the most important undertakings, by the necessity of hurrying to the northern frontier to meet the Dardanians or some other foe; and it may be noted that about now a new force appears in the north. A Germanic people, the Bastarnae—the first Germans to appear in history—were on the move, shifting their seats from the Carpathians to the lower Danube; their movements may have set up corresponding movements in the tribes to the north of Macedonia. Trogus thought that the movements of the Bastarnae had sufficient bearing upon Antigonid history, long before the time of Philip V, to warrant an interruption in his narrative while he told the story of this new migration;<sup>66</sup> and doubtless it was the incorporation of broken or fugitive clans that gave to the Dardanians that great access of strength which enabled them, a few years later, to wage their successful war against Demetrios II.<sup>67</sup> It is very tempting to put the incorporation of Paionia by Antigonos at this time, and to connect it with the movements in the north just referred to, even if we do

<sup>65</sup> Polyb. 2, 43, 9, πολυπραγμοσύνη.

<sup>66</sup> Trog. *Prol.* 28. — Movements of the Bastarnae, A. J. Reinach, *B. C. H.* 1910, p. 249. — The question of their nationality has naturally been much discussed. A. J. Reinach has promised a fresh examination of the question in the *Revue Celtique*; but at present the Germanic theory holds the field. See F. Stähelin, 'Der Eintritt der Germanen in die Geschichte' (*Festschrift für Theodor Pluss*, 1905, p. 46); O. Fiebiger, *Jahresh.* 1911, Beibl. 61; *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, vol. i, p. 190. But it is admitted that in the third and second centuries B.C. the Greeks called them Galatians; and as the employment of Gallic mercenaries had familiarized many Greeks with the Gallic idiom, the consequence (not, I think, drawn) is, that we have here a German people who had adopted Celtic civilization so thoroughly as to use the Celtic speech. It is quite possible that some of the 'Belgic' tribes of Gaul were in like case; Caesar, *B. G.* 2, 4; Tac. *Germania*, 28; see J. Rhys, *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 1905-6, p. 130.

<sup>67</sup> Something of the sort is wanted to explain the large forces of armed slaves owned by the Dardanians; Agatharch., fr. 12, in *F. H. G.* iii, 194.

not suppose that Ptolemy's far-reaching combinations extended to the Paionian king.

This, then, was the position by about the year 249. Alexander victorious and well established; Antiochos firmly bound to the interests of Egypt; Megalopolis and Arkadia detached from Antigonos, the Achaeans and Sikyon allied with Alexander; Antigonos' influence in the Peloponnese resting solely upon Aristomachos of Argos, and perhaps on the rulers of this or that small city of the Argolid; above all, his new fleet paralysed, and in large part lost. The second round of the struggle was over, and it had given a crushing advantage to Egypt at every point, unless in the far north. The Egyptian fleets were again parading the Aegean without meeting a hostile keel; that sea was still an Egyptian lake; confidence in Egypt's power was fully restored;<sup>68</sup> and Ptolemy personally had nothing to do but to emphasize his bloodless victory in the eyes of the world by sending his fleet to Delos, in the year 249, and there establishing in Apollo's honour the foundation which we know as the second Ptolemaieia.<sup>69</sup> It was his proclamation to all men that he was still lord of the sea.

<sup>68</sup> An Egyptian fleet was at Delos in 250; *I. G.* xi, 287, (Sosisthenes), A, l. 82, ὅτε ἀνήχθη ὁ στόλος. Note also the large amount of work put in hand at Delos that year; *ib.* A, ll. 89-122.

<sup>69</sup> The first vase appears under Badros, 248; Akridion, A, l. 76; also in Boulon and Menethales. (Refs. notes 26 and 28.) See Schulhof, *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 106. Akridion gives the ἐπιγραφὴ; [Δηλιάδες χορεΐα Ἀ]πό[λλωνι Ἀ]ρτέμειδι Δητῶι ἐπιδόντος βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου ἐπ' ἀρχοντος (τοῦ δεΐνα).

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE RECKONING WITH EGYPT

EGYPT's success had indeed been great, but it was a success based on diplomatic combinations and on gold. It did not really touch the crucial question between the two great Powers at all. That which diplomacy and fortune had made, fortune and diplomacy might unmake; but the root of the matter, after all, was simply whether Egypt could face Antigonos' Macedonians if and when the time came. The effective force in living men was on Antigonos' side; it remained to be seen whether the substitute provided by diplomacy had any elements of permanence.

However, for a little longer, fortune smiled on Egypt. It had looked possible at one time that Aratos might be the friend of Antigonos; and Antigonos had even sent him a present of twenty-five talents, as already related. But twenty-five talents were of little use to Aratos. The return of the exiles to Sikyon had created the usual tangle of difficulties in the town, which Aratos was expected to put straight.<sup>1</sup> Men who had had to leave home thirty or forty years before expected their property to be restored to them intact; that property had perhaps changed hands more than once in the interval, and was actually held by some innocent purchaser for value, who had not even notice of its origin. Aratos was constantly being called on to decide that hardest of hard cases, which of two innocent parties was to suffer; he could neither do justice—in such cases there is no possibility of justice—nor could he please the citizens and smooth out trouble. The only way out of the difficulty was to raise money enough to pay the claims of the exiles in cash; and, now that the Achaean League had become the ally of Anti-

<sup>1</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 12 and 14.



gonos' enemy Alexander, the only source of supply on a large scale open to Aratos was Ptolemy's treasury. Some time after the formation of that alliance—probably in 249 or 248<sup>2</sup>—things had become so bad that Aratos resolved to go to Egypt and see Ptolemy in person. Pressure of circumstances had thus thrown him entirely on to the side of Egypt, another great gain for the king who had the power of the purse.

Aratos could not reach the Egyptian harbour of Methana-Arsinoe, as the territory of Antigonos' friend Aristomachos intervened; and, after his abortive attempt on Corinth, he did not care to put himself into his friend Alexander's hands, as he would have done had he sailed from that, the obvious, port. To embark at Sikyon's harbour, and sail down the Gulf of Corinth, was to risk capture by an Aetolian privateer; he and his friend Timanthes therefore travelled overland, through the neutral territory of Megalopolis and Messene, and took ship from the Messenian harbour of Methone, intending to round Cape Malea and make for Alexandria through the straits. They had hardly started, however, when a storm met them blowing in from the open sea; there was nothing to do but turn and run north blindly before it; whither they were going they had no more idea than the men on St. Paul's ship had in similar circumstances; and when the wind fell and they succeeded with difficulty in making land, they found themselves at Adria, a city on the Atintanian coast north of Kerkyra, and possibly the old Athenian colony of that name. This coast now belonged, as already stated, to Antigonos; and his men garrisoned the town. Aratos and Timanthes managed to avoid the garrison and hid for the night in a wood. Next day the commander of the town took possession of the ship and cargo, declaring that, as the Achaean League was Alexander's ally, they were enemies' goods; but he was put off Aratos' track by the slaves of the latter, who, as instructed, met him and said that Aratos himself had already escaped and was on his way to Alexander.

<sup>2</sup> Evidently, from the story, the journey and the stay in Egypt occupied some time, and Aratos was back, but not long back, by the latter part of 247; see *post*, p. 374.

A few days after, Aratos and his friend had the good luck to be picked up by a Roman privateer, bound southward to work the trade route between Carthage and Phoenicia; they persuaded the captain to take them as far on his course as Karia, from whence in due course they reached Egypt.<sup>3</sup> Aratos won Ptolemy's ear by talking to the old dilettante about pictures, and promising him some good examples of the Sikyonian school of painting, a promise he afterwards fulfilled; and when he returned home, he brought with him, partly in cash and partly in promises, the magnificent sum of 150 talents. There was no more trouble in Sikyon.

Somewhere, too, about the same time the breach between Antigonos and Antiochos widened. When and in what circumstances the younger Stratonike left her husband Demetrios cannot now be made out; all that is certain is the fact that she did leave him and returned to her brother Antiochos, and that this happened some time before 247, or at the latest early in that year. To attempt to reconcile the inconsistent notices of the matter in our wretched authorities is waste of time: it is enough to note that it marks a new cause of differ-

<sup>3</sup> Strangely as it reads, this is only a paraphrase of Plut. *Arat.* 12, merely keeping the difficult MS. reading 'Αδρίας instead of the arbitrary and indefensible alteration 'Ανδρον, which has been generally adopted by historians (luckily not by Sintenis in the Teubner edition). — Παράφερόμενος is 'borne along the coast' or 'borne in the wrong direction'. A wind from the sea meeting a ship putting out from Methone could not carry it to Andros, as the Peloponnese is in the way; while ὥς . . . χρησιμοποιέμενος shows that the ship never actually reached the strait (between Kythera and the mainland). — Antigonos' nearest coast-garrison would be in Atintania. The distance from Methone is not greater than that travelled in the storm by St. Paul's ship when wrecked on Malta. — The name Adria is common. For the Athenian colony see *I. G.* ii, 809 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 153. Its locality is not known, as ll. 65 seq. cannot be restored; but it is easier to suppose, with Boeckh, that it was near the other Greek towns at the entrance of the Adriatic than to place it, as Koehler suggested, near the mouth of the Po. — 'To Euboea' means 'to Alexander', king of Euboea (*Suidas*, *Euphorion*), Aratos' ally and Antigonos' enemy. Whether Aratos could really have reached him or not is immaterial; his cruisers may have been active along the coast. — A Roman ship could hardly appear at Andros; but Roman traffic down the Adriatic was going on before 228 (*Polyb.* 2, 8), even if Rome had not had privateers there long before (see ch. 2, n. 22); and after Drepana (249) Rome carried on the war against Carthage solely by privateers (*Zonaras* 8, 397 A), which exactly explains the ship that picked up Aratos. A Roman merchantman would hardly be sailing for Syria during the first Punic war; though a 'Roman', Minatus, appears as a donor at Delos by 220 (*Schulhof*, *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 81).

ence between the former allies.<sup>4</sup> It was well for Antigonos at this time that he was on good terms with Aetolia; for, except Aristomachos, he had no other independent friend.

Such was the state of things when, toward the end of 248, a new and irresistible actor appeared on the scene, and the imposing edifice reared by Ptolemy's diplomacy suddenly collapsed like the card-house of a little child. It depended on certain men's lives; there intervened Death. Within a year, or a little over, Alexander, Antiochos, and Ptolemy himself, all passed away; and the political position changed absolutely.

The first death was that of Alexander. It cannot have happened before the autumn of 249, or later than about the autumn of 248.<sup>5</sup> It meant to Antigonos that Corinth was

<sup>4</sup> The fixed points in the tangled matrimonial arrangements of Demetrios II are, first, that he had no consort in 247, for naturally Nikaia was not going to surrender Corinth on any terms but legitimate queenship: and, secondly, that he cannot therefore have married Phthia *before* 247, as she was queen, with children, in 236/5; *I. G.* ii, 5, 614 b. It is clear that he did not marry Nikaia; for the point of the emphasis laid on the purple curtains of her litter on the fateful day is, that they had been given to her *before* she had the right to them; it also appears, from Justin 28, 1, that at a later time there was a version which connected the departure of Stratonike with the marriage with Phthia, and knew nothing of Nikaia at all. As, however, the Nikaia episode, even if highly coloured, is anyhow good third century (Phylarchos), Justin must be ruled out in this respect; this can be done without hesitation, as his account contains other blunders, e.g. that Stratonike urged Antiochos II (died 247) to attack Demetrios II (*accessit* 239). Agatharchides, in the second century (*F. H. G.* iii, 196, fr. 19), makes Stratonike leave of her own accord; Justin, 'sponte sua *velut* matrimonio pulsa,' bears this out. Agatharchides appears to suggest that Seleukos II was king when she left; the Nikaia episode, however, shows that it was certainly Antiochos II, as Justin says. — Beloch's very different arrangement depends on the old dating of *I. G.* ii, 5, 614 b; and Ferguson's (*Athens*, 199; Demetrios II divorces Stratonike in 239 in order to marry Phthia), is irreconcilable both with Phylarchos (the Nikaia episode) and Agatharchides.

<sup>5</sup> Antigonos was back in Corinth some time before Ptolemy III started on his expedition; for his speech in Corinth (Plut. *Arat.* 15) cannot have been uttered, or been supposed to have been uttered, after (see n. 16). Consequently he was back at latest some time in 247. He sent Demetrios to woo Nikaia directly (*εὐθὺς*) he knew she meant to keep Corinth; and, as there are no intervening events and she was marrying for ambition, a year between Alexander's death and the recovery of Corinth is ample. Therefore the latest possible date for Alexander's death is toward the end of 248. On the other hand, he was alive in 249, when Ptolemy founded the second Ptolemaieia on Delos (for this event presupposes that Antigonos had not yet recovered his fleet); and he was alive when Aratos sailed for Egypt, probably also in 249. Alexander's death, then, can be dated with very fair certainty to some time between autumn 249 and autumn 248. — The story that Antigonos

masterless; and the old king at once turned his attention to that all-important fortress. His love for it is said to have become the passion of his life;<sup>6</sup> and there is no need to disbelieve this. Its importance had been demonstrated in all his wars; Macedonians fought for Corinth as though for a bit of their homeland.<sup>7</sup> Its possession, too, like that of Delos, was to some extent symbolical, depending on the desire of Alexander's successors to attach themselves to him by any possible tie. If Ptolemy had his grave and name-city, Antigonos, having Corinth, had something more than the homeland alone. Philip and Alexander had undertaken to conquer Persia as heads of a confederacy of Greek states formed at Corinth. When the elder Antigonos and his son were attempting to reconstitute for themselves the undivided heritage of Alexander, Demetrios' first step had been to revive the League of Corinth:<sup>8</sup> it was, so to speak, the regularization of his position. And Gonatas, when he held Corinth in fact, held in idea the heritage of Alexander in Europe, the potential headship of the Greek world: he represented the men who had formed and re-formed the League. This must have been a useful counter in the political game played between Antigonid and Lagid; for although Ptolemy Soter's attempt to reconstitute the League in 308 under his own presidency had failed,<sup>9</sup> the Lagid did not let slip the idea, witness the ceremony at the celebration of the isolympic games in honour of Ptolemy Soter. There in the procession were borne together the statues of Alexander and Ptolemy Soter, and beside Soter stood the city of Corinth crowned with a diadem of gold,<sup>10</sup> symbolic of the Corinthian League and the headship of the Greek world.

But Antigonos' desire for Corinth was more than all this.

poisoned him is absurd, and even in Plutarch it is given as gossip only; it was bound to be said whenever a death fell conveniently for any one. The whole episode is probably from Phylarchos, and therefore vehemently anti-Macedonian; and the dead man's widow was soon on excellent terms with Antigonos. — That Phylarchos in Athen. 6, 251 c refers to Alexander the Great, see Beloch 3, 2, 106.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 17.

<sup>7</sup> Livy 32, 23, 5.

<sup>8</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 25.

<sup>9</sup> Diod. 20, 37, 1 and 2; Suidas, *Demetrios*; Beloch 3, 1, 150.

<sup>10</sup> Athen. 5, 201 d. Cf. J. Delamarre, *R. Ph.* 20, p. 114; Kaerst ii, 1, p. 401.



If he had had the best of the first round of his fight with Ptolemy, Ptolemy had scored heavily in the second; whether there ever would be a third depended entirely on whether he could regain Corinth and his fleet. He was seventy-two years of age; he could not count on much more time being given to him. Small wonder that the desire for the great fortress became a consuming passion, even in an old statesman like the king.

But Alexander's death seemed to bring Antigonos no nearer to his desire. If Corinth was masterless, it had a mistress; Alexander's widow Nikaia had taken over the mercenaries and intended to hold the fortress. As soon as Antigonos was certain of her resolution, he made his mind up; for once he might imitate Ptolemy, and offer a price. It is to be remembered that he was dealing with the widow and successor of a traitor, and of one who had been a traitor under peculiarly bad circumstances, one whose life by every known law would have been forfeit if caught. He saw that advantage could now be taken of the fact that Stratonike had left Demetrios; and he forthwith sent the crown prince to Nikaia, with the offer of his hand and the reversion of the crown of Macedonia. The middle-aged woman was ambitious;<sup>11</sup> she had the common failing of so many women of the time, the desire to be a queen. She had been a queen, of a sort; Alexander had held his little court at Chalkis, and she had played patroness there to a youthful poet of great promise, Euphorion.<sup>12</sup> Now a far larger prospect opened before her; and she made no difficulty about accepting the young prince's suit. The marriage was arranged to be celebrated in Corinth with great pomp; she placed the town in Antigonos' hands before the event, but still held Akrokorinthos with her troops; and without the fortress, the town was of no value whatever. The day fixed for the marriage drew very near, and still there was no hint of Nikaia withdrawing her men. Antigonos

<sup>11</sup> On her age, Beloch 3, 2, 437. She might be about thirty-five to forty.

<sup>12</sup> See Wilamowitz, *Berliner Klassikertexte*, 5, 1, 65, n. 2 (1907), who has disposed of the gossip (based on a combination of Suidas, *Euphorion*, with Plut. *Mor.* 472 D, and already discarded by Beloch, 3, 2, 494), that Euphorion was her lover. His poem 'Alexandros' (see Skutsch, 'Euphorion' in *P. W.*, cols. 1179-80) may have been addressed to her husband Alexander.

made no sign: he gave himself up to the festivities of the occasion, as though he had no object in life but the ordering of shows and sacrifices; day after day he might be seen drinking at the banquet in joy and lightness of heart, as though he had not a care in the world. At last the chance, so eagerly awaited, came. Amoibeus was to sing in the theatre, and Antigonos himself escorted Nikaia thither in her litter, which, in anticipation of the marriage, he had had decked for the occasion with the royal purple. Nikaia's mind was completely taken up with her new honours; and, when the festive procession reached the fork in the road where the path to Akrokorinthos turned off, neither she nor her friends marked that Antigonos hung back and signed to the bearers of the litter to pass on before him. Not another thought did the old king give to Amoibeus or Nikaia; he turned and set off up the steep path which led to the citadel at a pace, despite his seventy-two years, with which his guards could hardly keep up. Arrived at the gate, he rapped impatiently on it with his staff; the sentry, utterly dumbfounded and without clear orders, opened it; resistance there was none, for most of the garrison were down at the show. Sheer audacity had made Antigonos again master of the almost impregnable fortress.<sup>13</sup>

How he recovered Euboea is not known; possibly Nikaia had already put it into his hands. Neither is it recorded what happened to Nikaia; certainly she did not marry Demetrios.<sup>14</sup> The story goes that Antigonos could not contain himself for joy of the recovery of Akrokorinthos, and was seen that night reeling through Corinth at the head of a drunken rout, a garland on his head and a wine-cup in his hand. It is the same story that is told of Philip II after Chaironeia. It may conceivably be true; but (like the whole incident) it comes from a source entirely hostile to the Antigonids, and quick to make the most of any occasion against them; it is as well to receive it with caution. That the old

<sup>13</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 17; probably from Phylarchos, ultimately. Polyæn. 4, 6, 1 is identical, except that it states that the garrison were away at the show, which may be true. ἀμυλλώμενος implies that the king had an escort.

<sup>14</sup> See note 4.

king was almost beside himself with joy we may well believe. He did not restore the viceroyalty of Corinth, so far as can be ascertained; the risk was too great. He divided the responsibility and the power, a proceeding apt to induce risks of another sort. One Archelaos was appointed strategos of Corinth, military commander of the garrison; with him, as governor of the town, was associated the philosopher Persaios, on whose loyalty Antigonos thought he could absolutely rely.<sup>15</sup>

Antigonos held a great sacrifice in Corinth as a thanksgiving for his success; and he paid Aratos, who had just returned from Egypt, the compliment of sending a portion of honour to him at Sikyon.<sup>16</sup> His object was a twofold one. The brief kingdom of Alexander was at an end, and the Achaean League had ceased to be allies of a dead man and a vanished principality; they were no longer, theoretically, in a position of hostility to Antigonos, and in fact some little while was to pass before they were again actually his enemies. Antigonos therefore thought it worth making an effort to gain Aratos; if he failed, it was always possible that he might nevertheless have made Aratos suspect in Ptolemy's eyes. At the banquet which followed the sacrifice he is said to have pronounced a eulogy of the Sikyonian. It was true that at first (so ran his speech) the young man had been dazzled by the wealth of Egypt, the elephants and the fleets and the splendour of the court, and had rather overlooked the less showy merits of a Macedonian alliance; but his liberal nature had now made him a juster critic of royalty; he had been behind the scenes,

<sup>15</sup> Persaios was not general. He was governor, ἄρχων, Plut. *Arat.* 18; I presume that by this atticism epistates is meant. (On the resemblance see Dittenberger's note on *O. G. I.* 44.) The general, στρατηγός, who commanded the troops was the Macedonian Archelaos; Plut. *Arat.* 23; Polyæn. 6, 5. It is true that in *Arat.* 22 he is called ἡγεμών, and in Egypt the ἡγεμών was inferior to the στρατηγός (P. M. Meyer, *Heerwesen*, p. 26); but naturally one cannot apply this to Plutarch.

<sup>16</sup> This chapter (*Arat.* 15) is the key to the chronology of Alexander (see note 5). Sokolow (*Klio*, 3, 129) first saw that the events there recorded must fall *after* Alexander's death; but though he put this death in 247 he gave no reasons. Beloch, who followed Sokolow (3, 2, 436), put it in 245/4. Then de Sanctis saw that Antigonos' words in this chapter must fall *before* Euergetes' expedition (*Klio*, 1909, p. 7). This greatly narrowed the possible limits for Alexander's death.

and he knew that the imposing fabric of Egyptian power was merely the lath and canvas of the playhouse. 'So now he has joined us with his whole heart; I bid him welcome, for I know that he will aid me in every way I desire.'<sup>17</sup>

Whether Antigonos ever said anything of the sort may be doubtful. The most interesting part of the speech is, that the writer attributes to Antigonos the statement, before Philadelphos' death, that the power of Egypt was only a painted show; and this may be true enough: for Antigonos must of course have taken Egypt's measure at sea long before. At any rate, neither the words nor the honours had any effect on Aratos; and things were happening which for the time quite overshadowed that astute politician. For Antigonos' sacrifices for the recovery of Corinth fall some time in 247, perhaps late in the year; and that winter was to see the deaths of the kings of Asia and of Egypt. Which came first is not known.

Things had not gone any too well with Antiochos since his change of policy. A native rebellion in Parthia, and the revolt of Diodotos, the powerful satrap of Bactria, also backed by native feeling, had robbed his kingdom of the greater part of its possessions east of Persis and Media; for with Diodotos went the other satraps of the east. His sister Stratonike was back in Syria, deprived of her prospect of the crown of Macedonia, and, as the event showed, ready for mischief;<sup>18</sup> and he had little means of revenging himself on Macedonia if he wanted to, save through his friend of Egypt. It was said, however, that he was getting tired of his Egyptian wife and his Egyptian friends, and that his heart was really with Laodike. In these circumstances he suddenly died. Numberless stories were told; that he had been reconciled to Laodike; that he had named their son Seleukos as his successor; that Laodike had thereon poisoned him, lest he should again change his mind.<sup>19</sup> At any rate, Laodike at Ephesos claimed the kingdom for her son; Berenike shut

<sup>17</sup> Ἐγνωκὼς εἰς ἅπαντα χρῆσθαι, if really spoken, must have been meant to be understood as 'I am satisfied that I can employ him against Ptolemy'.

<sup>18</sup> Agatharch., fr. 19, in *F. H. G.* iii, 196.

<sup>19</sup> Polyæn. 8, 50; Pylarchos, fr. 23 (*F. H. G.* 1, 339 = Athen. 13, 593 b); App. *Syr.* 65.



herself and her infant son up in the palace at Daphne, and waited for help from Egypt and the Greek cities; in some way unknown, Laodike captured Berenike and murdered her, but her women for a while maintained the fiction that she was yet alive.<sup>20</sup>

Some time that autumn or winter, Ptolemy II also died, perhaps in the midst of the actual clash of warlike preparation called forth by the events in Asia. His eldest son by the first Arsinoe succeeded to the throne. Ptolemy III was a very different character to Ptolemy Philadelphos; he was, at any rate at this period of his life, full of warlike energy; he had re-united the crowns of Egypt and Cyrene by his long-deferred marriage with Magas' daughter Berenike; his private life was a welcome contrast to that of his father. It looked as if Egypt had much to hope for from the new king; and it looked too as if he would be more inclined to use his magnificent fleet than to follow the patient and tortuous path of diplomatic intrigue; for one of his first acts had been to see that a foundation to celebrate his accession was made at Delos. It is in the usual form, and is known as the third Ptolemaieia.<sup>21</sup>

With the spring of 246 came the news from Antioch; and Ptolemy, leaving his newly married wife to dedicate a tress of her hair for his safe return, started at once with all the force that could be gathered to try and extricate his sister. He seems, instead of waiting for the slow-moving army, to have gone with all speed to Cyprus, taken command of that part of the fleet which was there, captured Seleukeia in Pieria, and thence made his dash up the Orontes for Antioch, actually entering the city, but too late to save Berenike.<sup>22</sup> On

<sup>20</sup> It is enough to give a mere sketch of this story, and to refer to the excellent account in Bevan's *House of Seleucus*.

<sup>21</sup> The first vase of this foundation, (which comes out quite clearly in the inventories of Akridion, Boulon, and Menethales), appears under Mantiatheos, 245; the foundation was therefore probably made directly on Ptolemy's accession in 246. The *ἐπιγραφή*, given in Akridion, A, l. 78, is similar to that on the vases of the second Ptolemaieia; see ch. 12, n. 69.—See Add.

<sup>22</sup> The Gurob papyrus, on which this narrative depends (edited afresh by Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1906, p. 330), conceals a regular mystery. Ptolemy III, the writer, says that on reaching Antioch he went straight to see *his sister*, and afterwards busied himself about 'something useful'. *What* was it he saw? and is 'something useful' a euphemism for vengeance?

the arrival of his land army he for a short time swept the kingdom; Laodike and Seleukos were driven into Asia Minor; Ptolemy seems actually to have reached Seleukeia on the Tigris, and there to have received deputations which the court annalists construed as the submission of all such of the upper satrapies as had not yet made themselves independent.

His success for the moment was overwhelming. It always took time for a Seleukid king to mobilize, and in this case the kingdom was divided; some of the governors, and some of the Greek towns, had adhered to Berenike. There is no need to suppose that Ptolemy had a very large field force with him; it is certain that he would depend largely for success on the celerity of his movements, as is shown by the ground covered.

It looks as if Laodike and her son took the obvious course of turning to the traditional friend of their house, though no evidence on the point remains. Antigonos must have been ready, and more than ready; if he were ever going to follow up his challenge to Egypt, this was his opportunity. Delay might mean that the hour would pass and never return; Ptolemy might destroy the Seleukid power altogether. Whether the whole fleet of Egypt was at sea is not known; but it is obvious that Ptolemy had the best of his land troops with himself on land, and that in consequence there was no possibility of properly strengthening the marines.

Antigonos, too, found a most useful ally. The Rhodians were the traditional friends of the king of Egypt, for they knew well that their country was nourished by his;<sup>23</sup> but more important to them even than the friendship of Egypt was the preservation of the balance of power. It could not suit their commerce, or their position as the greatest of international bankers, that one state should become entirely preponderant in the Hellenistic world; and it was to hinder such preponderance that all their wars were fought. Their consistent policy was peace; but they knew that there is a peace that can be bought too dearly; and they fought in turn against all the great aggressors, Demetrios, Philip V,

<sup>23</sup> Diod. 20, 81.

Antiochos III. Their policy in the matter was clear-cut and well known; and it was in pursuance of that policy that they now intervened to save the Seleukid from what, at the moment, must have looked like utter ruin. Their intervention was of great importance; for the Rhodian fleet, though small, was second to none in quality.<sup>21</sup>

Before Antigonos and Rhodes the sea-power of Egypt went down, never to rise again. All that remains to record the catastrophe are a few broken allusions, and Antigonos' triumphant offerings on Delos. We have to interpret them as best we can; we merely guess at the bare events. The old king, some seventy-three years of age, appeared in the Aegean in the spring of 246 at the head of his fleet, commanding in person on the flagship named after the much-desired fortress of Corinth; off Andros he defeated an Egyptian fleet stationed there to watch him,<sup>25</sup> while another Egyptian squadron, under the Athenian exile Chremonides, was defeated off Ephesos by the Rhodian admiral, Agathostratos son of Polyaratos.<sup>23</sup> Finally, whether that same year or possibly in 245, Antigonos crossed the Aegean and met the combined forces of Egypt in a great battle off the island of Kos.<sup>27</sup> Though heavily outnumbered, he won a decisive victory; he had not trusted to the fighting powers of his Macedonians in vain. We would gladly know something of what took place,

<sup>24</sup> Rhodian policy was clear; but they never fought without a powerful ally, Egypt against Demetrios, Pergamon against Philip V, Rome against Antiochos III. — See note 26.

<sup>25</sup> That Andros was fought by Gonatas, was at this time, and was a victory, see App. 12 and references there given. Whether or no it precedes Kos, *ib.* — That *one* battle belongs to a year of the Isthmian games, i.e. 246, *ib.* — Andros would be a natural station to be taken up by an Egyptian fleet, if watching, or aiming at preventing the junction of, two squadrons issuing from Chalkis and Corinth respectively. The belief, so generally adopted, that Andros was at this time Macedonian has no foundation; see note 3.

<sup>26</sup> This victory (Polyaen. 5, 18), differently placed by various writers, must come in this war (so Bouché-Leclercq 1, 255; Ferguson, *Athens*, 198, who puts it in 242/1) for several reasons; Rhodian policy (see note 24): the League of the Islanders set up a statue of Agathostratos as soon as the League changed masters; see App. 13 (B): Teles, *περί φυγῆς*, implies that Chremonides had been Ptolemy's counsellor for some time before (*τὸ τελευταῖον*) he was given a fleet (I have shown in App. 12 that Teles does not demand 242 rather than 246), and it was probably Ptolemy III who set up Glaukon's statue at Olympia, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 222. — Agathostratos, then a trierarch, is mentioned in an *ex voto* on a prow from Lindos, *R. E. G.* 1907, p. 84.

<sup>27</sup> See App. 12, and references there given.



and of how Antigonos secured his boarding fight; we may suppose that he did not adopt the enveloping tactics of his Rhodian ally, which demanded superior seamanship, or the simple Roman device of each ship grappling with an opponent, which demanded equal or superior numerical strength, but that, like his father at Salamis, he trusted to Epameinondas' theory, massed strength on the left wing.<sup>28</sup> But instead of telling something of what happened, all that the tradition can furnish is faint echoes of the legends that grew up round the great battle and Antigonos' famous flagship, which he had, it seems, vowed to Apollo in the event of victory.<sup>29</sup> One legend was, that when his captains commented on the numerical superiority of the enemy, Antigonos merely asked them how many ships they thought *he* was worth.<sup>30</sup> Another was that parsley, the omen of victory to a Corinthian ship, sprouted on the vessel's poop before she went into action; and after the battle, whichever it was, Antigonos altered her name to Isthmia, the name of the games at her home port at which parsley was the victor's crown.<sup>31</sup>

Antigonos forthwith sailed to Delos, to notify Delos, the Island League, and the world that the sea had changed masters. There he dedicated two gold crowns to Apollo,<sup>32</sup> to

<sup>28</sup> Epameinondas' theory evidently constituted the dominant Macedonian sea tactics by 306, for apparently both fleets at Salamis used it. But Greek and Carthaginian fleets in the third century, while still practising the diekplous (Sosylos in *Hermes*, 41, 1906, p. 103), were fond of attempting, with a long line, to outflank one or both ends of the enemy's line. The Carthaginians at Ecnomus tried to envelop *both* flanks of the Roman fleet (cf. Hannibal at Cannae), and got their weakened centre pierced; and the allusion in Polyæn. 5, 18 to Agathostratos strengthening *both* his wings against Chremonides shows that he tried the same thing, with success. The Rhodian Polyxenidas attempted to envelop one Roman flank at Myonnesos, Livy 37, 29; but Rome's Rhodian allies knew the right counter-stroke.

<sup>29</sup> I think that Moschion's words in Athen. 5, 209 e, ἐνίκησε . . . ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι αὐτὴν ἀνέθηκεν, most probably import a vow made to Apollo before the battle. See *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 212.

<sup>30</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 545 B and 183 C and Plut. *Pelop.* 2. I have attempted, in *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 218, to explain the confusion which has attributed this story to both battles.

<sup>31</sup> *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 218, § D. — Whether this can have anything to do with the fact that a deme of Kos (? locality of the battle) was called Isthmia, (in 250 it sent a theoria of its own to Delos, *I. G.* xi, 287, B, l. 45), I do not know. It seems more likely that the legend belongs to the battle of Andros.

<sup>32</sup> These two crowns, in the temple of Apollo, come in Demares, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 588, ll. 10, 11. The weights show that neither is identical with the crown in



whom, on the conclusion of peace, he proposed to pay an honour that was unique. There he founded also, in the year 245, two festivals; they also were in their way unique, for though vase foundations of the usual type, the vases were in neither case dedicated, as was usual, to the regular triad of Delian divinities, Apollo, Artemis, and Leto. The usual rule had been broken once before, when in the heyday of Egyptian power Arsinoë's name had appeared on a series of vases with those of the gods of Delos; and Antigonos was not unmindful of the fact. His festivals were known by the names of the Paneia and the Soteria, the festival of the god Pan and the festival of the 'deliverance', the deliverance of the sea and the Islands from the yoke of Egypt. The name was deliberately chosen with reference to the events of forty years before; the Islanders on Demetrios' fall had honoured Ptolemy as Soter, the Deliverer, and had celebrated festivals of similar name for his viceroy Philokles; Antigonos proclaimed to the world, in similar fashion, that Fortune's wheel had at last come full circle and that the son of Demetrios had entered into his own. Neither set of vases had an inscription of the usual type; the vases of the Paneia were engraved with the words 'King Antigonos the Macedonian, son of King Demetrios, to Pan'; the vases of the Soteria bore a similar legend, but by great ill fortune the stone that gives the actual words is broken away at the god's name. It is quite certain, however, that the missing word (or words) *was* the god's name; and it is difficult to avoid the conjecture that the vases of the Soteria were offered to the Soteres, the 'Saviour gods', meaning thereby not Antigonos I and Demetrios, the founders of the League, whose well-known title this was, but Apollo of Delos and the gods associated with him, who had heard Antigonos' vow of his flagship and had lent their aid to work the great 'deliverance'.<sup>33</sup> The festival in honour of Pan needs no explanation;

Sosisthenes, B, l. 63; both are therefore later than 250. It may be that some of the intermediate inventories will show if they were really given by Gonatas, or by Doson. They were much finer than the crown in Sosisthenes.

<sup>33</sup> On these two foundations see Schulhof in *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 112 seq.; and on their significance the present writer in *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 264 seq., § D; Ferguson in *J. H. S.* 1910, pp. 191, 196; App. 12, p. 466. Both series of vases

for thirty years he had been Antigonos' patron deity; it is possible that on Delos Antigonos now built him a house.<sup>34</sup> But the actual part played by the god in the campaign is lost; and it cannot be said with certainty whether the Soteria are to be referred to Kos and the Paneia to Andros, or whether, as is possible, both festivals are to be referred to the whole series of events which, beginning with the recapture of Akrokorinthos and ending with the victory of Kos, had given Antigonos possession of Delos and command of the sea.

Before coming to the terms of peace between Antigonos and Egypt, it is as well to take up, very briefly, the thread of events on land contemporaneous with Antigonos' naval campaign.

Antigonos' good understanding with Aetolia at this time has already been mentioned, as well as the rapid expansion of the Aetolian League. In one sense, his difficulties had

come out quite clearly in Akridion, A, ll. 85-7; Boulon, ll. 67-9; and Menethales, B, ll. 32, 33. The Soteria vases are in each case listed before those of the Paneia. — The *ἐπιγραφή* on the Paneia vases is known for certain from a comparison of Akridion and Boulon with Demares, l. 48, and in particular Sosistratos (no. lxxvii in Homolle, *Archives*), B, l. 21; βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος βασιλέως Δημητρίου Μακεδῶν Πανὶ ἐπ' ἄρχοντος (τοῦ δεῖνα). It will be noticed that it is not in the usual form; the Deliades are not mentioned, and the dedication is to a strange god, Pan. The foundation is called indifferently Ἀντιγονείων and Πανείων; the latter occurs in Menethales 58, and lxi (Homolle), B, fr. a, l. 13; the equivalence of the two names depends on Stesileos, published by Schulhof, *l. c.* — The Soteria are not so simple. The title Σωτήρια for the foundation which provided the second series of Antigonos vases is given in Menethales, ll. 32 and 61; and its identity with one of the Antigoneia of Stesileos is not doubtful. As to the *ἐπιγραφή*, Akridion, l. 85, gives all but the critical word; βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος βασιλέως Δημητρίου Μακεδῶν . . . ἐπ' ἄρχοντος (τοῦ δεῖνα): that is, it followed the inscription of the Paneia vases, except for the god's name. A festival Soteria should import a god or gods Soter or Soteres; and, being under the impression that there was only room for a word of eight to ten letters, I communicated to Prof. Dürrbach the suggestion Σωτήρσιν; not in the sense of Antigonos I and Demetrios (for this, though appropriate enough, as they had founded the Island League, and were still being worshipped at Athens by this title, Michel 1491, would hardly suit with Antigonos Gonatas' character), but in the sense of the 'Saviour gods' generally, in this case Apollo and the other gods of Delos (as in *O. G. I.* 214, l. 15, where Dittenberger says 'nunc apparet deos quoslibet, quibus salus regis et regni curae erat, sic nominari potuisse'); for Apollo had accepted Antigonos' vow of his flagship and helped him to victory. (For Σωτήρσιν alone cf. *O. G. I.* 22 and 23.) M. Dürrbach, however, tells me that the gap is longer than I thought, and could take Θεοῖς Σωτήρσι(ν), which would of course be far preferable.

<sup>34</sup> *B. C. H.* 1910, no. 26 (opp. p. 122), l. 28; Dürrbach and Schulhof suggest the restoration Πανείωι, but doubtfully; see *ib.* p. 126.

been Aetolia's opportunity; she had seen her way to attempt a greater acquisition than any she had yet made; and we can now see the process at work by which Aetolia, two generations ago content to aid in maintaining a kind of balance of power in the north, and a generation ago content to have her sphere among the Amphiktyonic peoples recognized, henceforth discards all idea of her sphere and all notions of power save one; Aetolia is to be the equal and rival of Macedonia, exercising supreme influence over the western side of the peninsula, as Macedonia over the eastern. Elis and part of Akarnania were now hers, in fact if not in name; through her help Elis recovered, about 245, Triphylia and Lasion, and thus realized an ambition more than a century old;<sup>35</sup> Aetolia herself may have already begun to extend her influence southward to Phigaleia and Messene.<sup>36</sup> Meanwhile the larger half of Akarnania still belonged to Epeiros, once the friend, one might almost say the patron, of Aetolia, but now fallen on evil days. Aetolia now meditated a fresh stroke; she saw the possibility of incorporating the independent part of Akarnania into her League.

It seems to have been about the year 246 or 245, while Antigonos was at sea, that Aetolia made her attempt. The Epeirot government was not in a good position to offer resistance. Alexander of Epeiros was dead, and his widow and half-sister, Olympias, had been left regent for his sons Pyrrhos and Ptolemaios, both of whom were under age at the time. It seems probable that both were now of full age; but Olympias is represented as continuing to wield the actual authority, and neither Epeiros nor Akarnania felt any confidence in her power to offer an effectual resistance to Aetolia.<sup>37</sup> Epeiros turned to her old enemy Macedonia,

<sup>35</sup> Niese in Karl Robert's *Genethliakon*, 1910, p. 16.

<sup>36</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 234. See ch. 14, n. 21.

<sup>37</sup> Just. 28, 1 and 2. Beloch put this story much earlier. But now that it appears that Phthia was Demetrios' queen in 236/5 (*I. G.* ii, 5, 614 b), we cannot put it *before* Demetrios' betrothal to Nikaia in 247; and the reference, in the Aetolian reply to Rome, to disasters suffered often (*tot*) at the hands of Carthage, points to a period after 249, prior to which Rome suffered one defeat only (Regulus). Justin seems to imply that Olympias was still regent when the Aetolians invaded Akarnania, i. e. that Pyrrhos was still a child; and one of Beloch's arguments was that, as Alexander must have married on

Akarnania (it is said) to Rome. This last rests on poor authority; but the details fit. Rome is represented as having suffered many defeats at the hands of Carthage; and this would suit with the period after 249, when Rome, driven from the sea by the double disaster of the year of Drepana, was failing on land to make any impression upon the stubborn resistance of Hamilcar Barca. Rome was in no condition to intervene, had she desired to; but it is said that she sent word to the Aetolians to leave Akarnania alone, an insolence to which the Aetolians made the only possible reply, telling Rome to finish with Carthage before she tried to bully Greeks. If true, it is the first appearance of that 'cloud in the west' which was so soon to overshadow the whole peninsula.<sup>38</sup>

Olympias meanwhile had approached the young Demetrios, Antigonos' son, who was governing for his father in Macedonia while the latter was at sea,<sup>39</sup> offering him the hand of her daughter Phthia in marriage as the price of Macedonian aid. Probably the matter was not settled till Antigonos' return; anyhow Demetrios did marry Phthia,<sup>40</sup> granddaughter of the great Pyrrhos, and for a few short years Epeiros must have been to a considerable extent under Macedonian influence. It was another great success for Antigonos; but it was bought at a price. For his side of the bargain was to restrain the Aetolians; and, as Aetolia did not manage to incorporate Akarnania,<sup>41</sup> there is no doubt that he kept his undertaking. We need not suppose that he had any great difficulty; the Aetolians were still his very good friends, and were not likely to wish to face the formidable old king with the Mace-

his accession in 272, these events must fall earlier. But, even so, it may not have been Olympias whom he married in 272; she might have been a second wife. And in any case she might have continued to be the actual, after ceasing to be the legitimate, wielder of power.

<sup>38</sup> Technically, Polyb. 2, 12, 7 shows that there was no Roman embassy to Greece before 228. But Justin's story is so circumstantial that it is hard to believe that it has no foundation.

<sup>39</sup> This can be gathered from Justin's 'regem Macedoniae Demetrium'; though he was certainly not yet βασιλεύς; see his letter to Harpalos, App. 5, n. 6, which shows that in the thirty-sixth year of Antigonos (more probably 242/1 but possibly 248/7) he was governing Macedonia and was not βασιλεύς.

<sup>40</sup> *I. G.* ii, 5, 614 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 192; Just. 28, 1.

<sup>41</sup> Polyb. 2, 2.



donians flushed by a great victory. But it may be conjectured that the episode left its sting behind it, and that the working of the poison broke out in the Aetolian war of Demetrios II;<sup>42</sup> though it may well be that, at the pace at which Aetolia was now expanding, a collision with Macedonia was only a question of time.

Yet another state was brought at this time within Antigonos' sphere of influence. Boeotia, attempting a forward policy under the lead of Abaiokritos after long years of inactivity, had by the beginning of 245 come into conflict with Aetolia, probably over Phokis; a single-handed struggle was too formidable a matter even for a state of Boeotia's military strength, now doubtless somewhat rusted; and she sought the alliance of the Achaean League. That League had taken the important step of electing Aratos as its general for the first time for the official year which began in May 245; and at the head of the Achaean fleet he at once put to sea and harried the Aetolian coast. But while he thus wasted time, the Aetolians did not; they invaded Boeotia in force. Aratos began shipping the federal troops across the Gulf of Corinth to the aid of his allies, but he came too late. On the ancient battle-ground of Chaironeia the Aetolians had already broken the strength of the Boeotian League: Abaiokritos and 1,000 men lay dead on the field: Boeotia had no option but to join the Aetolians. She did not become a member of the Aetolian League, but occupied the more informal position of 'ally' or 'friend'; but therewith she came, informally, under the influence of Macedonia, and was treated as a friendly state.<sup>43</sup> At

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Kaerst, 'Demetrios II' in *P. W.*, no. 34, col. 2792.

<sup>43</sup> Generally, Plut. *Arat.* 16; Polyb. 20, 4. — Proxeny decree of Delphi for Abaiokritos; *Philol.* 58, p. 69; see *G. D. I.* 2700. — Aratos, who had just been operating in the Gulf of Corinth, obviously crossed by sea. Incidentally, this shows he was at peace with Antigonos, who commanded the sea. — 10,000 federal troops from Achaea and Sikyon is an obvious blunder; did Egypt subsidize mercenaries for the League? Cf. Polyb. 2, 62 on the resources of the Peloponnese; and see the end of ch. 2. — Dates of Aratos, generalships, Beloch 3, 2, 176 seq. — Boeotia's relation to Aetolia, Polyb. 20, 5, προσέειμαν Αἰτωλοῖς τὸ ἔθνος. See Niese 2, 250. It seems that Boeotia retained her Amphiktyonic votes. On the relations to the Aetolian League of states that were allies only and not συμπολιτευόμενοι see Hiller von Gaertingen in *P. W.*, 'Aitolia,' col. 1121 seq. — That this brought Boeotia within Macedonia's sphere is shown by the arbitration of Lamia between Boeotia

the same time Aetolia seems to have added to her League the independent portions of Phokis and Lokris.

It may be conjectured too, that it was about this time, in 246 or 245, that the recently formed Arkadian League broke up, and a revolution in Megalopolis again brought Antigonos' adherents into power: and with their support a young man named Lydiades, who had successfully led the Megalopolitan troops against Sparta in a battle fought at Mantinea some three years before, made himself tyrant. Lydiades, if ambitious, was a noble-minded man, of whom a good deal more was to be heard; and meanwhile the revolution in Megalopolis, and his accession to power, were a great gain to Antigonos.<sup>44</sup>

While Antigonos and his allies were thus piling victory upon victory, Ptolemy was finding himself unable to face all his enemies at once. His first sweeping successes had been won too rapidly; he could not hold what he had taken. It had been one thing for a Greek city to support Berenike against Laodike; it was quite another thing, now that Berenike and her son were dead, to stand by and see the rightful heir to the throne crushed by a foreign power. The Greek cities remembered the freedom they had enjoyed under the popular rule of Antiochos Soter and his son, a freedom that might not be guaranteed to them by a foreign conqueror; and under the leadership of absolutely loyal towns like Miletos and Smyrna they rallied to Seleukos' cause.<sup>45</sup> Ptolemy was recalled home, probably soon after the battle of Kos, by what is briefly described as 'internal troubles' in Egypt,<sup>46</sup> perhaps not unconnected with the conscription necessary to man the great fleet that had been so decisively beaten; and Seleukos was encouraged by the Egyptian defeats and the aid of the Greek

and Athens in 244/3; *I. G.* ii, 308, and ii, 5, 308 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 227 and 228 = Michel 1485 and 1486; Ferguson, *Priests*, 155; Kolbe, *Archonten*, 58, 59. — Phokis and Lokris; Beloch 3, 1, 643, n. 1.

<sup>44</sup> Paus. 8, 10, 6, and 27, 12; Plut. *Arat.* 30; Beloch 3, 1, 637. Obviously Lydiades was not in power during the war with Alexander of Corinth, or he would have taken part in it, as did Aristomachos; and the revolution in Megalopolis must be dated between 247 and 243, the years that Antigonos held Corinth.

<sup>45</sup> Their freedom, *O. G. I.* 222, 223, 226. Loyalty and aid of Smyrna, *O. G. I.* 229; cf. 228. Their rally to Seleukos, Just. 27, 2, 3. See generally Haussoullier in *R. Ph.* 25, 1901, p. 125.

<sup>46</sup> Just. 27, 1, 9.

cities to get a fleet to sea himself, which, however, went to the bottom in a storm.<sup>47</sup> On land, however, he fared differently; in the spring of 244 he triumphantly forced his way back over the Tauros;<sup>48</sup> and began the series of campaigns in Syria which won him the exaggerated name of Kallinikos, the 'Famous Conqueror', and only ended two or three years later with his abortive attempt to invade Egypt.

It was clear, by about the beginning of 244, that Ptolemy was no match for all his enemies at once; he must buy off one of them, and pay the price. As to which of them it was to be, there could be no doubt. The war against Seleukos was a war of vengeance for Berenike; it touched Ptolemy's honour. The war against Antigonos did not. Moreover, Seleukos was young and in the flush of conquest; and behind him stood his grasping and imperious mother. Antigonos was old; he had always been moderate in his ambitions; he knew very well what he could do and what he could not; it was likely that he would know exactly what he wanted, and probable that what he wanted was that which he already had and from which there was, in any case, no means of dislodging him. Ptolemy sent his envoy to Antigonos.

The envoy chosen was the old Sostratos of Knidos, a contemporary of Antigonos and of Philadelphos, and a man for long held in high esteem by all of Greek race for his masterly achievements in architecture. He had built the famous 'hanging porticoes' at Knidos, and something notable for the Knidians at Delphi. But his greatest glory was the Pharos, the lighthouse that illumined the entrance to the harbour of Alexandria: it was one of the wonders of the world, and many were the honours which its designer had received from Delos and the Island League. Nothing shows more clearly how wonderfully ready a Hellenistic king was to put intellectual ability before birth or station than Ptolemy's choice of an architect as his ambassador, even though he was also a man of affairs; and Sostratos was a good choice. For when

<sup>47</sup> Just. 27, 2, 1. Obviously the rally of the Greek cities to Seleukos comes before the preparation of the fleet, and not after, as Justin puts it; for they supplied the ships.

<sup>48</sup> *O. G. I.* 229, 1. 1. For the chronology, Haussoullier, *l. c.*; Beloch 3, 2, 458.

Antigonos took up the position that he did not care whether Egypt made peace or not, Sostratos, in falling back on Homer, as every Greek did in a difficulty, chose his quotation with consummate tact; using the words of Iris, Zeus' messenger, he addressed Antigonos as Poseidon, Lord of the Sea, and reminded him that a noble heart does not fear to relent. Antigonos must have thoroughly appreciated the delicate hint that if he were now Poseidon, Sostratos' king was still Zeus, the greater deity.<sup>49</sup>

All else that we know is the result, and it did Sostratos credit. Antigonos took Delos and the Cyclades, the Islands of the League, and no more.<sup>50</sup> The peace left Egypt in possession of the southern limit of the Aegean, following the volcanic deep-water line, with a ring of posts at Methana, Thera, perhaps Astypalaia, and Samos;<sup>51</sup> and she was left at liberty to do precisely what she pleased in the Seleukid sphere, or any sphere not claimed by Antigonos, that is to say, along the coasts of Asia Minor and Thrace.<sup>52</sup> Antigonos secured the

<sup>49</sup> Sostratos' mission, Sextus *adv. Gramm.* 662. The address to Antigonos as Poseidon (*II.* 15, 201) shows it was after a decisive naval battle; it has generally been placed after Kos, and there is really no alternative.—On Sostratos see P. Perdrizet, *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1899, vol. i, p. 261, and Dittenberger, note 1 to *O. G. I.* 66, who have collected the material.—The Delphic decree for him is *O. G. I.* 66, archon Ornichidas, 285/4, Pontow. A Delian decree, Perdrizet, *l. c.*, 267. The Kaunians gave him a statue on Delos, *O. G. I.* 68, and Etearchos of Cyrene another, *B. C. H.* 1909, p. 481, no. 7. The decree of the Islanders for him, P. Roussel in *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 340, no. 3 (amplifying *O. G. I.* 67); time of the nesiarch Bacchon; after 280, but not long after; Sostratos is given a gold crown, and a share of the victim at the Ptolemaieia.—Some of these honours may attest a prior political rôle of Sostratos. They prove that he was an oldish man in 244, as one would expect, and demand an early date for the erection of the Pharos.

<sup>50</sup> On the extent of the Macedonian protectorate see App. 13.—Everything—the laying up of the ship, the building on Delos, the non-interference of Egypt in the Cyclades henceforth—points to a definite peace. The only question is whether 244 is the right date, as I think, or if it falls in 242 or 241, when Syria and Egypt made peace. The latter would give Gonatas little time for building.

<sup>51</sup> Thera was Egyptian from Philadelphos onward; H. von Gaertringen, *Thera, passim*, and especially vol. i, 162–5. It almost certainly never belonged to the League of the Islanders.—Astypalaia, see App. 13, C.—Samos was the head-quarters of the Egyptian fleet under Philopator (Polyb. 5, 35), as it had been under Philadelphos (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202).

<sup>52</sup> Antigonos renounced all concern with these districts in 277. I see no other explanation of Egypt making conquests in the North without Macedonian interference. Ptolemy of course had still a good fleet, and Seleukos had none.—The fact that Teles, *περὶ φυγῆς*, spoken in 239 or 240 (see



indispensable fruit of his victories and the object of his long effort; but it was no part of his design to aid Syria in an attempt to crush Egypt. The Seleukids had not treated him any too well; it was much more to his interest that the two Eastern powers should balance each other; and the peace seems to have been deliberately calculated to save Ptolemy's face to some extent. Doubtless Rhodes counted for something in this; matters at sea had gone fully as far as those discreet islanders would care about.

Antigonos at once took a step which proclaimed to the world, even more emphatically than the foundation of the Soteria, that there was a new state of things in the Aegean, and that the League of the Islanders had a new master. He dedicated his flagship on Delos to the Delian Apollo.<sup>53</sup> No more marked step was ever taken by any king. Macedonian kings were supposed not to erect trophies,<sup>54</sup> though there seem to be a good many exceptions; but here was a trophy, not indeed of spoils taken from an enemy, but of an absolutely unique character. Greek naval history knows no parallel to this dedication. The common practice was to dedicate the prows or stern ornaments of the captured vessels,<sup>55</sup> it was

Hense, *Teles*<sup>2</sup>, p. xxxvi; Ferguson, *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 199, n. 44), already mentions Hippomedon (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 221) as governor of 'Thrace', appears to negative Beloch's conjecture that the Thracian conquests of Egypt fall after 227. — If Samothrake had once been valued by Demetrios (erection of the Nike), it is strange that Antigonos did not ever seek it. This does lend a kind of support to J. Hatzfeld's theory (*Rev. Arch.* 1910, p. 132) that the Nike has nothing to do with Demetrios.

<sup>53</sup> *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 209, §§ B and C. The statement, found in so many books, that this ship was dedicated at the *Triopian sanctuary*, has no evidence whatever of any kind to support it, and rests primarily, like many another historical blunder, on a conjectural emendation. At the same time, it is fair to remind the reader that the statement that it was dedicated on Delos is only a deduction of my own; see *J. H. S.*, *l. c.*—I said in *J. H. S.*, *l. c.*, p. 213, that Apollo had no concern with sea fighting. I do not think I need alter this, even if the Ulubad relief of a naval battle be really dedicated to Apollo Kaseos (F. W. Hasluck, *Cyzicus*, 4, 40); for anyhow it may only be a village dedication to a local god; and as all that remains of the name is -ωνι it is quite impossible to be sure that it is not Poseidon.

<sup>54</sup> Paus. 9, 40, 7-8; see A. J. Reinach, *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1911, p. 42. There are a good many exceptions, anyhow: Philip II in Diod. 16, 4; some of Alexander; a coin of Seleukos I with Nike crowning a trophy, Head<sup>2</sup> 757; Antigonos' own bronze coins with Pan and a trophy.

<sup>55</sup> Treasury of the Athenians at Delphi (Paus. 10, 11, 6); the Roman 'columnae rostratae'; ship's beaks, &c., in the Delian inventories, e.g.

something quite exceptional when the Greeks in 480, after Salamis, dedicated in their entirety three Phoenician triremes,<sup>56</sup> or when the Peloponnesians dedicated to Poseidon at Rhion an Athenian trireme taken from Phormion in the Gulf of Corinth.<sup>57</sup> But Antigonos went far beyond this in offering to Apollo—it seems as the result of a previous vow—his own most precious possession, his victorious flagship. And just as he had celebrated the victory of Lysimacheia, which gave him Macedonia, by striking a tetradrachm which did honour to Pan, so he now celebrated the victory which had given him the sea by striking another famous tetradrachm, which commemorates, so to speak, his vessel's life-history. On the obverse the coin bears the head of the Corinthian Poseidon, under whose auspices she had been launched; on the reverse it celebrates the dedication by the figure of Apollo of Delos, seated on the Isthmia's prow. In commemorating his victorious galley, Antigonos contrived to honour alike the god of Delos and the god of the Sea.<sup>58</sup>

A new series of honours forthwith appears at Delos. The League of the Islanders erected a statue to Antigonos' ally Agathostratos;<sup>59</sup> and long ago there was found in the Propylaia at Delos the base of a statue of Queen Phila erected by some private person, which must belong to this time. Phila, too, made a dedication jointly with one Patron son of Antiochos,<sup>60</sup> the meaning of which is quite obscure; how com-

Demares, l. 167, *νέως ἔμβολον*; *B. C. H.* 6, p. 130, an ἀκροστόλιον. See *Dar. Sagl.*, 'donarium.'

<sup>56</sup> Herod. 8, 121.

<sup>57</sup> Thuc. 2, 92, 5.

<sup>58</sup> For this tetradrachm see Imhoof-Blumer, *Monnaies grecques*, 127; G. F. Hill, *Historical Greek Coins*, 129; Head<sup>2</sup>, p. 231, fig. 143; Ferguson in *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 196, n. 36. Further on the connexion between it and the flagship, see the present writer in *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 209, §§ B and D.

<sup>59</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 224; see App. 13, B.

<sup>60</sup> Phila. She was alive in 246/5. In the erasure after line 11 of *I. G.* ii, 307 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 635 (Kallimedes' year), where sacrifice is offered ἐφ' ἡγια[ίαι καὶ σω]τηρίαι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ παίδων κα[ὶ γυναικῶ]ν . . . s, the s shows that the last word was feminine, i. e. the queen's name. I have counted all the letters in all the lines—average just under 55½; so the gap, 2 lines less 48 letters, contained about 62 letters, with a lowest possible (see lines 17 and 18) of 58. There can therefore be little doubt of the restoration, [καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου βασιλέως Δημητρίου καὶ τῆς βασιλίσσης Φίλα]ς; 60 letters. — Her statue: *O. G. I.* 216; donor, -οφάνης Δημ-, perhaps a citizen of Demetrias. The erection of the statue is itself conclusive that Delos had changed hands; had it still been under Egypt, no τύπος would have been

pletely the history of the time has been lost is illustrated by our entire ignorance of a man who must obviously have been among the first in Macedonia. To Antigonos himself no honours seem to have been paid. Consistently with precedent, the only thing which the Islanders could have done for him was to deify him; and Antigonos had no desire to become one of their gods. But if Delos could not honour Antigonos, the offerings have been recovered with which Antigonos honoured Delos. He set about building an addition to the sacred precinct there, the portico on the north side of the temenos, which has again become known to the world through the French excavations, and dedicated it to Apollo by his style of King Antigonos, son of King Demetrios, the Macedonian. There he set up the statues of his ancestors, some fifteen in number; they have perished, but the great monument on which they stood, with his dedication upon it, has been found.<sup>61</sup> He felt that his rule was to be a permanent one, built upon solid foundations. And in fact Egypt, though she remained a considerable sea-power—she could not be otherwise, so long as she held Phoenicia—never again challenged the Macedonian upon the water: and the command of the sea, with the control of the Islands of the League, passed unquestioned to Antigonos' two successors on the throne.<sup>62</sup>

granted for the statue of the Macedonian queen. The conclusive arguments of Holleaux in this respect about Doson's Sellasia inscription, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 94, apply equally here. — The joint offering at Delos made by 'Patron son of Antiochos and Queen Phila' (Stesileos, l. 81, in *B. C. H.* 1908, pp. 82, 85), is utterly obscure. It seems too early to belong to the Phila, daughter of Theodoros of Athamania, who figures several times in Demares.

<sup>61</sup> Portico and statue bases: Holleaux, *C. R. Acad. Insc.* 1907, p. 335; 1908, p. 163. The portico will be fully described in *L'Exploration archéologique de Délos*. — On the inscription, *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 268, § C. For another explanation of the difference between *Μακεδών* and *καὶ Μακεδόνες* see Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 190, n. 4, who suggests private and public donations. If this were correct, one could only identify the portico-builder as Gonatas, if at all, by the style of architecture; for though in popular speech 'Antigonos son of Demetrios' meant Gonatas (Polyb. 9, 34, 6, Paus. 3, 6, 4), this would not apply to an inscription. But I do not think it can be correct. Even as regards donations it will not hold, for the Soteria vases were as public a celebration of Kos as Doson's stele of Sellasia; and it cannot of course apply to treaties (see notes to *J. H. S.*, l. c., § C), or to the language of outsiders; why, on Ferguson's theory, should Epidauros employ one phrase (*I. G.* iv, 1419), while Rome employs the other (*B. C. H.* 1897, p. 621, trophy of Aemilius Paulus; Polyb. 18, 46, 5)?

<sup>62</sup> App. 13.

They exercised judicial authority in the Islands; <sup>63</sup> Delos was their granary; <sup>64</sup> on Delos Antigonos' son and grandson on their accessions made their foundations in honour of Apollo; <sup>65</sup> on Delos Antigonos Doson set up the memorial of his great victory at Sellasia over Kleomenes of Sparta. <sup>66</sup> It was not till after Doson's death that the Macedonian command of the sea lapsed at last through sheer neglect of the fleet. <sup>67</sup>

<sup>63</sup> App. 13, A, nos. 5 and 6.

<sup>64</sup> Ib. A, nos. 9 and 10; see P. Roussel and J. Hatzfeld, *B.C.H.* 1910, p. 370.

<sup>65</sup> The first vase of the Demetria appears under Timagenes in 237; probably founded 238. (The series appears in Menethales.) — The Philippeia are mentioned in Stesileos, and in the mutilated inventories lxx and lxxiii (Homolle). The first vase that appears in Stesileos is in 217; but Stesileos, an extremely confused document and quite unlike the excellent lists of Akridion, Boulon, and Menethales, does not give the actual beginning of any of the other fêtes it mentions (see Schulhof's table, *B.C.H.* 1908, pp. 102, 103), and there is no reason to suppose that the vase of 217 was the first vase of the Philippeia, or that this festival was anything but Philip's accession foundation. See generally Schulhof, *l.c.*; cf. Holleaux, *B.C.H.* 1907, p. 105, n. 1.

<sup>66</sup> Holleaux, *ib.* p. 94.

<sup>67</sup> Holleaux, *ib.* p. 94 and references, after allowing for the fact that (as I think) he misplaces the battle of Andros. — The mutilation of a number of Delian inscriptions relating to the Lagid domination (P. Roussel, *B.C.H.* 1909, pp. 479, 480), if done by a Macedonian at all, must have been done by Philip V, and perhaps bears some relation to the excision by the Athenians of all Antigonid names from their documents.



## CHAPTER XIV

### THE YOUNGER GENERATION

HERE the history of Antigonos Gonatas should end. Everything, and more than everything, that he had set himself to do was finished. From the most unpromising beginnings he had refashioned a strong and united Macedonia, restored its ancient boundaries to their fullest extent, and seated himself too firmly on the throne for anything to overthrow his dynasty but overwhelming force: he saw Aetolia his all but ally, Athens and Boeotia governed by his friends, Epeiros sailing humbly in his wake; he saw his Peloponnesian system, to all appearance, firmly based upon capable and devoted rulers in Argos and Megalopolis; above all, he had brought his long duel with Egypt to an end by regaining for his house the control of Delos and reconquering the command of the sea. The erstwhile exile from Macedonia had reached the highest pinnacle of success; and with success he had also peace on every hand. The drama is played out; the curtain should be rung down.

But the dramas of real life do not conform to the rules. Seldom enough do they close with the cockpit of the *Victory*; and the hero, who should have died at the crisis of his fate, is apt to survive his Waterloo and suffer his St. Helena. The great scene comes too early in the play; and the curtain rises again upon a tedious fifth act, with which we would often gladly dispense.

Antigonos lived for six years after his crowning victory. But he is no longer a leading figure on the stage; the interest begins to shift to others. The younger generation are knocking at the door; and they will not be denied. There are not only new men in the world; there are new ideas. Men begin to look on the old king as the survivor of a past age, a relic of the things that are gone. He has not

only outlived every one of his contemporaries ; he has in most cases outlived their sons also. Pyrrhos of Epeiros and his son Alexander ; Antiochos Soter of Syria and his son Antiochos the god ; Areus of Sparta and his son Akrotatos ; Krateros, viceroy of Corinth, and his son Alexander ; Magas of Cyrene and his successor Demetrios the Fair ; all these belonged to the past, and had followed to the grave the philosophers and historians who had been Antigonos' friends. Only one of his coevals had had a reign at all comparable to his ; and the death of his younger rival Ptolemy Philadelphos in 246 had removed the last of the great figures who during his life had played their parts on the political stage. A new age had arrived ; and that year had seen new kings reigning in both the great empires. Only one ruler then living had occupied his throne as far back even as the taking of Athens ; and Eumenes of Pergamon, like the old philosopher Arkesilaos, was yet to die before Antigonos. No wonder that these facts impressed themselves on the popular mind ; men came to refer to the Macedonian king as Antigonos the Old Man.<sup>1</sup>

Age, too, begins to tell. He does not appear to have taken the field again himself after 245 ; an enterprise is heard of as undertaken, left to allies, then abandoned, a thing strangely at variance with the career of one of the most persevering and tenacious figures in history. At the time of the battle of Kos he was about seventy-three or seventy-four years of age ; his life had been one of the most strenuous known ; small wonder if he lost something of his great energy.

It is possible, too, that a certain deterioration of character can be traced in these last years of his life. A more than full share of those disappointments of manhood which are said to succeed the illusions of youth may well have worked some change. The replacement of the influence of Menedemos and Zeno by that of Persaios and Bion was hardly to the good ; the revolt of Krateros' son might have soured any nature. But indeed we know too little to say. Not merely is our principal source, Aratos, bitterly biased, but both our contemporary sources are entirely careless of what passed in the north, and only accord a passing reference to Macedonia

<sup>1</sup> Ὁ γέρον. See *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 267, § B.

when her path happens to cut across that of local Peloponnesian affairs.<sup>2</sup> Polybios indeed tries to be just, and it is simply upon one fact recorded by Polybios that any view of Antigonos' last years must be based; but the formal commencement of Polybios' history falls many years after Antigonos Gonatas' death, and any references to him are merely incidental, and necessarily based not upon Polybios' own knowledge. The whole of the history of the years after 245 is utterly out of focus. The centre of gravity of the Balkan peninsula had not suddenly shifted to Achaea merely because the story of Achaea happens to be known disproportionately well; neither was Macedonia falling into the background because she no longer had a historian of her own to tell her own story from her own official archives, as Hieronymos had done. Such considerations are indeed most obvious; but insistence upon them may not be without its use, seeing the way in which the Achaean League has sometimes been handled as though it were Hellas, and as though every word that Aratos wrote bore its face value.

Antigonos had already reckoned with every possible opponent, save one; and it happened naturally that that one was the one who mattered most. Aratos had already secured his position in the Achaean League; and though his first generalship in 245 does not seem to have been particularly successful, he had already more than laid the foundations of his own peculiar and amazing influence over the federated cities. By the constitution of the League a year had to elapse before the same man could hold the generalship a second time; Aratos henceforth was elected every second year to that, the highest civil and military office, combining so to speak the functions of president and commander-in-chief. For the present, too, he shaped the League's policy in the intervening years; there was no one of weight to alternate with him, as Lydiades was to do later. Consequently, at this time, to a very large extent, the Achaean League *was* Aratos.

In May 243 Aratos entered upon his second term of office,<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See App. I.

<sup>3</sup> On the material dates see Beloch 3, 2, 176 seq.

and was able to make a real start with the carrying out of his policy. He seems to have seen clearly that, if he wanted to free the Peloponnese, he must go direct to the centre of the situation, and not fumble over the fringes; this is one of the things which marks him out as a considerable statesman. It did not take an Aratos to see what was the key of the position; given Corinth, everything else must, sooner or later, follow of itself. It was very necessary, therefore, to win Corinth; and to win it in open war against Antigonos was hopeless. Aratos took characteristic measures.

It must be clearly borne in mind that, up to now, there had been no open war between Antigonos and the League, and no antagonism at all since Alexander's death; and it did not follow that there ever would be any. The aid rendered by Achaëa to Boeotia had indeed been directed against Antigonos' friend; but in the Boeotian war Antigonos had not been directly concerned, and anyhow it was over and done with. To suppose that Antigonos and the League were in a condition of hostility, real, if half suppressed, ever since 251, arises both from misapprehension of Antigonos' Peloponnesian policy, a policy which has already been explained, and from applying later events to a situation which they do not fit. Antigonos had never sought any conquests south of Corinth; there he only needed allies to act as a check upon Sparta. He had never interfered actively in Peloponnese; he had absolutely acquiesced in the independence of the League of the ten Achaean towns; and if Sikyon became a member of the League, it was no business of his, and he never considered it such.<sup>4</sup> So long as Argos and Megalopolis were in the hands of his friends, that was all that he desired or required. Consequently, though Aratos knew well before 243 that a conflict in good earnest with Antigonos was inevitable, that fact depended solely on the temper and purpose of the man Aratos, and was not common knowledge, though doubtless communicated to his friends. Antigonos may or may not have had a shrewd suspicion of it; but nothing had as yet

<sup>4</sup> There is no evidence that Abantidas or any other Sikyonian tyrant had ever been a nominee, an ally, or a friend of Antigonos.



been translated into action, and at the beginning of the year 243 the relations between Antigonos and the League were entirely peaceful; men from Corinth were coming and going as they pleased between Corinth and Sikyon.<sup>5</sup> It was in these circumstances that Aratos planned the surprise of the fortress.

Of what took place we have Aratos' own account.<sup>6</sup> Through a not too scrupulous money-changer in Sikyon he made the acquaintance of some 'Syrians' in Corinth, who had succeeded in pilfering some of the king's money, and used to come to Sikyon to exchange the Macedonian pieces for something less compromising. These were four brothers, perhaps Asiatic Greeks, one of them a mercenary in Antigonos' garrison;<sup>7</sup> Aratos, who seems to have had an inexhaustible purse, bought those of them whom he required, and their leader, Erginos, remained with him afterwards and became a useful instrument in other undertakings. By his aid Aratos obtained the measurement of the walls at their lowest point, and in him he secured a sure guide. On the appointed night, leaving the Achaean army to wait at Sikyon till signalled for, Aratos took 400 picked men,<sup>8</sup> of whom only a few knew their destination, and with scaling-ladders approached the gate on the side of the Heraion. It was midsummer, and there was a bright moon; but they had the good fortune of a heavy cloud as they approached. Erginos and seven others, dressed as travellers, knocked at the gate; the door-keeper opened, and

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 18. From this, and from Polybios' ἀδύκία (2, 50, 9), Beloch concluded that there was peace at the time. This conclusion is as certainly correct as anything can be, and is supported by other details; e.g. the gate-keeper would not, in time of war, have opened at night to the first traveller who knocked, and Akrokorinthos would have been better garrisoned. Freeman wrote on the erroneous assumption that the League was at war with Antigonos all the time.

<sup>6</sup> What follows is Plut. *Arat.* 18-23 inclusive. There is no corroboration, for Polyæn. 6, 5 is exactly the same story from the same source. — The 400 Σύριοι (*Arat.* 24; for conjectures about them see Beloch 3, 1, 639, n. 1; Ferguson, *J.H.S.* 1910, p. 196, n. 35) were surely merely mercenaries, as Aratos says of one of them (*Arat.* 18).

<sup>7</sup> They had Greek names; but it does not follow from this that they were Greeks, Asiatic or otherwise.

<sup>8</sup> According to *Ind. Stoic. Herc.*, col. xv = Arnim 445, some of them at least were Thracian mercenaries (? supplied by Egypt). Plutarch does not say.

was at once cut down with his companions. Aratos with 100 men scaled the walls; and taking the ladders, and bidding the other 300 follow, he set off for the citadel of Akrokorinthos.

On the way he saw a picket of four men approaching, and ambushed them in the darkened street. Three fell dead on the spot; but the fourth escaped with a broken head and gave the alarm. In a few minutes the city had sprung to life; the trumpets of the garrison sounded to arms, and lights began to appear in the fortress on the crest of Akrokorinthos. But Aratos and his hundred were already scrambling up the great hill, stumbling about in the darkness, and perpetually losing the steep and winding track, when the moon shone out again; she lighted them right up to the wall, and then kindly hid herself once more, as Aratos began his assault upon the citadel.

Meanwhile Aratos' three hundred, left outside the Heraion gate without a guide and with no orders but 'Follow', had lost themselves in the city, unable to find which way Aratos had gone, and confused by the lights and the various noises. It was a better piece of good fortune than Aratos deserved: for had they followed him, his career would probably have ended then and there. As it was, they crouched in a shadow and waited for something to happen. What happened was that the Macedonian general Archelaos came hurrying through the city with his men, to take Aratos in the rear. Whereupon, as he passed, the three hundred rose up and smote him in flank, breaking and scattering his troops by their unexpected onset. Hard upon their success Erginos came down from the fight above to hasten them up the hill; they were needed to reinforce Aratos. A stiff fight followed at the wall of the citadel; but as day dawned the Achaeans forced their way over, and the sun rose upon a free Corinth. On the news the Corinthians opened their gates, and admitted the Achaean army, which came over from Sikyon. Archelaos was captured and released; another officer, Theophrastos, showed his devotion to Antigonos by refusing quarter. Persaios escaped to Kenchreai and took ship to Antigonos; the malicious gossip of a later day invented the story that his

friends used afterwards to chaff him with a saying of Zeno's, that the Stoic sage was the only good general.<sup>9</sup>

The Corinthians streamed together into the theatre, and Aratos came straight down from the captured fortress to meet them. A body of Achaean troops held either side of the stage; and between them Aratos came forward in his armour, weary and war-stained, and stood a little while in silence, leaning on his spear, till the cheering died away. It was the proudest moment he was ever to know. Then, collecting himself, he spoke to the people and persuaded them to join the Achaean League: and he put into their hands the keys of their city. They had not handled them for the better part of a hundred years.

Such is Aratos' story. We may wonder, if we will, that the man who could perform such an astounding feat of arms could ever have been a coward in a pitched battle; but what is necessary to consider here is the circumstances of the attack. Plutarch extols it to the skies as a noble action; yet Plutarch has himself left indisputable evidence that the Greeks of the third century regarded an attack made in time of peace as a disgraceful thing.<sup>10</sup> Polybios, the devoted friend of the Achaeans, who is far nearer in time than Plutarch, and who understands the facts better, does not mince words; it was an *ἀδικία*, a deliberate act of wrong, a breach of the law of nations; nay more, he seems to make Aratos admit this.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Persaios was not general at all; see ch. 13, n. 15. Aratos' narrative ends on the words *εἰς Κεγχρεῖας διεξέπεσεν*, with the fate of the three chief people in Corinth: Archelaos was released; Theophrastos refused quarter; Persaios escaped. Aratos of course knew; and he had no object, one way or the other, in telling a lie about Persaios. The version that Persaios fell in the battle may have been a tradition of the later Stoics (it is given in *Ind. Stoic. Herc.*, col. xv = Arnim 445), and became current, as seen in Pausanias (2, 8, 4 and 7, 8, 3); but Aratos' version lived on alongside of it (Hermippos ap. Ath. 4, 162 d = fr. 52 in *F. G. H.* iii, 48; Polyæn. 6, 5; and *ῥηές*, *Ind. Stoic. Herc.*, l. c.); and anyhow we must follow Aratos. Wilamowitz, in the face of Aratos' narrative, attributed the story of Persaios' escape to ill-natured *Klatsch* of the later republican-loving Stoa (*Antigonos*, p. 108, n. 10). Of course its accompaniment, the story in Plut. *Arat.* 23, *ὑστερον δὲ λέγεται* to the end of the chapter, is not from Aratos, but is a mere good story; Plutarch shows this clearly.

<sup>10</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 25 and 33.

<sup>11</sup> Polyb. 2, 50, 9. — The exact meaning of *ἀδικεῖν* is fortunately given by Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1, 10, 3, *τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον*.

No doubt, if questioned, Aratos would have said that, in itself, such a thing was wrongful; but that though Antigonos, in what concerned Macedonia, was a legitimate king, in what concerned Corinth he was merely a tyrant and as such outside all law. This of course would be a quibble; and Greek usage was clear. The Greeks expected a formal declaration of war, and thought badly of Sparta because she had discovered the enormous advantage of not issuing one. Pyrrhos had indeed done the same thing against Sparta, professedly copying the tactics of his opponent. But, Sparta apart, Greek international law was perfectly plain; full notice was obligatory, and it was looked on as a very noteworthy thing, if not as rather sharp practice, that Demetrios on one occasion was in a position to commence hostilities the day after his herald had delivered his declaration.<sup>12</sup> To us, Demetrios' action seems merely usual and prudent: and it is certain that in the future, as often in the past, the first blow will, at the least, instantly follow the rupture of diplomatic relations, while, as is well known, there are some who contemplate that it may actually precede it, so enormous is the advantage of that first blow. The surprise of Corinth, as a method of declaring war on Antigonos, would probably be less repugnant to one modern school of thought than it could ever have been to any Greek, even though Aratos could plead Spartan precedent. While then the absolute justice of Polybios' judgement from his own standpoint is recognized, Aratos may be permitted to keep what shreds of his glory he can; there was to be little enough of it in his later life.

Naturally, Antigonos did not see things in this light. What the old king felt we can only conjecture from his action; and his action shows that the iron had entered very deeply. He does not appear to have attempted to regain Corinth; the Achaeans had not only garrisoned it strongly with Achaean troops, refusing to trust to mercenaries, but maintained there a large number of big dogs as an effectual preventative

<sup>12</sup> On the declaration of war see Coleman Philippon, *International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome*, 1910, 2, p. 197 seq.—Sparta: Paus. 4, 5, 8; Sparta and Pyrrhos: Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26. The reference for Demetrios' action is Polyæn. 4, 7, 11.



against any surprise ; he evidently considered its recapture by direct means impossible. Neither did he attempt to attack the other towns, Megara, Troizen, Epidauros, which had revolted upon the loss of Corinth. His answer to Aratos was to turn to the Aetolians and to effect a real alliance with them, on terms that they together should conquer and partition Achaea.<sup>13</sup> It was the negation of all his previous policy ; it was a project of mere revenge, which he had never hitherto sought, and of territorial acquisition in Peloponnese, from which he had hitherto scrupulously held aloof. There is no doubt that the moving impulse to this treaty came from the Aetolians ; partitions were a well-known instrument of their policy, and it is indeed expressly stated that the invitation came from them.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless Antigonos acquiesced, and was severely blamed. To annex territory after a war was, and always had been, an everyday matter for every Greek ; but it seems that a project of partition of another state, announced beforehand, shocked the Greek mind no less than ours ; and Polybios describes this proposal by the same word as he uses to stigmatize Aratos' attack on Corinth ; it was an act of wrong, a transgression against the law of nations.<sup>15</sup> It was.

The position had in fact become a vendetta, where each succeeding act of wrong calls forth another. The original wrongdoing had probably been that of Demetrios, when he continued to hold Corinth after the expiration of the term for which the Corinthians had asked him to garrison it ;<sup>16</sup> though, in saying this, it is necessary to note that it is not known to what extent the League of Corinth of 303 may have regularized Demetrios' position. Then came Aratos' act of reprisal, as no doubt many a Greek called it ; and then that of Antigonos. In a continuing vendetta, modern thought cares nothing who began ; each fresh murder is just a murder. And Polybios here is splendidly inconsistent. He has risen above party

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 2, 43, 10 ; 9, 34, 6.

<sup>14</sup> Ib. 9, 34, 6. — The partition of Akarnania has already been noticed. In the Aetolian alliance with Rome of 211, of the conquests made by the alliance, Aetolia was to retain the land and Rome to take the movable goods ; Polyb. 9, 39 ; Livy 26, 24, 11 ; see Freeman 266.

<sup>15</sup> Polyb. 2, 43, 10.

<sup>16</sup> Diod. 20, 103, 3.

and above himself; each fresh move he has branded as an act of wrong, though that was not the general Greek idea. To the ordinary Greek, custom sanctioned retaliation; an eye was to be for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; the vendetta between Aratos and Antigonos was a simple exemplification of this law. Under this law, each fresh move in a vendetta is at once both justified and an invitation for a corresponding move from the opponent. And the amazing thing is that, on another occasion and in other circumstances, that law has never found a more passionate defender than Polybios himself.<sup>17</sup> Here and there in Greek history some one refused to avail himself of it, or to base his action upon the idea of revenge; but that was entirely his own personal matter. Antigonos had himself given more than one example of a better standard of conduct, notably after the death of Pyrrhos, when he had had both the pretext and the power for reprisals, and had held his hand. But very many years were still to elapse before a better-known Stoic ruler than Antigonos was to pronounce the brutal old law morally wrong, even for the Pagan world.<sup>18</sup>

As a matter of fact, very little came of the wretched business. It never passed from project into performance. Aratos

<sup>17</sup> Philippson, *op. cit.*, 2, p. 217, says that retaliation ('ius talionis') never became established as a general principle among the Hellenic communities; the only references given are *Nic. Eth.* 5, 8, and Polyb. 4, 27. I venture to think this is unfounded. The very obscure passage in Aristotle seems to me to go the other way, so far as it bears on the question at all; and Polyb. 4, 27 is a wrong reference for the proposition that Polybios rejected a plea of retaliation advanced by Philip. If 5, 9 seq. is meant, what Polybios does is to blame Philip for the destruction of Thermos in return for Dodona, not because he retaliated, but because he burnt *temples*; had he destroyed forts, harbours, cities, men, ships, crops (5, 11, 3), this would have been fair enough. And Polybios expressly states that Philip and his council were convinced that they had acted justly, ἀνυπομείνους τοῖς ὁμοίοις; surely this is good evidence for the popular belief. And Philippson omits altogether Polybios' tremendous discussion of the same subject, 2, 57-60 (on Mantinea), where Polybios vehemently advocates the most terrible examples of δράσαντι παθεῖν: (a) some citizens kill a friendly garrison. The sale of *all* the inhabitants of the town as slaves is an absolutely inadequate retribution. (b) A tyrant has killed men under torture. His own death under torture is not enough; he ought to have been publicly tortured all round the Peloponnese.—If Polybios could write thus, what did the common man feel?

<sup>18</sup> Marcus Aurelius 6, 6, 'Not to do likewise is the best revenge,' ἀριστος τρόπος τοῦ ἀμύνεσθαι, τὸ μὴ ἐξομοιωθῆναι. See R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, 1910, p. 145, for the later Stoics on this point. One would like to know if it is an echo of Christianity or not.

of course looked at once for allies, and found them readily in the powers that were always hostile to Macedonia, Sparta and Egypt. Agis, the noble young king who was engaged in attempting to reform Sparta, led an army to his assistance; and in return for an alliance Aratos made Ptolemy III generalissimo of the Achaean League by land and sea. It must have been largely an empty form, and Achaea thereby lost something of what she would have gained by adhering resolutely to independence of action; but there is one point in the story which perhaps suggests that Egypt may have sent a fleet to sea, though she naturally was not going to try conclusions again with Antigonos merely to please Aratos. She may, however, have compelled Antigonos to put to sea, thus drawing him off from the war on land;<sup>19</sup> further than this we cannot suppose that Egypt went, if indeed she took any action at all; for she was still engaged in war with Seleukos II.

In the spring of 241 the Aetolians came south by way of the Isthmus, and Aratos and Agis united their forces at Corinth to meet them. Agis was eager to fight; but Aratos absolutely refused, and insisted on retreat. It has been suggested that he was more afraid of the new ideas of the young Spartan than he was of the Aetolians. Thereupon Agis went home; he had come to help his allies to fight, and, very naturally, did not see what he was there for, if there was to be no battle. Aratos too retired, amid the curses of his troops, thus made to appear cowards in the eyes of Greece; the Aetolians streamed through the pass, invaded Achaea, attacked and took Pellene, and sacked it. While

<sup>19</sup> Ptolemy generalissimo; Plut. *Arat.* 24. It is not stated that Ptolemy accepted the position; and in any case it may have meant about as much as it means for us to make some foreign potentate an admiral of the fleet. See App. 12, p. 464. The fact that Aratos crossed to, and ravaged, Salamis might mean that he expected the support of a fleet; but it might equally mean that Antigonos left the war entirely to the Aetolians; and of course the Achaeans held Corinth and all its ships. If an Egyptian fleet did put to sea, it must have retired without fighting, as Ptolemy Soter retired without fighting before Demetrios' fleet in 295. (On the theory which places here Antigonos' victory at Andros see App. 12.) That Antigonos may have put to sea could be supported by the fact that Demetrios was governing in Macedonia about this time, if we could really be certain of the date of Demetrios' letter to Harpalos, on which see App. 5, n. 6.

they were in disorder and laden with plunder Aratos fell upon them ; his own account is that he defeated them completely with a loss of 700 men. Anyhow they went home again, and Aratos, justified of the event, absolutely regained his position with the League. What the ruined people of Pellene thought on the subject is naturally not recorded.<sup>20</sup>

This is all that is really known of the war, though it may have led directly to further Aetolian inroads into the Peloponnese. One of Aetolia's ambitions was to control the west of the peninsula, and she had to retaliate on Sparta for her interference ; beside her relationship to Elis, she had already acquired influence in Phigaleia and Messene, which were on terms of friendship with her, and a little later she is found unsuccessfully invading Lakonia, with a view to restore the Spartans exiled in the troubles that led to the death of Agis. But this expedition, which cannot fall in Agis' lifetime, almost certainly did not take place till after the accession of Demetrios II to the throne of Macedonia ; and it had no connexion with the alliance between Aetolia and Macedonia at all. Antigonos' story is in no way concerned with the obscure subject of the Aetolian movements in the Peloponnese.<sup>21</sup>

The winter of 241/40 saw peace, which included Antigonos and the Aetolians on one side, and the Achaean League and its allies on the other ; the event showed that it embraced

<sup>20</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 31, 32 ; *Agis*, 13-15.

<sup>21</sup> Aetolian friendship with and influence in Phigaleia and Messene, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 234. If the Timaios there mentioned as *πρεσβευτής* and *διαλυντής* be the Timaios who presently invaded Lakonia (Polyb. 4, 34, 9 ; 9, 34, 9 ; Plut. *Kleom.* 18), the decree must fall just at this time. For the dates see Beloch 3, 1, 651, 652 and notes, who I think has shown that the Aetolian attack on Sparta is anyhow later than 240. We know now that the war of Demetrios II against Aetolia and Achaia began in Lysias' year, 238/7 (*I. G.* ii, 5, 614 b = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 192), i.e. probably spring 237. This leaves the campaigning seasons of 239 and 238 available for the Aetolian attack on Sparta. — Of course, Teles, *περὶ φωνῆς*, being spoken 239 or 240 (see ch. 13, n. 52), Hippomedon was strategos of the Hellespont (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 221) by 241 or 240 at the latest. As a general peace was made winter 241/40, and 241 is otherwise occupied, it follows that if Hippomedon was one of the exiles with the Aetolian army, their inroad must have been in 242. But Hippomedon personally may not have been there at all ; and if the Aetolians had already challenged Sparta in 242, Agis could hardly have gone home as he did in 241. He was at the Isthmus in 241 (personal ambition apart) solely in pursuance of Sparta's ordinary philo-Egyptian and anti-Macedonian policy.



also the towns subject to or friendly to Antigonos, such as Athens and Argos. It had in fact the effect of a general truce throughout the Greek world.<sup>22</sup> Aratos, nevertheless, used the early months of 240, when he was still general, in an attempt on Argos; he had already tried in vain to assassinate Aristomachos, and after the death of the latter at the hands of his slaves he now made a similar attempt on his successor Aristippos, accompanying it by an attack on Argos which failed.<sup>23</sup> Aristippos made his complaint to the Achaean government of this attack in time of peace, presumably after Aratos went out of office, and the Achaeans acted rightly in submitting to arbitration; the arbitrators, the citizens of Mantinea, fined them thirty talents. Naturally this did not satisfy Aristippos, who tried in turn to assassinate Aratos, or so Aratos said; the story of the latter, that Antigonos was privy to the attempt, is at best an unfounded suspicion, and at worst a kind of moral murder.<sup>24</sup> It was probably, too, at the end of this generalship, which he did not vacate till the end of May, that Aratos made that celebrated attack on Athens in time of peace which brought such obloquy upon the Achaean name. He laid the blame of it on a mistake made by Erginos; but no one believed him.<sup>25</sup> For the president of a model power, Aratos was doing very well: he was in a fair way to put even a decent pirate to the blush.

<sup>22</sup> Though Plutarch has confused the order of events (for instance, chs. 28, 29, and 30 come after 31, 32, and 33 chronologically), one point is made clear in 33; that Aratos made the attack there mentioned on Athens in time of peace, and that it *preceded* Antigonos' death. Consequently the peace falls in Antigonos' lifetime. The attempt on Aristippos in time of peace (ch. 25) must have been made when Aratos was general and Antigonos alive; 'peace' puts Aratos' second generalship out of the question, and I agree with Beloch 3, I, 653 that, the campaigning season of 241 being occupied, the attempt on Aristippos must fall in early spring 240; consequently peace was made in the winter of 241/40. See also Freeman 308, who saw that peace followed the Pellene campaign.

<sup>23</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 25.

<sup>24</sup> Even Freeman quotes with approval Thirlwall 8, 126, 'Perhaps only a suspicion expressed by Aratos in his biography'; an opinion the more notable when one considers the very strong bias against Macedonia and Antigonos which Thirlwall displayed. — Antigonos had just made peace, when he could, so far as force went, have easily crushed Aratos. — Putting all other considerations aside, Antigonos was not the *kind* of character that uses the dagger; it is a psychological absurdity.

<sup>25</sup> Plut. *Arat.* 33.

The peace showed that Antigonos had accepted the situation. When his first wrath was over, he must have seen that, provided he could not retake Corinth, any other course was out of the question. This seems to be the best explanation of this abortive war, in which such fighting as was done was left entirely to the Aetolians. His age, of course, may have counted for something; he may, for all we know, have been at sea, watching the Egyptian fleet. But the truest reason of his inactivity, whether he was at sea or not, may well have been this, that he knew the war to be useless. His resources, by land and sea, were ample to have enabled him to crush Aratos and the youthful Achaean League, had he so desired; but that would not have given him Corinth. The siege of Corinth would be a long and difficult business; who could tell to what new complications and wars it might lead, and what damage might be inflicted upon Macedonia? He may already have been distrustful of Aetolia; that power may have considered herself insufficiently supported in the campaign of 241, in addition to her former grievance, and it is known that very soon after Antigonos died, she joined the Achaeans and attacked his successor.<sup>26</sup> Mere revenge could not help him; to conquer Achaea without Corinth was useless, as useless as he had always known conquest in the Peloponnese to be. It is true that the actual defections following upon the taking of Corinth had so far not been very serious; Argos and Megalopolis were still in the hands of his friends; but Antigonos realized perfectly that without Corinth his Peloponnesian system must fall to pieces. He was beaten; and he knew it. Had he been younger, he might have faced Aratos and begun again; but what had beaten him was, not Aratos, but an idea; against this he could not fight. Hence he made peace.

It was the end of Antigonos' system in Greece, the system that reposed upon the support of tyrants. Argos and Megalopolis were now absolutely isolated; and what would happen

<sup>26</sup> Polyb. 2, 44, 1; Plut. *Arat.* 33. Polybios shows the war was after Antigonos' death, and it seems to have actually broken out in 238/7 (n. 21); but the alliance may have been already made in Antigonos' lifetime, as Plutarch, *l. c.*, seems to say.—See Addenda.

was merely a question of time. Demetrios II made the best struggle he could ; but in the course of a few years the tyrants of both cities were to abdicate voluntarily and to become instead the elected generals of the Achaean League ; any of the smaller cities of Arkadia and the Argolid that had not already done so were to come in ; and with the loss of Athens—a loss that stands on a different footing, as Athens did not join the League—Macedonia at the beginning of Doson's reign was to hold nothing south of Thessaly save Euboea and the Cyclades, which she could cover with her fleet. It is a strange case of historical justice. As regards Macedonia, Antigonos had followed throughout a sound and just idea of government ; and all that he did for Macedonia prospered. But in the Peloponnese, though he found himself there from necessity rather than from choice, he had employed an unjustifiable system ; he lived long enough to see it collapse.

That collapse was brought about by the new spirit of which Aratos was the embodiment. Whether it should be called the spirit of liberty or of republicanism may be doubted ; possibly the one passed into the other. It looks indeed as if Aratos, beginning with the quest for liberty, went on to aim at the extension of the power and influence of the League, and ended, soon enough, by aiming at the extension of the power and influence of Aratos. But whatever the case, and whatever enthusiasm the Achaean League may arouse in students of constitutional history, its possibilities of usefulness in the history of Greece were severely conditioned and limited from the first. It never had any chance of revivifying Greece as a whole ; it had not the driving force even to withstand Kleomenes. It did good, of course, as every League did, by withdrawing from a number of individual cities the right to make war on and ruin each its neighbour at pleasure ; but a great number of leagues in Greece had already done this with success. The truth is that, whatever the conditions that brought about the union of four Achaean towns in 280, the greater League fashioned by Aratos originated in a reaction against Macedonia, and never really got beyond that limitation. It never had the least chance of carrying out by

itself its programme of the unification of the Peloponnese ; for, apart from the uncompromising hostility of Sparta, Elis and Messene resolutely refused to join until forced in by Rome. The only peoples in the Peloponnese that came heartily into the League, or that even cared to be members, were the peoples who had been under the rule of Demetrios the Besieger, the peoples among whom Antigonos Gonatas had maintained his garrisons or erected his system. Achaea, Megalopolis and part of Arkadia, Argos and the Argolid, Corinth, Megara—these were the lands in which the Macedonian had for generations sought a counterpoise to Sparta, and these *were* the League. Even in Arkadia, Sparta's traditional friend Mantinea was a terrible thorn in the League's side. The League in fact was a bit of the Macedonian empire broken off and fitted with a new constitution. The reason of its existence as a part of that empire had been to act as a counterpoise to Sparta ; and this remained its function.

The League in fact *prevented* the unification of the Peloponnese ; Kleomenes could and would have actually carried out this dream of centuries, had not Aratos first refused his overtures for union and afterwards called in Antigonos Doson to check the great Spartan king. Much as we may blame Aratos, it is to be clearly borne in mind that his action was but the expression of a political necessity which had lain deep in the nature of things for nearly a century ; Aratos in this merely acted as a personification of those deep-seated natural forces which compelled certain states of the Peloponnese into union with whatever ruler was strong in the North, were he Epameinondas or Demetrios, Gonatas or Doson. This aspect of the Achaean League has hardly received sufficient attention.

And it is just this aspect of the Achaean League which demonstrates the historical falsity of the view that the aim of Macedonia should have been to become 'the chosen head of a body of free and willing Greek confederates'.<sup>27</sup> The curse of Greece went too deep ; the thing was utterly impossible. Nothing but overwhelming force applied from without could ever fuse those jarring atoms that composed Hellas, or quench their eternal longings for the old particularist liberty ; and

<sup>27</sup> Freeman 475.



that force Macedonia never possessed. To attempt a general federation was a mere waste of time and energy. Demetrios had dreamt of it; and all men knew the result. Antigonos Doson was to attempt it, at his back the stronger Macedonia which Gonatas had fashioned, his front free from the hostility of the great sea-power which Gonatas had broken; and after a momentary semblance of success—a semblance only, for Aetolia was hostile, and Sparta was compelled—his work, too, fell to pieces. Antigonos Gonatas made no such attempt; for he had seen and understood his father's failure. He understood, or so it seems, that between the Macedonian and the non-Macedonian sections of Hellas the political position was and must be a stalemate. Even in the realm of immaterial things neither side could prevail. If science and the arts, and even history, were electing to flourish in the new kingdoms, the noblest and the least noble of all the intellectual manifestations of the Greek race still clung in pathetic devotion to the old form of the free city; and if the Roman Empire was the lineal successor of the Hellenistic kings, the free cities could claim that it was from their last great exemplar, Rhodes, that philosophy and rhetoric passed to the conqueror of the world. We can say, if we please, that Antigonos Gonatas was not a man of great ideas; he would probably have put it, that he was not a man of impossible ideals. He was in truth a man of one fixed idea, the good of his own land and kingdom of Macedonia as he understood it. This was an idea which he thought he could translate into practice; and with what strength and tenacity of purpose he did in fact translate it into practice, this book has attempted to show.

The general truce which in the winter of 241/40 had ended for the time all struggles in Hellas did not stand alone. The year 240 saw one of those strange episodes, which did occasionally occur, of entire peacefulness throughout the civilized Mediterranean world. The war in Syria was over, and peace had been made between Ptolemy and Seleukos. The war in Asia between Seleukos and his brother had not yet broken out.<sup>28</sup> Rome and Carthage had ended the first round of their tremendous struggle; and Carthage had yielded up Sicily

<sup>28</sup> See Beloch's dates.

and the sea, leaving to Hamilcar the vision of calling up out of the far west a new world to redress the balance of the old. In this momentary cessation of the clash of arms, some time in the year 240/39, Antigonos died, eighty years of age. Much of his life had been spent fighting ; a fresh outbreak of bloodshed was to follow quickly upon the accession of his son. But most of his wars had been forced upon him by others ; for war in itself he had no love. Rather, it can be truly said of him that he had sought peace for the kingdom of which he was the second founder ; and it was most fitting that in peace he should die. *Ἐν εὐφημία χρὴ τελευτᾶν.*

## APPENDIX I

### ONE VIEW OF THE SOURCES

No good account of the reign of Antigonos as a whole, contemporary or otherwise, seems ever to have existed. There were accounts to be found, no doubt, in general histories, such as those of Nymphis or Agatharkides; but it is not known if they did more than deal with certain selected items, the sort of items found in Trogus, and taken perhaps by him from the later general history of Timagenes. A question indeed that cries for treatment is the cause of the great wreck in the story of the third century. Did Rome think that history after the fourth century ought to flow, like modern school-history, in an Italian channel? Or was it due to selection in the second century? Or did third-century history never exist in any completeness? The question is much too large to discuss here. But how tremendous the wreck has been can be seen at a glance. Take, for example, the Athenian history of the learned antiquarian Philochoros. Out of seventeen books, seven sufficed him for the story from the earliest times to the peace of 311, while he required ten for the half-century from 311 to 261, a book to every five years. This shows *his* estimate of the importance of Antigonos' reign. Of his first seven books, we have 155 fragments left;<sup>1</sup> of the next three, eight fragments; of the last seven, including all those allotted to Antigonos, exactly *one* fragment. This gives some idea of the forces of destruction that have been at work.

What I want to consider here for a moment is the material that would have been available to a student in (say) the second century B.C. who desired to understand the reign of Antigonos. The best kind of material, such as written laws or debates in an Assembly, never did exist;<sup>2</sup> and I shall suppose that, like ourselves, he had no access to the copies of Antigonos' letters and rescripts in the official archives at Pella, but had to work with literary texts and the records of Greek cities like Athens or Delphi, the difference being that he had the complete series of texts and inscriptions of which we possess

<sup>1</sup> That is, 143 in *F. H. G.*, and 12 new ones, *Klio*, 5, 55.

<sup>2</sup> See the excellent remarks in Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft*, 148 seq.

only scraps, or echoes at third-hand, or may be the titles alone. This being so, he would have found that the reign of Antigonos fell into three well-marked divisions. The first would have closed with the death of Pyrrhos in 272; while the third would have opened with Aratos' surprise of Sikyon in 251.

In the first period, the main thing to do was to read Hieronymos. Here was an accurate and sympathetic narrative, written by a man of affairs who had seen and understood, who had been behind the scenes at the court not only of Antigonos, but also of his father and grandfather, who had access to the Macedonian archives, and who above all sought the truth; one who, though a Greek, could and did put the case for Macedonia and her king, and did not trick out history for popular consumption. Dry, perhaps; perhaps rather partial to Antigonos; but a guide to be more than thankful for.

Hieronymos, once read, could be supplemented and illustrated from many different sources. There was Philochoros' history of Athens, written presumably from the nationalist standpoint, but none the worse for that. As a corrective to it, there were not only the Athenian decrees themselves, but the corpus of them edited with a commentary by Antigonos' half-brother Krateros, a work that must have formed a history of Athens from a different point of view to that of Philochoros, and that seems to have gone down to 271 anyhow.<sup>3</sup> We have a few of the decrees; Krateros and Philochoros have alike perished. Then there was the huge lost monograph of Demetrios of Byzantion—an independent city, friendly to the Antigonids—treating of the crossing of the Gauls to Asia, which would have illuminated the to us so obscure years 281 to 277. There was the general history of Nymphis of Herakleia,—an independent city, neither friendly nor unfriendly to Antigonos—dealing with the successors of Alexander and their sons. So far as can be seen, he had no bias against Antigonos. Local patriotism utilized part of another work of Nymphis, and has left just enough to show how good he was; of his general history exactly one fragment remains, something about tortoises. Certain points in the early history of Antigonos might have been elucidated from the dramatic and popular chronicles of Douris of Samos, from the rhetorical history of Antigonos' opponent Demochares, from the history of his own time left by Euphantos of Olynthos, Antigonos' earliest teacher, and from the continuation of Diyllos' general history of Greece by Psaon of Plataia. All are lost, as is the history, whatever it was, written by Ktesibios of Chalkis, who was a friend of Menedemos

<sup>3</sup> If to him we owe, as generally supposed, Laches' decree for Demochares.



and knew Antigonos. Timaios' great industry probably supplied some details of Antigonos' Gallic war and Gallic mercenaries. Pyrrhos' own lost memoirs would have thrown light on his relations with Antigonos from his own point of view; certain details of the end of their duel might have been gathered from the collection and publication by Aratos' friend Deinias of the town archives of Argos; further information could be obtained from the lost history of Epeiros written by Pyrrhos' contemporary, Proxenos. Again, a mass of material was in existence which bore on the character and friends of the first king that philosophy had trained. The writings of Persaios the Stoic may not have thrown much light on this: but two invaluable sources to supplement Hieronymos were Antigonos' own lost letters to the historian, and the writings of Antigonos' friend Bion the Cynic, of which the mere echoes are invaluable to-day. The same subject was illustrated, to what extent cannot be said, in other parts of the lost philosophical literature, while masses of material, true and untrue, were to be found in writers like Hermippos. Last, but not least, the complete text was available of the writer to whom, even at second-hand, every student of the reign of Antigonos must owe so much, Antigonos of Karystos. One source, more personal still, was left; the poems of Aratos of Soloi, which celebrated the battle of Lysimacheia, praised Antigonos, and adorned Phila's name. If our student could not get a picture of this period extremely rich and full and as true as any history is apt to be, perhaps truer than the average, the fault was entirely his own.

The second period is utterly different. Hieronymos is gone, Krateros is gone. Philochoros goes down to 261; then he too ceases. Antigonos had to execute him for treason; we do not know with what bitterness he may have written of the Chremonidean war. There are no more contemporary memoirs, such as those of Pyrrhos; even the Athenian decrees are few, and for a while cease altogether. Though toward the end of the period Antigonos of Karystos is becoming a contemporary witness, he had perhaps not so much to tell about the king as in the earlier days of Menedemos and Zeno; in truth Antigonos' relations with the world of philosophy were not quite what they had been. There is no one now writing in Macedonia, or using the records of Pella. There is only one historian writing in the north at all. Nymphis goes down to 246; he may or may not have known and described what was really going on in Macedonia; but for some reason Nymphis seems to have exerted little influence. Deinias' Argive chronicle—certainly anti-Macedonian—is running on; doubtless other

town chronicles ; but, speaking broadly, the history of this second period of Antigonos' reign, so far as it was read at all, came more and more to depend on, and be coloured by, the version of a single writer, Phylarchos.

Phylarchos wrote at Athens, some time after the death of Antigonos Doson, in the period of recovered freedom. As he treated of Pyrrhos' death, it may be that he began his history where Douris left off, in 281. He was a man of parts, no inconsiderable writer, with an idea, an idea probably borrowed from Douris and developed : the world he saw, and the men he saw in it, were as dramatic and interesting as any figures in a stage-play ; he would so write history as to bring out its dramatic side, and make it compete with tragedy. He succeeded ; his popularity is attested by the number of surviving fragments, his influence by the fact that where he crosses Hieronymos, in the last years of Pyrrhos, his version of one of the two great events of the time, the attack on Sparta, seems to have ousted the narrative of the greater and more truthful writer and to have been the one which survived (see App. 8). Brilliance is not necessarily synonymous with partiality ; the dullest of historians may be the most unfair. But Phylarchos had in full measure one defect of his qualities. His aim was not truth but dramatic effect, or at the best psychological truth ; and he wrote as a partisan. His ideal state was Sparta, his ideal hero Kleomenes : he was not, perhaps, likely to be just to the other and rival 'Dorian' monarchy, and we have Polybios' word for his strong anti-Macedonian bias.

As regards, then, the second period of Antigonos' reign, the brilliant Phylarchos, aided perhaps by Philochoros, imposed at once upon the world an anti-Macedonian view ; and such correctives as were accessible to a student barred from the archives at Pella were not sufficiently important or popular to act as an efficient make-weight.

The third period is very simple. Two writers, Phylarchos and Aratos of Sikyon, have ousted or survived all others, save the Aratean Deinias and the historians of philosophy ; and Aratos tends to occupy much more space than Phylarchos, owing to the sympathetic outlook of Polybios. That these two writers are on opposite sides as regards Peloponnesian affairs, and therefore allow us, between them, an excellent picture of the Peloponnese, would be of little value to our student of Antigonos ; for both agree in two characteristics. The outlook of each is *Peloponnesian* ; the affairs of the north only enter (when they enter at all) accidentally, where they happen to cut across the story of the Peloponnese. And the outlook of each is strongly anti-

Macedonian. With Aratos, indeed, one may put it even more forcibly. One suspects that he was as ready to assassinate with the pen as he had been with the dagger.<sup>4</sup> His memoirs, indeed, are an apologia for his life. It needed one badly; and Aratos' real object in writing was neither the truth, nor the glorification of the Achæan League, but the whitewashing of Aratos. How exclusively one or other of these two writers imposed himself upon the history of this period is shown by this, that instead of the various medley of detail, true or otherwise, that one is used to in Polyænos, we here get two blocks of narrative, in exact, almost verbal, agreement, the one with Phylarchos-Plutarch and the other with Aratos-Plutarch.<sup>5</sup> It stands to reason that, beyond giving a few bare facts, such things as the records of Delos could not then, as they cannot now, do much to better the position.

Consequently it was already quite impossible, by the second century B. C., to get a true view of the last period of the reign of Antigonos; probably it never was possible. It was also very difficult, though not quite impossible, to get anything approaching a true view of the middle period. But of the first period it was more than possible, and in very full measure.

To the modern historian of Antigonos the matter stands thus. We know, though actually least, relatively most—far the most—about the third period; in essential outline, we probably know what the second century knew. We hardly know anything of Macedonia itself; but neither, apparently, did the second century. That is to say, the *unfavourable* view is pretty well preserved. The second period is almost entirely lost; the merest scraps survive. The first period is a wreck, also, but not beyond hope; a certain amount of reconstruction is possible. And according to the success of our reconstructions in the first period will be the amount of truth that enters into our picture of the reign of Antigonos. To reach the truth in the third period is, as it always was, hopeless; and, for the second, one has an uncomfortable feeling that if any one ever shall have much success in a reconstruction, what he will have reconstructed will be, not the facts, but Phylarchos.

<sup>4</sup> Further in ch. 14. — Aratos consistently spoke evil of Doson (Plut. *Arat.* 38; *Kleom.* 16), who had been his friend; how much more then of Gonatas, who had been his enemy? That the general tone of his memoirs, for the earlier period, must have been anti-Macedonian is evident. — Phylarchos being pro-Spartan was naturally anti-Macedonian; see especially Polyb. 2, 56, 6, on Doson.

<sup>5</sup> Polyæn. 4, 6, 1 = Phylarchos ap. Plut. *Arat.* 17; Polyæn. 6, 5 = Aratos ap. Plut. *Arat.* 18 seq. (condensed).

## APPENDIX II

## ON SOME ATHENIAN ARCHONS

A GREAT deal has been made certain in the last few years.<sup>1</sup> But I have found myself unable to accept in its entirety any one of the three archon lists of Beloch, Ferguson, or Kolbe ; and as the archon list must settle many questions of dating, I give here the list which I use and my reasons for it.

On the principle that should guide one in discussion, I unhesitatingly accept that of Beloch and Kolbe ; the first thing to consider is the historical material, and the secretary-cycle is only to be brought in as an auxiliary. The question, however, of the nineteen-year intercalation cycle is more difficult. Ferguson and Kolbe riddled this cycle with criticism,<sup>2</sup> and neglected it in forming their lists. Beloch, on the contrary, has stated that a list, to answer all requirements, must take account of this cycle ; but that in fact this can only be done very imperfectly owing to our lack of the necessary knowledge of the Athenian calendar. Recently Sundwall has sought to demonstrate a regular order in the last two nineteen-year periods of the fourth century.<sup>3</sup> I shall come back to this ; merely premising here, that if Sundwall be right for the earlier part of the third century, we should have, in constructing a list that should agree with his intercalation cycle, to violate flagrantly the historical material.

In one sense every possible list is unsatisfactory. There are a number of archons, for whose years both the secretary tribe and the calendar quality are unknown ; and it is always assumed that these can be put where we please. It is inevitable, but not scientific.

<sup>1</sup> The following recent works may be referred to : Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* 3, 2, p. 32 seq. ; *Klio*, 1, 412 seq. ; *Hermes*, 38 (1903), 130 ; W. S. Ferguson, *The Athenian Archons of the Third and Second Centuries B.C.* (Cornell Studies, No. 10), 1899 ; *Klio*, 5 (1905), p. 155 ; *The Priests of Asklepios* (1906, reprinted 1907) ; *Class. Philol.*, vol. ii (1907), p. 305, and vol. iii (1908), p. 386 ; J. Kirchner, *G. G. A.* (1900), 435 seq. ; *Hermes*, 37 (1902), p. 435 ; *B. Ph. W.* (1909), 844 seq. ; W. Kolbe, *Festschrift für Otto Hirschfeld* (1903), p. 312 ; *Ath. Mitt.* 30 (1905), p. 73 ; *Die attischen Archonten* (1908). To get this discussion into any reasonable compass I have had to assume that the reader already knows how most of the questions stand. Kolbe's book of 1908 soon gives the requisite orientation.—See also Addenda to note 13.

<sup>2</sup> Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 30, pp. 74-5 ; Ferguson, *Class. Philol.* 3, 386 seq.

<sup>3</sup> J. Sundwall, *Zur Frage von dem neunzehnjährigen Schaltcyklus in Athen* (*Öfversigt af Finska Vetenskaps-Societetens Förhandlingar*, lii (1909-10), Afd. B, no. 3).



The list I put forward for consideration follows. (O = ordinary year ; I = Intercalary year.) I give also for comparison the usual nineteen-year cycle, as used by Beloch and Sundwall, and also a cycle constructed by E. Cavaignac for the years 433-414.

		<i>Tribe of the Secretary.</i>	<i>Usual Cycle.</i>	<i>Cavaignac.</i>
293/2	Philippos, I (?) . . . . .	...	O	I
292/1	Kimon . . . . .	...	I	O
291/0	? Aristonymos, O or ? Charinos	(?) I	O	O
290/9	? Charinos . . . . .	...	O	I
289/8	Xenophon . . . . .	...	I	O
288/7	Diokles, O . . . . .	4	O	O
287/6	Diotimos, O . . . . .	5	O	I
286/5	Isaios . . . . .	...	I	O
285/4	Euthios, O . . . . .	7	O	O
284/3	Ourios, O . . . . .	9	I	I
283/2	Menekles, O . . . . .	11	O	O
282/1	Nikias Otryneus . . . . .	12	I	I

*New Cycle begins.*

281/0	? Aristonymos, O . . . . .	I	O	O
280/9	Gorgias . . . . .	...	O	O
279/8	Anaxikrates . . . . .	...	I	I
278/7	Demokles, O . . . . .	...	O	O
277/6	Glaukippos . . . . .	5	O	O
276/5	Euboulos . . . . .	...	I	I
275/4	Polyeuktos . . . . .	7	O	O
274/3	Hieron, I . . . . .	8	O	I
273/2	. . . . .	...	I	O
272/1	. . . . .	...	O	O
271/0	Pytharatos, I (Ferguson) . . . . .	...	O	I
270/9	. . . . .	...	I	O
269/8	. . . . .	...	O	O
268/7	Philokrates <sup>4</sup> (O Ferguson ; I Beloch) . . . . .	2	O	I
267/6	. . . . .	...	I	O
266/5	Peithidemos, O . . . . .	...	O	O
265/4	. . . . .	...	I	I
264/3	Diognetos . . . . .	...	O	O
263/2	. . . . .	...	I	I
262/1	Antipatros . . . . .	...	O	O
261/0	Arrheneides, O . . . . .	...	O	O

Of these Anaxikrates, Demokles, and Pytharatos are independently certain ; and on present materials there seems little room for doubt that Polyeuktos (and consequently Hieron) are rightly placed in 275/4 and 274/3.<sup>5</sup> The secretary cycle from Polyeuktos fixes Menekles and Nikias

<sup>4</sup> Ferguson, *Class. Philol.* 1908, 386, makes this an ordinary year ; Beloch, *Klio*, I, 416, an intercalary year. So far as I can see, the latter seems to be correct.

<sup>5</sup> Pomtow's forthcoming study (see *B. Ph. W.* 1910, pp. 1087-96) will place

Otryneus,<sup>6</sup> and also Glaukippos.<sup>7</sup> There can I think be little doubt now that Philippos is correctly placed in 293/2 :<sup>8</sup> the succession Diokles-Euthios is certain ; and I regard Ferguson's dating for Antipatros and Arrheneides as so clearly right that any further discussion is waste of time (see ch. 10, n. 93). With many misgivings I have come to the conclusion that on the date of *I. G.* ii, 5, 614 b (= *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 192) Kolbe was right, and that this inscription, and consequently the archon Lysias, belong to the reign of Demetrios II.<sup>9</sup> The real problem now is to fix Diokles, i.e. the fall of Demetrios ; subordinate problems are Ourios, Euboulos, and Xenophon.

To take Ourios first. He must come between Isaïos and Euboulos. Kolbe assigned him to 273/2, as Kirchner and Ferguson assigned him to 285/4, solely on the secretary order. But the important fact connected with Ourios is this, that in his year the Athenians decreed honours to the people of Tenos *στρατενομένοις καὶ τ[ε]λοῦσι τὰς εἰσφορὰς μετ' Ἀθηναίων*, *I. G.* ii, 5, 345 c, second half. The decree refers to an

Polyeuktos in 277, and the first celebration of the Soteria at Delphi in autumn 276. Till one knows on what this is based (apparently in part on unpublished material), it is impossible to make any comment ; but I do venture to think it will not be easy to prove (see, too, Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 164, n. 1). I gather that Pomtow does not contemplate disturbing any archons before Gorgias, 280/79, but that he will put Diokles in 290/89 with Ferguson and Kirchner.

<sup>6</sup> An independent reason which perhaps confirms the correctness of 282/1 for Nikias' date is that a year in which such a prominent citizen as Glaukon became agonothes ( *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 200) ought to be a Panathenaia year (autumn 282).

<sup>7</sup> Inscription published by G. P. Oikonomos, *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1910, p. 19 = Michel 1483. Subject to what is said in note 5, I accept Oikonomos' allocation of Glaukippos, as does Michel. Room is still left, before Epicurus' death, for Telokles and -laos.

<sup>8</sup> Where he comes in the list in Dion. Hal. See on this Kolbe, *Archonten*, p. 19 seq. Ferguson used to put him in 292/1, *Class. Philol.*, vol. ii (1907), 305 ; *Priests*. But even Kirchner, who generally agrees with Ferguson, could not accept this, *B. Ph. W.* 1908, p. 885 ; and Ferguson more recently has stated that he considers the date an open question, *Athens*, 140, n. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Kolbe in *Festschrift für Otto Hirschfeld*, p. 312. This view has been accepted by Niese (iii, 378), Ferguson (*Priests*, 159), and Kirchner (*B. Ph. W.* 1906, 988) ; and rejected by Beloch (3, 2, 37). See Kolbe further in *Archonten*, p. 62 seq. On consideration I believe that every argument for the late date of this inscription can be fully met, except one, but that one suffices ; it *does* refer to a continuing war, and I cannot make this fit the circumstances of 292-290 as I understand them. — There is a possible corroboration, too, which has not been noticed. Kirchner has published an Athenian decree of the year of Lysanias (*Klio*, 8, 487 = Michel 1491) with the usual gap in it ; and if Ferguson's date for this archon (235/4) be correct (and though the matter is uncertain, this seems to me more probable than Kolbe's 247/6, and has been accepted by Michel ; see note to 1490), the filling up of the gap, which demands fifty-five letters as near as may be, would probably be *ἔφ' ὑγίαι καὶ σωτηρ[ίαι] τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου [καὶ βασιλέως Δημητρίου βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου καὶ βασιλίσσης Φθίας]*.

earlier decree of the Athenians giving the Tenians *ισοτέλεια*, which it apparently ratifies.<sup>10</sup> It appears from the present tense that the fighting referred to may have been actually going on in the year of Ourios. The question is, when and under what circumstances Athens and Tenos can have fought side by side. The relations of Athens and Tenos had for some time been very friendly; in 307/6 Tenos had sent envoys to Athens to congratulate her on being 'liberated' by Demetrios, and a crown had been voted by Athens to the envoys (*I. G.* ii, 239, and an unedited inscription; see H. von Gaertringen, *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, p. xvi, test. 1302). But from 287 or thereabouts—anyhow from 285—Tenos was in Ptolemy's sphere: and though it is possible that Ptolemaic rule over the Islands was not consolidated till Lysimachos' death,<sup>11</sup> certainly after 285 Tenos, though retaining internal autonomy, was not in a position to run counter to Ptolemaic interests. Its help to Athens, then, would most probably fall before the rule of Ptolemy over the island world was consolidated, i. e. before 280; and the circumstances were, that the war touched Athens herself (which puts 273/2 out of the question), and that Ptolemy was friendly to Athens. As Ourios must follow Isaïos, he therefore belongs to the war between Athens and Antigonos which ended in 282/1, and this is confirmed by the appearance in his year of *οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει* (which again puts 273/2 out of the question).<sup>12</sup> If Diokles be 290/89 (as Ferguson), the date of 285/4 is right enough for Ourios; but if, as I hope to show, Diokles be 288/7 then 285/4 is certainly Euthios, and Ourios must fall in the only remaining war year, 284/3.

Fixing Ourios fixes Gorgias. The latter must fall either ten or fourteen years before Pytharatos; and 284/3 being occupied by Ourios, Gorgias falls 280/79 (so Ferguson, Kirchner, Kolbe, as against Beloch). His date is important, because in his year falls Demochares' motion in honour of the memory of Demosthenes.

I turn now to the main problem, Diokles: 288/7 Beloch, 287/6 Kolbe, Dittenberger, Koehler, de Sanctis, 290/89 Ferguson, Kirchner, and apparently Pomtow and Klotzsch.<sup>13</sup> First, the historical position. I cannot read Plutarch as meaning that, first Demetrios lost Macedonia

<sup>10</sup> *I. G.* ii, 5, 345 c, first half; cf. *I. G.* ii, add. 97 c. See H. von Gaertringen, Introduction to *I. G.* xii, 5, 2 (p. ix), under the year 285/4. I feel doubtful if the supposed reference to *εἰσφοραὶ* be correct.

<sup>11</sup> For the Islands between 285 and 280 see ch. 4, p. 104 seq., and ch. 5, p. 135.

<sup>12</sup> See Ferguson's list, *Klio*, 5, p. 170, with references, for the *ὁ* and *οἱ* periods respectively.

<sup>13</sup> Pomtow, see note 5. Klotzsch, p. 206, on Demetrios' fall (literary evidence only).—See Addenda.

to Pyrrhos, then went to Kassandreia, then toured the cities of Greece, then restored autonomy to Thebes, and that then and not till then Athens revolted. I do not think that Plutarch's words<sup>14</sup> are temporal at all; they merely introduce a new subject. For Plutarch is quite explicit elsewhere: in *Dem.* 44 he says Ptolemy, Lysimachos, and Pyrrhos all started together (ἀμα) and Ptolemy Ἑλλάδα ἀφίστη. What Hellas, seeing that Demetrios' garrisons stood loyal (*Dem.* 45)? Obviously Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάδα, Athens. Whether then the revolt of Athens came, in time, before or after Demetrios' abdication in Macedonia Plutarch leaves open; *but it belongs to the same campaigning season*; and be it remembered that the natural campaigning season was astride two Attic years.

The question as between 288/7 and 287/6 has been discussed by Beloch and Kolbe.<sup>15</sup> The latter admits that there are arguments both ways. The short point, as I understand it, is that the various versions of the list of Macedonian kings give Demetrios all or part of the year 288/7; I understand this to mean that we cannot place Demetrios' abdication prior to 1 Hekatombaion 288; but it will satisfy the chronographers if his reign runs on into 288/7: how far, is immaterial.

It is quite clear, however, that the Eusebian chronology and Plutarch (if correct) absolutely prevent our placing the fall of Demetrios in 290/89. Consequently Ferguson and Kirchner take up the position (a) that Athens revolted a year before Demetrios abdicated, and (b) that the decree for the Egyptian captain Zeno does *not* show that Athens was in revolt by 11 Hekatombaion of Diokles' year.<sup>16</sup>

Now I quite agree that there is nothing to hinder us believing that Athens revolted before Demetrios actually abdicated; I believe it myself; only, the events *must* both belong to one campaigning season; they cannot be separated by a winter, because of Plutarch, *Dem.* 44 (above). But I venture to think that no shadow of doubt can exist that Athens was in revolt by 11 Hekatombaion of Diokles' year. The ground taken by Ferguson and Kirchner, that Ptolemy had sent corn to Athens before, and that therefore the corn brought by Zeno does not imply that Athens was in revolt, is hardly correct: for the occasion on which Ptolemy had sent corn before was when Athens was starving after

<sup>14</sup> *Dem.* 46, Θηβαίους μὲν ἀπέδωκε τὴν πολιτείαν, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀπέστησαν αὐτοῦ.

<sup>15</sup> Beloch 3, 2, 40 and 65; *Hermes*, 38, 133; Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 30, 91, and *Archonten*, 27.

<sup>16</sup> Ferguson, *Athenian Archons*, p. 7; *Priests*, p. 151; Kirchner, *G. G. A.* 1900, 435. The decree for Zeno is *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 193 = *I. G.* ii, 5, 309 b = Michel 1480.



Lachares' siege,<sup>17</sup> at a time when Demetrios was also supplying corn (Plut. *Dem.* 34), and may have been glad enough to allow Athens to get food wherever she could; and moreover one does not convoy cornships with warships unless one is at war. But the matter of the corn is not the point of the decree at all. The point of the decree is, not that Zeno was thanked for convoying corn, but that he was thanked for convoying corn συναγωνιζόμενος τῇ τοῦ δήμου σωτηρίαι: he was thanked because by his act he was 'sharing in the struggle for the deliverance of Athens'. And the word σωτηρία here, as in all the decrees passed by the nationalist government of 288/7-282/1, means the freedom gained by Athens through her revolt from Demetrios. In the decree for Audoleon of Paionia (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 195 = *I. G.* ii, 312) Audoleon is thanked for helping Athens to her freedom, ἐλευθερίαν, (l. 20) νομίζων εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ αὐτ[ῷ] τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν; in the decree for Philippides (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 197 = *I. G.* ii, 314) when the city recovered her freedom, ἐλευθερίαν, he (l. 32) διατετέλεκε λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τεῖ τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαι; and in the decree for Strombichos (*I. G.* ii, 317, 318 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 198, 199), Strombichos, when the people took up arms for freedom, ἐλευθερίας, gave ear to their desire for freedom, thinking it his duty συναίτιος γενέσ[θαι] τῇ σωτηρίαι. These instances are, I think, sufficient to prove my contention.<sup>18</sup>

The positive historical arguments given for putting Diokles in 290/89 are two. (a) The decree for Aischron in Diokles' year, *I. G.* ii, 309, which may refer to the events of 290 at Delphi; so it may, but it does not follow that the Athenians thanked Aischron in the same year. Moreover the reading πνλ[αγορῶν] is quite conjectural, and the very mutilated words may not relate to 290 at all. (b) Demochares returned in Diokles' year. As Demochares did not choose to return under Demetrios' general amnesty in Philippos' year 293/2, it seems to me most unlikely that he would have returned till Demetrios fell; his return is good evidence that in Diokles' year Athens was *free*.

Of course the real reason which drove Ferguson to put Diokles in 290/89 was something quite different; it was, first, the desire to preserve the secretary rotation intact, and, secondly, the correspondences between the list of secretaries and the list of the priests of Asklepios; the historical argument is subordinate. Kolbe criticized Ferguson's equations at great length, and dated the priests differently; he has been in turn

<sup>17</sup> *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 213 = *I. G.* ii, 331, l. 29; see Dittenberger's note.

<sup>18</sup> For the explanation of the similar phrase in the decree for Phaidros (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 213 = *I. G.* ii, 331), which was passed by a pro-Macedonian government, and is quite another thing altogether, see ch. 2, notes 16 and 20.

answered by Kirchner, who agrees with Ferguson.<sup>19</sup> On this controversy I find myself in complete agreement with Ferguson; the coincidences which he has brought out cannot be accidental.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, Isaïos in 288/7, i. e. Diokles in 290/89, seems to me a demonstrated historical impossibility, unless we can prove one of two things; either (a) that Eusebios' list and Plutarch's seven years are quite wrong, and Demetrios reigned only four years, or (b) that Demetrios came to the throne of Macedonia in 296 and not in 294.<sup>21</sup> One of these two most incredible propositions has got to be demonstrated before Diokles can be placed in 290/89; I need go no further.

If then I accept Ferguson's dating for the priests from 275/4 onward, and do not accept his dating for the isolated priest Φυλῆς Χαίριον of Isaïos' year, I must suppose a break in the priestly rotation. Exactly. There is a break of two years in the secretary list between Euthios and Menekles, on my table: and I suppose the existence of a corresponding break in the tribes of the priests. It need not necessarily be a coincidence. Since the tribes had ceased to be identical, a certain tribe for the secretary may have come to entail a certain tribe for the priest, or perhaps vice versa; Antigonos made them identical again after the Chremonidean war. Even, however, if it be a coincidence, we may accept it; it is not nearly so much of a coincidence as another which seems certain, viz. that when Antigonos ended his own war with Athens in 281, the secretary-tribe in rotation for the new year 281/80 was his name-tribe Antigonis, and that when he ended the Chremonidean war the priest-tribe in rotation for the new year 261/60 was Antigonis.

To return to 288. Demetrios abdicated during some campaigning season, while the oaks were in leaf. There is a good deal to be got into that season first, and all the evidence is satisfied if we suppose it was in August-September that his army went over to Pyrrhos and he fled. This would make him king into the new archon year 288/7, and this is all that the chronographers require. But Ptolemy would have reached Greece long before that; the decree for Zeno is consistent with Zeno having already been at Athens before;<sup>22</sup> it may have been his cruisers that actually gave the signal for revolt, while Ptolemy's battle fleet (Plut. *Dem.* 44 στόλῳ μεγάλῳ) was observing Demetrios' naval bases, Corinth, Chalkis, &c. Consequently, Athens was in revolt before Demetrios actually gave up, though perhaps not before it was morally

<sup>19</sup> Kolbe, *Archonten*, p. 6 seq.; Kirchner, *B. Ph. W.* 1909, 847-9.

<sup>20</sup> Summarized, *Priests*, 171.

<sup>21</sup> Evidence for this, Beloch 3, 2, 64 and 80; Klotzsch 149, n. 1.

<sup>22</sup> Εὐρους ὡν δ[ι]ατε[λ]ε[ί] . . . ἰδίαι ἐκίστωι 'Α[θηναίων].

certain that he must be beaten. And if she was in revolt by 11 Hekatombaion of 288/7, i.e. eleven days after Diokles took office, she probably had actually revolted under his predecessor.

Here comes in the unexplained phrase of the decree for Phaidros. He was active all through Demetrios' government; but after holding office under Xenophon he held none again till under Nikias in 282/1 (on which see ch. 5, n. 36). The decree says χειροτονηθείς ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα πρῶτος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου στρατηγὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ Ξενοφώντος ἄρχοντος. Dittenberger's note on πρῶτος is 'Quo haec vox spectet, obscurum est'; unless, he suggests, Phaidros was the first general after some unknown change in the state. I interpret it to mean that Xenophon's year saw *two* hoplite-generals; Phaidros was the first, but his office ended before the year ended and another was appointed. That is, the revolt of Athens, with the usual change<sup>23</sup> of magistrates, occurred in Xenophon's year; he is therefore Diokles' immediate predecessor.

Kimón must be 292/1, I think, for the reasons given in ch. 2, n. 20. Aristonymos, on his secretary, may fall 281/80 or 291/90; but *I. G.* ii, 614 *may* contain his name, and if so his place is 281/80. Charinos must then be 291/90 or 290/89. We really require more evidence for these three archons.

Now as to the archon Euboulos. His place is of importance, because the decree for Phaidros was passed in the year after. The two years open for him (see Beloch 3, 2, 43; Kolbe, *Archonten*, p. 32), are 276/5 and 272/1. As he must be later than Ourios, Kolbe's ascription of Ourios to 273/2 drove him to put Euboulos in 272/1, and to attempt to justify 271/70 for the Phaidros decree. I do not see how this can possibly be accepted. I have considered Phaidros' political record in ch. 2; he became in 295/4, and remained, a Demetrian. The decree for him, with its wealth of (excised) references to Demetrios, and its peculiar use of the term ἐλευθέρῃ (see note 18), was obviously passed by a pro-Macedonian government. But the Amphiktyonic lists seem to show that in 271/70 a pro-Macedonian government was not in power

<sup>23</sup> Quite a number of such changes are known; they are not always easy to detect, for the eponymous archon was generally, for obvious reasons, re-appointed. Substitutions of magistrates took place in 319/8 (Polyperchon's proclamation, and the death of Phokion; references to inscriptions in Ferguson, *Priests*, 139; described Plut. *Phokion*, 33); in 296/5 (Ferguson, *ib.*; Lachares' *coup d'État*); possibly in 295/4, when Demetrios took Athens (Plut. *Dem.* 34, κατέστησεν ἀρχάς, αἱ μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν); in 282/1, the end of the war between Antigonos and Athens (Glaukon, agonothetes in the early part of the year of Nikias Otryneus, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 200 = *I. G.* ii, 1291, is replaced by Phaidros, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 213 = *I. G.* ii, 331, l. 53; see ch. 5, n. 36); and in 262/1 (end of Chremonidean war); see ch. 10, p. 307.

at Athens, and it was not considered to be under Antigonos' suzerainty. If and when it can be shown that Athens' brief tenure of an Amphiktyonic vote in the first part of the third century does not fall in 272-270, the date 271/70 for the Phaidros decree can be considered; not, I think, otherwise.<sup>24</sup> I therefore follow Beloch and Ferguson in placing Euboulos in 276/5.

The list now arrived at is found, like those of Kolbe and Beloch, to have two breaks in the secretary rotation; but not quite the same breaks.<sup>25</sup> Every one, of course, Ferguson included, reckons with the likelihood of *some* breaks; there are certain unquestioned breaks, i. e. between 307/6 and 306/5, between 304/3 and 303/2, after 262/1, and at the end of the third century (see Ferguson, *Priests*, 141). The rotation after 303/2 was no doubt looked on as a return to the old official order of 353/2-322/1, though it was in fact one place out. This order is correct to Nikostratos, 295/4, i. e. the year Demetrios took Athens. By Diokles' year the rotation had got two years in arrear, showing that two years had become inserted under Demetrios. The nationalist government dropped two years between 285/4 (Euthios) and 283/2 (Menekles), i. e. after Demetrios' captivity, restoring with Menekles the official order as though from 295/4, which was not disturbed again till after the fall of Athens in 262/1.

There remains only one point to consider, the nineteen-year cycle. It will be seen, by a glance at the table, that the usual cycle will not fit the second nineteen-year period of the third century, that beginning in 281/80, while at the same time this period *does* agree, so far as known years go, with a cycle constructed by E. Cavaignac for the years 433-414.<sup>26</sup> I draw no deductions; I merely note the coincidence, and emphasize our ignorance. Something seems wrong, on any cycle, with the years 284/3-282/1; but it seems to me impossible to correct the other evidence for these years by so obscure a matter as the cycle: they are war years, and the calendar may have become disordered. Even if Sundwall had absolutely proved his rotation for the last two fourth-

<sup>24</sup> See Beloch 3, 2, 327 and 350, and ch. 9, n. 27.

<sup>25</sup> Kolbe has a three years' break somewhere in 295/4-287/6 (under Demetrios), corrected by another three years' break, the reverse way, between 284/3 and 283/2. Beloch has a two years' break in 295/4-288/7, and one year somewhere between 280/79 and 274/3. My list gives a two years' break between 295/4 and 288/7 (as Beloch's), which corrects itself (like Kolbe's list) by a two years' break between 285/4 and 283/2. Ferguson and Kirchner manage to do without any breaks at this period, but at the expense, as I have tried to show, of historical credibility.

<sup>26</sup> Given in the table, p. 416; see Cavaignac on Sundwall, *R. Æ. G.* 23 (1910), p. 485. He seems to think Sundwall *has* proved his point for 338/7-301/300.



century periods, it would not follow that it would apply to the third century; but I hardly think it is proved for the fourth. Apart from the fact that of some years the calendar quality is unknown, and if known might conceivably upset the whole argument, I take one specific case, 324/3. This year depends on a long gap in *I. G.* ii, 5, 180 c. Koehler filled the gap with one number and made it an ordinary year. Sundwall fills it with another, and makes it (as he requires) an intercalary year. How can we say which is right?

I think we are some way yet from being able to use the nineteen-year cycle to rectify the archon list for 300/299–263/2.

### APPENDIX III

#### THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE MONARCHIES ON LAND

It may be convenient here to gather together the references (subsequent to Alexander) to the material for the strength of the Macedonian kingdoms and Epeiros on land, mercenaries of course omitted.

*Macedonia with Thessaly.* At Kynoskephalai, Philip, after calling out young boys and time-expired veterans, could only put in the field 25,500 men, of which (reckoning in the whole of the 2,000 horse, whose nationality is not given) 20,000 were 'Macedonians', i.e. Thessalians included (Livy 33, 4, after Polybios). His losses earlier in the war, apart from something over 2,000 men at the Aoos pass, were very small as given by Livy; say 3,000 in all, of whom not all were Macedonians; his levy of men under and over age at least made good his losses, mercenaries not reckoned in. As to garrisons, he had 6,000 men in Corinth (Livy 33, 14, 5), of whom 1,500 were Macedonians and a few Thessalians; 3,000 in Asia (Livy 33, 18, 14), of whom 500 were Macedonians; and a great many other points to garrison, including the conquests in Thrace (see J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder*, ii, 104). Niese, 2, 600, gives him 20,000 to 30,000 men for garrisons; the latter figure must surely be too high. Of the two forces known, not one-third were Macedonians and Thessalians; supposing his garrisons came to 20,000, and taking the same proportion, we get about 6,000 Macedonian-Thessalian troops in garrison; and this may be too high, for Macedonians would only be spared for one or two of the most important

points. Assuming that fresh levies balanced losses, this would have given Philip at the beginning of the war some 26,000 men, not counting mercenaries. Allowance must also be made for some further loss of strength due to Flamininus' occupation of Thessaly, though this would not affect the Thessalian troops already with Philip. It seems hopeless to try and calculate the strength of Thessaly alone, though it was a good deal more sparsely peopled than in the fourth century.<sup>1</sup> If the outside total which Philip could raise from Macedonia and Thessaly be taken at somewhere about 30,000, we are probably well within the mark; it would be less rather than more.

A generation later, at the time of Perseus' war with Rome, Macedonia was a good deal stronger, thanks to a long peace. Perseus (without Thessaly) put 43,000 men into the field, of whom 29,000 were Macedonians (Livy 42, 51, 3-11, after Polybios; see Kromayer, *l. c.*, p. 335), and this was the strongest force raised since Alexander. Kromayer, p. 339, gives his known garrisons, and estimates the total at 15,000 to 20,000 men. Of those known, not quite half the troops seem to be Macedonians. This would give Perseus a total Macedonian levy of 35,000 to 40,000 men, which agrees well enough with an outside levy of 30,000 for Philip V from Macedonia and Thessaly; for the long peace, and Philip's measures to encourage large families, might certainly increase the effective war strength of the land 50 per cent. in a generation.

The figures for 221, when Antigonos Doson had 13,300 Macedonians at Sellasia out of a total force of 29,200 (Polyb. 2, 65), are little use, as it is not known what proportion of the total levy he called out. It may have been only a one in two levy of the men between twenty and fifty.

To come now to Diodoros' figures (20, 110, 4) for Kassandros' army in 302. His total force—it is implied that it was all he could raise—was 31,000 men, no details given; Demetrios at the same time had 8,000 Macedonians in his own force. Now every Macedonian army included a large force of mercenaries and Northerners. Perseus had 12,000 such in his army (Kromayer, *l. c.*, p. 336). Demetrios in 302 had 15,000 mercenaries (Diod. 20, 110, 4), besides 'pirates', if the figures are trustworthy. Doson at Sellasia had 6,900 (*viz.* 3,300

<sup>1</sup> Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, 199-201; cf. the letters of Philip V to Larisa, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 238 and 239. Beloch accepts 13,000 foot for Thessaly in the Lamian war on the strength of Diod. 18, 38; but the passage seems to me to mean that 13,000 was the total of all those in the army that were not Aetolians, i.e. Thessalians, other allies, and mercenaries; there were some mercenaries, for the Aetolians left in Thessaly τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους στρατιώτας.

mercenaries, 1,000 Agrianes, 1,000 Gauls, and 1,600 Illyrians; the Epeirots and Akarnanians were allies). Philip at Kynoskephalai had 5,500 (1,500 mercenaries, 4,000 Illyrians and Thracians), the smallest number recorded; but he lacked money. In addition, Kassandros was almost bound to have some Epeirot troops with him, as the pretender Pyrrhos was with Demetrios. Against this, he had previously detached a force of unknown strength, which would certainly be one of mercenaries, to aid Lysimachos.<sup>2</sup> It will be seen that there is a large element of uncertainty about Kassandros' force; but supposing that he had 9,000 mercenaries, Northerners, and Epeirots, in addition to the corps sent to help Lysimachos—and we cannot well suppose more—even so, adding in Demetrios' Macedonians, Macedonia and Thessaly had together 30,000 men in the field, and to these fall to be added a proportion of Kassandros' troops in garrison; his garrisons were, however, low, as he had lost so many important points in Greece. It appears, therefore, that the total levy of Macedonia and Thessaly at this time would be anything from 30,000 to 40,000 men, and higher rather than lower; very nearly the strength of Perseus.

Demetrios' effective field strength as king of Macedonia would be somewhat less, as Macedonia in 294 lost two provinces to Epeiros, and Audoleon of Paonia, Kassandros' friend, was a potential enemy of Demetrios, necessitating a better guard on that frontier. It will be fairly safe to suppose that under Demetrios a general levy of Macedonia and Thessaly would have given 30,000 to 35,000 men available for field service, the latter an outside figure; he was therefore perhaps a little stronger than Philip V.

*Epeiros.* Pyrrhos took with him to Italy 25,500 foot (including Kineas' 3,000), and 3,000 horse. Of these, 2,500 were light-armed bowmen and slingers, and certainly not Epeirots.<sup>3</sup> Ptolemy Keraunos lent him 5,000 Macedonian foot-troops, and some horse.<sup>4</sup> He had

<sup>2</sup> Diod. 20, 107, 1. Beloch, *Bevölkerung*, p. 209, suggested that this force was Prepelasos' corps of 7,000 men mentioned just after; but even if Prepelasos was Kassandros' general (Diod. 19, 68, 5), the men were given him by *Lysimachos* (20, 107, 2).

<sup>3</sup> The order of battle in Dion. Hal. 20, 1, shows this, as it gives the Epeirots by tribes, and the light-armed separately. It has a curious omission of the Molossians, who doubtless were with the other Epeirots.

<sup>4</sup> Justin 17, 2, 14; cf. Dion. Hal. 20, 1, *τὴν Μακεδονικὴν φάλαγγα*, for the foot troops. As to the horse, Plutarch says Pyrrhos had 3,000 horse altogether; and there is no question that Justin's statement that Keraunos lent 4,000 horse is wrong; such a proportion to 5,000 foot is impossible. Allowing for Pyrrhos' Molossian guard, and the mercenary cavalry, Keraunos cannot have sent more than some 1,000 Thessalian horse.

mercenaries from Aetolia, Akarnania, and Athamania, as well as Thessalian horse. Kineas' contingent of 3,000 were mercenaries, *στρατιώτας*, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 15, 1. If we deduct 5,000 Macedonians, 3,000 mercenaries (supposing that is all there were), 2,500 light-armed, and 500 to 1,000 for the horse lent by Keraunos, we get about 17,000 Epeirots and Ambrakiots, or about 15,000 for Epeiros proper, which may not be far wrong. It gives Pyrrhos  $3,000 + 2,500 = 5,500$  mercenaries, the same total as Philip at Kynoskephalai in about the same force. It is rather low compared to the usual number in a Macedonian army; but this might be explained by Pyrrhos' knowledge that his army would receive a large accession in Italy, both of mercenaries and allies, and he would naturally take the biggest proportion of home troops possible. At the same time, it is possible that he had more mercenaries than Kineas' 3,000, and that in consequence I have fixed the strength of the Epeirots proper somewhat too high. Pyrrhos must, in the course of the war, have raised every man he could, leaving only the most necessary garrisons. All the reinforcements which he actually received during the war, allies apart, seem to have been mercenaries handed over to him by different cities of Magna Graecia or Sicily. At the end of the war he was begging Antiochos and Antigonos to lend him troops; clearly Epeiros was denuded, and so Just. 17, 2, 15 implies. If therefore we put the full Epeiot levy at not over 20,000 we may be near the mark; and 15,000 may be taken as an outside figure for the largest field force available for service. This, of course, applies to the enlarged Epeiros of 294. In addition Ambrakia could give Pyrrhos on a two-thirds levy somewhere near 2,000 men (Beloch, *Bevölk.* 193, 194), and Akarnania could put at least 2,000 men into the field, or more (ib. 189); Atintania and Amphilochia are probably to be reckoned with Epeiros. This would give Pyrrhos for home work, while he held Akarnania, a possible field force in an emergency of about 18,000 to 20,000 men, which, perhaps, owing to the question of the mercenaries above-mentioned, ought rather to be 16,000 to 18,000. Kerkyrean troops are never mentioned; probably their service was with Pyrrhos' fleet.

*Egypt.* Egypt made a very great effort at Raphia in 217, and put into the field 55,000 men.<sup>5</sup> An analysis of the 55,000 gives 20,000

<sup>5</sup> 55,000, and not 75,000 as Beloch 3, 1, 354 says. Polyb. 5, 79, 2 does indeed give 75,000; but this is merely the addition of the detailed numbers in ch. 65, and Polybios has forgotten that he has there given one figure of 20,000 twice over; these are the 20,000 native Egyptian phalangites under Sosibios, who appear first as part of the phalanx of 25,000, and then under a separate heading to show what troops the native Egyptians furnished.



Egyptians, 3,000 Libyans, and 2,300 native cavalry ; 15,000 mercenaries (including the 3,000 Cretans) ; and the following, some of whom were, and all of whom might be, of European blood : agema 3,000, Peltasts 2,000, Phalangites 5,000, Thracian and Gaulish epigonoî and κάτοικοι 4,000, household cavalry 700. Omitting mercenaries, out of 40,000 men 25,300 were certainly Africans, and only 14,700 of (probable) European blood. Egypt was probably, at this time, both wealthier and more populous than under Ptolemy I, and the Thracian and Gaulish settlement must be later than his reign ; consequently it is not very likely that Soter could have mustered 15,000 Europeans, mercenaries apart ; 10,000 may be nearer the mark. As the native Egyptians were regarded for the most part as of little use, and only tried at Raphia as an experiment, the figures show the comparative weakness of Egypt on land, and her dependence on mercenaries, i. e. on money.

*Syria.* Details remain of two armies of Antiochos III, at Raphia and at Magnesia. An analysis of the former, 68,000 strong (Polyb. 5, 79), gives 23,500 as certainly Asiatics, and 8,500 as certainly mercenaries, leaving the phalanx of 20,000 men, 10,000 argyraspides, and 6,000 cavalry, which must be the cataphract cavalry ; but many of the argyraspides, who were 'chosen out of the whole kingdom' (Polyb. 5, 79, 4), would certainly be Asiatics. An analysis of the latter, 72,000 strong (Livy 37, 40 ; App. *Syr.* 32 ; see J. Kromayer, *l. c.*, p. 208 seq.), shows again that a great number are Asiatics or mercenaries ; possible exceptions are the phalanx, 16,000 strong, the cataphract cavalry, 6,000 strong, the argyraspides (1,000 ?), and 3,000 unspecified heavy infantry. Even the agema was composed of Medes, and it is therefore not at all likely that even half the cataphract horse were Europeans. Taking the phalanx as what Appian calls it, Macedonian—Livy merely says, 'more Macedonum armati,' and Polybios on Raphia is silent—we have from 20,000 to perhaps 25,000 European troops at Raphia, and at Magnesia from 16,000 to perhaps 23,000 ; an unknown loss at Thermopylai has to be added here. Syria could perhaps, then, put in the field some 20,000 to 25,000 European troops under Antiochos III, with a preference for the larger number. Whether her strength in this respect was as great under the first Antiochos is quite uncertain. Some of the Asiatic troops of Antiochos were also good material.

## APPENDIX IV

## THE SUPPOSED NEUTRALITY OF DELOS

A SUGGESTION thrown out by Niese (ii, 131, n. 4), and apparently approved of by von Schoeffer and by Bouché-Leclercq,<sup>1</sup> that Delos was an absolutely neutral locality, a *κοινὸς τόπος* for the Greek race, has recently been developed at length by Werner König in *Der Bund der Nesioten*, 1910, p. 59 seq., whose views are more or less followed by P. Roussel.<sup>2</sup> It is of the first importance to ascertain if this be true or not; for, if true, the connexion between the kings' foundations on Delos and political events, generally adopted (since Homolle in 1887 published his *Archives de l'intendance sacrée à Délos*) as a method of obtaining important landmarks in this confused period, cannot be maintained, and the foundations are mere acts of worship and no more.

I may state first that the idea appears to me, evidence apart, to be quite misconceived. No one could lawfully fight another *on* Delos, of course (Livy 44, 29); it was in the position of a city that had become *ἱερὰ καὶ ἄσυλος*. But it was no more. A *holy* place was not necessarily a *neutral* place. And just as Smyrna or Magnesia on the Meander did not cease to be subject to Seleukid rule when they and their territories became *ἄσυλῆαι*, so Delos. It could not lawfully be plundered; but it could be governed by or for its master, and in that fact it was implicit that one master could oust another.

König's positive arguments are slight. He argues from the existence of several perpetual foundations side by side that Delos must have been neutral; otherwise one king, getting possession, would have wiped out the last trace of his rival's foundations. Again this seems to me to misconceive the nature of these foundations. A king deposited a capital sum with the priests of Apollo's temple, which was by them put out on security at interest; from the interest, year by year, a vase was purchased and dedicated to Apollo, and the expense of the other incidents of a festival, such as sacrifice, was discharged.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, once the

<sup>1</sup> Von Schoeffer, 'Delos' in *P. W.*, col. 2483. He says 'ja liessen (the Ptolemies) es so gar ruhig geschehen, dass die Delier die Gaben anderer Herrscher, . . . selbst ihrer politischen Gegner, wie des Antigonos Gonatas, annahmen'.—Bouché-Leclercq, vol. iv, p. 311 (on i, 193), 'Niese fait observer avec raison,' and quotes him.

<sup>2</sup> *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 447; Delos is not on the same footing with regard to the League as the other islands; in the decrees of the Nesiotes, she figures as a *ἱερὸν* only and not as a confederate town.

<sup>3</sup> See the clear statements by Homolle, *Archives*, p. 49, n. 2, and Schulhof, *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 105, n. 2. The working of similar perpetual foundations

capital was deposited with Apollo, the festival became automatically part of Apollo's service; no one could interfere save by committing sacrilege; in plain English, by robbing the temple. Pyrrhos *did* rob a temple in Italy, and created no small sensation by doing it; but the idea that Antigonos or Ptolemy would rob Apollo may be left out of the question.

As to the other points put forward by König, I may remark that the Philetaireia undoubtedly mark the accession of Pergamon to the cause of Egypt, and I have thus explained them (see ch. 11, note 6); while the Attaleia, the first known vase of which is in 217 (Schulhof, *B. C. H.* 1908, 110, Stesileos' inventory), belong, like many other things, to the break-up of Macedonian rule in the Aegean (on which see Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 94). Neither can be used to support the idea of Delian 'neutrality'.

Of course if Delos was a member of the League of the Islanders, it must, like the rest of the League, have been *ipso facto* under the authority of the master of the League, and then what becomes of its supposed 'neutrality'? Macedonia could not in fact, whatever it could in law, bring offerings to territory really Ptolemaic, merely as offerings; such a course would be in effect to abdicate its place and pretensions in the world. Macedonia could of course come openly and found something at Delos for some political reason, (as I conceive that Antigonos did in 253), whether as a challenge, a means of courting the Islands, or what not; but if the power that ruled the Islands could not prevent *that*, the time was ripe for the loss of its overlordship.

König accordingly goes the whole way, and says that Delos was not a member of the League at all, just as it was not a member of the first Athenian confederation. The point is interesting; for Delos is in fact nowhere directly alluded to as a member. Yet of its membership, during the greater part of the third century, there can I think be no doubt, for the following reason.

In the ordinary way, a city wishing to set up a stele or a statue in another city had to ask that city for a τόπος or site (see Michel 322, request of Delos to Thessalonike). A community, or a member of a community, not in the League of the Islanders, had therefore to ask the Delians for a τόπος in which to set up a decree; so Histiaia, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 245, ll. 29, 32; Kyzikos, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 791, ll. 18, 27; Theangela in Karia, *B. C. H.*

can be studied in two important decrees; one from Kerkyra, *I. G.* ix, 1, 694 = *G. D. I.* 3206, and one from Aigiale in Amorgos, *I. G.* xii, 7, 515, on which see E. Ziebarth's commentary, 'Εφ. Ἀρχ. 1907, p. 185 seq.; it has now quite a literature of its own.

1907, p. 366; Chios, *B. C. H.* 1910, p. 364, no. 12; Philoxenos of Samothrake, *B. C. H.* 1904, pp. 114-15. The request had to be made to the people of Delos and not to the priests, because it was the people of Delos who were masters of the sanctuary and could alone dispose of the least bit, however small, of the soil of the temenos (see Homolle, *Archives*, p. 21). When then during the Rhodian ascendancy in the second century the League has to ask Delos for a *τόπος* (*I. G.* xii, 5, ii, 817), this is good evidence that *at that time* Delos was not a member of the League. But in the earlier part of the third century the decrees of the League were apparently set up at Delos as a matter of course; see *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 340, no. 3 (which completes *O. G. I.* 67); *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 471; *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 93, no. 1; and *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202. The last two are especially instructive; the former (the decree founding the Demetriaia) provides that the decree shall be set up beside the altar of the kings (i.e. in Delos); the latter (the Nikouria decree) that it shall be set up beside the altar of Ptolemy Soter in Delos. Not only has the League no need to ask Delos for a *τόπος*; it can mark out its exact *τόπος* for itself. Delos therefore must be party to these decrees; that is, Delos was in the League in the third century.<sup>4</sup>

With this, the theory of a *κοινὸς τόπος* falls to the ground. And it would be extraordinary if the League in the third century should hold its meetings, keep its archives, set up its honorary statues, and, above all, celebrate the official worship of its master, Demetrios or Ptolemy II, on territory not its own.<sup>5</sup> (The League of the second century under Rhodian presidency is of course an entirely different matter.) And in fact there is quite strong positive evidence from other sources that Delos was *not* a neutral spot, in the sense König means. Omitting the

<sup>4</sup> P. Roussel (*B. C. H.* 1911, p. 447) has suggested that a formula in a decree like ἀναγράφαι τοὺς συνέδρους εἰς στήλην λιθίνην καὶ ἀναθεῖναι ἐν Δήλῳ εἰς τὸ ἱερόν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος is merely an instruction to the synedroi to take all necessary steps for getting the stele set up. I am afraid I cannot follow this; for it seems to overlook the fact that we *do* possess a number of decrees (I have cited several in the text) in which various persons are *specifically* directed to take the necessary steps, that is, to ask the Delians for a *τόπος*; and it is also inconsistent with the power of the League to mark out the exact *τόπος* for itself.

<sup>5</sup> König, p. 58, instances the fact that Delphi did not belong to the Aetolian League. Quite so. But in fact Aetolia stood to Delphi, not as the Island League stood to Delos, but as Ptolemy II stood to Delos; it was master (see ch. 7, p. 210). If Delphi proves anything, it proves exactly what I want, that a foreign power *could* exercise political domination over one of the great sanctuaries of Hellas. That Aetolia kept her archives at Delphi, a place not in her League, is no argument either way about Delos; for Aetolia always kept her archives at Thermos, and those at Delphi were only duplicates; see ch. 7, p. 210.



porticoes built by Gonatas and Philip V, and omitting the decree set up on Delos by Doson to commemorate his victory at Sellasia (*B. C. H.* 1907, p. 94), which König admits is dead against his view, I come to the story by which König seeks to minimize the effect of the Sellasia decree, and which, rightly understood, seems to me conclusive of the matter. Prior to the war with Perseus, Delos had entered into relations with Rome expressed by the words *οἰκειότης* and *φιλία* (*B. C. H.* 8, p. 87, l. 3 seq.), that is, she was an amicus of Rome; and by this time it was becoming extremely difficult for an amicus of Rome even to preserve neutrality (Louise E. Matthaei, *Class. Quart.*, vol. i (1907), p. 182 seq., 193-4). Delos, however, chose to allow Perseus, just before the war, to set up two decrees there (Polyb. 25, 3, 2, and Livy 42, 12); and Perseus' fleet used the island as a base during the war (Livy 44, 28 and 29). Naturally enough, Rome punished Delos by giving her back to her ancient enemy Athens. Now Delos had not force enough to keep out Perseus' fleet, had she wished to; and if she were indeed a *κοινὸς τόπος* she had every right to admit copies of Perseus' decrees, indeed she could not have refused them; and in that case Athens' proceedings in requesting, and Rome's in granting, the subjugation of this neutral spot would have been indefensible, and would surely have evoked bitter condemnation. But, on the contrary, Polybios expressly says *that no one could possibly blame Athens' action in regard to Delos*; and he couples Delos in the matter with Athens' old possession Lemnos.<sup>6</sup> Polybios' words alone seem to be conclusive against the notion that Delos was or had been a *κοινὸς τόπος*.

I have treated this at length, as it is of the first importance for the reign of Antigonos.

## APPENDIX V

### WHO FOUNDED THE LEAGUE OF THE ISLANDERS?

THE answer to the question, whether this League was in its origin a Ptolemaic or an Antigonid foundation, must make a considerable difference in the view we take of its subsequent history. The once universal belief was that it was founded by Ptolemy I in 308. Dürrbach's view,

<sup>6</sup> Polyb. 30, 20, 3, οἷς περὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ Δῆλον καὶ Λήμνον οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπιτιμήσειε.

that it was founded by Antigonos I—a view based on the federal fêtes Antigoneia and Demetrieia—has won considerable acceptance;<sup>1</sup> but Kaerst (ii, 1, 398 seq.) still inclines to champion its Ptolemaic origin, either in 308 or 287, and has suggested the possibility of reviving Dürrbach's first and discarded opinion, that the federal fêtes Antigoneia and Demetrieia belong to the end of the reign of Gonatas, an opinion to which Ferguson inclines.<sup>2</sup> I venture to think that Dürrbach is undoubtedly right, but that there is a good deal more to be said on the subject than has been said as yet: and as Kaerst promises a fresh examination of the whole question, I set out here the evidence known to me.

#### A. THE ARGUMENT FOR AN ANTIGONID ORIGIN

If the decree of the League which mentions the Antigoneia and Demetrieia does indeed refer to Antigonos I and Demetrios I, the question is settled. I give *seriatim* my reasons for supposing that it does.

(i) The Antigonos and Demetrios in question were joint kings. (It was this that decided Dürrbach, as it exactly fits the period 306–301.) Now it is not known that Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios II were ever joint kings, though the possibility has been suggested. But Plutarch *Arat.* 34 says Ἀντιγόνου δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ Δημητρίου τὴν βασιλείαν παραλαβόντος; and, on the face of it, this means that Demetrios II became king on Antigonos' death. If it was in an inscription there could be no possible doubt, owing to the meaning of παραλαβεῖν, to take over the kingdom from a *dead* predecessor, to take it *iure hereditatis* (see Dittenberger, *O. G. I.* 56, note 17): instances are *O. G. I.* 56, l. 6, παρέλαβεν τὴν βασιλείαν παρὰ τοῦ πατρός, of Ptolemy III, who was certainly not joint king with Ptolemy II;<sup>3</sup> and *I. G.* xii, 5, 1, 444 (the Parian chronicle), of Ptolemy I taking the royal title, ἀφ' οὗ Πτολεμαῖος τὴν βασιλείαν παρέλαβεν, i.e. took it over from the young Alexander, just dead. On the contrary, in the case of a king who *did*

<sup>1</sup> *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 208, on the decree mentioning the Antigoneia and Demetrieia published by him *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 93. Followed by Hiller von Gaertringen, *Introd.* to *I. G.* xii, 5 (ii), p. ix, and by Werner König, *Der Bund der Nesioten*, p. 13 seq.

<sup>2</sup> *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 200, n. 51, *Athens*, p. 150. His reasoning in *J. H. S.*, *l.c.*, is, however, based on the supposition that the Demetrieia were *substituted* for and abrogated the Antigoneia; while the words of the decree are plain to show that the two were to go on concurrently, both being celebrated every other year (*trieterides*), and the Demetrieia falling in the years in which there were no Antigoneia.

<sup>3</sup> See, too, the demotic version, cited by Dittenberger, *ad loc.*

reign jointly with his father,<sup>4</sup> (Ptolemy II), παραλαβεῖν is not used ; the Nikouria decree (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202) says of Ptolemy II διαδεξιμένος τὰμ βασιλείαν. Add to this, that Polybios (2, 44) says Demetrios II reigned ten years only ; and it is clear that a joint reign of Gonatas and Demetrios cannot be posited without some sort of reasonable evidence.

This agrees with the other indications. If I am right in supposing that Gonatas did not begin his portico till about 244, the inscription on it, and on the monument that carried the statues of his ancestors, is against any joint kingship with his son.<sup>5</sup>—The Nikouria decree (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 = *I. G.* xii, 7, 506), dealing with the subject of divine honours for Ptolemy I, is to be set up by Ptolemy's altar on Delos ; the Antigoneia-Demetrieia decree, dealing with the subject of divine honours for a Demetrios, is to be set up by the altar of Antigonos and Demetrios on Delos ; obviously one is a precedent of the other, and it is easier to imagine the temporal relations as 305 and 280 than as 280 and some point between 245 and 239. The Nikouria decree alludes openly to the overthrow of the rule of Demetrios ; why is the other decree, if dated *circ.* 245–239, silent as to the overthrow of the rule of Ptolemy III ?

Strong support is also lent to this view by an (unpublished) official letter from Demetrios to one Harpalos, dated in the thirty-sixth year of the reign of Antigonos ;<sup>6</sup> the letter shows that Demetrios was governing,

<sup>4</sup> This appears for certain from the Elephantine papyri published by O. Rubensohn ; see Bouché-Leclercq, *Rev. Phil.* 32 (1908), p. 129 seq. ; U. Wilcken, *Archiv für Papyrusf.* v (1909), p. 201.

<sup>5</sup> See *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 268, § C ; ch. xiii, n. 61.

<sup>6</sup> Found at Beroia by Mr. A. J. B. Wace. As to its date. Antigonos took the royal title on his father's death in spring 283, and was king for forty-four years (ch. 5, n. 3), and Beloch (3, 2, 81) felt able, after his examination of the Eusebian chronology, to state definitely that Antigonos counted his regnal years as king of Macedonia from 284/3. But I do feel grave doubts. This would imply that he used a system of reckoning which could run right on from 284/3 ; that is to say, that he reckoned either by the Olympiad year or by an actual year commencing from the date of Demetrios' death. But it is pretty clear that the kings of Macedonia reckoned by the Macedonian year beginning 1 Dios. Beloch (3, 2, 78) favoured this conclusion on the evidence then available (the dating of the letters of Philip V by the regnal year and Macedonian month is by itself strong ; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 238, 239, 253) ; and it can now be strengthened. For whereas we find Kassandros (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 178) and Kassandreia (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 196) dating by priesthoods, we find the people of Pella (unpublished decree, see ch. 7, notes 54 and 56) dating by a priesthood and the Macedonian month ; and it stands to reason that the term for which such a priesthood was held coincided with the Macedonian year, and had nothing to do with the king's accession, as we find towns outside the limit of Macedonia also dating by such a priesthood and the Macedonian month, e.g. Sestos (Michel 327 = *O. G. I.* 339). It seems to me inconceivable that a king should be dating by the Macedonian month and a year commencing at his accession while his capital was dating by the Macedonian month and a priest who held office for the Macedonian year. Consequently, Antigonos

or at any rate associated in the government of, Macedonia, while the opening words, Δημήτριος Ἀρπάλῳ χαιρεῖν, show that he was not βασιλεύς. At the date of this letter, no joint kingship can have existed.

(ii) The Antigoneia are mentioned in 296 in a Delian inventory, and must there be the federal fête, as no trace of any vase-foundation of this name is found till much later;<sup>7</sup> and the probabilities are that this fête is identical with the Antigoneia of the decree in question, which must have been abolished at some time after Demetrios' fall in 288.

(iii) The Antigonos of the decree was worshipped as a god. This applies to Antigonos I, but not to Gonatas. His whole mental attitude was opposed to it, witness the snub bestowed upon the wretched poet who addressed him as θεός.<sup>8</sup> None of the instances given in the books as evidence that Gonatas was worshipped will bear examination.<sup>9</sup> Of the known references to Antigoneia, those in Polyb. 28, 19, 3 (from the Achaean embassy), and in Polyb. 30, 29, 3 (celebrated at Sikyon), are obviously the Achaean Antigoneia in honour of Doson (Plut. *Kleom.* 16, *Arat.* 45; cf. Polyb. 2, 70); and those at Histiaia (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 245, end of third century) are most probably in honour of Doson.<sup>10</sup> Persaios' story of the Arkadians sending theoroi to Gonatas (Ath. 13, 607 c) does not imply that the Arkadians were imitating the masterpiece of Stratokles' servility towards Demetrios, and sending theoroi to Antigonos as to a god: there is not a word to show that they had not come to Demetrios in the usual way in which so many theoroi went to so

in all probability dated by a year beginning 1 Dios; and this he could not do in Greece, or till he was king of Macedonia. I consider then that his first year, in all probability, began officially 1 Dios 277 (for his accession to the throne of Macedonia in 277/6 is certain, ch. 5, n. 3), and that in consequence his thirty-sixth year ran from 1 Dios 242 to 1 Dios 241; and I am confirmed in this conclusion by Beloch's result (3, 2, 75) that the common original of both the lists of Macedonian and Thessalian kings gave Antigonos thirty-seven years (and two months), which looks as if this were his *official* chronology, and the forty-four years' kingship an independent, though true, tradition. — I may add that this is a much more probable date for Demetrios to be governing in Macedonia than the alternative, 248 (or 248/7). For Alexander of Corinth died some time between autumn 249 and autumn 248 (ch. 13, n. 5), and Antigonos was back in Corinth some time in 247 (ch. 13, notes 5 and 16); and it was therefore precisely in 248 or 248/7 that Demetrios had quitted Macedonia and was in Corinth, first as Nikaia's suitor and then as her (expected) bridegroom. — See Addenda.

<sup>7</sup> Year of Phillis I; *B.C.H.* 1905, p. 447 seq., no. 144 (= *I.G.* xi, 154), A, l. 42; cf. Dürrbach in *B.C.H.* 1907, p. 208; Schulhof in *B.C.H.* 1908, p. 118.

<sup>8</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 360 C, D; see *J.H.S.* 1909, p. 268; and ch. 8, p. 251.

<sup>9</sup> There was of course no state cult of Macedonian kings from Antigonos onward; but many writers repeat the statement that Gonatas was worshipped here or there. See E. Kornemann, *Klio*, 1, 1901, p. 84; Beloch 3, 1, 377, n. 2; Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 190.

<sup>10</sup> See P. Roussel and J. Hatzfeld in *B.C.H.* 1910, p. 369.



many cities.<sup>11</sup> As to the Knidos epigram on Antigonos son of Epigonos, it is to be hoped it will never again be quoted as referring to Gonatas.<sup>12</sup>

(iv) If Antigonos I founded the League we can explain why it was founded on a purely Ionic basis. If it was founded by Ptolemy I, no reason can be found for this. I have given the facts and the explanation in the text of chapter 3.

(v) Every one admits that Demetrios ruled the Aegean in some form or other from 306 to 288. Now a jest is given in Plut. *Dem.* 25 (after Phylarchos; see *F. H. G.* 1, fr. 29 = Ath. 6, 261 B) in which Demetrios' courtiers, *circa* 303, treating him as king of kings, called the other kings by the names of Demetrios' officials; Seleukos is elephantarch, Ptolemy nauarch, Lysimachos treasurer, Agathokles nesiarch. Now these are real offices; admiral and treasurer need no explanation, and there was an ἐλεφαντάρχης at the Seleukid court (App. *Syr.* 33). Consequently, Demetrios had also a real nesiarch, or governor of the Islands, or that part of the jest which relates to Agathokles would be pointless. Now under Ptolemy II there was an official called nesiarch, connected with the League of the Islanders; but though his name means 'island governor', he did not govern the Islands (this was done by the nauarch), but was merely a kind of Ptolemaic Resident.<sup>13</sup> His name then must be a survival, come down from some time when a nesiarch did govern the Islands; and the only explanation of Plutarch's story, taken in conjunction with the Ptolemaic nesiarch, is that Demetrios *circa* 303 governed the Islands of the League through a nesiarch, and that Ptolemy II kept the name though he transferred the bulk of the powers to the nauarch.

(vi) Diod. 19, 62, 9; Antigonos I sends Dioskourides with a fleet τῶν νήσων τὰς μὲν μὲν μετεχούσας τῆς συμμαχίας προσαγόμενον. But this, though it proves that Antigonos gathered all the islands he could into a συμμαχία, does not necessarily show that he formed them into a league.

<sup>11</sup> If the whole story does not rest upon some misapprehension, due to some Arkadian towns possessing an ancient form of magistracy whose holders were called *θεωροί*; so Mantinea, Thuc. 5, 47, 11; Tegea, Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 7; cf. C. Friedrich in *J. G.* xii, 8, p. 89. Cf. also the college of *θεωροί* at Naupaktos, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 247, l. 10.

<sup>12</sup> See the writer in *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 214 seq.

<sup>13</sup> See my paper, 'Nauarch and Nesiarch,' *J. H. S.* 1911, p. 251.

## B. THE ARGUMENT FOR A PTOLEMAIC ORIGIN

Kaerst's chief point is this, that the words of the Nikouria decree so exactly agree with Diodoros' description of Ptolemy's proceedings in 308 that he cannot dissociate the two.

Diod. 20, 37 says that Ptolemy, sailing through the Islands, 'liberated' Andros and drove out the garrison, and proposed to 'liberate' the Hellenic cities generally, but his plan failed. All he did was to garrison Sikyon and Corinth. (This proceeding enabled Demetrios to retaliate on him next year by setting out to free the whole of Greece 'which had been enslaved by Kassandros and Ptolemy', Plut. *Dem.* 8.)

The decree says that Ptolemy I was the author of much good to the Islanders and the rest of the Greeks, in that he freed the cities, restored the laws and the ancestral constitution in each, and released them from taxes.

So far from agreeing, the two accounts seem to me to be as different as they well can be. In the one, Ptolemy frees Andros and no other island, and fails to free the Greek cities generally; in the other, he frees the islands generally and an indefinite number of other Greek cities. It does not seem to me doubtful for a moment that the decree refers, not to the events of 308, but to those of some other time, which can only be the period after 288, the date of Demetrios' fall.

For a general discussion of the events of 308 and 288 seq. respectively, as bearing on the Island League, I refer to the text of chapters 3 and 4, merely noting here that the Nikouria decree, which can almost certainly be dated to 280 (see ch. 4, n. 29), is more likely to refer to the recent events following 288, which worked a tremendous change in the Aegean, than to the more distant year 308, which in fact worked no change at all. All then that remains to do is to show that the language of the decree itself is no bar to referring it to the events following 288, if the League already existed under Demetrios. The two points that are material to discuss are the phrase *πάτριος πολιτεία* and the title Soter.

(i) If Ptolemy, after Demetrios' fall, continued the League, a thing of yesterday, how could it be said that he restored to the cities of the League 'their ancestral constitutions'? The answer is, that in the third and second centuries *πάτριος πολιτεία* was commonly used as a mere antithesis of *τύραννος*, and the phrase here merely refers to the overthrow of Demetrios considered as a 'tyrant'. I give some instances. *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214. l. 14: the decree which prefaced the Chremonidean war speaks

of Gonatas, with a reference to the *τύραννοι* whom he supported, as 'those who attempt to subvert the laws and the ancestral constitutions of each state'. Polyb. 2, 47: Kleomenes overthrows the ancestral constitution of Sparta and turns the legal kingship into a tyranny. Polyb. 2, 70, and 9, 36: Doson, having overthrown Kleomenes, restores to Sparta her ancestral constitution. (In fact, he made her a member of his Hellenic League.) Polyb. 2, 43 (a variant): Aratos' aim was to expel the Macedonians from Peloponnese, overthrow the tyrants, and restore to each city its ancestral freedom, *πάτριον ἐλευθερίαν*. (In fact, he brought them into the Achaean League.) Plut. *Dem.* 8 and 10: Demetrios overthrows the government of Kassandros who had 'enslaved' Greece, and restores to Athens her ancestral constitution. (In fact, she became informally a part of Antigonos' empire.) Plut. *Titus* 10: Flaminius' proclamation that the Greeks are to be free, *νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις*, on the overthrow of the tyranny of Philip.

The restoration, then, of their ancestral constitution to the Islanders means much the same as their 'liberation'; it simply signifies the overthrow of the 'tyrant' Demetrios. It is always possible that Ptolemy did in fact dissolve the League and then 'request' the Islands to reform it under his protection.

(ii) *The name Soter*. The argument, as given by J. Delamarre in publishing the Nikouria decree (*Rev. Phil.* 20, 1896, p. 103), and followed by Dittenberger (notes to *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 and *O. G. I.* 16), may be summarized thus: Paus. 1, 8, 6 says that the Rhodians first gave Ptolemy I the title of Soter after the siege of Rhodes in 304; but the Nikouria decree shows that the Islanders were the first to call him Soter; therefore they gave him the name before 304; therefore it refers to the events of his expedition of 308.

The words of the decree are *τετιμηκόσιμ πρώ[τοις]* (or *πρώ[τον]* or *πρό[τερον]*) *τ[ὸν] σωτήρα Πτολεμαῖον ἰσοθέοις τιμαῖς*. All the readings are Delamarre's; first *πρώτοις* in 1896 (*Rev. Phil.* 20, p. 103); then *πρώτον* in 1907, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 343, n. 2; lastly *πρότερον* in 1908, *I. G.* xii, 7, 506; and one is bound to adopt his most recent considered reading *πρότερον*. Also it is clear that the word refers, not to *σωτήρα*, but to *ἰσοθέοις τιμαῖς*. It therefore reads 'who aforetime honoured Ptolemy the Saviour (i.e. honoured him by the name *σωτήρ*) with divine honours'; that is to say, at some previous time the Islanders had paid him divine honours. As it is not likely that the Islanders instituted *two* worships of Ptolemy I, the reference must be to the institution of the federal fête of the Ptolemaeia, which is mentioned *B. C. H.* 4, p. 323, no. 2, ll. 14-15, and again referred to (in a form enlarged to include the

worship of Philadelphos also) in the decree of the Islanders for Sostratos of Knidos.<sup>14</sup> This fête was the official worship paid by the League of the Islanders to Ptolemy I, and would naturally be instituted earlier than 280 if he freed them in *circ.* 286. The Nikouria decree, then, does not bear on the origin of the name Soter.

This is all that seems necessary for my purpose. It is impossible to say at present when and where Ptolemy I first got the name Soter. Pausanias does not say expressly that the Rhodians were the *first*; his words would be satisfied if the name were not yet in general use. That there were many local variations in the usage of royal titles is undoubted;<sup>15</sup> one need not here pursue the question further.

I conclude with one question. If Ptolemy I had been the founder of the League, is it conceivable that the Nikouria decree, in which the Islanders heaped upon him every praise they could, should have omitted to mention this (to the Islanders) most important of all his good deeds?

## APPENDIX VI

### PAUSANIAS' ACCOUNT OF THE GALLIC INVASION

It is obvious that the supposition of most classical and some modern writers, that Brennus' attack on Delphi *was* the Gallic invasion of Greece, cannot be true: for one thing, it does not explain how the Aetolians came to be considered the saviours of Greece; for another, it takes no account of the fact that what the Gauls were seeking was settlement, a new home.

The earliest evidence is quite clear on the subject. This is the Koan decree of 278, one year after the event, providing for the dispatch from Kos of an architheoros and theoroi to Delphi to sacrifice to Apollo.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>14</sup> P. Roussel in *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 304, no. 3, ll. 23-5, completing *O. G. I.* 67; cf. Schulhof in *B. C. H.* 1908, p. 118, n. 2, and p. 498.

<sup>15</sup> This may be the explanation of the terrible crux *O. G. I.* 16, which, on Dittenberger's explanation of ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ, would show that at Halikarnassos Ptolemy I was Soter and θεός before he was βασιλεύς, i.e. before 305/4. But Bouché-Leclercq (4, 313), if I understand him, says (a) that you *could* make a dedication *pro bona fortuna* of a dead man, and (b) that in any case a god could not die. So *O. G. I.* 16 may conceivably not bear on the question at all.

<sup>1</sup> Published by R. Herzog, *C. R. Acad. Insc.* 1904, p. 165. The preamble runs: ἐπειδὴ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατείων ποιησαμένων ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ



It is here stated that the Gauls made their expedition against the Greeks and against Delphi (the Greeks being put first), and that those who went to Delphi got punished, and that the remainder (who did not go to Delphi, be it noted) mostly perished in the ensuing battles with the Greeks. A sharp distinction is drawn between these two divisions of the Gallic host. And the contemporary Kallimachos, poet though he is, bears this out; for though in the hymn to Delos he does all he can to turn Apollo into a protagonist, nevertheless he has not yet got to the point of making Delphi the Gallic objective; he knows and states that that objective was the Greeks.<sup>2</sup>

The almost contemporary Koan decree, then, shows clearly that what we are dealing with is an attack of the Gauls upon Greece generally, with a second attack upon Delphi. But the version that fused the whole campaign into one thing, the deliverance of Delphi from Brennus, began very early. It is beginning in the two decrees of Athens (*I. G.* ii, 323 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 205) and of Chios (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 206), passed in reply to the Aetolian invitation to the Soteria at Delphi, and dated in 27/54; although the Gauls still march against the Greeks *and* against Apollo's temple, we get, not several victories, as in the Koan decree, but one victory only, τῆς νίκης τῆς γενομένης πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους. No doubt this can, and here perhaps does, refer to the several victories of the campaign all treated as one; but in a little while it came to mean the deliverance of Delphi. As the similar wording of the two replies shows that both are quoting the Aetolian invitation, it appears that the first step on the road toward fusing all events into the defence of Delphi was taken by Aetolia; though she had saved Greece, she was not averse from having it supposed, for her immediate political ends—to strengthen her hold on Delphi—that the greatest feat to her credit was the defence of Apollo's sanctuary. Fortunately there is a certain amount of evidence the other way: the A on the Gallic shields on which sits the statue of Aetolia on some of her coins (see ch. 6, note 74) is strong to show that it was Acichorius and not Brennus with whom the Aetolians

ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀναγγέλλεται τὸς μὲν ἐλθόντας ἐπὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τιμωρίας τετεύχεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐπιβοαθησάντων τῷ ἱερῷ ἐν ταῖς τῶν βαρβάρων ἐφόδῳ, τὸ δὲ ἱερὸν διαπεφυλάχθαι τε καὶ ἐπικεκοσμήσθαι τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιστρατευσάντων ὄπλοις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τῶν στρατευσάντων τοὺς πλείστους ἀπολώλεον ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις ἀγῶσι ποτὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτοῖς ὅπως οὖν ὁ δᾶμος φανερός ἦι συναδόμενος ἐπὶ ταῖς γεγενημέναις νίκαις τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τῷ θεῷ χαριστήριον ἀποδιδούς τὰς τε ἐπιφανείας τὰς γεγενημένους ἔνεκεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν κινδύνους καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἑλλάνων σωτηρίας. ἀγαθαὶ τύχαι κτλ.

<sup>2</sup> *Hymn to Delos*, l. 173; αἱ μὲν ἐφ' Ἑλλήνεσσι μάχαιραν . . . ἀναστήσαντες. Better in a fragment in the Schol. to Dionys. Perieg., l. 74, οὗς Βρέννος ἀφ' ἐσπερίου θαλάσσης ἤγαγεν Ἑλλήνων ἐπ' ἀνάστασιν.

chiefly fought, while the restoration to Phokis of her place in the Amphiktyonic assembly, together with her lost votes (*I. G.* ii, 551), shows clearly that Phokis had done some great thing, which on both geographical and political grounds was almost bound to be connected with Delphi; atonement for sacking Delphi required to be made by saving it from being sacked. It would be interesting to know what version was adopted by poets who sang of things Aetolian, such as the unnamed poetess of Smyrna who in the second century B.C. came to Lamia and recited poems in praise of the Aetolians and the famous deeds of their ancestors.<sup>3</sup>

The keenness of Aetolia to get what credit she could for the defence of Delphi comes out clearly in another way. From the very beginning Delphi had a version of the defence which included an epiphaneia of Apollo, as the Koan decree shows. But Aetolia was not very desirous that Apollo should carry off the honours; and the Soteria decrees already quoted (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 205 and 206) are silent—which means that the Aetolian invitation was silent—on the subject of Apollo's intervention. But Delphi easily carried the day. Aetolia could not afford to insist on her version and risk a charge of impiety; moreover, she herself had erected at Delphi statues of Apollo, Artemis, and Leto.<sup>4</sup> Aetolia, too, neither produced writers nor gained in popularity as the years went by, while Apollo's intervention formed splendid stuff for the poets, and was promptly glorified by Kallimachos in his hymn to Delos. So it came about that the story gradually settled down into the shape that the Gallic host which Brennus led attacked Delphi and was repulsed by Apollo in person.

A literary writer, then, if he represents a good early source or sources, must know nothing of the version that the Gallic invasion *was* the attack on Delphi, but must agree with the preamble to the Koan decree; he must know, that is, of an attack on the Greeks, and punishment received at their hands, quite apart from, and more important than, the attack on Delphi; he must explain the other contemporary evidence,

<sup>3</sup> *I. G.* ix, 2, 62 = *G. D. I.* 1440 = Michel 296: ἐν οἷς περὶ τε τοῦ ἔθνεο[s] τῶν Αἰτωλῶ[ν καὶ τ]ῶμ προγόνων τοῦ δάμου ἀξίως ἐπεμνάσθη.

<sup>4</sup> Paus. 10, 15, 2. In Justin 24, 8, 5, Artemis and Athene appear as aiding Apollo in the defence. Obviously this version of the legend might come simply from the statues; or both statues and legend might come from a misunderstanding of the 'oracle' given by Suidas, ἐμοὶ μέλησει ταῦτα καὶ λευκαῖς κόραις (i. e. the snowflakes, see Frazer's *Pausanias*, 5, 345; and had the goddesses been meant there must have been the definite article). Diod. 22, 9, 5 explains how the 'oracle' came to be interpreted of Artemis and Athene.

the A on the Gallic shields, and the reinstatement of the Phokians ; and he must explain the general acceptance of Aetolia as the saviour of Greece. Tried by this test, the account in Pausanias, book x, emerges triumphant.<sup>5</sup> For the details I refer to ch. 6 ; but the broad outline established by Pausanias' agreement with the Koan decree is, that the attack on Delphi was a raid, and that the main body of the Gauls fought with the Greeks and had to retire, the 'Greeks' being the Aetolians, who thus saved Greece. Of course Pausanias' story contains some rubbish ; for instance, it atticizes, witness the reference to the Athenian fleet ; it contains Herodotean echoes, e. g. the account of the turning of Thermopylai and the defeat of the Phokians who held the path ; and it has a miracle, the appearance of the 'heroes'. But the essential part of the narrative is good and sound, and is no more to be discredited because of the 'miracle' than is the Koan decree, which is in exactly the same position. Who need doubt that some of the men who were fighting in intensest excitement and a raging storm really did think they saw this or that ? Pausanias' narrative is not one to be used blindly ; but the kernel of it is good and from a good source—I do not presume to guess at the source—and we may not only accept it but, as the history of this period goes, think ourselves uncommonly lucky to have it.

## APPENDIX VII

### THE WORLD-POSITION IN 273

C. F. LEHMANN-HAUPT, in a paper in *Klio*, iii, 496 seq., brought forward arguments to prove that in 275–273 the civilized world was divided into two great coalitions, or rather *ententes*, 'Interessen-gruppen,' in which Ptolemy, Antigonos, Sparta, and Rome faced Antiochos, Magas, Pyrrhos, Tarentum, and Carthage. This idea is large and attractive, and if correct would be of the first importance for the history of Antigonos ; but I find it impossible to follow. It depends on three main considerations, none of which, I venture to think, can be supported.

The first is that Pyrrhos was too much of a statesman to have

<sup>5</sup> I speak throughout of book x only. The account in book i is entirely inferior.

driven Areus into Antigonos' arms unless he were there to start with. If he did such a thing, 'dann war Pyrrhus ein kläglicher Politiker, nicht ein kühner weitschauender Staatsmann' (*Klio*, 5, 379). To my mind, this expresses Pyrrhos exactly; and I venture to think that any one who considers him a statesman ought to produce and cite some *one* statesmanlike act on his part. Far truer is Klotzsch's remark (p. 202), that his policy has no sequence, and is conditioned exclusively by what seems advantageous at the moment. As to forcing Areus and Antigonos to combine, Pyrrhos had already achieved the greater feat of uniting Rome and Carthage, whose earlier treaties display them as jealous rivals.

The second is that Pyrrhos and Antiochos were friends. There is no trace of this in our tradition, nor does Lehmann-Haupt adduce any. It is implied by Pausanias (1, 13, 1) that Pyrrhos' application to Antiochos for help at the end of 275 was refused, and it is stated by Justin (25, 4, 1), for what it is worth, that Pyrrhos in 273½ was revolving the idea of conquest in Asia, 'Graeciae Asiaeque regna meditatur,' naturally at Antiochos' expense. Incidentally, there is not a hint anywhere of enmity between Antigonos and Antiochos later than 277.

The third and most important one is that Antigonos and Ptolemy were friends at the time, a theory that requires careful examination, both from its wide acceptance and from its bearing on the whole policy of Antigonos; I may add also from its startling nature, looking at the long traditional enmity of Antigonid and Lagid.

The positive evidence adduced for it by Lehmann-Haupt is the scholiast on l. 175 of Kallimachos' *Hymn to Delos*, Ἀντίγονός τις φίλος τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου Πτολεμαίου προξενεῖ αὐτοῖς (Gauls) αὐτῷ (to Ptolemy II) ὥστε μισθῷ στρατεῦσθαι; we are asked in effect to translate it as 'Antigonos the king, being at the time on good terms with Ptolemy', &c. This can hardly pass; and Wachsmuth's emendation of *τις* into *Γονατῆς* is indefensible. *Φίλος* cannot stand for *φίλος τότε γενόμενος*; neither could the most futile of scholiasts refer to Gonatas as *τις*. What the Greek means is, 'A certain Antigonos, a friend of Ptolemy,' and it can mean nothing else, and there is no use in trying to get any more out of it. Ptolemy sent some one named Antigonos (perhaps the Macedonian who commanded Egyptian mercenaries in 304, Diod. 20, 98, but the name was common enough), to recruit Gauls for him. (Incidentally, how many Gauls was Gonatas likely to spare in 274, with Pyrrhos threatening?) Of course *φίλος* ought to be *τῶν φίλων* if it has the technical meaning of 'one of the Friends'; but it does not follow



that it has the technical meaning, and if it has, the same mistake occurs elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> and is a pardonable blunder in a late writer. In spite of those who have accepted it, the view that Ἀντίγονός τις was, or could be, Gonatas must be most emphatically rejected.<sup>2</sup>

There is no other evidence for the supposed friendship of Antigonos and Ptolemy *circa* 275-273, and there is one consideration against it, which, curiously enough, was brought forward and emphasized by Lehmann-Haupt himself elsewhere (*Klio*, 5, 375 seq.), and which seems to me almost conclusive. The Chremonidean war was Arsinoë's war; it was fought in pursuance of *her* policy, and her policy was her father's policy. All this comes out absolutely clearly in the resolution moved by Chremonides (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214 = *I. G.* ii, 332 and 333). Her policy then was that of the first Lagid; stir up trouble for the Antigonid in Greece by posing as the champion of Greek freedom; and it was of course, as the event showed, a policy hostile to Antigonos. Arsinoë's reason for her policy antedated her marriage with Philadelphos; and she must have begun to work for it from the very beginning of her reign. The reason of her policy, and the aim of the latter part of her life, was to seat her son by Lysimachos, Ptolemaios, on the throne of Macedonia (*Klio*, 5, 375); Lysimachos had been king, and she herself had twice been queen, of Macedonia; and her son Ptolemaios had ruled there in some sort for a short time. That this aim involved the overthrow and dethronement of Antigonos is obvious. Consequently, from the beginning of 274 anyhow,<sup>3</sup> perhaps earlier, it would seem that there was no possible question of *friendship* between Egypt and Macedonia; though there was at the same time no question yet of any open rupture.

There was, on the contrary, friendship between Egypt and Pyrrhos. If Arsinoë's policy was hostile to Antigonos, she must, by that very fact, have cultivated the friendship of Sparta. At the time of the Chremoni-

<sup>1</sup> A good instance of φίλος for τῶν φίλων occurs Plut. *Kleom.* 36, Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Χρυσέρμου φίλος ὡν τοῦ βασιλέως (Ptolemy IV), where no mistake is possible, for Chrysermos himself was συγγενής (see *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 268, n. 19). See again H. Willrich, *Klio*, 9, 1909, p. 417, on 1 *Macc.* 10, 16-20. In Latin translations *amicus* is not uncommon; Livy 32, 5, 7; Jerome on *Dan.* 11, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Bouché-Leclercq 1, 167, n. 2, gives a list of those who have believed and have not believed that the king was meant. More recently A. J. Reinach (*Rev. Ét. Anc.* 13, 1911, p. 35) has followed Lehmann-Haupt in believing it; Niese (ii, 127, n. 1) thought it unlikely. Ferguson, who believes in it (*Athens*, 160), explains the supposed friendship by his theory that Ptolemy was still bound to Antigonos by the 'secret treaty'. I have shown that this is baseless, ch. 5, n. 8.

<sup>3</sup> See ch. 9, n. 10 on the date of Arsinoë's marriage.

dean war, Sparta was an Egyptian ally of some standing (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 214), and at some time or other Ptolemy II dedicated a statue of Areus to Zeus at Olympia (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 212). When Pyrrhos invaded the Peloponnese in 272, ostensibly as a move against Antigonos, Sparta was at first unperturbed; Areus was away fighting for Egypt in Crete; clearly she considered Pyrrhos to be in the same interest as herself, for Egypt and against Antigonos.<sup>4</sup>

Now one of the unnoticed puzzles of the time is, how Pyrrhos raised the army with which he invaded Macedonia in the spring of 273. He brought home 8,500 men, but had no money to pay them with (*Plut. Pyrrh.* 26). His application for help to Antigonos and Antiochos, made *before* Beneventum, shows that he had already raised every man he could from Epeiros; his plundering of the temple at Lokroi shows what desperate straits he was in for money. Yet in a short time, and without withdrawing his garrison from Tarentum (this was only done after his victory over Antigonos, *Just.* 25, 3, 6), he was strong enough to invade Macedonia successfully, which was not a matter for 8,500 men. Money he must have got from somewhere; and as Antiochos had refused to help him, the money can only have come from his old friend Egypt. Nothing can have been more natural for Arsinoe, in view of the policy above stated, than to subsidize her quondam brother-in-law to attack Antigonos; and if Pyrrhos started out as a friend of Egypt, everything else explains itself naturally.

In conclusion, I give reasons for the view taken in the text of the thorny group of problems connected with the name of Ptolemaios son of Lysimachos. Every possible theory has already been put forward; it will suffice to refer once and for all to the collection of references and discussion by Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 28 (1904), p. 408, and the clear statement by Bouché-Leclercq, vol. iv (1907), pp. 311-13. We have to account for the following persons: (i) Ptolemaios, son of King Lysimachos of Thrace and of Arsinoe Philadelphos, known from Justin, &c. (ii) Ptolemaios 'son of Ptolemaios', known from papyri as co-regent of Egypt with Ptolemy II from *cir.* 267/6 to 259/8.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Nothing in the interchange of embassies between Philadelphos and Rome in 273 (*Dion. Cass. fr.* 41) imports Egyptian hostility to Pyrrhos. Ptolemy's embassy was merely a wise compliment to a power growing great, like his dispatch of Dionysios to the court of Pataliputra.

<sup>5</sup> The date of the commencement of the co-regency is a question for papyrologists, and seems uncertain. Lehmann-Haupt, *Klio*, 5, 389, gives 269, a date followed by Ferguson (*Athens*, 175). Bouché-Leclercq, vol. iv (1907), p. 310, defends 267/6 against Grenfell and Hunt, *Hibeh Pap.* (1906), pp. 273-4, who thought even that year too early.

(iii) Ptolemaios 'son of Philadelphos', or 'son of Ptolemy the king', known from literary texts to have revolted at Ephesos, and to have been killed;<sup>6</sup> (iv) Ptolemaios 'son of Lysimachos', governor of Telmessos in February 240 (*O. G. I.* 55=Michel 547). (v) Ptolemaios 'son of Lysimachos' of *O. G. I.* 224, who was related to 'Antiochos the king'. (vi) Ptolemaios 'son of Lysimachos' of the inventory of Demares.<sup>7</sup> (vii) 'Ptolemaios' or 'king Ptolemaios' 'son of Lysimachos' or 'son of King Lysimachos', known from offerings at Delos listed in the year of Kallistratos (157/6, Ferguson).<sup>8</sup> Of these (v) may be omitted; either the inscription belongs to the reign of Antiochos III,<sup>9</sup> or else we do not know whether it be Antiochos II or III, and it is no use theorizing. Antiochos III seems most probable. Taking then the others, the view that commends itself to me is as follows: Ptolemy II adopted (i), and made him co-regent after Arsinoë's death, as a sort of replacement of his mother, who had been most emphatically co-regent herself; (ii) gives his official title as regent; (iii) is the same man, spoken of in common parlance as the son of his father by adoption, Philadelphos. (vii) *may* be the same man, giving his personal name as used by himself in his offerings made at Delos; but if it be the same man, it is extraordinary that his offerings do not appear in the inventories till the time of the second Athenian domination. The belief that (i), (ii), and (iii) are the same man has been adopted by Beloch, and by Ferguson in *Hellenistic Athens*.

The likeliest alternative to identifying (i) and (ii) is to suppose, with Mahaffy, Strack, and Bouché-Leclercq, that the 'regent' was Ptolemy III. The difficulty here is that there appears no reason for his appointment, and no reason why, if appointed, he then ceased to be regent in 258/7. The only explanation ever put forward is that he at that time became ruler of Cyrene in some form. Very probably he did; see App. 9. But as it is quite certain, from the contemporary evidence of Kallimachos, that Berenike, Magas' daughter, was never married to him till his accession to the throne of Egypt in 247/6,<sup>10</sup> and equally certain that a mere *betrothal* to Berenike (more there cannot have been in 258/7) would not make him ruler of Cyrene, there remains only the view put forward by me in App. 9 on a consideration of

<sup>6</sup> Ath. 593 a, b; Trogus, *Procl.* 26.

<sup>7</sup> *B. C. H.* 6, 1882, p. 1 = *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 588. It is line 94.

<sup>8</sup> See *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 410, for a list.

<sup>9</sup> So Th. Sokoloff, *Klio*, 4, 1904, p. 101; R. Laqueur, *Quaestiones epigraphicae et papyrologicae selectae* (1904) (I only know this book from the review by G. Radet in *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1904, p. 337).

<sup>10</sup> Catull. 66, ll. 11-15, '*novo hymenaeo, virgineis exuviis, novis nuptis.*'

Berenike's coins, that he ruled Cyrene as his father's viceroy. Obviously this furnishes no reason for depriving him of his co-regency of Egypt. On the other hand, on the view I adopt, Arsinoë's son naturally ceased to be co-regent when he revolted at Ephesos. The difficulty of *this* view is that the co-regency may not have begun till three years after Arsinoë's death, and one would expect it earlier. But the date seems uncertain; and in any case there is a curious parallel; for the first vase of the foundation at Delos in which Arsinoë was worshipped, the Philadelphieia, does not appear till 267 (see ch. 10, n. 46), and the two things may be connected by some reason now lost.<sup>11</sup>

As to (iv), the Telmessian Ptolemaios in my view is not the same as (i) (with whom Holleaux identified him),<sup>12</sup> but must be a son of Lysimachos the younger brother of Ptolemy III (Wilhelm). (v) may conceivably be identical with (iv) (Wilhelm, Dittenberger); the difficulties need not be discussed here.

## APPENDIX VIII

### PLUTARCH, *PYRRHOS*, CHS. 27 TO 34

(1) *Sparta*. The biography or biographical material used by Plutarch drew on (among others) both Hieronymos and Phylarchos (*Pyrrh.* 27); and the highly coloured narrative, pro-Spartan tone, and prominence of the women, suggest that we have here, in the main, Phylarchos. There is a little material for criticism in the brief account of Pausanias; but before coming to Pausanias, one isolated point may be dealt with. The action of the women is almost certainly from Phylarchos, and the question arises whether he may not have here also, as often, sacrificed truth to psychology; for with every desire to credit his heroic story, it is impossible not to remember that Aristotle (*Pol.* 1269 b) said that the Spartan training made the women particularly useless, and not like the women of other cities, and that they showed it when Epameinondas

<sup>11</sup> The traces of the co-regency on the coins, noticed by Svoronos, *νομ.* Πτολ. iv, p. 148, suit just as well for Ptolemy son of Lysimachos as for Ptolemy III.

<sup>12</sup> Some criticism of Holleaux's conjecture ἐπὶ γ[ονο]ν in *O. G. I.* 55 will be found in *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 215, n. 39 and p. 222.



invaded Lakonia. But then again it may be that Aristotle was Macedonian enough to be unjust to Sparta.

To turn to Pausanias 1, 13, 6 seq. He knows nothing of Antigonos' succour to Sparta (μέλλοντος Ἀντιγόνου κτλ.), but this is immaterial, as this detail would almost certainly go back to Hieronymos; on the other hand, he makes Argos and Messene send help, of which Plutarch knows nothing. It may quite well be true, at any rate as regards Messene; but looking at the way in which Sparta was surprised, these succours can hardly have arrived till the crisis was over.—More important is Pausanias' statement that Sparta was already surrounded by a trench and palisade, made when Demetrios threatened the city, and that there were even more permanent fortifications at the weakest points. At first sight this directly conflicts with Plutarch. But although it is difficult to make out exactly what Plutarch means by his trench and wagons, I take it that he is describing the fortification, or re-fortification, of a *small* part of the circuit only, opposite Pyrrhos' camp; and there is nothing inconsistent in this with the remainder of the circuit being already sufficiently fortified, or considered so to be. On the second day Pyrrhos passes the trench and the wagons, and attacks *beyond* them; and the allusion to the slippery place where his horse fell may well imply that there was a trench there also.—The real flaw in Plutarch's narrative, apart from the fact that too much is crowded into the one night, is the sudden arrival of Areus at the critical moment; there had been no time to summon him from Crete. Pausanias' statement, that Pyrrhos, having failed to catch Sparta asleep, μικρὸν ἡσύχαζεν, would explain all this; at the same time, Areus might simply have been recalled as a precaution, for instance when Pyrrhos reached Megalopolis and the Spartans sent an embassy to him there.

The conclusion, then, is that Pausanias' source here seems to be a fairly good one, while Phylarchos has (as we should expect) worked up his version for the dramatic effect; where they clash, Pausanias is entitled to consideration. But as it seems clear that Pausanias' version does not go back to Hieronymos (since he knows nothing of the succour sent by Antigonos), and as it is quite uncertain how much of Plutarch may derive from Hieronymos, I have in substance followed Plutarch in the text, merely entering here the necessary cautions.

(2) *Argos*. The events here are on a different footing. Pausanias (1, 13, 7-8) has quite a different story to Plutarch. In Pausanias, Pyrrhos defeats Antigonos outside Argos, enters the city with the fugitives, and is *killed* by the tile thrown by a woman. (So Polyæn. 8, 68.) Pausanias then adds the invaluable information, 'this account

(*ταῦτα*) is different from that of Hieronymos,' who gave a version, he says, more favourable to Antigonos. This word, *ταῦτα*, cannot refer specially, either (*a*) to the Demeter story, which Pausanias himself gives as poetry only and which he would not compare with Hieronymos, or (*b*) to Pausanias' own account of Pyrrhos' death, for Plutarch's account of this is in no sense written *ἐς χάριν Ἀντιγόνου* any more than Pausanias'. *Ταῦτα* then must refer to the whole story, and Pausanias' source, whatever it is, cannot derive from Hieronymos, as Beloch supposed (3, 1, 595, n. 1). As Plutarch's account differs from Pausanias on every point—Antigonos never fights Pyrrhos, Pyrrhos enters the city by treachery from within, he is only *stunned* by the tile, and killed by a mercenary—and as Plutarch's account is obviously written from the point of view of one who had knowledge of the proceedings of Antigonos and Halkyoneus, and was perhaps even in their camp, it is reasonable to suppose that Plutarch's source here does to a large extent derive from Hieronymos, and not from Phylarchos as Niese 2, 60, n. 3, and Beloch 3, 1, 595, n. 1, supposed; though it is just possible, for the reason (*b*) above, that Hieronymos' account of Pyrrhos' death did not give the tile story at all. This being so, we must of course, for the events at Argos, follow Plutarch and neglect Pausanias. Justin's brief version (25, 5, 1)—Pyrrhos is besieging Antigonos, and is killed by a stone thrown from the wall (cf. Strabo 8, 376, which is similar)—is much nearer to Pausanias than to Plutarch. Lastly, in Zonaras 8, 6, we get the garbled absurdity that the woman herself falls on Pyrrhos' head and kills him.

## APPENDIX IX

### THE DEATH OF DEMETRIOS THE FAIR

Is the episode of Demetrios' brief rule in Cyrene to be placed, with Koehler, Niese, Kaerst, and Bouché-Leclercq, *circa* 259/8, or, with Droysen, Beloch, and Ferguson, a good deal later, about 250?

Porphry (ap. Euseb. 1, 237, Schoene) puts Demetrios' death Ol. 130, 2 = 259/8. It followed soon on Magas' death. Magas became governor of Cyrene through putting down a rebellion for Ptolemy (Paus. 1, 6, 8). Agatharchides (ap. Athen. xii, 550 B) says Magas ruled Cyrene for fifty years. Suidas, *Δημήτριος*, says Ptolemy reduced Cyrene in 308 after Ophelas' revolt. If it be supposed that this is the rebellion which

Magas suppressed, everything fits well; Magas' fifty years (a round figure) run from 308 to a little before 259/8. In Beloch's view it fits too well; but it must stand, unless Beloch's argument against it be well founded.

The arguments for Beloch's theory are given 3, 2, 133 seq., and should be consulted. He calls the other view 'heute herrschende Schulmeinung', which rather prejudices the defence. I take first his arguments *seriatim*, as he numbers them.

(i) Kallimachos, the only contemporary evidence except the coins. Berenike's lock of hair speaks, and after saying to her how anxious she must be for her newly wedded bridegroom, gone to the Syrian war (her marriage certainly falls in 247/6; see App. 7, p. 446), continues (Catull. 66, 25):

At te ego certe  
cognoram a parva virgine magnanimam.  
anne bonum oblita es facinus, quo regum adepta es  
coniugium, quod non fortior ausit alis?

You weep, not for yourself, but for your husband (21, 22); 'but of a truth I had known that you had a fine spirit ever since you were a small maiden. Do you not remember the noble deed through which you won your royal wedlock, a deed no other could dare with more courage?' It seems to me, I confess, quite clear, that if you say to a married woman, 'You have been so and so ever since you were a small maiden,' you imply that some considerable time has elapsed since the action performed by the small maiden with which you proceed to illustrate your remark. How it can refer to an event of yesterday (and Beloch puts Demetrios' death and Berenike's marriage in the same year), I do not see. Neither do I see how even a poet could ask Berenike whether she had forgotten her 'bonum facinus', if it had only happened yesterday. To my mind Kallimachos is quite clear that some considerable time elapsed; always (that is) supposing that Catullus accurately represents Kallimachos. Magas was married at latest early in 274, and Berenike, an only child, was probably born in 273 or soon after; she might be about fourteen or fifteen—'parva virgo'—in 259/8, but in 250 she would be about twenty-two or twenty-three, certainly not 'parva' to a Greek.

(ii) Pausanias, 1, 6, 8, is said to put Magas' suppression of a revolt in Cyrene after Ipsos. I venture to doubt if it goes to this length. This chapter deals with *Ptolemy*; it is possible enough that Pausanias, having taken the relations of Ptolemy and Antigonos in unbroken sequence down to Ipsos and Ptolemy's consequent recovery of Hollow

Syria and Cyprus, turns back to clear up his previous allusion (1, 6, 5) to a revolt in Cyrene; to have there mentioned Magas and the lengthy story of his mother Berenike would have formed a long break in the continuous narrative.—If Suidas says *Ptolemy* reduced Cyrene, this does not, in such a brief narrative, necessarily mean that he did it in person, and not through a general.—Pausanias' allusion to the five years between the revolt and Magas' suppression may be a muddled allusion to the events in Cyrene 313–308.—Pausanias is poor here anyhow; he has a very bad mistake a few lines on, viz. that the Athenian tribe Ptolemais was named from Ptolemy II.—The conclusion is that while Pausanias and Suidas do appear, in their more natural sense, to support Beloch, it is not necessary so to read them; they are not clear enough to set up against the contemporary Kallimachos.

(iii) Porphyry's date is 'einfach verschrieben'. Why? It is in fact supported by Justin 26, 3, 2, who puts Magas' death at 'about the same time' ('per idem tempus') as the attack of Alexander of Epeiros upon Antigonos, which latter event he expressly dates in the Chremonidean war. Naturally Beloch cannot quote this, because elsewhere, treating Demetrios' death as settled, he reverses the order of the evidence and tries to use Justin to displace Alexander's attack (3, 2, 427).

(iv) and (v) are admittedly valueless. The year in which Asoka dispatched a missionary to Magas fits quite well with 259 (see V. A. Smith, *Asoka*², pp. 68 and 73); and whether Berenike had ceased to be attractive at thirty is a matter that depended solely on Berenike and of which we know nothing.

Before leaving the texts, I note two other points material to Beloch's theory. One is that Beloch treats it as inconceivable that twelve years elapsed between Berenike's 'bonum facinus' and her marriage to Ptolemy III. Why? These long engagements, for political purposes, were not uncommon. Demetrios I was betrothed to Ptolemais in 299 and married her in 287/6; and two other instances are given by H. J. W. Tillyard and A. J. B. Wace, 'The History of Demetrios the Fair,' *B. S. A.* 1905, p. 119. (It seems necessary to believe that Berenike was betrothed to Ptolemy upon Demetrios' death, because of Catullus' words, 'quo regium adeptas es coniugium'.)

The other point concerns Ekdemos and Demophanes. Beloch has to make them come to Cyrene on Demetrios' invitation, there being no other place for them on his view. But Polybios (10, 22) says plainly, διεφύλαξαν αὐτοῖς (the Cyrenaicans) τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, i.e. the Cyrenaicans were free before the two came, though in a state of στάσις (Plut. *Philop.* 1, νοσοῦντων). Also both Polybios and Plutarch agree that the invitation



was sent by the people of Cyrene ; this statement therefore comes from their common early source (see ch. 12, n. 43), and is alone sufficient to make Beloch's theory impossible.

I now turn to the other contemporary evidence that remains beside Kallimachos, namely the coins.

We have to account somehow for two sets of coins : (1) those coins which show that at some time Cyrene was a *κοινόν*, and (2) those coins of Berenike II on which her head has not the married woman's veil, and which therefore probably date from before her marriage. As to (1), I find no attraction in Beloch's view (3, 1, 640) that Cyrene was organized *under Demetrios* as a *κοινόν* with the monarch at the head of it ; Polybios could never have called such an arrangement *ἐλευθερία* (10, 22), and moreover it seems to me fairly clear that Demetrios executed a *coup d'État* (ch. 11, p. 323). On the other hand, I feel it very difficult to put the *κοινόν*, as do most numismatists,<sup>1</sup> in the reign of Ptolemy III. Their ground, as I understand it, is that the regal coinage of Cyrenaica of the Ptolemaic type only begins with Ptolemy IV. It is true that the *κοινόν τῶν νησιωτῶν* existed under Ptolemy II ; but in the case of Cyrene there was a legitimate monarch all the time, and she was Ptolemy III's wife. Could the king who in all probability derived his cult-name from the union of the two crowns of Egypt and Cyrene<sup>2</sup> permit, in his wife's dominions, the existence of a republic (and a real republic, *ἐλευθερία*), which even restruct, instead of using, his father's coins ? To my mind, the *κοινόν* coins, and the events connected with Ekdemos and Demophanes, demand a real independence for Cyrene, and must fall prior to 247 ; that is, they demand a fair interval between Demetrios' death and Berenike's marriage.

As to (2), these coins appear to show that Berenike reigned in Cyrene at some time before her marriage.<sup>3</sup> As on Demetrios' death her party gained the ascendancy, and as the visit of Ekdemos and Demophanes to Cyrene seems to fall later than the liberation of Sikyon in May 251 (ch. 12, n. 43), her reign must fall somewhere between Demetrios' death and 251-250, to allow room for the *κοινόν* before 247. But these coins bear the legend *Πτολεμαίου βασιλέως* as well as *Βερενίκης βασιλίσσης*.

<sup>1</sup> See R. S. Poole in *B. M. Coins (Ptolemies)*, p. xlv seq. ; G. Macdonald, *Hunterian Collection*, 3, p. 575 ; Head<sup>2</sup>, p. 871.

<sup>2</sup> Bouché-Leclercq 3, 77.

<sup>3</sup> J. N. Svoronos, *Journ. Intern.* 1, 212, see *πίναξ* Θ, 6, 9, 10 ; the coins show obv. head of young Berenike with the royal diadem but no veil, *Βερενίκης βασιλίσσης* ; rev. eagle on thunderbolt, wings closed, *Πτολεμαίου βασιλέως*. See also U. Wilcken, 'Berenike,' no. 11 in *P. W.* ; U. Kahrstedt, *Klio*, 1910, p. 269.

Many believe that the prince who was afterwards Ptolemy III did, from and after the death of Demetrios, reign in Cyrene as Berenike's betrothed ; but of course being betrothed to a queen does not make a man king. Assuming that the Ptolemy in question be he who was afterwards Ptolemy III, it seems to me that this legend can only signify one thing : Ptolemy II was overlord of Cyrene, and deputed his son to reign for him there.

As I see the obscure question here discussed, the following authorities demand the early date for Demetrios' death : the coins, Kallimachos, Justin, Porphyry, and the common source of Polybios and Plutarch. The only thing to be set against it is a possible but not certain method of interpreting a rather poor passage in Pausanias. The conclusion cannot be doubtful.

The events at Cyrene I read as follows. On Demetrios' death the philo-Egyptian party, for protection against the nationalists and possibly against Antigonos, threw themselves and their country into the arms of Ptolemy II. He left Berenike her nominal queenship, but betrothed his son to her and made him king beside her : at the same time he had no intention that his son should as yet *marry* Berenike and perhaps set up as independent king of Cyrene. The nationalists presently overthrew this government (? perhaps in 253 with Antigonos' support) ; the country suffered from internal discord, and Ekdemos and Demophanes were called in. Ptolemy II, averse to war, did not attempt reconquest. On his death Ptolemy III married Berenike, but could not attend to the country owing to the Syrian war ; the *κοινόν* lasted some years longer, corresponding to the fact that Ptolemy III did not, apparently, receive his cult-name immediately on his accession.<sup>4</sup> After his peace with Antigonos in 244, however, Ptolemy III was able to attend to Cyrene : he re-united (whether by conquest or peaceably cannot be said) the two crowns in fact as well as in right, and was thereon called Euergetes. For the rest of his reign the coins of Cyrene bear the head and legend of Berenike.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The gods *εὐεργέται* seem to be first mentioned in a contract dated in his fifth year, while another contract, dated in his third year, shows that they had not yet been associated in the cult of Alexander, *Hibeh Pap.* i, p. 328, no. 145 ; p. 331, no. 171 ; see *ib.* p. 369. Of course this is not *conclusive* against his having been already canonized in another connexion.

<sup>5</sup> These coins, with *Βερεϊκής βασιλίσσης* and the monogram M or Ma, the head being often that of a middle-aged woman, were assigned by Svoronos to Berenike I, Magas' mother (*Journ. Intern.* 1, 223 ; *Τὰ νομίσματα τοῦ κράτους τῶν Πτολεμαίων*, pt. 4, p. 156), but this has not found general acceptance ; see U. Kahrstedt, *Klio*, 1910, p. 262, and generally Head<sup>2</sup> 852.

## APPENDIX X

## THE SEA-STRENGTHS OF EGYPT AND MACEDONIA

No one has attempted to estimate the power of Ptolemy II at sea ; but the material exists, and it is very necessary to try.

I start from the territorial figures which I have elsewhere deduced for the year 480.<sup>1</sup> At that time the total effective force of the Mediterranean coasts east of Cape Malea was about 1,000 triremes, of which Xerxes controlled 600, in five territorial divisions of 120 each. We may take it, for purposes of reckoning, that the trireme of 480 stood to the quinquereme of the third century, as regards man-power, roughly in the ratio of 3 to 5 ; the former carried 180 men, the latter, according to Polybios, 300. In 480, then, the sea-power of the eastern Mediterranean would have been the equivalent of about 600 quinqueremes.

Taking now the last decade of the fourth century, we find Demetrios and Ptolemy I together controlling some 500 warships.<sup>2</sup> In addition to these was the navy of Kassandros, of unknown strength ; that of Lysimachos, the same ; and (omitting pirates) at least three independent city navies of note, those of Rhodes, Herakleia, Byzantion. Rhodes, for the war against Antiochos III, got 77 vessels in all to sea at different times ;<sup>3</sup> but in 310-300 she was not nearly as strong ; perhaps 30-40 vessels. Herakleia and her territory could, we know, a few years later muster 40 anyhow ;<sup>4</sup> Byzantion and her territory do but less as many ; a few must be allowed for Kios. We may give these four powers together some 120-50 ships, more or less ; and the navy of Herakleia formed the best part of that of Lysimachos, whose navy grew later when he acquired part of Asia Minor. Macedonia had put 220 ships into line at Amorgos ; but this included vessels from every part of Alexander's empire which Antipatros as regent was able to draw upon ; and this fleet no longer existed as a fleet. Looking at what was done by Philip V, Kassandros can certainly not have got 100 large vessels to sea from Macedonia and Thessaly alone, without any Greek towns. Add some small balance for Lysimachos, and we get the total effective sea-power of the eastern Mediterranean in 310-300 as some 700-50

<sup>1</sup> 'The Fleet of Xerxes,' *J. H. S.* 1908, p. 202.

<sup>2</sup> Ch. 3, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> This figure is arrived at by mere addition and subtraction of the various material numbers in the accounts of the war in Livy and Appian.

<sup>4</sup> Memnon 23.

vessels, more or less. 600 is certainly too low, while I cannot see where 800 or over could come from; I do not believe that the margin of error can be more than about 50 ships either way.

Demetrios had a few ships bigger than quinqueremes; but a great many quadriremes and even triremes were still in use; the average was certainly not yet that of the quinquereme (see *post*). We shall not be very far wrong, then, if we take the total power of 310-300 at somewhere about that of 480, that is to say, equivalent to some 600 quinqueremes, but differently distributed. We are justified, then, in supposing as a hypothesis that the total sea-power of 246 would be somewhere about the same as that of 310-300.

With regard now to distribution. Athens in the third century gradually falls out, and by 246 she, like Sparta and Aigina, had practically ceased to be a sea-power; the three together mean a loss of say 240 triremes (or the equivalent of 150 quinqueremes) on the figures of 480. If we suppose for a moment that the power of the eastern and southern coastline, from Thrace to Cyrene, had remained constant, then the deficiency of 150 quinqueremes would fall to be made up by Rhodes, Macedonia proper, and the little Argolid towns, giving at least 100 quinqueremes for Macedonia. It will be seen presently that this is unlikely. Consequently we must treat the coast from Thrace to Cyrene as having a rather higher value under Xerxes, though the city-distribution may be different.

To take it another way, through the territorial divisions,<sup>5</sup> which under Xerxes each supplied 120 triremes (= 72 quinqueremes). Ptolemy in 247/6 held (i) Egypt, (ii) Phoenicia, (iii) that part of no. 3 which consisted of Cyprus, and (iv) that part of Ionia-Karia which consisted of Samos and the towns in Karia; say the equivalent of three of the old territorial divisions, perhaps rather more, or about 210-30 quinqueremes. Of the other two territorial divisions, the rest of (iii) and (iv) belonged to the Seleukid, while (v), the Aeolis-Hellespont division, fell principally to the Attalid and to Herakleia, Kios, and Byzantion, though parts of the coastline, e. g. in Thrace, were Seleukid. (v) was almost certainly much over strength; the Seleukid territory almost certainly much under, as the Seleukids did little for their navy. Take them each at normal, say 140 quinqueremes all told, and we get some 230-50 quinqueremes more or less left for Rhodes and Macedonia with Greece, Greece meaning really Corinth and Chalkis; this would give Antigonos a total of some 200 quinqueremes. It will be

<sup>5</sup> For the numbering see *J. H. S.* 1908, p. 205.



seen presently that this will not do : and consequently we must raise the figures elsewhere, as we saw before.

Clearly the power whose figures must be raised is Egypt. This seems obviously correct, for Egypt's resources were more than merely territorial ; she had in addition great wealth, and a great new capital ; Alexandria alone could add many ships to the navy.<sup>6</sup> But it is no use guessing how much we must raise the figure ; we can go no further, territorially, and must therefore now get back to tradition.

There are two lists, those of Athenaios 5, 203 d (probably from Kallixenos), and Appian (*Proöm.* 10). Both derive from the same (intermediate) source, as will be seen ; both therefore ultimately go back, in some way, to the same original, which is known from Appian to be an official one, the βασιλικαὶ ἀναγραφαί.

Kallixenos gives 336 warships (the figure is got by adding up the separate totals of each size of vessel), plus over 4,000 vessels 'sent to the Islands and other cities' (i. e. cruisers, aphracts) 'and to Libya' (potamophylakides on the Nile). Appian gives 1,500 regular warships plus 2,000 κοντωτά (barges) and smaller boats for use in war, and 800 θαλαμηγὰ ἐς πολέμον πομπήν ; as θαλαμηγός was a Nile dahabiyeh (Kallixenos ap. Athen. 204 d), we see that these 800 correspond to Kallixenos' class ἐς τὴν Λιβύην. We get therefore in Appian 2,000 + 1,500 + 800 = 4,300 = 4,000 + 300 warships, the same as Kallixenos, showing a common source ; only Kallixenos has taken down the list of 336 warships exactly, Appian has given a round figure. (If further proof of a common source be needed, compare Kallixenos' ἀπὸ τετρήρους μέχρι τριηρημολίας with Appian's ἀπὸ ἡμιολίας μέχρι πεντήρους.) I need not pause to say that the 4,000 is rubbish ; the figure has grown up in a well-known way, (precisely as Herodotos or some one evolved an addition of 3,000 pentekontors to Xerxes' fleet, *J.H.S.* 1908, 231), and represents who can say what original list of the accompaniments of the war fleet, transport, supply, Nile boats, &c. The common source, then, is not the original source, but an intermediate one. But in one respect it derives from the original. The 336 warships, given in detail, undoubtedly represent the official fleet-list. Whether they represent it correctly, in all its details, we cannot say ; but the first and most startling item of the list has been confirmed by an inscription (*O. G. I.* 39), and the list therefore cannot be very far out. Probably the most uncertain point about it is whether the original total of 336 did, or did

<sup>6</sup> Beloch (3, 1, 296) makes Alexandria three times as large as Athens at its best.

not, include guard-boats on the Nile (for which see Diod. 20, 76. 3). In view of Ptolemy's wealth, and the definite nature of the list, I incline to give the list the benefit of the doubt, especially as 336 is a very probable number in itself.<sup>7</sup>

If this is correct, the naval power of Ptolemy II was indeed enormous, *on paper*, as the tradition everywhere assumes. On paper, he would have been, keel for keel, more than half as strong again as Ptolemy Soter or contemporary Carthage, slightly stronger than Demetrios had ever been, and very definitely superior to contemporary Rome.<sup>8</sup> But counting keels may not represent his actual material superiority. The ships of Demetrios and of Soter were certainly by no means of the average power of quinqueremes. Neither were the ships of Rome or Carthage, though we know for certain that sometimes the proportion in a fleet in the Hannibalian war was as high as 88 per cent. of quinqueremes to 12 per cent. of quadriremes and triremes.<sup>9</sup> But Philadelphos' fleet contained an extraordinary number of much larger vessels. We cannot say, of course, if the man-power of a triakonteres stood to that of a quinquereme as 30 to 5, and so forth, but if this was the case, and if we like to add up Kallixenos' list on this footing, averaging the last group as triremes, we shall find that the average power of the whole is just about that of the quinquereme.

Whether the whole fleet could ever have been manned at once, even with the naval conscription, is another question. It is certain that once Egypt lost the command of the sea her fleet simply melted away, by the usual process of not replacing ships as they became rotten;<sup>10</sup> from 217 onwards, Egypt only sends small squadrons to sea.

Now as to Antigonos. I must return for a moment to the territorial figures; these, on the basis of Egypt having some 210-30 quinqueremes, left some 230-50 quinqueremes for Rhodes and Macedonia. Egypt now having the equivalent of say 330 quinqueremes, there are about 130-50 quinqueremes left for the two allies; and as Rhodes had certainly 30-40 quinqueremes, it comes to this, that Antigonos' strength, territorially, ought to be the equivalent of somewhere about 100 quinqueremes, more or less.

This figure, derived from a territorial scheme which I originally

<sup>7</sup> One need not consider the 1,500 'naves longas, quas nunc Liburnas vocant' of Jerome on *Daniel* xi, 5; it is obviously Appian's 1,500 regular warships.

<sup>8</sup> See ch. 3, n. 47.

<sup>9</sup> *J. H. S.* 1907, 60 (Hannibal's figures).

<sup>10</sup> The average 'life' at Athens was about twenty years; see Kolbe, *Ath. Mitt.* 1901 (26), p. 377.

worked out for quite another reason and on quite other evidence, agrees so nearly with tradition that I cannot help feeling that it must be in substance correct. In 201, Philip V, off much the same territory as Antigonos, got to sea 53 cataphracts, an unknown number of aphracts, and 150 lemboi and pristeis.<sup>11</sup> The aphracts cannot have been numerous, for Philip had just adopted the Illyrian lembos, and, not without good cause (as the battle of Chios showed), was pinning his faith to it as his light ship. The lembos did the work which the triakontor had done in the fourth century :<sup>12</sup> it probably therefore was smaller than the pente-kontor. If, however, we take it even to have been as large as a pente-kontor (50 rowers, and say 70 men all told), then 4 lemboi were roughly equal to one quinquereme, or 150 lemboi equal to 37 quinqueremes ; consequently Philip's fleet cannot, in any case, be made out to be the equivalent of much more than 100 quinqueremes, and may have been less ; and even so, to man it his phalangites had to take the oar themselves.<sup>13</sup>

If then Antigonos, making a special and tremendous effort, had anything approaching the equivalent of 150 quinqueremes in line at Kos, he was doing wonders ; and it is not likely that he had anywhere near so many. And if Egypt had anything like the equivalent of 200 quinqueremes to meet him with, ships actually at sea after her other defeats and the other calls on her navy, she was doing wonders also ; probably she had not. Kos may very well have been a contest between about the same numbers as fought at Salamis (Cyprus), with some 300 vessels, all told, engaged ; it can hardly have been comparable with Ecnomus, or the third day of Artemision.

## APPENDIX XI

### DATING BY DELIAN FESTIVALS

I USE in this book Homolle's dates for the Delian archons, so far as concerns the reign of Antigonos ; and I give here my reasons.<sup>1</sup>

In *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 264 seq., § E, I put forward certain suggestions for modifying Homolle's dating of the Delian archons, with a view to

<sup>11</sup> Polyb. 16, 2.

<sup>12</sup> *J. H. S.* 1905, p. 147.

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. 5, 2, 4.

<sup>1</sup> I note that Homolle's *order* has recently been confirmed in many points by the fragments of a list of Delian archons published by P. Roussel, *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 423.—See Addenda.

finding room for Schulhof's five (or six) new archons. There was room for two in Homolle's list; and I showed that a third could be inserted by moving Homolle's list for 198-166 to 197-165. I imagine that this last is a permanent factor gained (see Dürrbach's new arrangement from 208, *B. C. H.* 1911, pp. 53-74). Then came the question, could the archon list before and up to Anectos (225 Homolle) be put back two years to get in the other two archons? I suggested so moving it, and incidentally fell into quite unnecessary confusion over the accession of Ptolemy III. Meanwhile Ferguson (*J. H. S.* 1910, p. 189 seq.) independently rearranged the list so as to make room for *six* new archons, putting Kosmiades in 197 instead of 198, Anectos, as I did, in 227, but inserting the supposed sixth archon, Lysimachides, between Badros and Mantitheos, making the dates prior to Badros (249 Homolle) go back three years. This is the dating adopted in *Hellenistic Athens*.

Professor Dürrbach, with whom I had some correspondence on the question (of which he has kindly allowed me to make use), tells me he has come to the conclusion that Homolle's dates prior and up to Anectos can be retained, Lysimachides being (as he told me before) a much older archon, and two archons being omitted as unsupported by sufficient evidence, Mantitheos II and Agatharchos II; and this I understand will be the dating adopted in *I. G.* xi (see also Ferguson, *Athens*, 189, n. 1). I agree with Ferguson that one cannot comment on this till one has the complete exposition; at the same time, it was always evident to any one that Mantitheos II was somewhat doubtful (as I tentatively suggested *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 275, n. 62), and I should be glad to see him left out. And unless there is further or better evidence for Agatharchos II than the fragment of a document in Homolle, *Archives*, p. 93, n. 1, it is clear that he is at least doubtful, too (absence of ἐπ' Ἀγαθάρχον). It has seemed to me best, therefore, in this book to keep Homolle's dating during Gonatas' reign, while envisaging the possibility of the list up to Anectos having perhaps ultimately to go back *one* year.

Now a possible error of one year in the Delian dating does not vitiate historical conclusions, for a reason that may be pointed out. Given three successive archon years A, B, and C, and the first vase of a new foundation appearing in C, then the event which led to the foundation may have happened in any one of the three years, and we cannot, *a priori*, say which. We can have (i) event in A, capital lodged in B, first vase (one year's interest) in C; or (ii) event and capital lodged both in B, first vase in C; or (iii) event and capital lodged in C, and the festival started off with the further gift of one year's interest



in hand (first vase). No doubt (iii) would be uncommon in private foundations : but certainly, when a king was the founder, it cannot be said that it might not quite well happen. Hence any event dated by a Delian festival has always a possible two years' margin of error. I have assumed however that, as a normal thing, the event would most commonly happen a year before the first vase appears.

Ferguson, however, gave two independent reasons for his dating (see *Klio*, 9, 339 : *J. H. S.* 1910, 190), which must be considered. One was that the letting of the temple lands for the decades prescribed by law brings Sosisthenes (250 Homolle) to 253. Yes, if the decades were not disturbed : but we do not know this, and Ferguson has shown that they were in fact disturbed later. The other is his theory that all the Ptolemaieia festivals are one, and that every establishment or re-establishment of the Ptolemaieia must fall in the first year of an Olympiad.

I confess that this theory still seems to me as difficult to follow as it always did (*J. H. S.* 1910, p. 223). *A priori*, there is no reason for the five festivals in question being one. There were many Dionysia in Hellas ; were they all one ? When we do get one and the same festival in two places (e. g. the Soteria for Philokles at Athens and Delos), it is so stated. Ferguson, so far as I can see, really deduces the theory of the first year of an Olympiad from his archon dating, and then uses it to prove the archon dating. Even as he states it, it breaks down ; for while (*J. H. S.* 1910, p. 191) he makes the first celebration of the Ptolemaieia at Delos 279, which he equates with Ol. 125, 1, he follows Homolle in giving seven vases as earlier, making the first vase (i. e. the first celebration) fall in 286, which on his equation is *not* the first year of an Olympiad. I lay no stress on this, for it is certain now that there are more than seven undated vases of the first Ptolemaieia, and that they run quite differently ; the actual foundation was probably made in 280, the first vase appearing in 279 (see ch. 5, n. 50). But the theory breaks down again over this, that only two archons come between Badros and Manti-theos, under whom the first vases of the second and third Ptolemaieia respectively appear : *both* cannot fall in the first year of an Olympiad. Ferguson attempted to rectify this by the insertion *ad hoc* of Lysimachides (*J. H. S.* 1910, p. 192) ; but Dürrbach, who is acquainted with the documents, considers that Lysimachides is certainly a very early archon. In fact, it appears that the 'first year of an Olympiad' theory will not bear examination.

Putting aside altogether the difficulty due to the difference of the Attic and Delian calendars, the basis of this theory was that the festivals at Delos which (following Schulhof and for convenience) I call the first,

second, and third Ptolemaieia were the same as the well-known penteteris at Alexandria, and must be dated by reference to the date of the death of Ptolemy I. But surely they have nothing whatever to do with the death of Ptolemy I: the first vase of the first Ptolemaieia appears four years after that death, and this was an *annual* festival. Ferguson says (*Athens*, 195, n. 1) that I have offered no proof of the proposition that these Ptolemaieia at Delos were not the same as the Ptolemaieia at Alexandria. But why should I? The burden of proof must surely be on any one who asserts, on the ground of identity of name, that an *annual* festival at Delos, in which the gods worshipped were *Apollo*, *Artemis*, and *Leto*, was the same as a *quadrennial* festival at Alexandria, in which the god worshipped was *Ptolemy Soter*; and that burden of proof has not yet been discharged. The federal Ptolemaieia, celebrated by the League of the Islanders, though it existed before the Alexandrian penteteris (*Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202), may possibly have afterwards been identical with it: we really know nothing about the federal Ptolemaieia. But I cannot regard *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202 as proof of identity (*Athens*, 195, n. 1). Every state in Hellas must have been asked to vote the Alexandrian festival isolympic; it is a mere chance that the record remains in the case of one state only, the League of the Islanders.

## APPENDIX XII

### THE DATES OF KOS AND ANDROS

THAT Andros was a victory won by Gonatas may now, I hope, be taken for granted. I proved this by analysis of Trogus and Plutarch in §§ A and B of a paper in *J. H. S.* 1909, 264, 'The Battles of Cos and Andros'; and Ferguson proved it independently on different lines in a paper in *J. H. S.* 1910, p. 189. See also Werner König, *Der Bund der Nesioten*, p. 90 seq.<sup>1</sup>

This being so, the possible views of the dates of these much discussed battles seem to be reduced at last to three (which is always

<sup>1</sup> I have not got any help from a recent article in *Klio*, 11 (1911), p. 277, by V. Constanzi, *Il dominio egiziano nelle Cicladi sotto Tolomeo Filopatore*, the idea of which seems to be that both Kos and Andros were inoperative and the Egyptian rule of the sea lasted to Philopator. The article appears to have been written some years before publication, and has not the modern material.

something): (i) Ferguson's; Beloch's date for Kos (*circ.* 256), and 242/1 for Andros;<sup>2</sup> (ii) mine, Andros and Kos in one campaign, or two consecutive campaigns, at the very beginning of the reign of Ptolemy III; (iii) some combination of the two. The reasons I have already given for my view seem to me to hold good as regards all of my paper except § E; as regards the *actual* and not the relative date (§ E), that depends on the Delian archon list, and what I wrote requires modification (see App. 11). I want to state here, as briefly as possible, how the question seems to me to stand now, and why I cannot accept Ferguson's view, for which there is much to be said. All our theories, as Ferguson rightly says, are provisional only; and I did not abandon Beloch's date for Kos without much thought. I use Homolle's archon dates here.

*Kos.* Beloch brought this battle into connexion with two events: (*a*) the withdrawal by Antigonos of the Mouseion garrison in 256/5 (so Ferguson also); (*b*) the Antigoneia founded by Antigonos on Delos, the first vase of which appears under Phanos (252). One or other may be a good argument; not both. If (*a*) be correct, the battle must fall in 257, or 256 at latest; and then it is not conceivable to me that Antigonos waited till 253 to make his offerings to Apollo, to whom he dedicated his ship after the victory. Ferguson gets over this by putting Phanos in 255; that is quite another matter (see App. 11). Unless this is possible, the Antigoneia of Phanos' year must be left out of the question. In my view they must be left out in any case, because of the association of the Stratonikeia (see ch. 12, p. 352 seq.). If one could accept Ferguson's date, 255, one might accept his excellent scheme of things on p. 190 of *Hellenistic Athens*, which meets this difficulty; but if 252 is going to be correct for Phanos, or even 253, one cannot connect the festivals with an event in 257 or 256. And, now that we have the 'peace' of 255 (see ch. 11, n. 10), Kos is no longer required to explain the withdrawal of the Mouseion garrison, if indeed it ever was required; for it is difficult to see how a naval victory could affect a purely inland town like Athens, with Antigonos holding the Piraeus.<sup>3</sup> Kos would of course explain the peace. But so will Antiochos' successes in Asia. And again, after Kos Antigonos' flagship was dedicated, and dedicated on Delos (see my paper on this ship in *J. H. S.* 1910, 209, especially §§ B and C); this

<sup>2</sup> Niese, followed by König (p. 97), put Andros in 243, connecting it with the same event, the appointment of Ptolemy III as generalissimo of the Achaean League.

<sup>3</sup> Beloch's date was long ago doubted on this ground by J. Delamarre, *Rev. Phil.* 26, 1902, p. 321.

could not have been done unless the peace of 255 gave Antigonos Delos and the League; he could not deprive himself of his best weapon till certain of the result of his labours. But if he had obtained everything he wanted by 255, it is again inconceivable that no offering of his to Apollo appears till 252, and then only in conjunction with the Stratonikeia, which latter festival is certainly *not* 'indicative of sovereignty'; for be it remembered that the peace of 255 is also dated by a Delian archon, and whatever the absolute dates, a three years' interval between the mention of the peace and the first vase of the Antigoneia is a certainty.

Another most material point is this. Ptolemy's combinations in reply to Antigonos all centre on the year 252, as I have shown in ch. 12; and as regards the winning over of Antiochos and Alexander of Corinth the date seems free from doubt. Consequently Ptolemy is replying to something Antigonos did in 253 (i. e. to the foundation of the first Antigoneia). If Ptolemy had been badly beaten at sea in 257 or 256, is it conceivable that he would have delayed his counter-stroke, so tremendously effective when it came, until 252? The only way out of this would be to adopt Hiller von Gaertringen's new date for Kos, *circ.* 253 (in the Introduction to *I. G.* xii, 5, 2); but then, apart from the peace of 255 (which seems to put it out of the question), we must again ask, *why* the Stratonikeia?

Again, if the Antigoneia show that Antigonos had replaced Ptolemy as master of the League of the Islanders, as Ferguson thinks (*Athens*, p. 190), why was Delos thereupon in such terror of Antigonos' friends the Aetolians that she obtained from them a decree of ἀσφάλεια (see ch. 12, p. 354). This shows plainly, to my mind, that Delos was not at the time under Antigonos' protection, though something had happened to make her doubt the efficacy of that of Ptolemy.

One word on the coins. Ferguson is clear, as I am, that one of Antigonos' two tetradrachms is connected with Lysimacheia and the other with Kos (*B. C. H.* 1910, p. 196, n. 36); and he quotes Imhoof-Blumer's suggestion that the ratio of known specimens of each is 12 or 13 to 6 as agreeing well with the date of 256 for Kos. Yes, *if they ceased to be struck on Gonatas' death*. But as it seems to me to be as certain as anything can be that Demetrios II and Doson both continued to strike Gonatas' silver, no silver of either king being known,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Like Kassandros, whose gold and silver coins were struck in the name and with the types of Alexander (Macdonald, *Hunterian Collection*, 1, 334; Head<sup>2</sup> 228). There *is* a silver coin, with ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ on the reverse, which J. P. Six (*Num. Chron.* 1894, p. 279 seq.) assigned to Demetrios II (see



this argument falls to the ground. I might say, and do say, that we get a very good ratio thus: 276-221 B.C. : 246-221 B.C. : 12 or 13 : 6.

*Andros.* Ferguson's arguments<sup>5</sup> for 242/1 (*J. H. S.* 1910, 199 seq.) are (i) the Achaeans appointed Ptolemy III generalissimo by land and sea (Plut. *Arat.* 24); (ii) Aratos invaded Salamis, an island; (iii) Teles in 239 puts Chremonides' command καθ' ἡμᾶς; (iv) the battle must come *after* the operations in Thrace against 'Adaeus'; (v) Trogus puts it after 243. To this it may be replied as follows: (i) and (ii), the appointment of Ptolemy was an empty honour; we do not hear of his doing anything; yet he must still have had a larger fleet left than Antigonus (especially as Antigonus had lost Corinth; and cf. App. 10), and may have been expected to intervene; and in any case the crossing to Salamis meant little, for the Achaeans had Corinth and its ships. And if Ptolemy fought Andros in 242/1 as Aratos' ally, Plutarch must have mentioned it. Besides, it may be noted that Egypt also supported Aetolia against Demetrios II (see Soteriades in *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1905. 91, on the bases of eight statues of Ptolemy III and his family found at Thermos), but this did not interfere with the Macedonian control of the Cyclades (App. 13), nor is any sea-fight known. (iii) If one reads through Teles περὶ φιλγῆς, one sees that he begins by talking of Homer's Phoinix, then of Themistokles, then says there are no such men now, then begins on contemporaries ἴνα μὴ τὰ παλαιὰ σοι λέγω ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς, where he contrasts 'present day' with παλαιά, Homer and the fifth century. Obviously on this we cannot say that καθ' ἡμᾶς must refer to 242/1, and that 246 is too far away. (iv) As to 'Adaeus'. The MS. readings in Trog. *Prol.* 27 appear to vary between 'Ut Ptolemaeus eum denuo captum interfecerit' and 'adeum denuo'. 'Denuo' may be part of the corruption, as Müller thought: or it may not. But to supply the lost name, and then build theories on 'Adaeum denuo', is hardly a process that calls for refutation: and the general acceptance of the conjecture 'Adaeum' makes it no better. And even if the conjecture be right, nothing is known about the man or the circumstances. (v) Trogus 27 deals with Asiatic affairs, and these (as Ferguson says) are in book 26 taken down to 247/6; it is at this point that book 27 begins, and therefore Andros can come any time *after* that date.

*B. M. Coins, Seleukid Kings*, p. 29, nos. 2-4, Pl. XXVIII, nos. 2 and 3; *B. M. Guide*, Pl. XLII, 17; Head<sup>2</sup>, p. 335). But whether struck in Aetolia or not, the legend shows that it was at any rate no part of his regular coinage for Macedonia.

<sup>5</sup> On some of the objections to my view see my note in *J. H. S.* 1910, 223. I have borne them all in mind in constructing the text of this book, and I hope my narrative is self-explanatory.

On the other hand, as I have already pointed out (*J. H. S.* 1910, 223), Ferguson's view imports (a) that Antigonos delayed to fight the crucial battle till he had lost Corinth and the best section of his fleet; (b) that, though Andros broke the Egyptian sea-power, Antigonos did not mark the fact by any offering at Delos, a most astonishing thing when we remember all that he did on Delos; (c) that Antigonos, being by the way ἄνθρωπος, appeared at Delos in 246, in the absence of Ptolemy and his fleet, and set up a festival called Soteria, the feast of deliverance, in honour of the θεοὶ σωτῆρες, to celebrate the fact that he . . . had walked in at an open door and might be expelled as soon as the owner returned.<sup>6</sup> This is why I cannot accept it.

Of course the weak point of my view is that Trogius mentions Andros and not Kos.<sup>7</sup> But I cannot set Trogius up against the fact that a tetradrachm was struck to commemorate Kos, and nothing, or copper only, for Andros; the tetradrachm and the dedicated ship together conclusively mark Kos as *the* battle. It may, I admit, be an open question which battle preceded the other. If they belong to one campaign, Andros ought to come first on geographical grounds; if to two (as is now possible, supposing it be correct to use Homolle's dates for the Delian archons; see App. 11), we cannot say. If any one, noting that in Akridion, Boulon, and Menethales the Soteria vases are listed before those of the Paneia, likes to help out Trogius' prologues by putting Kos first, and supposing that the flagship, though vowed, was not laid up till peace came, I have no objection; but Kos would still remain *the* battle. Trogius' prologues are not worth helping out, in any case. For instance, in 25 he gives Antigonos' war with Apollodoros and omits the vital point, that he became king of Macedonia; and in 26 he manages to notice two events in the Chremonidean war and to omit the vital one, the capture of Athens. Save for the flagship incident, both battles are mere names; and if we are going to make Andros *the* battle, on the faith of Trogius, and put Kos in the fifties, then the text of Athenaios must be emended so as to make the flagship dedicated after Andros and not after Kos. I am not prepared to do this.

<sup>6</sup> It would not help matters to refer the Soteria to the taking of Corinth (unlikely, as there was no fighting), according to König's suggestion, p. 97; for the original difficulty would remain. Antigonos could not set up Soteria on what was practically Ptolemy's island (see App. 4).

<sup>7</sup> Emphasized by König, p. 96, as well as by Ferguson. One could of course conjecture many reasons. If I may suggest a modern parallel, it is tolerably certain that the future naval historian of the Russo-Japanese war will consider the battle of August 10 as much more important than that of the Sea of Japan; but the official Japanese celebrations followed the latter victory.

When all is said, the main point is this. A festival called Soteria, in the circumstances, marked an *end*. The laying up of the flagship marked an *end*. We cannot postulate *two* ends to the struggle, which must have terminated in a treaty of cession, as I have shown; therefore both refer to the same event. Again, the dedication to Apollo of the ship vowed to him must be connected with the dedication of a vase foundation to Apollo and the gods of Delos as the 'Saviour gods'; therefore, again, both refer to the same event. As one refers to Kos, so must the other; and that dates the main battle.

## APPENDIX XIII

### THE MACEDONIAN PROTECTORATE OF THE CYCLADES

THE evidence for this protectorate, in the years between 245 and the death of Doson, requires marshalling; for much material has accumulated since J. Delamarre's important paper was written ('L'Influence macédonienne dans les Cyclades au III<sup>e</sup> siècle av. J.-C.', *R. Ph.* 1902, p. 301), while some writers even doubt the fact of such protectorate at all (e.g. Werner König, *Der Bund der Nesioten*, 1910, pt. 1, ch. 3). One must treat the period as a whole, for much of the evidence can refer either to Gonatas or Doson, we cannot say which. Very early in the reign of Philip V, the Macedonian rule decayed, and an interregnum followed; see Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 94 seq.

There are three distinct questions. A. Do we find Macedonian influence in any and what Islands? B. Did the League of the Islanders still exist after 245 under Macedonian suzerainty? C. Did either Gonatas, or Demetrios II, or Doson, extend his power *beyond* the Islands of the League?

A. I give the inscriptions, beginning with five of Delamarre's.

1. No. 1 in Delamarre, from Minoa in Amorgos, = *I. G.* xii, 7, 223, is a decree of *προξενία* in honour of Sostratos, who stood in some relation (lost) to an Antigonos.

2. No. 2 in Delamarre, from Minoa, = *I. G.* xii, 7, 222 = Michel 381, is a decree in honour of Kottas of Demetrias. Naxos is in direct relations with a King Antigonos and sends an embassy to him.

3. No. 3 in Delamarre, from Minoa, = *I. G.* xii, 7, 221 = Michel

382. A decree in honour of Diokleidas, sent by a King Antigonos with letters to Minoa (apparently on the initiative of the king and not of the city); he made a speech to the citizens exhorting them to compose some internal dissensions.

4. No. 4 in Delamarre, from Arkesine. A fragment relating to a commission sent to compose internal troubles in the town. The only place-name remaining shows that one commissioner was from Akanthos in Chalkidike, and therefore a Macedonian.

5. No. 5 in Delamarre, from Syros. (Incomplete in Delamarre; edited later by Dürrbach, *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 116.) Decree in honour of Eumedes, sent by King Antigonos to compose troubles which had arisen between debtors and creditors. Eumedes allayed the trouble, in most cases by conciliation of the parties, but in certain cases by formally acting as arbitrator—*τὰς ἐπικρίσεις ποιησάμενος*—(he is called *ἐπικριτὴς τῶν συμβολαίων*). He must have had judicial powers; and he had therefore what is implied ultimately in all judicial powers, force behind him to enforce his award. That force was Antigonos; and it again appears that the initiative came from Antigonos and not from the city; also that this was by no means the first benefit that Syros had received from the king.

6. Inscription of Poiessa,<sup>1</sup> *I. G.* xii, v, ii, 570 (being an amended form of *I. G.* xii, v, 1, 570, as given by P. Graindor in *Musée Belge*, xi, 1907, p. 104, no. 5), which shows a King Demetrios ordering that certain Poiessians are to pay their taxes (to the city). The lettering is said to make Demetrios I out of the question; it is therefore Demetrios II; and he acts as protector of the city.<sup>2</sup>

7. With 6 may be coupled *I. G.* xii, 5, 1, 571 (iii), a decree of Poiessa conferring *προξενία* on one Pausanias, a Macedonian.

8. The documents concerning Admetos son of Bokros, of Thessalonike, which show a close connexion between Thessalonike and Delos, viz. (i) two decrees of the boule and demos of Delos, moved by Boulon son of Tynnion who was archon in 234, and dated about 240—

<sup>1</sup> The inscriptions give Poiessa, Poessa, Poiassa, but never the literary form Poieessa; Graindor, *B. C. H.* (1906), 30, p. 448.

<sup>2</sup> H. von Gaertringen, in *I. G.* xii, 5, 1, 570, doubts Graindor's explanation, saying 'monuit Wilamowitz non curavisse reges intestinas Graecarum urbium res'. Without discussing how far this is generally true, it will not apply to the Islands in the third century. See nos. 3 and 5 above; and see (a better case) the decree of Naxos in honour of the people of Kos (Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1894, p. 400 = *O. G. I.* 43), which shows Ptolemy II issuing instructions for a judicial commission to settle internal differences in Naxos, at a time when Naxos was indisputably an autonomous member of the League.



230, providing that Admetos, the Delian proxenos, is to be honoured with a wreath and two statues of bronze, to be set up one in the temple at Delos by the altar of Zeus Polieus, and one in Thessalonike; Michel 389 = Dürrbach in *B. C. H.* 10 (1886), 125 seq.

(ii) A letter of the Thessalonikans (*ἡ πόλις Θεσσαλονικέων*) to the Delians in reply, and a decree of the boule of Thessalonike praising the people of Delos for the honours conferred on Admetos and granting a *τόπος* for the statue; *B. C. H.* 10, 125 seq. = Michel 322.

(iii) The dedication on the base of the statue of Admetos at Delos; *B. C. H.* 10, 130.

9. Decree of the boule and demos of Delos in honour of Aristoboulos son of Athenaios of Thessalonike, proxenos of the Delians, who was sent to Delos as *σιτώνης*<sup>3</sup> by King Demetrios II, and remained there a good while; his behaviour was worthy of the temple and the king and the people of Delos, and he did everything he could to further the interests of the temple and the king and the people of Delos (P. Roussel and J. Hatzfeld, *B. C. H.* 1910 (34), p. 367, no. 15, and see the commentary). The way in which the interests of the king are treated as identical with those both of the temple and the people of Delos is of the first importance.

10. With 9 may be compared the *σιτώναι* sent by Histiaia to Delos, apparently when the former was under Doson; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 245; see *B. C. H.* 1910, pp. 369, 370.

11. Further with reference to the position of Demetrios II may be cited the Delian decree in honour of Autokles son of Ainesidemos of Chalkis, a friend of King Demetrios. It appears to admit of no doubt whatever that he is Demetrios II. See Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1903, p. 209 (on the inscription as published *B. C. H.* 13, p. 232, no. 2); P. Roussel, *B. C. H.* 31, 1907, pp. 362, 363; cf. *B. C. H.* 1910, p. 369.

12. Doson's inscription, set up on Delos, commemorative of the battle of Sellasia; Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 94.

13. *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 1008. A fragment from Ios, some time later than 280-270, mentioning *βασ[ιλέ]α*, and *Ἀν[τιγόνω]* in a place where Graindor thought the king's name should be.

14. *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 1069-70. A very tantalizing third-century fragment from Ios, mentioning *Κασσανδ-* (perhaps *Κασσανδρεύς*), *Νησιώταις*, and a king's name, probably (from the city name) an Antigonid.

15. The accession foundations at Delos of Demetrios II and Philip V

<sup>3</sup> On *σιτώναι* in general see H. Francotte, *Mélanges Nicole*, 1905, pp. 145-51; on those at Athens, Ferguson, *Athens*, p. 98, n. 1.

(see ch. 13, note 65; Doson, as *ἐπίτροπος*, of course does not make one).

On the foregoing, there can be no doubt that the Antigonids controlled anyhow *certain* islands, including Delos, during 245-220.

**B. The League.** Either the League did not exist, Macedonia controlling certain islands as units; or it existed and was controlled by Macedonia. It is not conceivable that it still existed under Egyptian suzerainty, while some of its members were submitting to the Antigonid as arbitrator, &c., though König (*l. c.*, p. 33) thinks it is (if I have not misunderstood him). Try and imagine a protected native state in India submitting an internal question to some power other than ourselves.

The prevalent view, for the latest expression of which see Hiller von Gaertringen, *I. G.* xii, 5 (ii), test. 1324, is against the continued existence of the League. Looking, however, at the history both of Gonatas and the League, it would be very strange if he had dissolved it; and it can, I believe, be shown that the League continued to exist after 245 under Macedonian suzerainty.

The League dedicated on Delos a statue of the Rhodian Agathostratos, the conqueror of Chremonides, of which Phyles of Halikarnassos was the sculptor; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 224. This dedication was obviously not made at a time when the League was under Egyptian suzerainty, and is therefore later than 245. The question is how much later. It was once even sought to place it in the second century, in the time of the Rhodian hegemony. Then came a brilliant paper by A. Wilhelm (*Jahresh.* 8, 1905, p. 1), which by combining the supposed Delian decree for Agathostratos (*B. C. H.* 1904, p. 136, no. 32) with much other matter proved that Agathostratos' statue was set up during the Macedonian protectorate, about or soon after the middle of the third century, and consequently that the League then existed. But recently a fresh examination of the stone has shown that the Delian decree in question is not for Agathostratos at all; the name is Φιλόδαμος ΟΛ (or ΘΑ) . . . ον Πόδιος (P. Roussel, *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 443). Roussel, however, on palaeographical grounds, places the dedication of Agathostratos' statue, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 224, somewhere near 250, and says that the dedication found at Lindos, which mentions Agathostratos as trierarch, is also middle of the third century (Kinch, *Explor. arch. de Rhodes*, 3<sup>e</sup> rapport, p. 48 seq.). Wilhelm, *l. c.*, also showed from other evidence that the sculptor Phyles was third century. Consequently there is a strong probability, almost a certainty, that Agathostratos' statue was, as we should expect, set up soon after the sea changed masters in 245, i.e. that the League continued to exist.

Confirmation of this appears to exist in the decree of Syros, no. 5 in this Appendix. The order at the end of this decree is ἀναγράφαι δὲ τὸ ψή[φισ]μα καὶ ἀναθεῖναι εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀ[π]όλλωνος ἐν Δήλῳ. Syros, that is to say, has a right to set up her decree in the temenos; otherwise the order would provide for a request for a τόπος. A community not in the League had to ask the Delians for a τόπος in which to set up its decree; the distinction is critical (see the evidence given in Appendix 4, p. 430). Syros, then, and Delos must have been in some close relation; and, as the League set up its decrees at Delos as of right, the natural inference is that the League still existed, and that Delos and Syros were both members.

As against the view that the League still subsisted, the chief point that can be taken is that we have no decrees of the League of this period. The possibility that some Cyclades, Siphnos and perhaps Keos, were still Egyptian (Beloch 3, 2, 282; cf. Holleaux, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 107) no longer exists; of the decrees in question, that of Karthaia in honour of Philotheros (now enlarged, *I. G.* xii, 5, 2, 1066; see P. Graindor in *Musée Belge*, 1907, p. 98) belongs to the time of Philokles; and as to that of Siphnos for Perigenes (*O. G. I.* 730 = *I. G.* xii, 5, 1, 481; see Holleaux in *B. C. H.* 1905, p. 319, and a facsimile in *I. G.* xii, 5, ii, *add. et corr.* s. v. 'Siphnos'), if Holleaux is right (in which case may it have been recut?), it belongs to Philadelphos' time; if H. v. Gaertringen in the *Corpus* is right, Siphnos again became friendly to Egypt in the general break-up that followed the death of Doson. It does not affect the period I am considering.

As to decrees of the League. There is nothing in this. We have, it is true, none that can be dated to 245-220; but then we have none that can be dated to the latter part of the reign of Ptolemy II; and of the nineteen decrees known to me,<sup>4</sup> only three can be dated accurately, and eight cannot be dated at all. The following list is approximately complete. Three dated accurately, viz. one *circ.* 306, *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 93, no. 1 = *ib.* 1907, p. 208; one in 280, *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 202; and one between 280 and 274, *B. C. H.* 1907, p. 340, no. 3, amplifying *O. G. I.* 67. Two of the Rhodian epoch in the second century: *I. G.* xii, 5, ii, 817 and 824. Three *somewhere* in the reign of Ptolemy II: *I. G.* xii,

<sup>4</sup> Two fragments formerly reckoned as decrees of the League (*B. C. H.* 28, 1904, p. 112, nos. 4 and 5) must now be omitted; see P. Roussel in *B. C. H.* 1911, p. 441, n. 3. But I cannot follow Roussel (*ib.*, p. 450 seq.) in making *I. G.* xii, 7, 509, the decree of the Nesiotes from Herakleia, a decree, not of the League, but of Herakleia itself. Very clear evidence would be required, I think, before the κοινὸν τῶν νησιωτῶν of the decree could be interpreted as the κοινὸν of the Herakleots, as is done by him.

7, 13; *O. G. I.* 40, which is continued by *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 109, no. 2 (see *B. C. H.* 1907, 369); and *B. C. H.* 35, 1911, p. 449. Three probably in the same reign: *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 93 seq., no. 7; *B. C. H.* 1906, p. 665, no. 1; and *B. C. H.* 4, 323, no. 2. Against these eleven there are eight that cannot be dated at all: *C. I. G.* 2272; *B. C. H.* 4, 324, no. 3; *Syll.*<sup>2</sup> 471; *B. C. H.* 1904, p. 93 seq., nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 (with 6 a; but see Graindor, *Mélanges Kurth*, p. 8); *B. C. H.* 1906, p. 99, no. 19; *ib.* p. 666, no. 2; *I. G.* xii, 7, 509.

The conclusion is that Antigonos Gonatas in 245 continued the League. It may have lasted till the general break-up at the beginning of Philip's reign.

**C.** Did the Macedonian protectorate then extend further than the Cyclades?

Demetrios II made a treaty with Gortyna and her allies (Inscription of Gortyna, *Amer. Journ. Arch.*, ser. ii, vol. i, 1897, p. 188, no. 17); and Doson had treaties of alliance with both Eleuthernai and Hierapytna (*B. C. H.* xiii, p. 47, nos. 1 and 2 = nos. 7 and 8 in Delamarre's article above cited; that they belong to Doson seems clear from the formula *Ἀντίγονον καὶ Μακεδόνας*; see *J. H. S.* 1909, p. 268, § c). These, however, are alliances only, and while they point to a steady extension of influence by Gonatas' successors, they do not bear on the question of control, or on what Gonatas obtained in 245.

There is a statement in *Athen.* 9, 400 d, that in the reign of Antigonos Gonatas there was a plague of hares in Astypalaia. If the island had been Egyptian, as generally supposed from *I. G.* xii, 3, 204 (the base of a statue of Ptolemy III), Hegesandros would surely have said that the plague was in the reign of Ptolemy so and so. It looks as if Astypalaia at some time became Macedonian for a while and then Egyptian again; but the matter is quite uncertain.

There remains only the inscription of Kos (no. 6 in Delamarre, *l. c.* = Paton and Hicks, xxxii = *B. M. Inscr.* 247 = *G. D. I.* 3611). It is a decree of honours to a Kalymnian for finding money when Kos had to do something (lacuna) for King Antigonos; and the word *στρατιωτῶν* appears. Delamarre's completion was as follows: l. 10, *χρήματα ἔς τε τὸν ψαφι[σθέντα στόλον τῷ βασιλεῖ Ἀντιγόνῳ καὶ ἔς τὰν [ἔκπεμψιν τῶν] στρατιωτῶν*. This, if correct, would seem to make the king suzerain or master of Kos, an equal alliance being out of the question here. Beloch (3, 2, 463) took the same view. But Holleaux (*B. C. H.* 1907, p. 106, n. 3) was not convinced; and now we have an alternative conjecture by Niese (communicated to König, *op. c.*, p. 34, n. 1), *ἔς τε τὸν ψαφι[σθέντα στέφανον . . .] . . καὶ ἔς τὰν [ἐστίασιν τῶν] στρατιωτῶν*. But, even so, there



seems to be no getting away from the fact that Kos did *something* for Doson's troops, and therefore was under his influence, at any rate. The inscription must be of Doson's time, for the reason which Delamarre gives; consequently we must suppose that Doson obtained some influence of some kind over Kos. I do not see how to connect it with Gonatas and the battle of Kos; it is too remote from everything else that we know about Gonatas.


The conclusion then is, that as far as can be seen at present, Gonatas in 245 got nothing beyond Delos and the Islands of the League.

# GENEALOGICAL TABLES

## A. HOUSE OF ANTIPATROS



Antipatros the Regent—(continued)



## B. HOUSE OF ANTIGONOS

Antigonos the One-eyed

Demetrios I, the Besieger

*m.* (1) Phila

(2) Eurydike, an Athenian

(3) Deidameia

(4) Laonasa

(5) Ptolemais

(by Phila)

Antigonos Gonatas

*m.* Phila II(by Demo,  
an hetaira)

Halkyonens

Demetrios II

*m.* (1) Stratonike II

(2) Phthia

(3) Chryseis, a Thessalian

(by Chryseis  
Philip V)

by Seleukos I

Phila II

Seleukos

Antiochos II

Apame

Stratonike II

Antigonos Doson

Stratonike

*m.* (1) Seleukos I  
(2) Antiochos I, son  
of Seleukos I

(by Antiochos I)

Demetrios the Fair


*m.* Olympias,  
a Thessalian

(by Ptolemais)



## C. FAMILY OF BERENIKE

?



## ADDENDA

Ch. v, note 21. It is conceivable that the blunder in Eusebios arose from a misplacement of some such statement as that of Apollodoros, (Λακῶνων κρατήσας, (in Philodemos *περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν*, col. v of the Herculanean papyrus no. 399, given by A. Mayer, *Philol.* 71, 1912, pp. 226, 231), referring really to the victory of Antigonos' allies the Aetolians over Areus; always supposing that Mayer's readings are right.

Ch. v, note 42. The statement of Apollodoros, in col. v of the above papyrus, τῆς Μακε(δο)νίας ἐκπύπτει πά(λι), perhaps implies that Antigonos had actually occupied some part of Macedonia prior to his sea-fight with Keraunos. If so, this may increase the possibility that he attempted to get a footing there during his war with Antiochos; see ch. vi, pp. 161, 163.

Ch. vii, note 32. Add to this pantheon Zeirene, the Macedonian Aphrodite (Hesych.), and see generally Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-8.

Ch. vii, note 78. It is a possible deduction from the letter of Demetrios to Harpalos (App. 5, n. 6) that the towns of Macedonia proper (as Beroia) owned land of their own.

Ch. vii, note 97. It is possible that this paragraph requires modification in the light of Demetrios' letter to Harpalos; for the latter may have been epistates of Beroia.

Ch. ix, note 10. The date 274 for Arsinoe's marriage now receives strong support from the fact that in that year she made an offering on Delos (*I. G.* xi, 199 B, l. 70), which is, so far as is known, her first. Had there been any earlier one, it must have appeared in Sosimachos, 276 (*I. G.* xi, 164), which seems to have no material gaps in the offerings of the time of the Ptolemaic domination.

Ch. x, note 24. On the legal position generally, as regards tyrants, see H. Swoboda, *Klio*, 1912, pp. 343-5

Ch. xi, note 10. The Delian choragic inscriptions referred to in this note, with some others, are now collected, *I. G.* xi, 105 to 134. Of these thirty, which range from the year 284 to the end of Delian independence, fourteen give the usual formula, two have no formula, eleven are fragments or broken away, and *three* give εἰρήνη, the two referred to in my note (nos. 114 and 116), and another. The new example, no. 130, is dated in Demares' year, 179; this means that it was actually composed in 178, as these inscriptions mention the transfers made to the *succeeding* archon. At this time the three naval powers in the Aegean, Rome apart, were Pergamon, Rhodes, and Macedonia. In 179 Eumenes II concluded his four years' war in Asia with a peace (Polyb. 25, 2); Philip V died, putting an end to the fear of an immediate war with Rome; Perseus 'renewed friendship' with Rome and promulgated at Delos

his general amnesty (Polyb. 25, 3); and Rhodes, the enemy alike of Philip V and Antiochos III, and the friend of Eumenes in the late war (Polyb. 24, 15, 13), became the friend of both Perseus and Seleukos Philopator (Polyb. 25, 4, 8-10). No year was more fitted to be marked by a reference to 'peace': and none of the other inscriptions which can be dated, except these three, fall in a year which saw the making of any 'peace'.

Ch. xiii, note 21. The Delian decree for Sosibios of Alexandria, recently published by M. Holleaux (*Rev. Ét. Anc.* 1912, p. 370), may belong to this period, the beginning of the reign of Ptolemy III.

Ch. xiv, note 26. An article by Costanzi in Beloch's *Saggi di storia antica*, 1910, which I have been unable to see, puts this war later and connects it with the extinction of Pyrrhos' line.

App. ii, note 13. The new fragment of Apollodoros (*Philol.* 71, p. 226, see above) is important here, as against Ferguson's view. Apollodoros shows that Euthios' year was the first in which Antigonos could have been expected to act as an independent ruler. In that year, therefore, Antigonos received his father's message of abdication. This was not sent off till some little time after Demetrios' surrender (Plut. *Dem.* 50, 51), which took place in spring, 285, i.e. before July (ch. 4, n. 21). Therefore Euthios was probably archon in 285/4, where I have placed him; 286/5 is *possible*, but hardly Ferguson's 287/6.

App. v, note 6. This important inscription, of which I owe a copy to the kindness of Messrs. A. J. B. Wace and M. S. Thompson, will be published in the next number of the *Annual of the British School at Athens*. I was not able to utilize it in the text of ch. vii.—See also, on the beginning of Antigonos' reign, A. Mayer in *Philol.* 71, 1912, p. 228 seq.; he believes there was yet another tradition, which made Antigonos king of Macedonia from 279/8. But the Eusebian chronology seems to have known nothing of this; and, as an official starting-point, it seems open to the objection I have urged against 284/3.

App. xi, note 1. See the Introduction to *I. G.* xi (ii); part of p. 459 is now superfluous, but it could not be recast. The dating adopted by me is that of Prof. Dürrbach in *I. G.* xi.

# INDEX

Abaiokritos of Boeotia, 384.  
 Abantidas, tyrant of Sikyon, 279, 361, 362, 395 *n.*  
 Abdera, 168.  
 Academy, the, 27; patriotism of, *ib.*; under Arkesilaos, 332 *seq.*  
 Achaea, belongs to Demetrios, 51; military strength, 68 *n.*, cf. 384 *n.*; sends troops against the Gauls, 152.  
 Achaean League, beginnings of, 133, 268; sends envoys to Pyrrhos, 269; joins Peloponnesian League of 266, 293; captures a ship of Krateros', 300; Sikyon joins, 363; alliance with Alexander of Corinth, 364; alliance with Boeotia, 384; at peace with Antigonos from Alexander's death to 243, 395, 396; Corinth joins, 398; war with Antigonos and Aetolia, 400 *seq.*; alliance with Sparta and Egypt, 402; makes Ptolemy III generalissimo, 464; general peace, 403; limitations of the League considered, 406, 407.  
 Acheloos, 59, 60 *n.*  
 Acichorius, Gallic leader, 143, 149, 153; defeated by Aetolians, 155, 157, 158 *n.*  
 'Adaeus', 464.  
 Admetos, son of Bokros, 186 *n.*, 467, 468.  
 Adria, Athenian colony, 85, 220, (?) 368, 369 *n.*  
 Aetolia, figure of, at Delphi, 158.  
 Aetolian League, cantonal character of, 53; described, 61 *seq.*; first expansion of, 62, 63; did not include Delphi, 211; later expansion, 346, 385.  
 Aetolians, alliance with Pyrrhos, 48; occupy Delphi, 48, 49 *n.*; exclude Demetrios from Pythian games, 49; nationality of, 61; characteristics, *ib.*; policy of, prior to 279, 63, 64; military strength of, 64; Aetolian 'pirates' privateers, 87; offer Lysimachos their friendship, 111; join Pyrrhos and Antigonos, 119; defeat Areus, 133; garrison Herakleia, 150;

contingent at Thermopylai, 151; return home after sack of Kallion, 152; defeat Orestorius and Combutis, 152, see 154; face and defeat Acichorius, 154, 155, 157, 440; contingents at Delphi, 155, 156; Aetolian version of defence of Delphi, 440; recognized as saviours of Greece, 154 *n.*, 157; dedications at Delphi, 158; found Soteria at Delphi, *ib.*; federal coinage of, 158 *n.*; friendly to Sosthenes, 163; their hill-forts, 201; ambitions of, after 279, 208; growth of control of, over Delphi, 208, 210; create 'asylums', 209; archives of, at Thermos, 210; at Delphi also, *ib.*; alliance with Akarnania, 120 *n.*, 212; their 'sphere', 211; assume leadership of Amphiktyonic League, 211-15; control four Amphiktyonic votes, 213; relations, *circ.* 276, with Antigonos, 214; aid Pyrrhos in 272, 266, 287; shelter the Elean exiles, 287; obtain Antigonos' recognition of their 'sphere', 288; promise him neutrality, *ib.*; accentuate their neutrality, 347; partition Akarnania, 302; enlarged notion of their 'sphere', 303; further expansion, 346; control nine Amphiktyonic votes, 347; *entente* with Antigonos, *ib.*; beginnings of abuse of power, *ib.*; decree of safety for Delos, 354, 209 *n.*; further expansion, 382; new policy, *ib.*, 403; desire to incorporate Akarnania, 382; restrained by Antigonos, 383; defeat Boeotians at Chaironeia, 384; incorporate rest of Phokis and Lokris, 385; alliance with Antigonos, 400; project to partition Achaea, *ib.*; sack Pellene, 402; defeated by Aratos, 403; invade Lakonia, *ib.*; war with Demetrios II, 384, 403 *n.*, 405; supported by Egypt in, 464.  
 Agatharkos II (supposed Delian archon), 459.  
 Agathokles, son of Lysimachos, 16, 37; campaign against Demetrios, 99, 100; put to death, 124.



- Agathokles, tyrant of Syracuse, 47, 48, 139, 259 *n.*, 436.
- Agathostratos, son of Polyaratos, Rhodian admiral, defeats Chremónides, 378; tactics, 379 *n.*; statue at Delos, 389, 469.
- Agis, king of Sparta, aids Aratos, 402.
- Agrianes, 321, 426.
- Alakides, king of Epeiros, 7, 64, 65.
- Aigai (Edessa), name discussed, 178 *n.*; Pyrrhos at, 264, cf. 237 *n.*
- Aigiale, 87.
- Aigion, 205.
- Aigosthena, 65 *n.*, 299.
- Ainianes, League of the, 52; joins Brennus, 148, 153; Amphiktyonic votes of, 213 *n.*; joins Aetolian League, 346.
- Aiolos, 38 *n.*
- Aischron, son of Proxenos, 49, 303 *n.*, 420.
- Akanthos, 467.
- Akarnania, ceded to Pyrrhos, 58; military strength, 427; freed by Lysimachos, 120; alliance with Aetolia, 120 *n.*, 212; partitioned by Aetolia and Alexander of Epeiros, 302; Alexander's rule in, 319; seeks help from Rome, 382, 383; its League, 52, 54 *n.*, 58 *n.*; archives of, at Aktion, 210 *n.*
- Akraiphia, 210 *n.*
- Akrokorinthos, 298; Antigonos regains, 373; taken by Aratos, 397.
- Akrotatos, father of Areus I, 304 *n.*
- Akrotatos, king of Sparta, at Pyrrhos' siege, 271; accession, 302; defeat and death, 304.
- Alabanda, *ἄστυς*, 209 *n.*
- Alalkomenai, 209 *n.*
- Alexander the Aetolian, poet, 229, 240.
- Alexander, Macedonian pretender, 167.
- Alexander the Great, 5, 139, 183, 185, 285; his conception of his 'sphere', 198, 278; Amphiktyonic votes of, 212, 213.
- Alexander IV, 5, 7.
- Alexander, son of Kassandros, 13, 16.
- Alexander, son of Krateros II, revolts from Antigonos, 355; king of Euboea and Corinth, *ib.*; war against Antigonos, Athens and Argos, 356; friend of Nikokles, 362, 355 *n.*; alliance with Achaeans, 364; compels Athens and Argos to make peace, 364; death, 370.
- Alexander, king of Epeiros, son of Pyrrhos, succeeds his father, 287; keeps Epeiros together, *ib.*; partitions Akarnania, 302; attacks Antigonos, 302, 303, cf. 451; defeat and exile, 304; rules in Akarnania, 319; restored to Epeiros, *ib.*
- Alexandria, 8; intellectual position of, 223; Delphic decree for citizens of, 347.
- Alexarchos, brother of Kassandros, 91, 185.
- Aleximachos, Phokian general, 155 *n.*, 156, 157.
- Allaria, 87.
- Ambrakia, ceded to Pyrrhos, 58; his capital, 60; military strength, 427.
- Ameinias of Phokis, arch-pirate, takes Kassandreia for Antigonos, 86, 172; enters his service, 272 *n.*; saves Sparta, 271.
- Amoibeus, singer, 373.
- Amorgos, 76 *n.*, 78, 87, 466, 467.
- Amorgos, battle of, 72, 74, 454.
- Amphiktyonic League, 157, 158; Aetolia assumes leadership of, 211, cf. 286; its decrees, 211; secretary Aetolian, 212; fiction of independence of, 289 *n.*
- Amphiktyonic votes, position of, in 277, 212-13; see 267, 289, 290, 294, 298, 346-7.
- Amphilochia, 58.
- Amhipolis, 196, 197.
- Amphissa, 155.
- Anatolian layer in Macedonia, 176 seq.
- Anaxikrates, Athenian archon, 416.
- Andronikos of Kyrrhos, architect, 228 *n.*
- Andros, 77, 220 *n.*, 369 *n.*, 437.
- Andros, battle of, 378; date discussed, 461, 464, 465.
- Anektos, Delian archon, 459.
- Antagoras of Rhodes, epic poet, 24, 201 *n.*; at Pella, 229; attacks Arkesilaos, 333.
- Antiates, piracy of, 48.
- Antigone, wife of Pyrrhos, 20, 47, 134 *n.*
- Antigoneia, festival.
1. Of the Islanders, in honour of Antigonos I, 79, 108, 433-5.
  2. at Delos, founded in 253 by Antigonos Gonatas, 351; reasons

for foundation of, 352, 353, 462, 463.

3. at Delos, see *Soteria*.

4. at Delos, see *Paneaia*.

5. of the Achaeans, in honour of Antigonos Doson, 435.

Antigoneia, town.

1. On the Orontes, 8.

2. In Atintania, on the Aaos, 197, 264 *n.*, 312.

3. In Chalkidike, 197.

4. In Paionia, on the Axios, 197, 321.

Antigonis, Athenian tribe, 421.

*antigonis*, wine-cup, 248 *n.*

Antigonos I, Monophthalmos, birth, 5; satrap of Phrygia, 6; flies to Antipatros, *ib.*; war with Eumenes, *ib.*; ambition, 7; first coalition against, *ib.*; aims at sea-power, 72, 73, 77; his proclamation, 73, 77; founds the League of the Islanders, 77, 433 *seq.*; builds Antigoneia, 8; king, 9; invades Egypt, *ib.*; commands the sea after 306, 80, 81; worshipped by the Islanders, see *Antigoneia* (1); joint altar of, on Delos with Demetrios, 434; relations with Hieronymos of Kardia, 244; second coalition against, 10; killed at Ipsos, *ib.*

Antigonos Gonatas, interest of his reign, 4; birth, 6, 15; meaning of Gonatas, 15 *n.*; loyalty to Demetrios, 18, 110; not at Ipsos, 19; governs for Demetrios in Greece, 20, 37, 92; his teachers, 21 *seq.*; friendship with Menedemos, 25 *seq.*; friendship with Zeno, 34 *seq.*; defeats the Boeotians (292), 40; at siege of Thebes, 41; left in Greece in 287 as governor, 99, 101; loses Thessaly to Pyrrhos, 102; Athens makes war upon, 103; loses Eleusis, *ib.*; retains Piraeus, 104; return of part of the fleet to, 106, 114; offers himself hostage for Demetrios, 110; length of his reign discussed, 112 *n.*, 434 *n.*; his unsatisfactory position in 285, 112-14; taxation of Greece, 113; discontent in Greece, 114; his opinion of Pyrrhos, 115 *n.*, 259, *cf.* 250; the 'secret treaty' with Pyrrhos, 115, *cf.* 208; aids Pyrrhos against Lysimachos, 116; loses Piraeus and Elateia, 118; Aetolia joins him and Pyrrhos, 119; fear of Lysimachos, 119; be-

sieges Piraeus, 121, 124; alleged conquest of Sparta, a misunderstanding, 121 *n.*; brings home Demetrios' ashes, 122, 126; captures Piraeus, 126; end of war with Athens, 126, 127; lends transports to Pyrrhos, 129; defeated at sea by Keraunos, 131; alleged naval victory of Ptolemy II over, explained, 131 *n.*; Greece revolts against, 132; loses most of Greece, 132, 133; lowest ebb of fortune, 137; sends troops to Thermopylai, 150; and probably ships, *ib.*; holds Corinth strongly, 151; war with Antiochos I, 160-4; sails to Asia Minor, 161; aided by Nikomedes and the Northern League, 162, 163; loses Troizen to Sparta, 163; fails (?) to get a footing in Macedonia, *ib.*; operations in Thrace, 164; victory over Gauls at Lysimacheia, 165; consequences of this victory, 166; dedications at Athens, *ib.*; becomes king of the Macedonians, *ib.*; his royal style, 390, 54 *n.*, 168 *n.*; no hereditary claim, 167; title legally derived from Macedonian army, 168, 189, *cf.* 253; how his regnal years reckoned, 434 *n.*; makes peace with Antiochos, 168; renounces Thrace, *ib.*; enrolls Gauls, 169 *seq.*; disposes of Antipatros Etesias, 168-70; enlists pirates, 172; Ameinias takes Kassandreia for, *ib.*; recovers Thessaly, 172; marries Phila, 173, 226; bids his friends, 174, 225 (see *ch. viii passim*); sits for portrait of Pan, 174, *cf.* 250 *n.*; first set of tetradrachms, 174, 463; weaknesses in position of, 185-8; finances, 187; mints, 197; system of government, 194 *seq.*; the strategos, 195; the epistates, *ib.*; the name-cities, 197, and see 312, 321; makes Pella his capital, 199, 200; defence of the northern frontier, 200-2; his conception of his 'sphere', 198, 202 *seq.*, 205, 277; a Macedonian king, 203; reverses Demetrios' policy in Greece, *ib.*; relations *circ.* 276 with Greece generally, 204 *seq.*; head of Thessalian League, 206; relations *circ.* 276 with Thessaly, 207; with northern Greece, *ib.*; with Aetolia, 212-15; controls seven Amphiktyonic votes, 212; but never uses them, 213, 214; recog-

Antigonos Gonatas—*continued*.

nizes Aetolia's 'sphere', 214; relations *circ.* 276 with Peloponnese, 215; with Egypt, 217; with Athens, 217-19; position of, as to Athenian corn supply, 219-21; importance of Athens to, 205, 223; importance of Corinth to, see *Corinth*; his circle, 224 seq.; interest in poetry, 225 *n.*; commissions Aratos of Soloi to write, 227; invites Zeno to Pella, 230; receives Persaios, 232; close relations with Bion, 235; Bion upon, 236, 237; knows Timon, 240; interest in history, 243, 244, 246; friendship for Hieronymos, 246; letters to Hieronymos, *ib.*, 412; character, 247-53; banquets, 248; portrait, 249; hatred of shams, 250, 251; never worshipped, 250, 435. *cf.* 390; his sayings generally, 251 *n.*; sense of duty, 252; his kingship, 253; its philosophic basis, 254-6; 'kingship is service,' 256; refuses aid to Pyrrhos, 259; supposed friendship with Ptolemy II discussed, 443, 444; defeated by Pyrrhos, 264; loses upper Macedonia, *ib.*; defeated by Ptolemaios, 265; dates, 260 *n.*; loses Athens and Euboea, 267, 268; recovers Macedonia, 267; and his elephants, 286 *n.*; saves Sparta, 271, 272, *cf.* 448; outgenerals Pyrrhos at Argos, 272, 273, *cf.* 449; weeps for Pyrrhos' death, 274; burns his body, *ib.*; policy toward Greece after Pyrrhos' death, 275-7; his system of tyrants in the Peloponnese, 278-80; actual tyrants known, 279, 280; accusations against him exaggerated, 281; the system considered, 281-5; system due to expediency, not philosophy, 285, 286; regains his suzerainty over Athens, 290, *cf.* 293; formation of coalition against, 293-6; siege of Athens, 298 seq. (and see *Chremonidean war*); defeats mutinous Gauls at Megara, 300; defeats Areus at battle of Corinth, 301; his set of drachms, 301 *n.*; defeat of Alexander of Epeiros, 303, 304; takes Athens, 305, 306; date, 306 *n.*; measures at Athens, 306-8; strikes tetradrachms at Athens, 308; his saying on Zeno's death, 310, 236 *n.*; measures with Epeiros, 311; re-

covers Parauaia, Tymphaia, and Atintania, 312; peace (of 261), 315, 316; war (of 259), 317; whether co-operating with Antiochos II, *ib.*; executes Philochoros, 320; recovers Paionia, *ib.*, 321, *cf.* 365; sends Demetrios the Fair to Cyrene, 322 seq.; peace (of 255), 325, see 462, 463; his strong position after the peace, 325, 326; joint guardian of Nikomedes' children, 326; withdraws garrison from Mouseion, 327, *cf.* 462; relations after 255 with Athens, 336; with the philosophic schools, 331 seq.; with Lykon, 332, 335, 336; with Hieronymos of Rhodes, 335, 336; with Arkesilaos, 334; Asoka's mission to, 337 seq.; considers reconquest of the Aegean, 340; creates a new navy, 342-6; its probable strength, 344, 455-8; his flagship, 345, 379, 388; *entente* after 255 with Aetolia, 346, 347; alliance with Antiochos II, 348; puts to sea, 349; founds Antigoneia and Stratonikeia at Delos, 351, 352, 462, 463; this action a challenge to Ptolemy by Demetrios' heir, 352, 353; causes panic in the Aegean, 353, 354; foiled by Ptolemy's diplomacy, 355 seq.; Alexander, son of Krateros revolts against, 355; fleet paralysed, 356; Antiochos II deserts, *ib.*, 357, *cf.* 369; influence in Arkadia lost, 358, 359; Aratos of Sikyon asks help of, 362; sends Aratos a present, 363; war with Alexander of Corinth, 356, 364; (?) active in the north, 365; desire of, for Corinth, 371; the Nikaia episode, 372; regains Corinth, 373; does not restore the vice-royalty, 374; seeks to win Aratos, *ib.*; alliance with Rhodes, 377; defeats Egypt at Andros, 378; and at Kos, *ib.*; dates discussed, 461 seq.; legends of these battles, 379; sails to Delos, 379; founds the Paneia and the Soteria, 381; receives Sostrotos, 386, 387; the peace with Egypt, 387; takes Delos and the Cyclades, *ib.*, 472; dedicates his flagship to Apollo, 388, *cf.* 462, 465, 466; second series of tetradrachms, 389, 463; continues and controls the League of the Islanders, 387, 388, 466-72; his monuments on Delos,

- 390; outlives all his contemporaries, 393; called 'the Old Man', *ib.*; character in his last years, *ib.*; Polybios on, 394, 400; relations with Peloponnese in 243, 395; loses Corinth, 396 *seq.*; and other towns, 400; alliance with Aetolia, *ib.*; project of partitioning Achaea, *ib.*; the position considered, 400, 401; war with Achaeans League, 400 *seq.*; at sea in 241 (?), 402; not joint king with Demetrios II, 433-5; general peace, 403; reason of his inactivity in the late war, 405; collapse of his Peloponnesian system, 406; general considerations on his reign, 408; death, 409; character of sources for reign, 410-14, *cf.* 278.
- Antigonos Doson, royal style, 54 *n.*; conquest of Sparta, 121 *n.*; at Mantinea, 145; Illyrian war, 201 *n.*; his Sellasia inscription on Delos, 391, 432, 468; strength at Sellasia, 425; worship of, see *Antigoneia* (5); policy in Greece, 408; strikes Gonatas' silver, 463; controls the League of the Islanders, 466-71; and extends his influence in the Aegean, 471, 472.
- Antigonos, son of Epigonos, 436.
- Antigonos of Karystos, biographer, 224, 412.
- Antigonos, Ptolemaic general, 443.
- Antioch in Macedonia, 160.
- Antiochos I, Soter, 122; marriage with Stratonike I, 349; troubles on Seleukos' death, 130; sends troops to Thermopylai, 150; lays claim to Macedonia, 160; cultivates Aetolia, Athens, and Sparta, *ib.*; war with Antigonos, Nikomedes, and Northern League, 160-4; alliance with Apollodoros and Sparta, 162; difficulties of, *ib.*; peace with Antigonos, 168; renounces crown of Macedonia, *ib.*; betroths Phila II to Antigonos, *ib.*; blackmailed by the Galatians, 202; refuses aid to Pyrrhos, 259, 443; alliance with Magas, 261; war with Egypt (first Syrian), 261, 263, 264; war with Eumenes I, 314; relations with Bindusâra, 337; death, 315.
- Antiochos II, Theos, accession, 315; second Syrian war, 317, 324; aids Ptolemaios to revolt, 318; recovers Miletos and Ionia, 318, 319; deified, 318; conquers Pamphylia, part of Kilikia, and Samothrake, 324; peace of 255, 325; invites Lykon, 335; alliance with Antigonos, 348; prepares for war, *ib.*; deserts Antigonos for Ptolemy, 356, *cf.* 369; repudiates Laodike and marries Berenike, 357; death, 375.
- Antiochos III, employs pirates, 87; military strength, 427.
- Antipatros, the Regent, 5, 6; misfortune of his house, 15; character, 16; as historian, 243.
- Antipatros, son of Kassandros, 13, 14, 16, 37, 102.
- Antipatros (Etesias), nephew of Kassandros, at Lysimachos' court, 37; pretender, 130, 134; king of Macedonia, 147; pretender again, 159, 167; expelled or slain by Antigonos, 170.
- Antipatros, Athenian archon, 306 *n.*, 307, 416, 417.
- Anubis, worshipped at Smyrna, 349.
- Aoos, pass of the, 143, 264, 303, 311, 312.
- Apame, wife of Magas of Cyrene, 261, 322, 323.
- Aphrodite Stratonikis, see *Stratonike I*.
- Aphrodite Zephyritis (Arsinoe II), 291.
- apokletoi*, 62.
- Apollo of Aktion, 54 *n.*
- Apollo of Delos, his position in the Aegean, 74, 75, 77; loans from his temple, 76 *n.*, 108; worship, 136, 292, 350, 351, 352 *n.*, 354, 380, 381 *n.*, 388, 391, 429; on Antigonos' tetradrachm, 389.
- Apollo of Delphi, see *asyliai*; epiphaneia of, 155 *n.*, 156, 441.
- Apollo of Didyma, 129, 209 *n.*
- Apollo Kaseos, 388 *n.*
- Apollo Ptoios, 210 *n.*
- Apollo Thermios, 62.
- Apollodoros, nesiarach, 78 *n.*
- Apollodoros, tyrant of Kassandreia, attains power, 159; alliance with Antiochos I and Sparta, 162; wickedness of, 171; put down by Antigonos, 172.
- Apollonia at Delos, 122 *n.*
- Apollonia (the city), 58, 245 *n.*
- Appian, on the fleet of Ptolemy II, 456.
- Arabs, 245.



- Arados, 348.  
 Arantides, 177.  
 Aratos of Kos, 227 *n.*  
 Aratos of Sikyon, character, 359-61; early life, 361, 362; frees Sikyon, 363; joins it to Achaean League, *ib.*; receives a present from Antigonos, *ib.*; abortive attempt on Corinth, 364; becomes Antigonos' enemy, *ib.*; difficulties at Sikyon, 367; voyage to Egypt, 368; lands at Adria, *ib.*; Ptolemy's present to, 369; Antigonos attempts to win, 374; first generalship of, 384; fails to aid Boeotia, *ib.*; influence over Achaean League, 394; second generalship, 394 *seq.*; surprise of Corinth, 396-8; Polybios on this, 398; Aratos' act considered, 399-401; war with Antigonos and Aetolia, 400; secures alliance of Agis of Sparta and Ptolemy III, 402; refuses to fight, *ib.*; defeats the Aetolians, 403; invades Salamis, 464; general peace, *ib.*; attempt to assassinate Aristomachos and Aristippos, 404; attack on Athens in time of peace, *ib.*; accusation against Antigonos, *ib.*; his later policy considered, 407; character of his *Memoirs* as a source, 393, 394, 413, 414.  
 Aratos of Soloi, at Eretria, 24; at Pella, 174, 226; 'Hymn to Pan,' 174, 226; court poems, 226, 412; life, 227; 'Phainomena,' 227-9; Stoic sympathies, *ib.*; quoted by St. Paul, 229; Bion upon, 237.  
 arbitration, growth of, 146.  
 Archelaos, king of Macedonia, 174 *n.*, 177 *n.*, 225.  
 Archelaos, Macedonian general, 374, 397.  
 Archiadas, Delphic archon, 215 *n.*, 268 *n.*  
 Archias of Corinth, naval architect, 342 *n.*  
 Archidamia, 270.  
 archons, Athenian, 415 *seq.*; Delian, 458 *seq.*  
 Ardiaei, 142.  
 Areus I, king of Sparta, introduces luxury, 66; leads the Peloponnesian League (in 280), 132; defeated by the Aetolians, 133; statues at Olympia, 133 *n.*, 445; in Crete, 269; saves Sparta, 271 *cf.* 448; attacks Pyrrhos, 272, 273; Chremonidean war, 298-300; death at battle of Corinth, 301.  
 Areus II, king of Sparta, 304 *n.*, 347.  
 Argolid (and see *Argos*), belongs to Demetrios, 51; in part to Antigonos, 133, 137, *cf.* 205, 326.  
 Argos, held by Demetrios, 51; check on Sparta, 67, 215; military strength, 67 *n.*; expels Antigonos' garrison, 132; feuds in, 272; Pyrrhos' attack on, 272-4, 449; Antigonos' system at, 280, 281, and see *Aristomachos I*; in Chremonidean war, 293, 298, 302; war with Alexander of Corinth, 356, 364; Sikyonian exiles at, 362; Aratos' attempt upon, 404; joins Achaean League, 406.  
 Aristagoras, Delphic archon, 347 *n.*  
 Aristippos of Argos, 272, 280 *n.*  
 Aristippos, tyrant of Argos, 280, 281 *n.*; Aratos tries to assassinate, 404; tries to assassinate Aratos, *ib.*  
 Aristoboulos of Kassandreia, historian, 243.  
 Aristoboulos of Thessalonike, sitones of Demetrios II, 186 *n.*, 468.  
 Aristodemos, tyrant of Megalopolis, 280, 302; called 'the Good', *ib.*; defeats Akrotatos, 304; adorns Megalopolis, 305; death, 358.  
 Aristogenes, Antigonos' physician, 226.  
 Aristokleides or Aristomelides, tyrant of Orchomenos, 280 *n.*  
 Aristomachos I, tyrant of Argos, founds a dynasty, 280; does something for Athens, 327; aids Athens against Alexander of Corinth, 356, 364; shelters Aratos, 361; who tries to assassinate him, 404.  
 Aristomachos II, tyrant of Argos, 280, 281 *n.*  
 Aristomachos of Sikyon, 362.  
 Aristomelides, see *Aristokleides*.  
 Ariston of Chios, philosopher, 231, 330; attacks Arkesilaos, 333, 334.  
 Ariston of Paionia, 119.  
 Aristonymos, Athenian archon, 416, 422.  
 Aristoteles, dialectician, 361.  
 Aristotimos, tyrant of Elis, 269 *n.*, 279; his cruelty, 280; assassinated, 287; his daughters' death, 288.  
 Aristotle, 225; his school, see *Colonnade*; on kingship, 285.

- Arkadia, most of belongs to Demetrios, 51; military strength, 67 *n.*; in Peloponnesian League of 280, 132; Arkadian League revived, 359; League breaks up, 385.
- Arkesilaos, Academic philosopher, 241; teaches Demetrios the Fair, 293, 334; character and position, 332 seq.; attacks on, 333, 334; political neutrality, 334; friend of Hierokles, *ib.*; patriotism, 335, 357; friendly relations to Pergamon, *ib.*; attends the festival for Halkyoneus, 336.
- Arrhesine in Amorgos, 220 *n.*, 467.
- Arrheneides, Athenian archon, 306 *n.*, 309 *n.*, 416, 417.
- Arrhidaïos, Macedonian pretender, 167, 171.
- Arsinoë I, first wife of Ptolemy II, 16, 131 *n.*, 263, 291.
- Arsinoë II, Philadelphos, 16; wife of Lysimachos, 123; character, *ib.*; her beauty, *ib.*; friendship for Stratonike, *ib.*, 350; intrigues, 124; escapes to Kassandreia after Kouroupedion, 128; rules part of Macedonia, 130; marries Keraunos, 134; escapes to Samothrake, 135; returns to Egypt, 261; correspondence with Straton, 28, 331; aims and policy, 262, 263, 444, 445; marries Ptolemy II, 262, 263; date discussed, 261 *n.*; statue at Athens, 267; and at Olympia, 291; death, 290; worshipped, 290, 291; her influence on Egyptian sea power, 291, 292, and see *Philadelphæia*; Chremonidean war her war, 293, 313; her policy reversed, 313 seq.
- Arsinoë, town: (1) in Aetolia, 111. (2) in Keos, 292 *n.*, 299. (3) Arsinoë-Methana, 292 *n.*, 341, 387.
- Arsinoëion in Samothrake, 135 *n.*
- Artemis, 136, 158, 292, 352 *n.*, 354 *n.*, 441 *n.*
- Artemis Gazoria, 178.
- Artemis Leukophryenē, 209 *n.*
- Asklepios, priests of, 306 *n.*, 307, 420, 421.
- Asoka, king of India, 336 seq.; mission to Antigonos, 337; his 'law of piety', 338.
- Astypalaia, 387, 471.
- asyllai*, 146, 209, 210, cf. 354.
- Athamania, 427.
- Athambos, Delphic archon, 298 *n.*
- Athene, statue of, at Delphi, 158, 441 *n.*
- Athene: (1) Alkis or Alkidemos, 177 *n.*, 200, 301 *n.* (2) Itonia, 54 *n.*, 206, 265. (3) Nikephoros at Athens, 166, 218. (4) Nikephoros at Pergamon, 210 *n.*
- Athens, welcomes Demetrios, 8; revolts after Ipsos, 11; taken by Demetrios, 12, 13; philosophic schools at, under Demetrios, 27 seq.; parties at, after 307, 42 seq.; abolishes conscription, 43, 69, 70 *n.*; tyranny of Lachares, 43; two new parties take shape, 44; citizens ill-treated by Aetolians, 49; military strength under Demetrios, 69; loses Delos, 73; measures against piracy, 85, 86, 88; revolts against Demetrios, 92; date discussed, 419-22; nationalists come into power at, 92, 93; threatened by Demetrios, 97; saved by Krates, 98; seeks Lysimachos' support against Demetrios, 101, cf. 118; war of 286-282 against Antigonos, 103, 104, 118, 121, 125-7; thanks Tenos for help, 417, 418; attempt on Piræus, 103; recovers Piræus, 118; loses it, 126; makes peace with Antigonos, 127; nationalist government in 280, 137, 218; contingent at Thermopylai, 151, cf. 157; ships not sent, 150 *n.*, 151; right of coining, 197; value of, to Antigonos, 205, 223; pro-Macedonians return to power in, 218; Antigonos (276-273) suzerain of, 217, 218; nationalists at, become pro-Egyptian, 219; dependence on foreign corn of, consequences of, 219-21; praise of, 221, 222; intellectual position of, 223 seq., and see ch. viii *passim*; fall in 273 of pro-Macedonian government, 267; *entente* with Egypt, *ib.*, 268 *n.*; Amphiktyonic vote, 267, 289, 290, 298, 422; dominated by Antigonos' fortresses, 289; nationalist government of 273-270, 289; pro-Macedonians in 270 return to power, 290; nationalists in 266 return to power, 294; joins coalition against Antigonos, *ib.* (see *Chremonidean war*); siege and surrender, 305, 306; Antigonos' measures at, 306-8; governed by an epistates, 308; loses right of coining, *ib.*; honours and decree for Zeno, 309,

Athens (*continued*).

310; intrigues against Antigonos, 320; garrison and epistates withdrawn by Antigonos, 327; position of, after 256, 328, 336; philosophical schools at, after 256, 329 seq.; war with Alexander of Corinth, 356, 364; Aratos' attempt upon, 404; archon-list, part of, 415 seq.  
 Attintania, 58; recovered by Antigonos, 312, cf. 368; Antigoneia in, 197, 312; strategos of, 199.  
 Attaleia at Delos, 430.  
 Attalos I of Pergamon, 335.  
 Audoleon, king of Paionia, 53, 64, 65 *n.*, 92, 101, 103, 119, 173, 420, 426.  
 Autariatae, Illyrian tribe, 142, 143, 183.  
 Autokles of Chalkis, friend of Demetrios II, 468.  
 Axios, 97 *n.*, 143, 320, 321.

Bacchon of Boeotia, nesiarch, 78 *n.*, 291.

Bactria, 198, 375.

Badros, Delian archon, 459, 460.

Bardylis, Illyrian king, 47.

Basileia, festival, 174, 254.

Bastarnae, German tribe, 170 *n.*, 201, 365.

Bedu, Thracian (?) deity, 59 *n.*, 60 *n.*, 178; discussed, 176.

Belgae, the name, 141; see *Gauls*.

Belgius, Gallic leader, 141 *n.*, 143, 147, 148.

Berenike: (1) wife of Ptolemy I, 20, 322, 351 *n.* (2) daughter of Ptolemy II, marries Antiochos II, 356; death, 376. (3) daughter of Magas of Cyrene, 322; her age, 450; her 'bonum facinus', 323, 450, 451; supposed portrait, 323 *n.*; rules in Cyrene, 452, 453; her coins, *ib.*; marries Ptolemy III, 376, 446, 453.  
 Berenikis, 60.

Bindusâra, king of India, 337 *n.*

Bion of Borysthenes, philosopher, life, words, and character, 233-9: at Pella, 235; close relations with Antigonos, *ib.*; traditional view of, 236; failings, 237; the man and his message, 238, 239. See also 225, 241 *n.*, 338 *n.*, 412.

Birkenna, wife of Pyrrhos, 47.

Bithynia (and see *Nikomedes*), inde-

pendence of, 117, 130, 162; Ziaelas' succession, 326; joins Egypt, 356.

Boeotia, first revolt against Demetrios, 39; second revolt, 40; suppressed, 41; military strength, 69; importance to Demetrios, *ib.*; successful revolt against Antigonos, 132; contingent at Thermopylai, 151, cf. 157; independent, 207; Amphiktyonic votes of, 213 *n.*; defeated by Aetolians at Chaironeia, 384; comes under Macedonian influence, *ib.*

Boibe, 38 *n.*

Bounomos (Pella), 178.

Boura, 205.

Brennus, Gallic leader, 143; meaning of, 144 *n.*; in Macedonia, 147, 148; invades Greece, 148; attacks Thermopylai, 151; draws off the Aetolians, 152; turns the pass, 153, 154; raids Delphi, 153 seq.; defeat and death, 156, 157; ousts other leaders in the tradition, 165 *n.*, 440 seq.

Buddhism, referred to, 337 seq.

Byzantion, navy of, 85, 454; friendly to the Antigonids, 117, cf. 220; joins the Northern League, 131, 162; joint guardian of Nikomedes' children, 326.

Calliphon, Apollodoros' minister, 172.

Carthage, 220; sea-strength, 83, cf. 343; victory over Pyrrhos, 259; war with Rome mentioned, 342, 383, 408.

Celtae, the name, 140, 141; see *Gauls*.  
 Cerethrius, Gallic leader, 143, 164, 165 *n.*

Chaironeia, battle of (245), 384.

Chalaion, 209 *n.*

Chalkedon, 131, 162 *n.*

Chalkidike, cities of, 178, 185; *kleros* system in, 191 seq.; government of, 196, 199; Antigoneia in, 197.

Chalkis, 22, 52 *n.*, 90 *n.*, 204, 235, 289.

Chandragupta, 10.

Chaonians, 56.

Charinos, Athenian archon, 416, 422.

Chersonese on the Orontes, 110 *n.*

Chilonis, Akrotatos' queen, 304 *n.*

Chios, 431.

Chios, battle of, 84 *n.*

Chlaineas, Aetolian, 202 *n.*, 279, 282.

Chremonidean war, 295 seq.; general considerations, 296, 297; ineffec-

tiveness of Egypt, 299, 301; fall of Athens, 306; a nickname, 298 *n.*  
 Chremonides, son of Eteokles, 295; his decree, 295, 295, cf. 278, 293; exiled, 306; defeated by Agathostratos, 378.  
 Colonnade, the, 27 seq.; pro-Macedonian, 28, cf. 331; its triumph and fall at Athens, 28; draws nearer to Antigonos, 331, 335.  
 Combutis, Gallic leader, 152.  
 command of the sea, meaning of, 79, 80.  
 Comontorius, Gallic leader, 165 *n.*  
 Confederation of Delos, 74.  
 Corinth, held by Demetrios, 11, 51; League of, revived by Demetrios, 9, 19, 371, cf. 400; military strength, 67 *n.*; great importance of, to Antigonos, 132, 204, 217, 269, 277, 289, 371; strategos of, 195; right of coining, 197; communications of, with Demetrias, 286, 289; connexion with Syracuse as regards ship-building, 342; Antigonos' flagship built at, 345; Alexander, king of, 355; symbolical importance of, 371; Nikaia holds, 372; Antigonos regains, 373; taken by Aratos, 396 seq.; joins Achaean League, 398; garrisoned by Achaeans, 399.  
 Corinth, battle of, 301, see 280.  
 corn supply of Athens, 219-21.  
 Crimea, 220.  
 Cyclades (and see *Islanders, League of the*), join Antigonos I, 73; early combination of, 74; importance of, *ib.*; no Egyptian strategos of, 109; pass under Antigonos' control, 387; Macedonian protectorate over, 466-72.  
 Cynics, 30, 230, 238, 239, 240; on kingship, 254.  
 Cyprus, 8, 12, 81.  
 Cyrene, Demetrios the Fair king of, 322 seq.; Berenike ruler of, 452; comes under Egyptian rule, 324, 446, 453; independence of, 452, 453; coins, 452; sequence of events at, 453.  
 Daimachos, envoy of Antiochos I, 337 *n.*  
 Damosthenes, Delphic archon, 298 *n.*  
 Dardanians: offer Keraunos help, 142; join the Gauls, 143; charac-

teristics, 200; invade Macedonia, 201, 365.  
 Darron, Thracian god, 177.  
 Dead Sea, 245.  
 declaration of war, Greek usage, 399.  
 Deidameia, wife of Demetrios I, 9, 11, 19; death, 20.  
 Deinias of Argos, historian, 361, 412, 413.  
 Deliaes, 137.  
 Delos, revolts from Athens, 73; joins Antigonos I, *ib.*; ancient centre of the Aegean, 74; importance of, to Antigonos I, 77; supposed neutrality of, examined, 429-32; if in League of Islanders, 430; threatened by pirates, 86; passes under Egyptian control, 106; honours Philokles, 106, 108; decree for Philokles, 108, 109; reconciled to Athens, 109; corn market, 221; Arsinoe II, relations with, 291, 292; Kallimachos' hymn to, 291; value of, to Macedonia, 341; Antigonos at (in 253), 351-3; Stratonike's offerings at, 350, 351; Aetolian decree of safety for, 354, 209 *n.*, 463; Egyptian fleets at (in 251 and 249), 366; Antigonos at (in 245), 379 seq.; passes under Antigonos' control, 387 seq., see 466 seq.; Antigonid monuments at, 389-91; amicus of Rome, 432; archons and festivals, dating by, 458 seq.; relations of, with Demetrios II and Doson, 391, 467, 468; with Thessalonike, 467, 468; with Syros, 470; foundations at, see *Antigoneia* (1), (2); *Attaleia*; *Demetrieia*, (1) and (4); *Nikolaia*; *Paneaia*; *Philadelphieia*; *Philetairiea*; *Philippeia*; *Ptolomaeia* (2) (3) (4) (5); *Soteria* (2) (3); *Stratonikeia*.  
 Delphi, annexed by Aetolia, 48, 63; Gauls attack, 153-7, see 439 seq.; worth plundering, 153, 154; defence of, 155, 156; Aetolian version of the defence, 440; Delphic version of the defence, 441; memorials at, of defeat of Gauls, 158, 441; Dropion's dedication at, 173; under Aetolian control, 208 seq.; leads movement for making 'asylums', 146, 209; not member of Aetolian League, 211, cf. 431 *n.*; Amphiktyonic votes of, 212, 213; archons of, dating adopted, 215 *n.*



Delphians, alleged tribe of, in Magnesia, 156 *n.*  
 Demetrias, foundation and position of, 38; see 102, 199; Demetrios buried there, 122; Antigonos coins at, 197; see *Corinth*, communications of, with.  
 Demetriaia, festival.  
 1. Of the Islanders at Delos, in honour of Demetrios I, 79, 90 *n.*, 108, 433.  
 2. At Athens, 90 *n.*  
 3. In Euboea, 52 *n.*, 90 *n.*  
 4. Foundation of Demetrios II at Delos, 391, 468.  
 Demetrios I, the Besieger, marries Phila, 6; sails to Greece, 8; defeats Ptolemy I at Salamis, 9, 81, cf. 245; becomes king, 9; siege of Rhodes, *ib.*; wrongfully (?) holds Corinth, 400; revives the League of Corinth, 9, 19. cf. 371, 400; marries Deidameia, 9, 19; invades Thessaly, 9; Ipsos, 10; loss of his Asiatic empire, 10; alliance with Seleukos, 11, 81; gives Stratonike to Seleukos, 11, 20; his kingdom (301-296), 11; fresh combination against him, 12; takes Athens, 13; becomes king of the Macedonians, 13 seq.; character, 18; supposed bust of, 18 *n.*; aims at recovering his father's empire, 37; founds Demetrias, 38; suppresses first Boeotian revolt, 40; suppresses second Boeotian revolt and takes Thebes, 41; attempts union of parties at Athens, 43; recalls the Athenian oligarchs, 44, 46; governs through the moderate oligarchs, 44; marries Lanassa, 47; his polygamy, 47 *n.*; western expedition, 48; alleged embassy to Rome, *ib.*; enters Athens with Lanassa, 49; celebrates Pythia at Athens, *ib.*; invades Aetolia, 50; makes peace with Pyrrhos, *ib.*; his policy as king of the Macedonians, 50 seq.; his possessions in Greece, 51; worshipped in Greece and the Islands, 89, see *Demetriaia* (1) (2) and (3); joint altar of, on Delos, with Antigonos I, 434; military strength of, 64-71, and see 84, 424-6; policy in Peloponnese, 66; his taxation of the Islands, 76 *n.*, 113 *n.*; and elsewhere, 113 *n.*; rules the Aegean (306-288), 81, 436; controls the

Island League, 81; his nesiarch, 436; strength of, at sea, 81-4; his large ships, 83, 84, 91; relations with the pirates, 85, 86; failure as king of the Macedonians, 89 seq.; oriental dress and methods, 90; addressed as the Sun, 91; prepares (289) to reconquer Asia, 91; new coalition against, 91, 92; date discussed, 418-21; loses Athens, 92, 419 seq.; loses Macedonia, 96, 418 seq.; threatens and spares Athens, 97; makes peace with Pyrrhos, 98; hatred of Lysimachos, 99; sails for Asia, 99; marries Ptolemais, *ib.*; invades Lysimachos' kingdom, *ib.*; driven east by Agathokles, 100; surrenders to Seleukos, *ib.*; loses the sea, 104 seq., and the islands, 106 seq.; abdicates in favour of Antigonos, 110; his captivity, *ib.*; death, 122; Seleukos sends home his ashes, *ib.*; reversal of his Greek policy by Antigonos, 203; necklace of, at Delos, 350; Antigonos claims the inheritance of, in the sea, 351 seq.

Demetrios II, defeat of Alexander of Epeiros by, 304; marries Stratonike II, 348; she leaves him, 369; the Nikiaia episode, 370 *n.*, 372; marries Phthia, 370 *n.*, 383; his marriages discussed, 370 *n.*; governs Macedonia for Antigonos, 383, 434; never joint king with Antigonos, 433-5; letter of, to Harpalos, 434, 184 *n.*, 402 *n.*, addenda; his Aetolian war, 384, 403 *n.*, 405, 464; strikes Gonatas' silver, 463; relations with Delos, 391, 468; with Poiessa, 467; controls League of the Islanders, 466-71; extends his influence in Aegean, 471.

Demetrios of Byzantion, historian, 411.

Demetrios the Fair, Antigonos' half-brother; studies in Athens, 290 *n.*, 293, 334, cf. 358; not the victor of Derdia, 304 *n.*; Cyrene offered to, 322; king of Cyrene, 323, 324; death, *ib.*; dates of reign and death discussed, 449-53.

Demetrios of Phaleron, 28, 42, 131 *n.*, 196 *n.*, 307.

Demo, hetaira, mother of Halkyoneus, 248 *n.*

Demochares, exile, 42, 44; recalled,

- 93, cf. 420; character, 93, 94; goes twice as envoy to Lysimachos, 101, 102, cf. 289; recovers Eleusis, 103; moves decree for Demosthenes, 137; historian, 224, 411; Laches' decree for, 268, 289.
- Demokles, Athenian archon, 416.
- Demophanes of Megalopolis, see *Ekdemos*.
- Demosthenes, Demochares' decree for, 137.
- Derdia, 304.
- diatribe, 238.
- Dikaiarchos, privateersman, 87.
- Diodoros (historian), fleet figures, 82.
- Diodoros Kronos, dialectician, 234 *n.*, 241, 334.
- Diodotos, satrap of Bactria, 375.
- Diokleidas, Macedonian commissioner, 467.
- Diokles, Athenian archon, 416, 418 seq.
- Dionysia at Delos, 20 *n.*
- Dionysios I, 139.
- Dionysios of Herakleia, Zeno's pupil, 24, 31 *n.*, 227, 231.
- Dionysios, envoy of Ptolemy II, 337 *n.*, 445 *n.*
- Dioskourides, nephew of Antigonos I, 73, 82 *n.*, 436.
- Diotimos, Athenian archon, 416.
- Dodona, 54, 55, 59; god of, 59 *n.*, 176, 265.
- Dolopes, Amphiktyonic votes of, 212, 213; join Aetolian League, 346.
- Doris, 207; joins Aetolian League, 346.
- Douris of Samos, historian, 242, 411, 413.
- Dromichaetes, king of the Getae, 40.
- Dromokleides, Athenian democrat, 42.
- Dropion, king of Paionia, reorganizes Paionia, 173, cf. 321.
- Dyme, 133.
- Dyrrhachion, 58.
- Edessa (and see *Aigai*), name discussed, 176.
- Egypt (see *Ptolemy I, II, III, Arsinoe II*), military strength of, 71, 427; naval strength under Ptolemy I, 83; gains by falls of Demetrios and Lysimachos, 135; takes no part against the Gauls, 150; hostility to Macedonia, 215, 217, 276, chs. x to xiii, *passim*; ineffective in Chremonidean war, 299, 301; explanation of this, 313 seq.; losses in second Syrian war, 324; strong position of, through sea power, 341; great naval strength under Ptolemy II, 343, 454-7; but weak points in same, 299, 342, 344, 345; loses command of the sea to Antigonos, 378 seq.; terms of peace with Antigonos, 387; alliance with Achaean League, 402; and with Aetolia, 464.
- Ekdemos and Demophanes of Megalopolis, pupils of Arkesilaos, 334, 357; free Megalopolis, 358; aid Aratos to free Sikyon, 362, 363; at Cyrene, 451-3.
- Elateia, 51, 95, 118, 119.
- Eleimiotis, 177.
- elephants, Antigonos', 286 *n.*
- Eleusis, recovered by Demochares, 103; work at, *ib.*; retained by Athens, 126; garrisoned by Antigonos, 307 *n.*; ? restored to Athens, 328.
- Eleuthernai, 471.
- Elis, 51, 68; joins Peloponnesian League of 280, 133; joins Pyrrhos, 269; Antigonos' system at, 281, and see *Aristotimos*; treatment of Aristotimos' daughters, 288; joins Peloponnesian League of 266, 293; under Aetolian influence, 382; forced into Achaean League, 407.
- Emathia, 176, 192.
- Emmenidas, Delphic archon, 294 *n.*, 304 *n.*
- enneres*, 259 *n.*, 343, 345.
- Eordaia, 177.
- Epameinondas, 9, 66.
- Epeiros (and see *Pyrrhos, Alexander*), nationality, 55; 'Epeirot alliance,' 56; kingdom of, 56 seq.; military strength, 60, 426; invaded by Demetrios, 50; by Lysimachos, 120; Antigonos' measures after Chremonidean war, 311, 312; draws close to Macedonia, 382, 383.
- Ephesos, 12, 128; taken by Egypt, 314; under Ptolemaios, 317; Antiochos II recovers, 318; Laodike at, 357.
- Ephesos, battle of, 378.
- Ephoros, historian, 139, 242.
- Epicurus, his school, 30; on justice, 251; death, 309; quoted by Antigonos, 310.

- Epidauros, decree of, for Antigonos, 326 *n.*, 390 *n.*; lost to Antigonos, 400.
- Epilimnios, 356 *n.*
- epimeletes*, 196 *n.*
- epistates*, in Macedonia, 195, 196; at Athens, 308; removed, 327; of Corinth, 374 *n.*
- Eratosthenes upon Bion, 237, 236 *n.*, 239; at Alexandria, 331.
- Eresos, law of, against tyrants, 284.
- Eretria (and see *Menedemos*), its culture, 21; Demetrios worshipped at, 52 *n.*, 90 *n.*; decree of, for Antigonos after Lysimacheia, 166 *n.*; Persaios interferes concerning, 233, 287; its brief independence, 286.
- Erginos, in Aratos' service, 396, 397, 404.
- Erythrai, 106 *n.*
- Etearchos of Cyrene, 387 *n.*
- ethnos*, see *Folk*.
- Etruscan piracy, see *Pirates*.
- Euaimon, 359 *n.*
- Euboea, lost to Demetrios, 11; recovered, 13; held by him, 51; his worship there, 52 *n.*; military strength, 69; taxation, 113 *n.*; under Antigonos, 132; strategoi of, 195; importance of, to Antigonos, 204, 289; lost to Antigonos, 268; recovered, 286; Alexander king of, 355, cf. 369 *n.*
- Euboulides, philosopher, 26.
- Euboulos, Athenian archon, 416, 422.
- Eudokos, Delphic archon, 215 *n.*
- Eugnotos of Akraiphia, 40.
- Eumedes, Macedonian commissioner, 467.
- Eumenes of Kardia, 6, 7, 182, 244.
- Eumenes I of Pergamon, 314, 335.
- Euphantos of Olynthos, philosopher and historian, 25, 255, 411.
- Euphoriion of Chalkis, poet, 372.
- Eurydamas, Aetolian general, 158.
- Eurydike:
- (1) wife of Philip Arrhidaios, 6, 7.
  - (2) daughter of Antipatros, 16, 99, 159.
  - (3) daughter of Lysimachos, 16, 37, 159 *n.*
  - (4) wife of Demetrios I, 47 *n.*
- Eurytanes, 61.
- Euthios, Athenian archon, 416, 417.
- Folk, 52, 53, 63.
- Gaisatoi, 141 *n.*
- Galatae, the name, 141; see *Gauls*.
- Gallic mercenaries, see *Gauls, mercenaries*.
- Garden, the, 30.
- Gauls, knowledge of, in fourth century, 139; first migration, 140; second migration, 141, 142; invade Macedonia under Belgius, 143; appearance of, *ib.*; aim at settlement, 143, 154; character of, 144; poetry of, *ib.*; alleged cruelty of, 145, 146; arms, 149; invade Greece under Brennus, 148 seq.; see 439 seq.; numbers of, 148; invade Aetolia, 152; sack Kallion, *ib.*; defeated by Aetolians, 152; attack on Delphi, 153-7; growth of the story, 439-42; driven out of Greece, 157; shields of, at Delphi, 158; sack Lysimacheia, 164; cross to Asia, *ib.*; blackmail Asia, 202; invade Thrace under Cerethrius, 143, 164, 165 *n.*; defeated by Antigonos at Lysimacheia, 165; enrolled as mercenaries, by Apollodoros, 159; by Nikomedes, 164; by Antigonos, 169, 264, 300; by Pyrrhos, 260, cf. 265, 271, 273; by Ptolemy II, 263, 291 *n.*, 443; by Ziaelas, 326; by Doson, 426; cheapness of, as mercenaries, 169, 170; try to bluff Antigonos, 170; settled in Macedonia, 183, 192; loyalty to Antigonos, 264; plunder tombs at Aigai, 265; mutiny against Antigonos, 300, and defeated, *ib.*
- Germans, 141, 365.
- Getae, 40.
- Glaucias, Illyrian king, 19.
- Glauketas, pirate, 86.
- Glaukippos, Athenian archon, 137 *n.*, 416, 417.
- Glaukon son of Eteokles, early career, 95; agonothetes in 282/1, 127 *n.*; his part in 266, 295; Delphic decree for, *ib.*; exiled, 306; statue at Olympia, 378 *n.*
- Gonatas, possible meanings of, 15 *n.*; see *Antigonos*.
- Gonnoi, 15 *n.*
- Gorgias, Athenian archon, 416, 418.
- Gortyna, 471.
- Greece, military strength of, 67-71; increase of humanity in third century, 145 seq.; ethnology in relation

to Macedonia, 175 seq.; slavery and tyranny, Greek view of, 282-4. Gyaros, 78.

Halikarnassos, 291, 292 *n.*

Halkyoneus, Antigonos' son, 232, 247, 248; aids Argos against Pyrrhos, 273, 274; death, 301; festival for, at Athens, 335, 336.

Halos, 38 *n.*

Harpalos, letter of Demetrios II to, 434, addenda.

Hegesias, philosopher, 234 *n.*

Helenos, son of Pyrrhos, 266, 273, 274, 287.

*helepolis*, the, 41.

*hepteres*, 84, 259 *n.*, 343.

Herakleia in Lynkestis, 184 *n.*, 196, 197 *n.*

Herakleia in Malis, 150, 153, 157.

Herakleia on Pontos, navy of, 85, 131, 454; acquired by Lysimachos, 117; recovers her freedom, 130; joins the Northern League, 131, 162; supplies Keraunos with ships, *ib.*; war with Zipoitae, 161 *n.*; joint guardian of Nikomedes' children, 326.

Herakleia, the island, 78, 470 *n.*

Herakleides, Demetrios' general, 104.

Herakleitos of Athmonon, agonotheites of Panathenaia, 218; strategos of Piraeus, 327; the war with Alexander of Corinth, 356, 364.

Herrillos of Carthage, Zeno's pupil, 231.

Hermaphilos, Egyptian nauarch, 86, 105 *n.*

Hermarchos, Epicurean, 329.

Hermias, Egyptian nesiarch, 291; devotion to Arsinoe II, 292.

Hermione, 280 *n.*

Hermippos, historian, 412.

Hetairideia, festival, 38, 206.

Hierapytna, 87, 146 *n.*, 471.

Hierokles the Karian, officer of Antigonos, 104; strategos of Piraeus, 205, 287, *cf.* 308; friend of Arkesiaios, 334.

Hieron, Athenian archon, 260 *n.*, 416.

Hieronimos of Kardias, historian: governor of Boeotia, 40, 245; source of Diodoros' fleet-figures, 82; on Demetrios I, 91, 246; life of, 244 seq.; friendship for Antigonos, 246;

his history, *ib.*; appreciation of, 247, 411; source for part of Plutarch's *Pyrrhos*, 447-9.

Hieronimos of Rhodes, Peripatetic philosopher, 248 *n.*, 329; relations with Antigonos, 335, 336; conducts the festival for Halkyoneus, 335, 336.

Hippolochos, Macedonian, 248 *n.*

Hippomedon, Egyptian strategos of Thrace, 388 *n.*, 403 *n.*

Histiaia, 52 *n.*, 90 *n.*, 219 *n.*, 430, 468; revolts from Antigonos, 293, 294; recovered, 320; Antigoneia at, 435.

Hollow Syria, 313, 348.

Ilion, law of, against tyrants, 284.

illusion (*πῦφος*), Zeno on, 240, 250; Timon on, 240, 241; meaning considered, 240 *n.*, *cf.* 250; Antigonos free from, 250.

Illyria, Pyrrhos' conquests in, 102; Gallic conquests in, 142.

Illyrians, in Epeiros, 55; in Aetolia, 61; how far Macedonians were, 176-81; settled in Macedonia, 183, 192, *cf.* 426.

Imbros, see *Lemnos*.

inscriptions, first study of, 244.

Iolkos, 38 *n.*

Ios, 78, 220 *n.*, 468.

Ipsos, battle of, 10, 19, 245.

'Iron gates,' 143, 321.

Isaios, Athenian archon, 416, 421.

Islanders, League of the, founded by Antigonos I, 432-9; date of foundation, 73, 75; circumstances and object of foundation, 77; peculiarities of, 75; controlled by Antigonos I, 76; Ionian basis of, 77, 78; members of, 78; whether Delos a member, 430; worships Antigonos I and Demetrios, 79, 433 seq.; controlled by Demetrios, 81; taxed by him, 76 *n.*, 113 *n.*; passes to Ptolemy I, 106 seq.; honours and worships Ptolemy I as Soter, 108, 438 (and see *Ptolemaieia* no. 2); government of, by the Egyptian nauarchs, 109; votes the Alexandrian Ptolemaieia isolympic, 136; invited to Soteria at Delphi, 159 *n.*; imports corn, 220 *n.*; passes to Antigonos after battle of Kos, 379, 387; not dissolved, 469-71; under Macedonian control, 390, 391, 469-



- Islanders, League of the (*continued*).  
 71 ; dedicates Agathostratos' statue, 469 ; list of decrees of the, 470, 471.  
 Isthmia, Antigonos' flagship, 345, 379, 388, 389, 462, 465, 466.  
 Isthmia, deme of Kos, 379 *n*.  
 Isthmus of Corinth, supposed fortification of (in 279), 151.  
 Itanos, 270.  
 Itonia, festival, 54 *n*.  
 Kalauria, 209 *n*.  
 Kallikrates of Samos, Egyptian nauarch, 25 *n*., 105 *n*., 106 *n*. ; succeeds Philokles, 291 ; devotion to Arsinoe II, *ib*.  
 Kallimachos, 150 *n*., 227 ; hymn to Delos, 291, 440, 441.  
 Kallion (Kallipolis), sack of, 152 ; rebuilt, 152 *n*., 266 *n*.  
 Kallippos, Athenian general, 151.  
 Kallixenos on the fleet of Ptolemy II, 456.  
 Kalydonian boar, the, 58 *n*., 61, 160 *n*.  
*kamara* tombs, 265 *n*.  
 Kaphyai, 293.  
 Karthaia, 76 *n*., 78 *n*., 470.  
 Karystos, 52 *n*., 90 *n*.  
 Kassandreia, 8, 97 ; foundation of, 159 ; (?) worship of Kassandros at, 199 ; Arsinoe at, 128, 134 ; worship of Lysimachos at, 128, 199 ; handed over to Keraunos, 135 ; under Eurydike, 159 ; under Apollodoros, *ib*., 171 ; taken by Antigonos, 172 ; disaffection of, 180, 198.  
*Kassandreis* of Lykophron, 171 *n*.  
 Kassandros, seizes Macedonia, 6 ; captures Olympias, *ib*. ; builds Kassandreia, 8, 159, 199 ; murders Alexander IV and Roxane, 8 ; attacked by Demetrios, 8, 9 ; sends troops to Ipsos, 10 ; hatred of, 16, 89 ; governs Athens through Demetrios of Phaleron, 28 ; Gallic war of, 139 ; patronizes Euhemeros, 225 ; worshipped at Kassandreia (?), 199 ; death, 12 ; manner of death, 89 *n*. ; military strength, 425 ; navy, 454.  
 Kaunos, belongs to Demetrios, 12, 99, 100, 105 ; taken by Philokles, 106.  
 Keos, 78, 299, 470.  
 Kerameikos, 309.  
 Keraunos, see *Ptolemy Keraunos*.  
 Kerkyra, 47, 102, 427.  
 Keryneia, 205.  
 Kilikia, 324.  
 Kimon, Athenian archon, 47 *n*., 416, 422.  
 kingship, theory of, 254-6.  
 Kios, 162 *n*., 326, 454.  
 Kleanthes, Stoic, character, 231, 330, *cf*. 332 ; Hymn to Zeus, 330 ; turns toward Egypt, 331 ; quoted by St. Paul, 229 *n*.  
 Kleinias of Sikyon, Aratos' father, 268, 361.  
 Kleitarchos, historian, 242.  
 Kleitos, Antipatros' admiral, 72.  
 Kleomenes III of Sparta, 286, 331, 407.  
 Kleon, tyrant of Sikyon, 268.  
 Kleonymos of Sparta, 39, 163, 266 ; takes Aigai-Edessa, 163 *n*., 266.  
*kleros*, system of, in Macedonia, 190 *seq*.  
 Knidos, 386.  
*Koina*, see *League*.  
 Kolonos, grove of, 305 *n*.  
 Koressos, 292 *n*., 299.  
 Korope, 38 *n*.  
 Kos, theoriai of, to Delos, 78 ; mission in 278 to Delphi, 439 ; Asklepieion at, made ἄστυλον, 353 ; relations with Doson, 471.  
 Kos, battle of, 378, 353 *n*., 458 ; date discussed, 461-6.  
 Kottas of Demetrias, Macedonian commissioner, 466.  
 Kouroupedion, battle of, 128 ; date of, 128 *n*.  
 Krannon, 54 *n*.  
 Krateros I, 5, 6.  
 Krateros II, viceroy of Corinth, 133 *n*., 195, 204, 287, 298, 300 ; his dedication at Delphi, 213 *n*. ; historian, 243, 244, 411 ; dead, 355.  
 Krates, Academician, 27, 98, 230, 234, 309.  
 Krates, Cynic, 24 *n*.  
 Ktesibios of Chalkis, historian, 25, 411.  
 Kylon of Elis, kills Aristotimos, 287.  
 Kythnos, 77, 86.  
 Kyzikos, 161 *n*., 163, 430 ; *ἱερά*, 210 *n*.  
 Lachares, tyrant of Athens, 12, 43.  
 Laches, moves decree for Demochares, 268, 289.  
 Lamia, 384 *n*.  
 Lanassa, wife of Pyrrhos, 47 ; marries

- Demetrios, *ib.*; enters Athens as Demeter, 49.
- Laodike, wife of Antiochos II, 348, 356, 357, 375, 377.
- Larisa, 207.
- Lasion, 382.
- La Tène culture, 140, 149 *n.*
- League, typical of northern Greece, 52; founded round a religious centre, 54; see *Achaean L., Aetolian L., Ainiānes, Akarnania, Amphiktyonic L., Arkadia, Corinth, Islanders, Lokris (Eastern), Molossians, Paionians, Peloponnesian L., Phokians, Phthiot Achaeans, Thessalian L.*
- Lemnos, belongs to Demetrios, 98; taken by Lysimachos, 117; restored by Antiochos to Athens, 160 *n.*
- Leokritos, Athenian patriot, 96.
- Leonnorius, Gallic leader, 164, 165 *n.*
- Leto, 136, 292, 350, 352 *n.*, 354 *n.*
- Leukas, 48, 120.
- Libya, 323.
- Lilybaeum, 258.
- Lokris, Eastern or Opountian, belongs to Demetrios, 51; its League, 52; lost to Antigonos, 132; contingent at Thermopylai, 151; independent, 207; Amphiktyonic vote, 213; in Aetolian League, 347, 385.
- Lokris, Western or Ozolian, in Aetolian League, 53, 63; sends a contingent to Delphi, 155; Aetolia exercises Amphiktyonic vote of, 212, 213.
- Long Walls at Athens, 125 *n.*
- Lucretius, 228.
- Lutarius, Gallic leader, 164, 165 *n.*
- Lydiades, tyrant of Megalopolis, 385.
- Lykiskos, general of Kassandros, 158 *n.*
- Lykiskos of Akarnania, 202.
- Lykon, Peripatetic philosopher: character, 329, 330; friend of Antigonos, 331, 332, 335, 336; relations with Pergamon, 335.
- Lykophron of Chalkis, poet, 25, 171 *n.*
- Lynkestis, 177.
- Lysandra, wife of Agathokles, 16, 37, 124, 125, 130.
- Lysias, Athenian archon, 417.
- Lysimacheia, 8, 117, 129, 164, 165.
- Lysimacheia, battle of, 165, *cf.* 218, 253.
- Lysimacheia in Aetolia, 111.
- Lysimachides, Delian archon, 459, 460.
- Lysimachos, king of Thrace, Thesalian origin of, 183; builds Lysimacheia, 8; at Ipsos, 10; enlargement of kingdom of, 10 *seq.*; marries Nikaia, 16; shelters Kassandros' heirs, 37; expedition against Getae, 40; joins coalition of 288, 92; invades Macedonia, 96; divides Macedonia with Pyrrhos, 97; hatred of Demetrios, 99; supports Athens, 101; seeks Demetrios' death, 110; conquers rest of Macedonia, 116; his great power, 116, 117; acquires Herakleia, 117; his navy, 84, 99, 117, 131, 454; conquests in the Aegean, 117; further designs, 118; annexes Paionia, 119; invades Epeiros and frees Akarnania, 120; threatened by Gauls, 139; marriage with Arsinoe, 123; domestic troubles, 124; death at Kouroupeidion, 128; worshipped at Kassandreia, 128, 184 *n.*; Hieronymos on, 246 *n.*
- Lysimachos, son of Ptolemy II, 447.
- Macedonia, monarchical constitution of, 54; 'League of the Macedonians,' 54 *n.*, 181 *n.*; military strength, 64, 424-6; objections to Demetrios' rule, 89-91; divided between Pyrrhos and Lysimachos, 97; falls entirely under Lysimachos, 116; Seleukos' kingship of, 129 *n.*; Celtic invasion of, 143, 147; under Sosthenes, 159; Antiochos claims, 160; Antigonos claims, 161; Antigonos becomes king of, 166; under Antigonos, (*ch. vii, passim*); ethnology of, 175-82; language, 179, 180; akin to Thessalian, 180, 182; no religious centre, 54, 341; Thracian (?) elements in religion of, 177; capacity of upper classes for hellenization, 181; their opinion of the Greek, 181, 182; sense of nationality, 182, 183; cities of, 183 *seq.*, 197 *seq.*; finances, 187; king and State identical, 189; king's date by Macedonian calendar, 434 *n.*; army, 193; powers of the army, 189; land tenure, 190-3; court, 194; system of government under Antigonos, 194-6; defence of the northern frontier, 200 *seq.*; bulwark of Greece, 202; relations with the Greek states,

Macedonia (*continued*).

204 seq.; with Egypt, 215 seq.; Athens prevents rival university in, 223; influence of, on historical writing, 243; banquets, 248; invaded by Pyrrhos, 264; rivalry with Egypt, 276, and chs. x to xiii, *passim*; Antigonos restores the old boundaries of, 312, 320, cf. 365; hemmed in by Egyptian sea power, 341; naval strength of, 454-8; attains command of the sea (see *Antigonos Gonatas*); and control of the Islands of the League, 390, 391, 466-71; Macedonia and Hellas, 407, 408.

Maedi, Thracian tribe, 143, 200.

Magas of Cyrene: rules Cyrene, 449, 451; alliance with Antiochos I, 261; marries Apame, *ib.*, cf. 322; war with Egypt, 261, 263, 264, 321; death, 322, 449-51.

Magnesia, 38, 156 *n.*

Magnesia on the Maeander, sends aid to Delphi, 153, 155, 156 *n.*; *ἄστυλος*, 209 *n.*

Magnetes, kinship of, to Makedones, 179; Amphiktyonic votes, 212, 213.

Makedones, (tribe of), 176 seq.; conquer Macedonia, 177; kinship to Dorians, 178; if Illyrians, 179 seq.

Malians, Amphiktyonic votes of, 212, 213; join Aetolian League, 346.

Mania, courtesan, 248 *n.*

Mantineia, 51, 145, 293, 404, 407.

Mantineia, battle of, 385.

Mantitheos, Delian archon, 459, 460.

Marcus Aurelius on retaliation, 401.

Marseilles, 140.

Marsyas of Pella, historian, 243.

Medeios of Larisa, 82 *n.*

Megalopolis, check on Sparta, 66, 67, 215; expels Antigonos' garrison, 132; in 279, 150; receives Pyrrhos, 269, 270; Antigonos' system at, 280, 281, and see *Aristodemus*; in Chremonidean war, 293, 298, 302; defeats Sparta, 304, 305; freed by Ekdemos and Demophanes, 358; revives the Arkadian League, 359; Lydiades tyrant of, 385; joins Achaean League, 406.

Megara, belongs to Demetrios, 51; military strength, 69; revolts against Antigonos, 132; contingent at Thermopylai, 151; recovered by

Antigonos, 286; Antigonos defeats Gauls at, 300; lost to Antigonos, 400. Megasthenes, 337 *n.*

Melatas, pirate, 172.

Meleagros, brother or uncle of Keraunos, 147.

Menedemos of Eretria, character, 22 seq.; his suppers, 24; his circle, 24 seq.; teacher and friend of Antigonos, 25 seq., cf. 114 *n.*; moves decree of congratulation to Antigonos after Lysimacheia, 166; hatred of Persaios, 233; on Bion, 239; Timon upon, 24 *n.*, 241; exile and death, 286, 287.

Menedemos Pyrrhaios, 22 *n.*

Menedemos, (satyr-play of Lykophron), 25.

Menekles, Athenian archon, 416, 421, 423.

Menekrates of Ephesos, grammarian, 227.

Menelaos, brother of Ptolemy I, 82 *n.*, 83 *n.*

mercenaries, rate of pay, 169 *n.*; Gallic, see *Gauls*; Thracian, 318, 396 *n.*, 426, 428.

Messene, Demetrios' attack on, 13, 68; neutrality of, 51, 67, 133, 293; military strength, 68 *n.*; in 279, 150; sends envoys to Pyrrhos, 269, cf. 448; Aetolian influence at, 382, 403; forced into Achaean League, 407.

Methana, see *Arsinoe* (3).

Methone, 368, 369 *n.*

Miletos, belongs to Demetrios, 12, 99; goes over to Lysimachos, 105, 106 *n.*; *ἄστυλος*, 209 *n.*; taken by Egypt, 314; under Timarchos, 318; recovered by Antiochos II, *ib.*; aids Seleukos II, 385.

Minatus, a 'Roman', 369 *n.*

Minoa in Amorgos, 466.

Mithridates of Pontos, 131.

Mitylus, Illyrian king, 287.

Mnaseas, father of Zeno, 31 *n.*

Mnaseas, father of Aratos of Soloi, 227.

Mnasitheos, friend of Aratos, 363.

Mnesidemus, Athenian strategos, 104.

Molossians, League of the, 52, 53, 55 seq.; prostates of the, 56, 57.

Monunius, Illyrian king, 58, 135.

Mounychia, garrisoned by Demetrios, 13; lost by Antigonos, 118; taken and garrisoned by Antigonos,

- 126; under strategos of Piraeus, 195, 307 *n.*, 327.  
 Mouseion, garrisoned by Demetrios, 13; stormed by Olympiodoros, 96; garrisoned in 261 by Antigonos, 306; garrison withdrawn, 327.  
 Mykonos, 78.  
 Naïa, 60 *n.*  
 Naïos (Zeus), 60 *n.*  
 Naupaktos, Aetolian, 62, 185 *n.*, 300.  
 naval tactics, 9, 379.  
 Naxos, 77, 466, 467 *n.*  
 Nearchos, 183, 243.  
 Nelia, 38 *n.*  
 Neogenes, a stone-cutter, 354.  
*nesiarch*, 75 *n.*, 81, 291, 436.  
 Nesos, 220 *n.*  
 Nestos, 168.  
 New Comedy, 221, 224, 329.  
 Nikaia, daughter of Antipatros, 16.  
 Nikaia, wife of Alexander of Corinth, captured and released by Achaeans, 300; patronizes Euphorion, 372; holds Akrokorinthos, *ib.*; courted by Demetrios II, 370 *n.*, 372; but not married, 373.  
 Nikandros, arch-pirate, 87.  
 Nikias Otryneus, Athenian archon, 127 *n.*, 416, 417 *n.*, 422.  
 Nikokles, tyrant of Sikyon, 355 *n.*, 362, 363.  
 Nikolaeia at Delos, 354.  
 Nikolaos son of Hagias, Aetolian, 354.  
 Nikomedes of Bithynia, war with Antiochos, 161 *n.*, 162, 163; brings Gauls to Asia, 164; death, 326.  
 Northern League, 131, 162; invites Antigonos, 162.  
 Nymphis of Herakleia, historian, 125 *n.*, 411, 412.  
 Oia, 86.  
 Oiantheia, 209 *n.*  
 Oliaros, 78.  
 Olizon, 38 *n.*  
 Olympias, wife of Alexander of Epeiros, 382, 383.  
 Olympias, wife of Philip II, 7.  
 Olympiodoros, Athenian nationalist, archon, 43; career, 45; storms the Mouseion, 96; saves Eleusis, 103; takes Piraeus, 118; joint action with Xanthippos, 119.  
 Olympos, 39.  
 Olynthos, 159, 183.  
 Opountian Lokris, see *Lokris*.  
 Orchomenos (Arkadia), 280 *n.*, 293, 359 *n.*  
 Orestis, 177.  
 Orestorius, Gallic leader, 151.  
 Ormenios, 38 *n.*  
 Oropos, 219 *n.*, 286.  
 Ossa, 39.  
 Ouranopolis, 185, 197.  
 Ourios, Athenian archon, 416, 417, 418, 422.  
 Oxythemis, friend of Demetrios, 48.  
 Ozolian Lokris, see *Lokris*.  
 Pagasai, 38.  
 Paionia, 53, 65 *n.*; annexed by Ly-simachos, 119; overrun by Gauls, 147; regains independence under Dropion, 173; strategos of, 195, 199; Antigoneia in, 197; recovered by Antigonos, 320, 321, *cf.* 365.  
 Paionians, League of the, 173.  
 Pamphylia, 324.  
 Pan, Aratos' hymn to, 174, 226; wor-ship at Pella, 174; Antigonos sits for portrait of, *ib.*; honours to, at Delos, 380, 381.  
*Panaitolika*, 62.  
 Panakton, 307 *n.*, 328.  
 Panathenaia of 274, 218.  
 Paneia at Delos, 380.  
 Paneion (?) at Delos, 381.  
 Pangaia mines, 188.  
 Pantauchos, general of Demetrios I, 50.  
*παλααβῆν*, meaning of, 433.  
*παραφυλάσσειν* in Polybios, 312 *n.*  
 Parauaia, 53, 58, 120, 173, 312.  
 Parnassos, 155, 156.  
 Paros, 78.  
 Parthia, 375.  
 parties at Athens, see *Athens*.  
 Paseas, tyrant of Sikyon, 362.  
 Passaron, 57.  
 Patrai, 133.  
*πάτριος πολιτεία*, 437, 438.  
 Patroklos son of Patron, Egyptian nauarch, 105 *n.*; in Chremonidean war, 298, 299; challenges Antigonos, 301, *cf.* 342.  
 'Patroklos' camp,' 298.  
 Patron son of Antiochos, 389.  
 Pausanias, account of the Gallic in-vasion, 149, 439-42; on Pyrrhos in 272, 447-9.  
 Pausanias (a Macedonian), 467.  
 Pelion, 39.



- Pella, Antigonos I from (?), 199;  
Demetrios builds ships at, 91;  
Antigonos' marriage at, 174; an  
Illyrian foundation, 178; how far  
autonomous, 183, 184; Antigonos'  
capital, 199, 200; Antigonos' circle  
at, ch. viii *passim*; Koan invitation  
to, 354.  
Pellene, sack of, 402.  
Peloponnesian League, members of  
in 280, 132, 133; in 266, 293.  
Perdikkas, 5, 6, 7.  
Pergamon, 210 *n.*, 335.  
Perigenes, (? Egyptian official), 470.  
Perrhaibia, Amphiktyonic votes of,  
212, 213.  
Persaios of Kition, Stoic philo-  
sopher; goes to Pella, 231; charac-  
ter, 232, 233; conflict with Bion,  
235, 237; on kingship, 255; inter-  
ference concerning Eretria, 233,  
287; governor of Corinth, 374; not  
killed when Corinth taken, 397,  
398 *n.*  
Perseus, 170 *n.*, 201 *n.*, 304 *n.*, 425,  
432.  
Phaidon of Elis, philosopher, 22.  
Phaidros of Spettos, 43; his career,  
45 *seq.*, see 94, 422; decree for him,  
45, 218, 422; exclusion from office  
after 288, 93, 422; agonothetes in  
281, 127.  
'*Phainomena*,' see *Aratos of Soloi*.  
Phanos, Delian archon, 352, 462.  
Pharai, 133.  
Pharos, the, 386.  
Phigaleia, 293, 382, 403.  
Phila I, wife of Demetrios I: mar-  
riage, 6, 17; goes to Kassandros,  
18, 19; rejoins Demetrios, 11, 20;  
character, 17; death, 97.  
Phila II, daughter of Seleukos and  
Stratonike I, betrothed to Anti-  
gonos, 168; married to him, 173,  
226, 247; Aratos' poems for, 227;  
statue at Delos, 389.  
Phila, daughter of King Theodoros,  
351 *n.*, 390 *n.*  
Philadelphieia at Delos, 292, *cf.* 447.  
Philadelphieion at Delos, 291.  
Philadelphos, see *Arsinoe II*, *Ptole-*  
*my II*.  
Philemon, vision of, 305.  
Philetaireia at Delos, 314 *n.*, 430.  
Philetairōs of Pergamon, 314.  
Philip II, 188, 211, 212, 225, 248.  
Philip III, Arrhidaios, 5, 6, 7.  
Philip IV, son of Kassandros, 12.  
Philip V, royal style, 54 *n.*; at Aby-  
dos, 146; wars with barbarians,  
201 *n.*; relations with Delos, 391;  
sack of Thermos, 401 *n.*; military  
strength, 424; fleet of, 458.  
Philippeia at Delos, 391, 468.  
Philippides of Kephale, career of, 94;  
friendship for Lysimachos, 94, 101;  
envoy to Lysimachos, 101; agono-  
thetes, 103; decree for, 118, 420.  
Philippides of Paiania, Athenian oli-  
garch, 44.  
Philippoi, 188, 197.  
Philippos, Athenian archon, 416, 417.  
Philochoros, historian, 224, 244, 410,  
411; executed, 320, 412.  
Philokles, king of the Sidonians, in  
Demetrios' service, 104; goes over  
to Ptolemy I, 105, see 109; takes  
Kaunos, 106; honoured at Delos,  
106, 108; and at Athens, 109; made  
nauarch by Ptolemy, *ib.*; his suc-  
cessor, 291.  
Philomelos, Aetolian leader, 156.  
Philonides of Thebes, 232.  
Philotheros, Ptolemaic official, 76 *n.*,  
470.  
Philoxenos of Samothrake, 431.  
Phlios, 280 *n.*  
Phoenicia, comes into Ptolemy's  
hands, 105; *cf.* 261.  
Phokians, League of the, 52; contin-  
gent at Thermopylai, 151; large  
share in defence of Delphi, 155-7,  
441; readmitted to Amphiktyonic  
League and votes, 157, 212, 213, *cf.*  
346.  
Phokis, part belongs to Demetrios,  
51; military strength, 69; freed by  
Xanthippos, 118; independent, 207;  
part of in Aetolian League, 346; and  
the remainder, 385.  
Phthia, daughter of Alexander of  
Epeiros, second wife of Demetrios  
II, 351 *n.*, 370 *n.*, 373, 417 *n.*  
Phthiot Achaeans, League of the, 52;  
Amphiktyonic votes, 212, 213.  
Phylarchos, historian, 66, 328; as  
source for Antigonos' reign, 412,  
413; for part of Plutarch's *Pyrrhos*,  
447-9.  
Phyle, 307 *n.*, 328.  
Phyles of Halikarnassos, sculptor,  
469.  
piracy, see *pirates*.  
Piraeus, attempt upon, by Athens,

- 103; recovered by Athens, 118; besieged by Antigonos, 121, 125; taken, 126; strategos of, 195, 205, 307 *n.*, 308, 327; booms of, 298 *n.*
- pirates, sea power of, in Aegean, 85-8; Etruscan, 85, 86; Cretan, 85 *n.*, 87; independent, 88; meaning of piracy, 87; Aetolian 'pirates' privateers, *ib.*; relations of, with Demetrios, 85, 86; with Gonatas, 86, 172; with Ptolemy II, 86, 87; with Antiochos III, 87; measures against, by Athens, 85, 86; by Rhodes, 87; aid Alexander of Corinth, 356.
- Pisis of Thespiiai, 39, 40.
- Pitane, 332, 334.
- Plato, his school, see *Academy*; Timon on, 241; on kingship, 285.
- Pleiston, Delphic archon, 294 *n.*, 298 *n.*
- Plutarch, *Pyrrhos*, chs. 27 to 34, 447-9.
- Poessa, 292 *n.*, 299, 467.
- Polemon, Academician, 27, 98, 230, 309.
- Politarchs in Macedonia, 196.
- Polybios, panegyric on Macedonia, 202; on history, 242; on Antigonos' tyrants, 279; on Antigonos, 394, 400; on Aratos' surprise of Corinth, 398, 399; on retaliation, 400, 401.
- Polyeuktos, Athenian archon, 416, 417 *n.*
- Polykleitos, Ptolemaic admiral, 82 *n.*, 83 *n.*
- Polyperchon, 6, 7, 9.
- Pontos, kingdom of, 117.
- Poseidon, on Antigonid coinage, 200, 301 *n.*, 389; temple of, on Tenos, 209 *n.*; Antigonos addressed as, 387.
- potamophylakides* on the Nile, 456, 457.
- Potidaia, 159.
- Priansos, 146 *n.*
- privateering, 87; see *pirates*.
- probouloi* at Eretria, 22.
- prostates* of the Molossians, 56, 57.
- Providence, Stoic doctrine of, 228.
- Proxenos of Epeiros, historian, 412.
- Psaon of Plataia, historian, 411.
- Ptolemaieia, festival of (see generally 460, 461):
- (1) at Alexandria, 104 *n.*, 135, 136, 261 *n.*, 371, 461.
  - (2) federal fête of the Islanders at Delos, 107 *n.*, 108, 137, 291, 438, 461.
  - (3) at Delos, the first, 104 *n.*, 106 *n.*; foundation and date, 136, cf. 460.
  - (4) ditto, the second, foundation of, 366, cf. 460.
  - (5) ditto, the third, foundation of, 376, cf. 460.
- Ptolemaios, son of Alexander of Epeiros, 382.
- Ptolemaios, son of King Lysimachos and Arsinoe II, 123, 130, 135, 142 *n.*, 166, 171; pretender to Macedonian crown, 262, 444; co-regent of Egypt, 291, 315, 446; governor of Ionia, 317; revolts, 318, 447; death, *ib.*; identification discussed, 445, 446.
- \* Ptolemaios son of Philadelphos, 446.
- \* Ptolemaios son of Ptolemaios, 445.
- Ptolemaios, son of Pyrrhos, defeats Antigonos, 265; date, 260 *n.*; at siege of Sparta, 271; death, 272.
- Ptolemaios, son of Sosibios, Alexandrian, 238 *n.*
- Ptolemaios (the Telmessian), 446, 447.
- Ptolemais, wife of Demetrios, 99, cf. 322.
- Ptolemy I. Soter, early policy, 7; war with Antigonos I, 10 seq.; makes peace with Demetrios, 12; acquires Cyprus, *ib.*; attempts in 308 to revive League of Corinth, 80, 371, 437; naval strength, 83; did not found League of the Islanders, 437; joins coalition of 288, 92; detaches Athens from Demetrios, 92, 419, 421; supports Athens, 102; acquires command of the sea, 105 seq.; and control of the League of the Islanders, 106 seq., cf. 437; remits taxation in the Islands, 107; reimposes it, 108; rewards Philokles, 109; as historian, 243; death, 123; worshipped, at Alexandria, see *Ptolemaieia* (1); and at Halikarnassos, 292 *n.*; and by the Islanders, 108, 137, 434, see *Ptolemaieia* (2); title Soter discussed, 438.
- Ptolemy II, Philadelphos, character of, 216; taxes the islands, 76 *n.*; employs pirates, 86; alleged victory at sea over Antigonos explained, 131 *n.*; institutes Ptolemaieia at Alexandria, 135; and first Ptolemaieia at Delos, 136; position of, as regards Athenian corn-supply, 219-21; war with Antiochos I and Magas (first Syrian), 261, 263, 264;

Ptolemy II (*continued*).

supposed friendship with Antigonos discussed, 443, 444; subsidizes Pyrrhos, 263, 444; alliance with Sparta, 263, 293; embassy to Rome, 445 *n.*; understanding with Athens, 267; his statue there, *ib.*; makes Arsinoe's son co-regent, 291, 446; alliance with Athens, 294, 295 (see *Chremonidean war*); reverses Arsinoe's policy, 313, 316; alliance with Eumenes I, 314; peace of 261, 315; abandons Ptolemaios' claims, 316; makes him governor of Ionia, 317; war with Antiochos II (second Syrian), 317, 324; restores Alexander of Epeiros, 319; becomes overlord of Cyrene, 453; peace of 255, 325; joint guardian of Nikomedes' children, 326; invites Kleantes, 331; strength of at sea, 343, 454-7; challenged at sea by Antigonos, 352, 353; foils Antigonos by diplomacy, 355 seq., 463; wins over Antiochos II, 356; and Ziaelas, 357; retains command of the sea, 366; founds the second Ptolemaieia at Delos, *ib.*; death, 376; worship of, see *Ptolemaieia* 1 and 2, *Philadelphieia*.

Ptolemy III, Euergetes, restored to favour, 318; not the regent, 446; betrothed to Berenike of Cyrene, 322, 446, 451; governs Cyrene, 324, 447, 453; accession, 376; character, *ib.*; marries Berenike, 376, 446, 453; founds the third Ptolemaieia at Delos, 376; cult-name, 452, 453; war with Seleukos II (third Syrian), 376, 377, 385, 386; his fleets defeated (see *Andros, Kos, Antigonos Gonatas, Agathostratos*); sends Sostratos to Antigonos, 386; makes peace with Antigonos, 387, 388; alliance with Achaean League, 402; its generalissimo, 464; peace, 408.

Ptolemy Keraunos, 16; at Seleukos' court, 124; goes to Lysimachos, *ib.*; kills Agathokles, *ib.*; stays with Lysimachos, 125; taken prisoner by Seleukos, 125 *n.*, 128; kills Seleukos, 129; becomes king of the Macedonians, *ib.*; dealings with pretenders, 130 seq.; defeats Antigonos at sea, 131; makes peace with Antiochos and Pyrrhos, 133; supplies Pyrrhos with troops, 134, 426; abjures the crown of Egypt, 134; mar-

ries Arsinoe, *ib.*; murders her sons, 135; refuses aid from the Dardanians, 142; defeated and slain by the Gauls, 138, 147; date of his death, 128 *n.*

Pyrrheion at Ambrakia, 274 *n.*

Pyrrhon of Elis, Sceptic, 239, 240, 241 *n.*, 332, 334.

Pyrrhos, early history, 19; eclipses Antigonos, 19, 20; at Ipsos, 20; governs for Demetrios in Greece, 11, 20; goes as Demetrios' hostage to Egypt, 20; marries Antigone, 20; restored to Epeiros, 20; supports Boeotia against Demetrios, 41; marries Lanassa, 47; loses Kerkyra to Demetrios, *ib.*; his polygamy, *ib.*; alliance with Aetolia, 48; defeats Pantauchos and raids Macedonia, 50; makes peace with Demetrios, *ib.*; doubtful if Greek, 55; kingship of, 57; kingdom of, 58 seq.; military strength, 426, 427; conquests in Illyria, 58; joins coalition of 288, 92; invades Macedonia, 96; divides it with Lysimachos, 97; makes a treaty with Demetrios, 98; breaks it, 102; drives Antigonos out of Thessaly, *ib.*; other conquests, *ib.*; his power in 285, 111; makes overtures to Antigonos, 111, 115; 'secret treaty' with Antigonos, 115; loses Macedonia to Lysimachos, 116; Aetolia joins Pyrrhos and Antigonos, 119; Pyrrhos loses Akarnania, 120; gets troops from Keraunos, 134, 426; Bion upon, 237; character, 257 seq.; features (?), 257 *n.*; war with Rome and Carthage, 258, 259; want of statesmanship, *ib.*, 443; applies to Antigonos for help, 259, 260; and to Antiochos, 259, 443; attacks Macedonia, 260, 264; friend of Egypt at the time, 444, 445; position in 273 discussed, 442 seq.; defeats Antigonos, 264; date, 260 *n.*; overruns upper Macedonia and Thessaly, 246 *n.*, 264, 265; surcharges Antigonos' money, 266; invades Peloponnese, *ib.*, 269; receives Spartan envoys, 270; attack on Sparta, 270-2, 447, 448; against Argos, 272; outgeneralled by Antigonos, *ib.*; defeat and death, 273, 274, 449; consequences of his death, 275 seq.; memoirs, 412.

- Pyrrhos II of Epeiros, 382.  
 Pythagoras, pirate, 86.  
 Pytharatos, Athenian archon, 416.  
 Pythian games, at Athens, 49.
- quinqueremes, ships larger than, 83, 84, 131, 259 *n.*, 343, 345, 354, 456, 457.
- Raphia, battle of, forces at, 426, 427.  
 representation, supposed traces of, 62, 75 *n.*  
 retaliation, Greek view concerning, 401.  
 Rhamnous, 307 *n.*  
 Rhizous, 38 *n.*  
 Rhodes, siege of, 9; honours Ptolemy I as Soter, 438; sends theoriai to Delos, 78; navy of, 85, 454, 457; treaty with Hierapytna, 87; corn market, 221; Bion at, 235, 238; alliance of, with Antigonos, 377; policy of, *ib.*; victory of Ephesos, 378.
- Rome, Demetrios' alleged embassy to, 48, 85; sea strength of, 83, *cf.* 343, 344; recognizes ἀσυλία of Teos, 210 *n.*; Hieronymos on, 246; Pyrrhos against, 258, 259; naval victories of, affect Antigonos, 342; privateers, 369; insolent message to Aetolia, 383; war with Carthage mentioned, 342, 383, 408; restores Delos to Athens, 432.
- Roxane, 5, 7, 8.
- Sabazios, 177, 178 *n.*  
 Salamis in Cyprus, battle of, 9, 81, 245.  
 Salamis, under strategos of Piraeus, 195, 307 *n.*, 327, 364; ravaged by Aratos, 402 *n.*, 464.  
 Samos, not in Island League, 78; taken by Timarchos, 318; recovered by Egypt, 324, *cf.* 387.  
 Samothrake, pirates attack, 86, 87; taken by Lysimachos, 117, 135 *n.*; Arsinoe escapes to, 135; Egyptian, 220; taken by Antiochos II, 324, 325 *n.*; Egyptian, 388 *n.*  
 Sanc-Ouranopolis, 185.  
 Sangarios, 117.  
 Sardis, 99, 314.  
*sarisa*, Anatolian, 177.  
 Sauadai, Thracian (?) water spirits, 178.  
 'Saviour-gods,' the, see *Soteres*.
- Scordisci, Gallic tribe, 142, 143 *n.*, 144, 157 *n.*, 200.  
 Seilenos, old water-god, 176 *n.*, *cf.* 178; Menedemos compared to, 25.  
 Seleukeia in Pieria, 376.  
 Seleukeia on the Tigris, 8, 377.  
 Seilenos I, Nikator, 7, 8; at Ipsos, 10; alliance with Demetrios, 11; marries Stratonike, *ib.*; dedications at Delos, 12, 81; quarrels with Demetrios, 12; joins coalition of 288, 92; war with Demetrios, 100; receives Demetrios' surrender, *ib.*; holds him captive, 110; sends home his ashes, 122; defeats Lysimachos at Kouroupedion, 128; captures Ptolemy Keraunos, *ib.*, *cf.* 125 *n.*; assassinated, 129.  
 Seleukos II, Kallinikos, succession, 375; war with Ptolemy III (third Syrian), 376, 377, 385, 386; peace, 408.  
 Sepias, 38 *n.*  
 Seriphos, 78.  
 Sidon, belongs to Demetrios, 12, 105 *n.*; lost to Ptolemy I, 105.  
 Sikinos, 78.  
 Sikyon, democracy at, 268, 279, 361; tyrants of, 361, 362; Nikokles, 362; freed by Aratos, 363; joins Achaean League, *ib.*; difficulties of Aratos at, 367; see 395, 396, 435.  
*silloi*, 240, 241.  
 Siphnos, 78, 470.  
 slavery, 282-4.  
 Smyrna, ἄστυς, 209 *n.*; worship of Stratonike at, 349; aids Seleukos II, 385.  
 Sosibios of Alexandria, addenda.  
 Sosthenes, Macedonian general, 147, 159, 163, 166, 167; city named after, in Aetolia, 163.  
 Sostratos of Knidos, architect, achievements, 386; envoy of Ptolemy III to Antigonos, 386, 387; honours, 387 *n.*  
 Sostratos (? official of Antigonos), 466.  
 Sotades, poet, 263.  
 Soter, see *Ptolemy I*.  
*Soteres*, 380, 381 *n.*  
 Soteria, festival: (1) at Delphi, 158, 294 *n.*, 417 *n.*, 440. (2) for Philokles, at Delos and Athens, 108, 109, 460. (3) Antigonos' foundation on Delos, 380; significance of the name, *ib.*; *cf.* 465, 466. (4) Peculiar use of



Soteria (*continued*).

the term, at Eleusis, 126 *n.*; σωτηρία as catch-phrase, 47 *n.*, 420.

Sounion, 195, 307 *n.*, 327.

Spalauthra, 38 *n.*

Sparta, position and policy, 65 seq.; kinship and hostility to Macedonia, 66, cf. 215; military strength, 68; did not use to declare war, 399; in 280 re-forms the Peloponnesian League, 132; attacks Antigonos, *ib.*, cf. 172; supported by Antiochos I, 160; alliance with Antiochos and Apollodoros, 162; alliance with Egypt, 263, 293, 445; Pyrrhos' attack on, 270-2; sources for this, 447, 448; women of, Aristotle on, 447; position of, on Pyrrhos' death, 275, 276; in 266 re-forms the Peloponnesian League, 293; alliance with Athens, 296; battle of Corinth, 301; League dissolves, *ib.*; defeated by Megalopolis, 304, 305; alliance with Achaean League, 302.

Spartokos, king of the Crimea, 101, 103.

Spercheios, 150, 155, 157.

Sphairos of Bosphoros, Stoic philosopher, 331.

Spintharos, commander of mercenaries, 96 *n.*

Stilpon of Megara, philosopher, 22.

Stoboi, 321.

Stoic school, foundation of, 31; turns from Macedonia to Egypt and Sparta, 331.

Stoicism referred to, 32 seq., 228, 339; Stoic view of kingship, 254, 255; of slavery, 283 *n.*, 284 *n.*; of tyrants, 285, 286, 295.

*strategoi*, Egyptian, 109; Macedonian, 195, 198.

Stratokles, Athenian democrat, 42 seq., 94.

Straton, Peripatetic philosopher, 28, 226, 309, 331.

Straton, Delphic archon, 215 *n.*

Stratonike I, daughter of Demetrios: birth, 6; marries Seleukos, 11, and Antiochos I, 349; mother of Phila II, 168, and of Stratonike II, 348; life, 349; religious, *ib.*; offerings at Delos, 350, 351 *n.*; devotion to Demetrios, 350; never refers to Antiochos, 350, 351; Antigonos' foundation for her on Delos, 351 seq. (see *Stratonikeia*); worshipped at

Smyrna as Aphrodite Stratonikis, 349.

Stratonike II, daughter of Antiochos I and Stratonike I, marries Demetrios II, 348; leaves him, 369, 370 *n.*, 375.

Stratonikeia at Delos, 352; reasons for foundation of, *ib.*, 353, cf. 462, 463.

Strombichos, captain of mercenaries, 96, 125, 127 *n.*, 420.

Syracuse, 220, 259 *n.*, 342.

Syria, military strength of, 71, 427.

'Syrians' in Corinth, 396.

Syros, 78, 466; relations with Delos, 470.

Tarentum, 442, 445.

taxes, Demetrios', 76 *n.*, 113 *n.*; of Ptolemy II in the Islands, 76 *n.*; Antigonos', 113 *n.*, cf. 187, 191; Stoics upon, 255.

Tectosages, Gallic tribe, 144.

Tegea, 293.

Teletimos, sculptor, 349 *n.*

Tenos, 78; help to Athens, 118, 417, 418; temple of Poseidon ἄσυλος, 209 *n.*, cf. 346 *n.*

Teos, ἄσυλος, 210 *n.*

Thaulos or Thaumos, Thracian god, 177.

Theangela, 430.

Thebes, taken by Demetrios, 41; constitution restored by Demetrios, 97.

Theodoros of Cyrene, philosopher, 234 *n.*, 235, 236.

Theodoros of Larisa, 207.

Theophrastos, Macedonian officer, 397.

Theophrastos, Peripatetic, 27, 28, 235, 248 *n.*

Theopompos, historian, 242.

Thera, 78, 86, 387.

*Thermika*, 62.

Thermopylai, Brennus' attack on, 150 seq.; turned, 153.

Thermos, described, 62; Aetolian archives at, 210.

Thesprotians, 56.

Thessalian League, 52, 53, 54 *n.*; Antigonos head of, 206.

Thessalians, some join Brennus, 148, 150, 155, 157, cf. 207.

Thessalonike, daughter of Philip II, 13.

Thessalonike (Salonika), loyalty to

- Antigonos, 186, 264; government of, 196; relations with Delos, 467, 468.  
 Thessaly, belongs to Demetrios, 37, 51; to Pyrrhos, 102; to Lysimachos, 116; to Keraunos, 133; invaded by Gauls, 150; affinity with Macedonia in speech, 180, 182; epistatai in, 195; relations of to Macedonia, 206, 207; Amphiktyonic votes, 212, 213; military strength, 425.  
 Thrace (and see *Lysimachos*): Antigonos in, 164 seq.; Gallic invasion of, ib.; Seleukid, 168, cf. 387.  
 Thracian Chersonese, 220.  
 Thracian elements in Macedonia, 177.  
 Thracian mercenaries, see *Mercenaries*.  
 Thrason of Anakai, 308 n., 309, 31.  
 Thrasymboulos of Elis, 269 n.  
 Thymochares, father of Phaidros, 45.  
 Timaios, Aetolian, 403 n.  
 Timaios, historian, 93.94 n., 224, 242, 328, 412.  
 Timanthes, friend of Aratos, 368.  
 Timarchos, Aetolian, aids Ptolemaios to revolt, 318; overthrown, ib.  
 Timokleidas of Sikyon, 268, 281 n., 361.  
 Timokles, arch pirate, 86.  
 Timon, the Sillographer; life and teaching, 239, 240; at Pella, ib.; the *Silloi*, 240 seq.; on Zeno, ib.; on Menedemos, 24 n.; on Arkesilaos, 333, 334.  
 Timosthenes of Rhodes, Egyptian officer, 292.  
 Tios, 162 n.  
 Tolistoagii, Gallic tribe, 144.  
 τόπος, request for a, 430, 470.  
 Totoes, Thracian god, 178.  
 Trichonis, lake, 62.  
 Triopian sanctuary, 388 n.  
 Triphylia, 382.  
 Tritaia, 133.  
 Trocmi, Gallic tribe, 144.  
 Troizen, 133, 163, 172, 205, 400.  
 trophies, erection of, 388.  
 Tylos, Gallic kingdom of, 144, 165 n., 166, 200.  
 Tymphaia, 53, 58, 120, 173, 312.  
 tyrants, 278-86, and see *Antigonos Gonatas*.  
 Tyre, belongs to Demetrios, 12, 105 n.; lost to Ptolemy I, 105.  
 wandering teachers, 233, 234.  
 water-drinkers, 207, 248.  
 worship of the kings, see *Antigoneia*, 1 and 5; *Demetrieia*, 1, 2, and 3; *Ptolemaieia*, 1 and 2; *Philadelphieia*; *Kassandros*, 199; *Lysimachos*, 128, 184 n.; *Ptolemy I*, 292 n.; *Arsinoe II*, 290, 291; *Stratonike I*, 349; *Antiochos II*, 318; *Antigonos Gonatas*, 250, 435.  
 Xanthippos of Elateia, 95 n., 119; expels Antigonos from Phokis, 118.  
 Xenokrates, 27 n., 234, 239 n.  
 Xenophanes, 241.  
 Xenophantos, flute-player, 122.  
 Xenophilos, arch-klept, 363.  
 Xenophon, Athenian archon, 416, 422.  
 Xermodigestos, friend of Audoleon, 120.  
 Xerxes' fleet, alluded to, 454 seq.  
 Yonas, 337.  
 Zeirene, addenda.  
 Zeno of Kition, character and teaching, 31 seq.; friendship with Antigonos, 34 seq.; neutral attitude in politics, 34, 94 n., 294; refuses Antigonos' invitation to Pella, 230; his treatise 'on the State', ib.; his pupils, 231, 295; sends Persaios to Pella, 231; Chremonides a friend of 295; Antigonos' 'audience', 236 n., 310; Timon on, 241; death, 309; honours, ib.; Athenian decree for, 310.  
 Zeno, Egyptian officer, 92, 419-21.  
 Zephyrion, see *Aphrodite Zephyritis*.  
 Zeus Naïos, 60 n., cf. 176.  
 Ziaelas, king of Bithynia, 326, 357.  
 Zipoitēs, king of Bithynia, 130, 161 n.

OXFORD: HORACE HART  
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY





